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THE 



Japan- Russia War 



An Illustrated History of 
the War in the Far East 



The Greatest Conflict of 
Modern Times 



=BY= 



SYDNEY TYLE R 

War Correspondent and Author of 

The Spanish War," "The War in South Africa," Etc., Etc. 



Illustrated by Photographs and Drawings 
Made by Eye-Witnesses 



P. W. ZIEGLER CO. 

PHILADELPHIA 






LIBRARY of CONGRESS 

Two CoDies Received 

JAN 13 1906 

Copyright Entry 

CLASS /J XXc. No 

/ n 

c 



¥ J AAV.! 

:ot>y B. 



Copyright 1905 

BY 

SYDNEY TYLER 




A SILENCED GUN IN PORT ARTHUR. 



INTRODUCTION. 

The Japan-Russia War goes into history as the greatest 
military struggle the world has -known. ! Its story, therefore, rivals 
in interest those of the great wars of- the past which have been an 
unceasing inspiration in every field of artf and literature. The politi- 
cal machinations of great and little kings, of famed prime minis- 
ters, of peoples and states have attracted attention in more. or less 
limited circles, but the world's wars have appealed to every class 
and rank. The world's vast, army of readers have never wearied of 
the classic stories of feats of arms by men and armies told of the 
dawning days of world history; the tales of later map-making strug- 
gles of Asia, of Europe, of America, have never grown old or dull. 
So in the Orient of to-day. The great political battles which have 
centred about China and Japan for the last half century have inter- 
ested the few. But to-day the attention of the world is centred on 
the lands bordering the Pacific, because a war has waged; because 
the whole human family loves the stories of valorous deeds, of mili- 
tary achievement, of the history-making that is done with the 
sword. 

The purpose of this volume is to bring American readers face to 
face with the events of the struggle of such stupendous magnitude, 
now drawn to a close. From battlefield to battlefield the author car- 
ries his thrilling narrative, bringing the scenes before the mind's eye 
as only one could do who stood within sound of the roaring guns, 
within sight of the onrush of resistless battalions, elbow to elbow 

5 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

with Japan's brilliant history makers. From the opening of the 
struggle to its close there was never a moment when stupendous 
events were not either in the process of making or so imminent that 
the civilized world held its breath. A single year's campaign in 
Manchuria and around famed Port Arthur furnish three land bat- 
tles, greater in' the number engaged in the awful cost of life, in the 
period of duration, than is presented by all of the pages of history. 
The siege of Port Arthur has no duplicate among all recorded mili- 
tary achievements. The opening of the second year of the war 
added a battle, that at Mukden, so vast, so brilliant from the stand- 
point of the victors, so disastrous from the standpoint of the de- 
feated, that it has been accorded by masters of strategy a niche by 
itself in the chronicles of war. The author saw this wonderful pan- 
orama of events unfolded. His story bristles with dramatic touches, 
flashes of enlightening description that bring the scene home to the 
reader with a vividness that thrills. 

American readers have a more immediate interest in the strug- 
gle than the universal love of the stories of battle. With Japan 
victor over Russia, with the great Muscovite Empire deprived of 
a foothold on the Pacific, Japan and America remain the only Powers 
there to divide the rich spoils of Oriental commerce. Our posses- 
sions, the Philippines, are Japan's nearest neighbors, and their prox- 
imity to Japan, their bearing upon the Asiatic problem open the 
way for events of more than ordinary importance, if not of serious- 
ness. Already the statement has been made that Japan covets these 
Islands. Will the United States, one day be called upon to go to 
war in their behalf? The question is one which no American can 
ignore. The nation must educate itself to decide one day, the 
issue, for or against a struggle with this wonderful little Empire, 
the Great Britain of Asia. The volume, therefore, in addition to 

6 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

its value and interest as a chronicle of a marvelous series of bloody 
battles is educational, the pioneer, blazing the way to an apprecia- 
tion of events, of possibilities for our own country which lie in the 
story of Japan's overwhelming success. Will the Mikado come to 
believe that having humbled and crushed what was Europe's mighti- 
est Power, he can as readily drive from the Pacific the American 
Republic ? 

The author in this volume has even more completely demon- 
strated his genius as a chronicler of war than in any of his earlier 
efforts. Step by step he followed the British in Africa and at the 
conclusion of that struggle contributed to British literature a his- 
tory which was generally conceded to have been more accurate, 
more graphic, less warped by prejudices than any other. Step by 
step he followed the unfolding of our own Spanish war and the 
story of that struggle as told by Mr. Tyler became at once the 
standard not only in Great Britain, but in the several Continental 
countries in which it appeared. With the priceless experience of 
these two wars to ably equip him, Mr. Tyler has contributed 
one more narrative of a great war to military literature and the as- 
sertion is unhesitatingly made that it will not be equalled by any of 
the hosts of volumes destined to be written of this memorable war. 

Along with the author went his camera. To that fact the reader 
is indebted to a series of illustrations never before attempted in the 
portrayal of military campaigns. What little the author has left to 
the imagination is supplied by these graphic pictures that bridge 
nine thousand miles and bring the sights and almost the sounds of 
battle to the reader. 

In brief, this volume as a description of the succeeding strug- 
gles of the Japan-Russia War, for accuracy, graphic qualities, detail 
and literary finish ; for its educational value and significance, for the 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

hitherto unattempted excellence of its illustration is presented to the 
American public with confidence that an appreciative reception will 

not possibly be denied. 

The Publishers. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 
Causes of the War 13 

CHAPTER II. 
The First Blow 39 

CHAPTER III 
The Korean Campaign 69 

CHAPTER IV. 
Naval Operations 101 

CHAPTER V. 
Sinking of the "Petropavlovsk" 133 

CHAPTER VI. 
Battle of the Yalu 167 

CHAPTER VII. 
Cutting off Port Arthur . ., 197 

CHAPTER VIII. 
The Assault that Failed .,. 225 

CHAPTER IX. 
Battle of Liaoyang . 257 

CHAPTER X. 
Naval Battle off Port Arthur ". 289 

CHAPTER XI. 
Battle of the Sha-ho 317 

CHAPTER XII. 
The North Sea Outrage. 347 

9 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

CHAPTER XIII. 
Surrender of Port Arthur ......... • » 3/9 

CHAPTER XIV. 
The First Year of the War 409 

CHAPTER XV. 
After Port Arthur 430 

CHAPTER XVI. 
In Winter Quarters. . , . . ... 6 , c 453 

CHAPTER XVII. 

The Battle of Mukden • -. 4^7 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
Retreat towards Harbin 497 

CHAPTER XIX. 
The Battle of the Japan Sea. .,..,.....,... 323 

CHAPTER XX. 
The Treaty of Peace 557 



10 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Page 

A Silenced Gun at Port Arthur Frontispiece 

Japanese Infantry Attacking a Chinese Position 21 

Map Showing the Area Affected by the .Dispute. 25 

The Japanese at Port Arthur 27 

Battle of the Yalu — Sinking of the Chih-yuen. 38 

Japanese and Russian Admirals 48 

Japanese Generals 57 

Russian Generals „ 68 

The Harbor of Port Arthur ,. . 71 

Russian Fleet Trying to Leave Port Arthur T] 

Russian and Japanese Destroyers at Close Quarters 88 

The Czar .,. 97 

The Mikado , 97 

Raid by the Vladivostock Fitet „ 107 

The Tokio Military Hospital — Officers Quarters , 118 

Sketch Plan of Port Arthur's Main Fortifications 121 

Funeral Procession of a Japanese Officer in Yokohama , 125 

A Skirmish Between Japanese and Russian Cavalry 129 

Desolation in Manchuria . 140 

Blowing up of the Petropavlovsk 145 

Arrival of a Dispatch for General Kuropatkin 152 

Russian Concentration on the Yalu.... 161 

Map Showing the Actions on the Yalu, April 39th — May 1st, 169 

Hauling a Japanese Howitzer into Position under Fire 171 

Russians Collecting Wounded on the Night after the Battle.. 182 

A Last Gallant Stand of Russian Gunners 191 

After Three Months ., 199 

In the Russian Trenches . ... 202 

A Desperate Encounter at Port Arthur. 211 

General Stoessel Exhorting his Troops in the Defence of Port Arthur... 222 

Outside Port Arthur 227 

A Skirmish on the Manchurian Railway < 234 

Russians Charging Japanese Trenches at Port Arthur 243 

After Four Months 247 

Russian Priest in the Trenches with General Stackelberg's Army 250 

General Nogi before Port Arthur . 257 

After Five Months 261 

Food for the Japanese Army ,..,... 265 

Map Showing Territory Adj acent to Liaoyang 269 

After Six Months • • • • 273 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Page 

Death of Count Keller at Yang-Ze-Ling Pass 275 

The Six Days' Action Around Liaoyang, Aug. 29 — Sept. 3d 281 

Map Showing Route of March and Principal Actions of the Four Jap- 
anese Armies, Feb. 7th — Sept. 4th 283 

Japanese Assault on a Russian Position at Liaoyang 286 

Russians Recapturing their Lost Guns at Liaoyang 295 

On the Deck of the "Rurik" 307 

After Seven Months .... 313 

Capture of the "Reshitelni" at Chifu 316 

Japanese Outpost Relieving Guard near the Sha-ho 325 

Japanese Scaling Fort at Port Arthur 335 

The Remnant of a Regiment After the Battle of the Sha-ho 347 

Huge Siege Guns before Port Arthur 355 

Thirsty Japanese Troops Crossing the Sha-ho 366 

Fight in Street of Lin-Shin- Pu, Battle of Sha-ke River 375 

Port Arthur and the Surrounding Forts 381 

Hauling Guns Up a Captured Hill at Port Arthur 386 

Japanese Eleven-Inch Mortar before Port Arthur 396 

The Evacuation of Port Arthur 405 

After Twelve Months 408 

Cossacks in Retreat After a Reconnaissance Near Liaoyang 415 

The Garrison of Port Arthur — Leaving the Fortress 426 

The Bamboo Gun at Port Arthur . . 435 

On the Slopes of Ojikeishan before Port Arthur 446 

A Night Attack on a Russian Position 455 

Japanese Troops Caught in Barbed Wire Entanglement. 466 

Map of the Battle of Mukden 469 

Russian Retreat in Manchuria 475 

Russian Suffering after the Battle of Mukden 486 

On Board a Japanese Battle ship during the Battle of the Japan Sea 496 

The Russian Fleet in the Battle of the Japan Sea 505 

The Retreat from Mukden * 5*9 

Peace Envoys in Session at Portsmouth 556 



12 





r 



CHAPTER I. 




Two Irreconcilable Destinies — Progress v. Stagnation — Europe's Danger — Insati" 
able Russia— A Warm Water Port— Japan's Warlike Progress— The Chino- 
Japanese War — Russia's "Honor" — M. Pavloff — Russia in China—The Russo- 
Chinese Bank — The Mailed Fist — Russian "Leases" — Benevolent Profes- 
sions— Wei-Hai- Wei— Niuchwang Railway— Pavloff in Korea — Russia and 
Manchuria — Russo-Chinese Treaty — Anglo- Japanese Alliance — Russians in 
Korea — Japanese Protests — Russia'sDiscourtesy. 

EVER since the great Napoleonic wars which convulsed Eu- 
rope a century ago has the world witnessed an appeal to 
arms so momentous in its issues and so tremendous in its 
possibilities as that which has just been tried between 
Russia and Japan in the Far East. The great internecine struggle 
in the United States in the middle of the last century, the disastrous 
duel between France and Germany which followed, and England's 
recently-concluded campaign in South Africa, have each, 
indeed, left a deep mark upon history. But while their 
import was at most Continental, if not local, the conflict 
between Japan and Russia is fraught with consequences 
which must inevitably be world-wide in scope. There is 
no civilized Power in either hemisphere whose interests are not 
more or less directly concerned in the question — Who shall be the 
dominant Power in the China Seas? For the whole course of the 
world's development in that quarter must depend on whether the 
mastery remains to the obstructive and oppressive Colossus of the 
North or to the progressive and enlightened island-Empire which, 
like Pallas in Pagan myth, has sprung fully armed from an ancient 
civilization into the very van of modern progress. It was no mere 
dynastic jealousy or racial animosity that brought about this fateful 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

collision. It was the inevitable antagonism of two irreconcilable 
destinies. "Two stars keep not their motion in one sphere"; and 
the ambitions of Russia and the aspirations of Japan cannot find 
room for fulfilment together. One or the other must be crushed. 

For Japan, the question is one of national existence. With 
Russia established in Manchuria and dominating the Yellow Sea, 

the absorption of Korea becomes a mere 
Two Irreconcilable matter of time; and then the very inde- 
Destinies. pendence of Japan would be subject to a 

perpetual and intolerable menace; while 
the new life which has dawned for its wonderfully gifted people 
would be crushed at the outset. But if Japan is fighting for her life, 
Russia is fighting for something almost as precious — the consumma- 
tion of an ambition which has been the dream and the fixed goal of 
her statesmen for more than a generation. The expansion of the 
Russian Empire has been steadily eastwards ; and the further con- 
quest and dominion have spread, the more has the necessity been felt 
for an outlet to the navigable seas. Unless all the labor and sacri- 
fices of years are to be in vain, and the great Siberian Empire is 
to remain a mere gigantic cul-de-sac, Russia must establish herself 
permanently in the Gulf of Pechili, and find in its ice- free ports that 
natural outlet for her trans-continental railway which will enable the 
life-blood of commerce to circulate through her torpid bulk. The 
struggle, therefore, was one between two irreconcilable destines. 
But if the issue was immediately of such paramount signifi- 
cance to the two combatants, it was only less charged with import 

for all Asia, Europe and America. The 
Progress v. Stagnation victory of Japan would incontestably give 

her the predominance in the Far East, 
commercially as well as politically. Not only would she be a iot- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

midable trade rival to the European nations whose methods 
she has so successfully adopted, but she would be able to 
influence the conditions under which that trade was carried on. The 
immensely valuable and as yet imperfectly developed market of 
China would be practically within her control ; and European Pow- 
ers would no longer be able with impunity to seize naval bases and 
proclaim exclusive spheres of influence in Chinese territory. On 
the other hand, if Russia were to emerge victorious from the war, 
the whole of China would become a mere vassal state, if indeed its 
integrity could be preserved. Trade would be discouraged and 
finally extinguished by the exclusive methods of Russian policy, 
and except on sufferance no other Power could obtain a footing in 
the Far East. The whole future of this vast region, therefore, hung 
in the balance, for the battle was between freedom, progress and en- 
lightenment, as represented by Japan, and obscurantism, oppression 
and stagnation, as represented by Russia. 

But the anxious concern of the world in this Far Eastern war 
was based not only upon a calculation of material interests. Every 

civilized Government had before its eyes 
Europe's Danger the imminent danger of other countries 

being dragged into the conflict. The sit- 
uation was such that at any moment some untoward incident might 
set Europe in a blaze. The specific obligations of France to Russia 
under the terms of the Dual Alliance, and of Great Britian to Japan 
under the Treaty of Alliance concluded in 190 1, made the limitation 
of the struggle to the original. combatants not only difficult, but even 
precarious. A breach of neutrality by any third Power would at 
once have compelled France to join forces with her Russian ally, 
or Great Britain to come to the assistance of Japan. Such a breach 
might have been merely trivial or technical, and yet sufficient to 

15 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

give a hard-pressed belligerent ground for calling her ally to her 
assistance. It might even have been deliberately provoked, in the 
hope of retrieving disaster by extending the area of conflict; and 
if the two Western Powers were once dragged into war, no states- 
man would be bold enough to put a limit to the consequences. Both 
Germany and the United States are profoundly interested in the 
Far East and in the issue of this great struggle for predominance ; 
and one or both of them might at any moment have been ranged on 
one side or the other. From such an Armageddon the factors 
which determine the balance of power throughout the world, and 
therefore the development of national destines, could hardly have 
emerged without profound modification; and the ultimate es- 
tablishment of peace would have found many more international 
rivalries and antagonisms resolved than those which are immedi- 
ately connected with the Far East. Lord Beaconsfield once said 
that there were only two events in history — the Siege of Troy and 
the French Revolution. It seems more than possible that the 
Russo-Japanese war will have to be reckoned as a third supreme 
factor in the progress of the world. 

The outbreak of the present war became practically inevitable 
as long ago as 1895, when, on the conclusion of peace between 

China and Japan the three European 

Insatiable Russia Powers— Russia, France and Germany- 
stepped in and robbed the Mikado and his 
people of the fruits of their hard-earned victory. From that time up 
to the present Russia has steadily, and without ceasing, tightened her 
grip upon the Northern province of the hapless Chinese Empire, 
and has ended by threatening the independence of Korea, the legiti- 
mate sphere of influence of Japan, and the indispensable buffer be- 
tween herself and the insatiable and ever-advancing Northern 
P©wer. 

16 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

It must be borne in mind that the determining consideration 
which led Russia to cast longing eyes upon Manchuria — apart from 

that eternal hunger for territory which is 
A Warm Water Port one of her strongest characteristics — was 

the necessity of acquiring a warm water 
port as a naval base and commercial harbor. The port of Vlad- 
ivostock — which, by the way, she acquired from China as early as 
i860 by a truly Russian piece of bluff — has proved of little use in 
this respect, owing to the fact that during the winter months it is 
almost entirely icebound. A striking illustration of the embarrass- 
ment such a state of things must cause was afforded in the course 
of the present war by the plight into which the Russian Cruiser 
Squadron stationed there fell. There can be no doubt that the 
ambitions of the Czar's advisers had for years been directed to- 
wards the acquisition of the fortress and harbor of Port Arthur 
(known to the Chinese as Lu-shun-kau), which situated as it is 
upon the narrow neck of land at the extreme southernmost point 
of the Liao-tung Peninsula, should, if properly served by a strong 
and efficient naval force, dominate the Gulf of Pechili, and prove 
the most powerful strategic post in Northern China. 

It is not known, of course, what path the development of Rus- 
sian plans in this respect would have followed if they had been 

allowed to proceed without interruption; 

Japan's Warlike but, as it turned out, they were suddenly 

Progress threatened with a dangerous obstacle in 

the complete and unexpected success of 
Japan over China and her capture of the whole of the Liao-tung Pen- 
insula. This short but sanguinary conflict between China and 
Japan is memorable for having first revealed to the world the amaz- 
ing progress which Japan had made in her efforts to engraft and 

17 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

assimilate the characteristics of Western civilization. It proved 
that in less than twenty years Japan had earned for herself an estab- 
lished position in the community of progressive nations. The wai 
also made it possible for the first time to estimate the influence arid 
effect in warlike operations of the tremendous engines of destruction 
with which modern science has equipped the fleets and armies of to- 
day. The navy of Japan had been organized on the latest model, 
and her officers had been trained in British schools; and though 
China's equipment was not to be compared with that of her antag- 
onist, she possessed several powerful armorclads of the latest type, 
officered and engineered by experienced Europeans. 

The salient features of the war were, at sea, the battles of 
the Yalu River and of Wei-hai-Wei; and on land, the rout of 

the Chinese at Ping- Yang, the. passage of 

The Chino-Japanese the Yalu and storming of Port Arthur. 

War. The first of these in order of time was the 

battle of Ping- Yang, a town situated near 
the north-west coast of Korea. Here the Chinese troops under 
General Tso attempted to prevent the advance of the Japanese 
towards the Yalu. By a series of skilful movements carried out 
on September 15th and 16th, 1894, the Japanese Commander-in- 
Chief, Marshal Yamagata, completely surrounded the Chinese and 
defeated them with great slaughter, their General himself falling 
dead upon the field. On the next day the Chinese fleet stationed at 
the mouth of the Yalu, which had proved entirely ineffective in pre- 
venting the landing of the enemy's forces upon Korea, gave battle 
to the Japanese. The ships of the latter Power were mainly 
cruisers, but the extraordinary skill with which they were man- 
oeuvred and the rapidity of their fire completely outweighed the 

18 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

advantage, possessed by the Chinese Admiral in battleships. He 
sustained a crushing defeat, and eight of his best vessels were de- 
stroyed. In the meanwhile Marshal Yamagata continued his march 
to the North, and after a bloody but indecisive conflict near Wiju 
on October 22nd he succeeded in crossing the Yalu River and driv- 
ing his antagonists in rout before him. The Japanese now pro- 
ceeded to overrun Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula, captur- 
ing all the principal positions one after the other with unvarying 
success. A great army under Marshal Oyama invested Port Arthur 
in November, and on the 20th and 21st he took that powerful 
fortress by storm, the defenders being massacred to a man. The 
final and decisive act of the war was the bombardment of Wei-hai- 
Wei and the island fortress of Leu-Kung-tan by the combined naval 
and military forces of Admiral Ito and Marshal Oyama. The oper- 
ations lasted from January 30th, 1895, till February 12th, when, un- 
able to hold out any longer against the terrific assault, Admiral Ting, 
the Chinese Commander, surrendered his fleet and the forts under 
honors of war. A closing touch of tragedy was the suicide of Ting 
and his principal officers, unable to bear the shame of their defeat. 
On March 19th negotiations for peace were opened at Shimonoseki, 
and the final treaty was signed on April 17th. The Treaty of 
Shimonoseki gave Japan unqualified possession of that Peninsula 
and also, of course, of Port Arthur — a very moderate territorial 
prize, considering the absolute character of her victory over China, 
and the sacrifices she had made to obtain it. But Russian suscepti- 
bilities were alarmed, and the Government of St. Petersburg de- 
cided upon a drastic step to avert the calamity which threatened to 
render its ambitions futile. Gaining the support of both Germany 
and France, it compelled Japan, by threats of force which that 
Power could not resist, to retire from Port Arthur and the Liao- 

19 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

timg Peninsula, and to restore the territory to China. The reason 
alleged for this high-handed action was the specious plea that the 
presence of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland would endanger 
the independence of China and Korea, and would be a constant 
menace to the peace of the Far East. Naturally enough the in- 
dignation of Japan was intense, but defiance of three such power- 
ful antagonists was impossible for her at that moment, isolated as 
she was and exhausted by the exertions of a great war. Great 
Britain was asked by the other three Powers to act jointly with 
them in this matter, but she refused to assist in depriving the gallant 
Island people of their rightful spoils of victory. The attitude of 
Lord Rosebery's Government on this occasion, although it gave no 
positive aid to Japan, undoubtedly led to a better understanding be- 
tween the two countries, and paved the way ultimately to the 
Anglo- Japanese Treaty of Alliance, which, by rescuing Japan from 
her position of isolation, enabled her to enter effectively into the 
momentous and complicated game which the European diplomatists 
were playing, with varying fortunes, at Peking. 

Meanwhile, however, Japanese aspirations received a check 
from which they were to take several years to recover. The states- 
men of the Mikado were even unable to 
Russia's "Honor" . obtain a pledge from China that the terri- 
tories yielded back to her by Japan would 
never be alienated to a third Power. Russia's delicate sense of honor, 
it appeared, revolted against the imputation implied, and therefore 
China must give no pledge. On the other hand, Russia would be 
so generous as to give an assurance on her own account that she 
had no designs upon Manchuria. Forced to content herself with 
the cold comfort of this empty and meaningless declaration, and 
baffled upon all essential points, Japan sullenly withdrew her troops 

20 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

from the mainland and settled down to nurse her just wrath, and 
prepare for the inevitable day of reckoning. 

The centre of interest was now shifted to Peking, where began 
that amazing scramble among the European Powers for commer- 
cial, and especially for railway, concessions in China, which, by 

unmasking the ambitions of some coun- 
M. Pavloff tries, and revealing the community of in- 

terests of others, has led ultimately to 
important modifications of international policy, and to a re-arrange- 
ment of alliances. The complexity of the game, the swiftness of 
the moves, and the ignorance of the average man, not 
only of the issues involved, but even of the main geo- 
graphical and economic features of the immense country 
which was the object of the struggle — all contrived to puzzle 
the mind and to darken the understanding; but a vague feeling, 
only too clearly justified by the events, arose in this country that 
England and America were not getting the best of the conflict, and 
that Russia and Germany were making all the running. In truth, 
there is no doubt that the skill, or perhaps, to speak more correctly, 
the duplicity, of the Russian diplomatists both in Peking and in 
St. Petersburg left their competitors completely behind. Foremost 
among them there emerges at this time the sinister figure of M. 
Pavloff, the Minister of the Czar at the Chinese Court. The tor- 
tuous diplomacy of the Muscovite has produced no more charac- 
teristic tool. M. Pavloff has been the stormy petrel of the Far 
East. Intrepid, resourceful to a degree, unscrupulous beyond the 
average, he is ever in the forefront of the diplomatic battle line. 
His appearance in any part of the field is the signal for new combi- 
nations, fresh aggressions, the stirring up of bad blood between 
nations, and the unsettlement of apparently settled questions. A 

23 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

man whose god is the Czar; a man with whom the expansion ol 
the Empire of the Little White Father is an ideal cherished with 
almost religious fervor; a man who indeed in all probability hon- 
estly regards the extension of the Russian autocracy over the world 
as essential to the due progress of higher civilization — he is thor- 
oughly typical of the class of agents whose devoted services Russia 
has always managed to secure for the spread of her Empire and 
the gradual but steady absorption of fresh territory all over Asia, 
whether in China, Persia, Turkestan or Tibet. 

Such was the instrument possessed by the Government of the 
Czar at the Court of Peking, and he was not likely to neglect the 

unique opportunity which lay ready to his 

Russia in China hand. By her action in restoring Port 
Arthur to the nerveless grasp of China, 
Russia naturally assumed the character of a powerful friend 
whose smile was to be courted and whose frown was to 
be proportionately dreaded. What more natural, in the cir- 
cumstances, than that the Emperor should grant to the 
subjects of his brother and ally, the Czar, peculiar com- 
mercial privileges in the country which had been so generously 
rescued from the grip of Japan and restored to the Empire of the 
King of Heaven? 

The first result of M. Pavloff's policy of disinterested friend- 
ship became manifest in 1896, when the Chinese Government con- 
cluded an agreement with the Russo- 

m , ^ „, . _ , Chinese Bank, providing for the forma- 

The Russo-Chinese Bank . > r . s> 

tion of a company to be styled the Eastern 

Chinese Railway Company, the ownership 
of which was to be vested solely in Russian and Chinese subjects and 
which was to construct and work a railway within the confines of 

24 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




SaHtvGys open 
«» building 
it proposed 
9 Treaty Ferlt 



MAP OF THE AREA AFFECTED BY THE WAR. 



25 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

China, from one of the points on the western borders of the prov- 
ince of Heh-Lung-Kiang to one of the points on the eastern borders 
of the province of Kirin ; and to the connection of this railway with 
those branches which the Imperial Russian Government would con- 
struct to the Chinese frontier from Trans-Baikalia and the South- 
ern Ussuri lines. The institution, which went by the plain, solid, 
commercial name of the Russo-Chinese Bank, was, of course, 
merely a sort of Far Eastern annex of the Finance Bureau of 
M. de Witte, and the line thus modestly announced was the mucleus 
of the great railway which has since played such a large part in 
consolidating the Russian dominion over Manchuria. At the outset 
it was pretended that the line was to be merely a short cut to Vlad- 
ivostock, but the true ambitions at the bottom of the scheme be- 
came apparent when Russian engineers began to pour into the 
country followed by squadrons of Cossacks, nominally for the pro- 
tection of the new railway, but really in pursuance of Russia's in- 
variable policy of impressing the natives with a due sense of her 
enormous military strength. 

The construction of the line, however, had not proceeded very 
far when, in 1897, an event occurred which gave the Czar's Gov- 
ernment the chance for which they had 
The Mailed Fist long been anxiously looking. The massa- 
cre of some German missionaries led to 
swift and stern reprisals on the part of the Kaiser. The port of 
Kiao-Chau, in the province of Shantung, was seized until reparation 
was made for the outrage committed upon the majesty of the Ger- 
man Empire, and to placate the offended "mailed fist," the feeble 
Government of China were compelled to hand over this important 
position to Germany as a permanent possession, although, by a char- 

26 



'$f f /fa 1 / }'*$■' 




THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

acteristic euphemism of diplomacy, the transaction was conveniently 
styled a "lease." Russia's opportunity was now too good to be neg- 
lected. Emboldened by the example of Germany, she demanded — 
for that is what her so-called "request" amounted to in reality — per- 
mission from the Chinese Government to winter her fleet at Port Ar- 
thur. Perhaps it may be imputed to her for righteousness that, un- 
scrupulous as she is, she has never found it necessary to employ the 
missionaries of Christ as instruments of aggression ; at all events on 
this occasion she had no such excuse at hand. The helpless Chinese 
assented, of course, to her request; but now Great Britain, awake 
at last to the dangers which threatened her Treaty rights, endeav- 
ored to intervene. Strong representations were made by the Eng- 
lish Minister to the Tsung-lai-yamen as to the necessity for turning 
the port of Ta-lien-wan — which lies immediately adjacent to Port 
Arthur — into a Treaty port ; that is to say, throwing it open to the 
trade of the world on the same terms as obtain at Shanghai, Can- 
ton, Hankau, and other ports of China at which the policy of the 
Open Door prevails. 

English statesmen, however, were no match for the wily Rus- 
sians, who had the ear of the Chinese mandarins. The Government 

of the Czar successfully opposed the sug- 
Russian Leases gestion, and backed up its representations 

at Peking by significant display of force, 
for a considerable fleet of men-of-war arrived at Port Arthur and 
Ta-lien-wan in the spring of 1898 and practically took possession 
Then, by a mingled process of terrorism and corruption, the Chinese 
Government were induced to grant the Czar a "lease" of the two 
harbors on the same terms as those on which Germany had been 
granted possession of Kiao-Chau, and, equally important, to permit 
the extension of the line of the Eastern Chinese Railway Company 

2 9^ 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

to Port Arthur. Thus came into being the Manchurian Railway, 
the construction of which was pushed on with feverish activity. 

The first step towards the complete acquisition and control of 
Manchuria had now been successfully accomplished, and English 

diplomacy sought in vain to wrest 

Benevolent from Russia the advantage she had 

Professions trms skilfully acquired. Of course 

Russia was prolific of "assurances" 
as she always has been in similar circumstances. The 
Government of the Czar solemnly declared, for the satis- 
faction of any confiding person who was willing to be- 
lieveie it, that it had "no intention of infringing the rights 
and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and 
foreign countries," and that the last thing it contemplated was in- 
terference with Chinese sovereignty over the province of Man- 
churia. The sincerity of these benevolent professions was to be 
judged by the fact that, having once secured a grip of Port Arthur, 
Russia hastened to convert it into a fortified post of great strength 
and magnitude, and closed it absolutely against the commerce of 
the world; and that, while on the one hand she so far met the 
anxious representations of the British Government as to constitute 
Ta-lien-wan a free port in name, on the other hand she deprived 
the concession of all real meaning by an irritating system of pass- 
ports and administrative restrictions upon trade. 

Great Britain attempted to neutralize the advantage her rival 
had gained in the Gulf of Pechili by securing a port on her own 
account, and, with the support of Japan, she induced the Chinese 
Government to enter into an agreement for the acquisition "on 
lease" of Wei-hai-Wei, a harbor situated on the southern shore of 
the Gulf and opposite to Port Arthui. It was imagined at the time 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that the port could be turned into a powerful naval base, but the 
naval and military surveys afterwards taken showed that it was of 

little use for strategic purposes, and it has 
Wei-hai-Wei consequently sunk into the position of a 

health station for the English China 
Squadron. 

In the meantime Russia steadily increased her hold upon Man- 
churia, and large bodies of troops continued to be poured into the 

country. Her position had now become 
Niuchwang Railway so strong in the counsels of the Chinese 

Court that in July, 1898, she openly op- 
posed the concession, which British capitalists were seeking, of 
an extension of the Northern Railways of China to the Treaty Port 
of Niuchwang, which lies to the north of Port Arthur, at the ex- 
tremity of the Gulf. The importance of this extension to British 
and American commerce was immense. Niuchwang is the main 
outlet of the trade of Manchuria, and was at that time a busy thriv- 
ing town of about 60,000 inhabitants. Its value from the commer- 
cial point of view may be estimated from the fact that its total 
trade rose from £1,850,000 in 1881 to £7.253,650 in 1899, the year 
before it fell absolutely into Russian hands. Russia's attempt to 
deprive her commercial rivals of practical access by land to this val- 
uable port were, however, on this occasion only partially successful ; 
the construction of the Shan-hai-Kwan-Niuchwang Railway was 
finally permitted; but the agreement was greatly modified to suit 
Russian views. 

Concurrently with these events, significant developments had 
been taking place in Korea, which brought Japan once more upon 
the stage. For some time after the Japanese had been driven from 
Port Arthur, Russia left Korea alone. She even entered into formal 

3* 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

engagements with Japan, recognizing that Power's peculiar com- 
mercial rights and interests in Korea. But now M. Pavloff arrived 

upon the scene at Seoul. In March, 1900, 
Pavloff in Korea he gave the Japanese the first taste of his 
quality by endeavoring to obtain a lease of 
the important strategic port of Masampo, situated in the southeast of 
Korea, facing the Japanese coast and dominating the straits be- 
tween. At the same time he stipulated that the Korean Government 
should not alienate to any other Power the island of Kojedo, which 
lies just opposite to Masampo. Japan successfully resisted this bold 
stroke of policy; and matters were in this position when the Boxer 
rising gave Russia a supreme opportunity. Her troops in Man- 
churia were attacked by the rebels, and she at once hurried in rein- 
forcements and seized the whole country. Resistance to her arms 
was put down with relentless vigor — with a vigor, indeed, far 
transcending the necessities of the case, and the Blagovestchensk 
massacres, in which thousands of unarmed Chinamen were offered 
up as a sacrifice to the offended majesty of Russia, will long be a 
stain upon the escutcheon of the Imperial Prophet of Peace. In 
the drastic process of absorption which was now adopted, the treaty 
port of Niuchwang was naturally included, and the interests of other 
Powers there became of very small account indeed. 

It was evident that the Manchurian question had now assumed 
a more serious form. Of course the Czar's Government was pro- 
fuse in its explanations. No perma- 
Russia and Manchuria nent territorial advantage was being- 

sought, we were told ; as soon as lasting 
order had been established in Manchuria, and indispensable meas- 
ures taken for the protection of the railway Russia would not fail 

32 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

to recall her troops from the province; above all "the interests of 
foreign Powers and of international companies at the port of 
Niuchwang must remain inviolate." The restoration of lasting 
order, however, appeared to be a very tedious process. More and 
more troops were drafted into the province and on the naval side 
also preparations were made for an imposing demonstration. 

Admiral Alexeieff, commanding the Russian fleet, though not 
yet advanced to the dignity of Viceroy of the East, now took charge 

of the Czar's interests, one of his first 
Russo-Chinese Treaty acts being to invite China to resume the 

government of Manchuria "under the 
protection of Russia." On November nth, 1900, an agreement 
was signed at Port Arthur between the Russian and Chinese repre- 
sentatives. The terms of this remarkable document, which were 
promptly disclosed by the able and well-informed correspondent of 
the London Times at Peking, were a startling revelation. They 
provided virtually for a Russian military protectorate over Man- 
churia. Mukden, the ancient capital of Manchuria and the burial- 
place of the Manchu dynasty, was to be the centre of control, and a 
Russian political resident was- to be stationed there. This city, 
which now possesses a population of about 250,000, has in modern 
times become a great place of trade. It is situated no miles to 
the northeast of Niuchwang, and its position in the centre of the 
Manchurian railway system renders it a place of much strategical 
importance. Not only were these vast concessions made to Russia, 
but the Treaty rights of other Powers at Niuchwang itself were 
disregarded. Great Britain and the United States necessarily en- 
tered an urgent protest against this singular method of preserving 
their interests inviolate. But Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, declared to our Ambassador that the 

33 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

RussoChinese Agreement was merely a temporary arrangement. 

The value of the solemn assurance of the Foreign Minister was 
exposed to the world almost immediately afterwards by the in- 
valuable correspondent of the London Times, who sent to his paper 
the terms of a new and more far-reaching Agreement which the 
Russian diplomatists were trying to force upon the Chinese Court. 

The position of affairs was now profoundly altered by the 
conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This important Treaty 

gave Japan the strength and the en- 
Anglo- Japanese Alliance couragement ultimately to intervene on 

her own account and endeavor to curb 
the restless ambitions of Russia. Russia gave a definite pledge 
that her troops would be withdrawn from Manchuria by instal- 
ments on the expiration of a certain period. That period expired 
on October 8th, 1903, but the pledge was never redeemed. A show 
of evacuation was made in 1902, but the troops returned, and at 
the end of October of 1903 Mukden was re-occupied in force. 
Never during the whole period did Russia lose her grip upon 
Niuchwang. 

Notwithstanding the conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty 
of Alliance in the beginning of 1902, Japan waited for eighteen 

months before entering into the diplomatic 
Russians in Korea lists alone against Russia. But at last, in 
August of 1903, this course was rendered 
imperative upon her, not only by the failure of the Czar's Govern- 
ment to carry out their engagements in regard to Manchuria, but 
by their aggressive policy in Korea. M. Pavloff, rebuffed at 
Masampo in 1900, had turned his energies in another direction. 
He secured for his countrymen valuable mining rights in Northern 
Korea, and Russians then began to cross the Yalu River and ulti- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

mately occupied Yongampo, a town of some importance on the 
southern bank. Not content with railway enterprises, they even 
started to construct fortifications. The Japanese, of course, inter- 
posed energetically and succeeded in modifying the Russian activ 
ity ; but it now became apparent that, unless some binding arrange- 
ment could be arrived at, Korea was destined to share the fate of 
Manchuria. 

Representations were therefore made at St. Petersburg calling 
for a revision of the Treaties of 1896 and 1898, and a friendly 

settlement of the respective rights of the 
Japanese Protests two Powers. The story of the negotia- 
tions which ensued is a simple one. It is 
a story of courteous and moderate representation on the one side, and 
of studied delay and contemptuous refusals on the other. The nego- 
tiations on behalf of Russia were in the hands of Admiral Alexeieff, 
now elevated to the position of Viceroy of the East, and it is said 
to be mainly due to his influence that his Government adopted such 
an unbending attitude. Japan asked for a repetition by Russia of 
the pledges she had given that she would recognize the integrity and 
independence of China and Korea; and, further, that she should 
recognize the preponderance of Japanese political and commercial 
interests in Korea. Russia haughtily refused to give Japan any 
pledge as to the integrity of China, and contended that her position 
in Manchuria was regulated by treaties with China in which Japan 
had no right to interfere. As to Korea, she proposed the establish- 
ment of a neutral zone in the north of the province, leaving the 
south of the country to become a sphere of commercial influence 
for Japan, but she expressly stipulated that the latter Power should 
make 00 use of any portion of Korean territory for strategic pur- 

31 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

poses. The proposal was so absurdly one-sided that Japan re- 
turned to the charge with the suggestion that a neutral zone should 
be established both on the Manchurian and the Korean sides of 
the frontier. She also reiterated her request for an agreement as 
to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Manchuria and 
China. 

Russia contemptuously delayed reply to these representations 

in spite of the courteous requests of the 

Russia's Discourtesy Japanese Government. In the meanwhile 

she kept augmenting her forces in the 
Far East till the situation became impossible of continuance. 

Every day that passed threatened to transfer the balance of 
naval power in favor of the European Power, for a powerful fleet 
was being hurried out to the Far East, and the badly-finished war- 
ships in Port Arthur were being patched up by an army of mechan- 
icians. Mr. Kurino, who conducted the negotiations at St. Peters- 
burg, pressed for an answer, but was put off with promises no less 
than six times. Such discourtesy could only have one result. The 
dignity of Japan could brook no further insolence, and the Czar 
and his Ministers were politely informed that under such circum- 
stances negotiations were useless. It was in vain that hurried tele- 
grams were dispatched to Admiral Alexeieff to present a reply to 
the justly incensed Cabinet at Tokio. The die had been cast, and 
the big bully of the North, who had for so long baited the plucky 
little Japanese, realized at last that threats and bluff no longer were 
of any avail, and that the matter was now referred to the God of 
Battles. 

On February 7th, 1904, Japan formally broke off the negotia- 
tions and withdrew her Minister from St. Petersburg. The wai 
cloud had burst 

36 




#1 Uii 





CHAPTER II. 

Russia Bluffing— Japan's Navy— "Nisshin" and "Kasaga"— New and Efficient- 
Japan's Dockyards — Opposing Figures — Russian Navy — Belated Help — Ja- 
pan's Superiority — Russian Harbor — Japan on Land — Russia's Army — 
East of Baikal — Weak Communications — Port Arthur — Korea as Base — 
Command of the Sea— The First Blow— World-Wide Interest— A Graphic 
Account— Russian Losses— The Fight of February 9th— Russian Bravery- 
Japanese Modesty— Damage Understated— Only One Repairing Dock— 
AlexeiefP s Reason for Casualties— The Fight at Chemulpo— The First Shot 
— Japanese Disembarkation — A Brave Russian Captain — A Target for Ja- 
panese Gunners — The Plucky "Korietz"— Wounding and Burning— Japan's 
Handicap. 

HE growing menace of the situation in the Far East had 
been for months attracting the anxious attention of the 
whole world, and at the beginning of 1904 it became evi- 
dent that war was inevitable, unless one or other of the 
disputants was prepared to make a complete surrender of its essen- 
tial claims. The unlikelihood of this remote possibility being ful- 
filled was confirmed by the steady and, on 
Russia Bluffing the Russian side at least, the feverish 

preparations for hostilities which were 
carried on as an accompaniment to the repeated protestations of 
pacific intentions by the Czar's Government and its diplo- 
matic agents abroad. Those who still believed in peace 
were sustained by the conviction that one of the parties 
to the dispute was bluffing. Sympathizers with Russia 
pointed to the tremendous power and inexhaustible resources of the 
Northern Empire, and asked whether it were possible that a young 
and small country like Japan should dare to try conclusions with so 

39 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

gigantic an antagonist. On the other hand, the friends of Japan 
emphasized the weakness of the Russian position in the Far East 
and the well-known financial embarrassments beneath which her 
Exchequer was laboring. It is, therefore, apropos to survey at this 
point the military and strategic position in the Far East which 
revealed itself immediately before the final rupture of diplomatic 
negotiations and the beginning of active hostilities. 

In any conflict between Russia and Japan it was obvious that 
the first struggle must be for the mastery of the sea, and it is, there- 
fore, interesting to consider primarily the 
Japan's Navy relative naval strength of the two Pow- 

ers in Far Eastern waters. The navy of 
Japan has been built, not only on English models, but for the most 
part in English yards ; and since the Chino-Japanese War it has been 
increased by a number of vessels of the latest and most powerful 
type. The result is that the most formidable feature of Japan's naval 
strength is its complete homogeneity. The tabular statement on 
page 41, gives the names and principal characteristics of what may 
be called Japan's first fighting line at sea. 

Towards the close of 1903 the Japanese Government, with 
great enterprise, managed to secure a powerful accession to this 

fleet by purchasing from Argentina two 
"Nisshin" and "Kasaga" freshly constructed cruisers of the 

most modern and efficient type. These 
two vessels, which have been re-christened the Nisshin 
and Kasaga, were hastily equipped for sea at Genoa, and, 
commanded for the time being by retired English officers and 
manned by English crews, started in January for the long 
voyage to the Far East. Although war had not yet been de- 
clared, it was clearly imminent, and the Russian squadron in the 

40 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Mediterranean received orders to watch the new cruisers closely, 
with the object, of course, of capturing them in case hostilities broke 
out before the vessels had reached Japan. The taste of their quality, 
however, which the Nisshin and Kasaga were able to give to the 
Russians proved how valuable an addition they were to the Japanese 
navy, for they easily outdistanced their slow-footed pursuers, and 
what promised at one time to be an exciting race degenerated prac- 
tically into a walk over. The new cruisers arrived safely at Yoko- 
hama on February 16th, and were at once sent into dock to refit 
and prepare for active service. These splendid fighting machines 
must, therefore, be added to the list. 



JAPAN'S UP-TO-DATE NAVY. 



. BATTLESHIPS. 



Dis- 
Name place- 

ment 

Hatsuse 15,000 

Asahi 15,000 

Shikishima . . 15,000 

Mikasa 15,200 

Yashima 12,300 

Fuji 12,300 

ARMORED CRUISERS, 

Tokiwa 9,750 

Asama .", 9,750 

Yakuma 9,850 

Adzuma 9,436 

Idzumo 9,800 

Iwate ........ 9,800 



I.H.P. 

15,000 
15,000 
15,000 
16,000 
13,000 
13,000 



18,000 
18,000 
16,000 
17,000 
15,000 
15,000 



Weignt 
Nominal Gun Pro- of 
Speed tection Broad- 
side Fire 



18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 



21.5 
21.5 
20.0 
21.0 
24.7 
24.7 



14 — 6 

14 — 6 
14 — 6 
14 — 6 
14 — 6 
14 — 6 



6 — 6 
6 — 6 
6—6 

6—6 
6 — 6 
6—6 



4,240 
4,240 
4,240 
4,225 
4,000 
4,000 



3,568 
3,568 
3,368 
3,368 
3,568 
3,568 



41 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

PROTECTED CRUISERS. 





4,300 


15,500 


24.0 


41- 


—2 


800 




4,784 


15,500 


22.5 




n 


800 




4,784 


15,500 


22.5 




n 


800 


Itsukushima . . 


4.277 


5,400 


16.7 


11- 


—4 


1,260 


Hashidate 


4,277 


5,400 


16.7 


11- 


—4 


1,260 


Matsushima . .. 


4,277 


5,400 


16.7 


11- 


—4 


1,260 




4,180 


15,750 


23.0 




— 


780 




3,727 


7,120 


17.8 




— 


1,196 


Takachiho 


3,727 


7,120 


17.8 




— 


1,196 


Akitsushima . . 


3,150 


8,400 


19.0 




— 


780 




3,420 


9,500 


20.0 




— 


920 


Tsushima 


3,420 


9,500 


20.0 




— 


920 




2,700 


8,500 


20.0 




— 


335 




2,700 


8,500 


20.0 




— 


335 



The table, it will be observed, does not include a number of 
coast defence vessels, nor — more important for offensive purposes — 
the torpedo flotilla, which is of great strength and of remarkable 

efficiency, and includes over a score of 30- 
New and Efficient knot destroyers of the most modern type. 
The first four battleships in the list were 
completed less than two years before the war, while the armored 
cruisers were built between 1899 and 190 1. The protected cruisers 
include several of the vessels that defeated the Chinese fleet at the 
battle of the Yalu. 

For the accommodation of her fleet 
Japan's Dockyards Japan possesses four well-equipped dock- 
yards, capable not only of repairing dam- 
aged vessels of any class, but of constructing new ones ; and this is, 
perhaps, the greatest advantage which the island kingdom has over 
Russia in the present struggle. 

42 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The naval strength of Russia in the Far East at the outbreak 
of hostilities is shown in the tabular state- 
Opposing Figures ment appearing on page 44, which, again, 
does not include vessels of the smallest 
class nor the torpedo-boat flotilla. 

It will be remarked that the Russian battleships offered a great 
variety in design and fighting power — a serious disadvantage, for in 

manoeuvring the efficiency of the whole 
Russian Navy squadron sinks to the level of that of the 

least effective vessel it contains. The Czar* 
evitch and the Retvisan, which were the latest vessels to arrive at 
Port Arthur, were also the most powerful members of the fleet. The 
former vessel was built in France afier the latest French model, and 
the latter in Philadelphia. This fleet was divided, at the outbreak 
of war, between Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the four powerful 
cruisers, Gromoboi, Bogatyr, Rossia, and Rurik being stationed at 
the latter port. 

While negotiations were still proceeding, though at a critical 
point, Russia prepared to send out very formidable reinforcements 

to the Far East from her Mediterranean 
Belated Help Fleet. These reinforcements included 

the Osliabia, a battleship of over 12,000 
tons displacement, with a speed of 19 knots; the Dmitri Donskoi, an 
armored cruiser of 6,000 tons displacement and a speed of 15 knots; 
the Aurora, a swift protected cruiser of the largest class; several 
cruisers of the volunteer fleet, with troops, naval drafts, and sup- 
plies ; and a number of torpedo craft. This squadron had begun to 
assemble at Port Said before the outbreak of war, and the vessels 
at once began to pass through the Canal. But before they were 
ready to sail for the China seas, war broke out, and the departure 

43 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

was delayed. The initial Russian reverses at sea made it practically 
impossible for this reinforcing fleet to proceed to the seat of war, 
as it would have been liable to interception by the Japanese fleet in 
overwhelming strength. Accordingly, after cruising aimlessly about 
in the Red Sea for some weeks, the ships were ordered to return to 
the Baltic ; and in the beginning of March they passed through th« 
Suez Canal again on their way north. 

RUSSIA'S AVAILABLE NAVY. 



BATTLESHIPS. 











Weight 




Dis- 




Nominal Gun Pro- of 


Name 


place- 
ment 


I.H.P. 


Speed 


tection Broad- 
side Fire 




Tons 




Knots. 


In. Lbs. 


Poltava ...... 


10,950 


11.200 


17.0 


10—5 3,367 


Petropavlovsk 


. 10,950 


11,200 


17.0 


10 — 5 3,367 


Sevastopol 


10,950 


11,200 


17.0 


10 — 5 3,367 




12,674 


14,500 


19.0 


10 — 5 2,672 




12,674 


14,500 


19.0 


10 — 5 2,672 


Retvisan 


12,700 


16,000 


18.0 


10 — 5 3,434 


Czarevitch . . . 


13,100 


16,300 


18.0 


11—61 3,516 




ARMORED CRUISERS. 












Weight 




Dis- 




Nominal Gun Pro- of 


Name 


place- 
ment 


LET. P. 


Speed 


tection Broad- 
side Fire 




Tons 




Knots. 


In. Lbs. 




6,750 


19,500 


23.0 


5 — 4 872 




6,500 


19,500 


23.0 


— 772 


Varyag 


6,500 


20,000 


23.0 


f Bid 




6,630 


11,600 


20.0 


H 632 


Pallada 


6,630 


11,600 


20.0 


4* 632 




3,200 


11,500 


22.0 


— 180 




3,000 


18,000 


25.0 


— 180 




ARMORED CRUISERS. 


■ 










Weighc 




Dis- 




Nominal Gun Pro- of 


Name 


place- 
ment 


I.H.P. 


Speed 


tection Broad- 
side Fire 




Tons 




Knots. 


In. Lbs. 


Gromoboi . . . 


. 12,336 


18,000 


20.0 


6 — 41 1,197 




7,800 


17,000 


22.0 


7 — 3 952 


Rcssia ...... 


. 12,200 


18,000 


20.0 


2 1,348 




.. 10,940 


13,500 


18.0 


2 1,345 



44 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Though nominally the fleets of the two Powers were fairly equal, 
Japan possessed several very considerable advantages which, in the 

opinion of experts, changed that paper 
Japan's Superiority equality to marked superiority on her 

side. In the first place, the Chino-Japa- 
nese war only ten years ago had given her naval officers and men 
an invaluable experience of fighting on the grand scale under mod- 
ern conditions; in the next place, their fleet was much more of a 
pattern; and in the third place it was operating from a base fully 
capable of providing all the needs and reinforcements entailed by 
losses in war, including a ready coal supply. 

Russia, on the other hand, had for its only bases Port Arthur 
and Vladivostock, the one inadequate to the multifarious needs of 

her fleet, and the other ice-bound in win- 
Russia's Harbors ter, and so situated geographically as to 

be completely isolated from what prom- 
ised to be the main scene of operations. Although Port Arthur had 
been rendered almost impregnable as a fortress, the Russians had 
not had time to complete it as a naval dockyard, and at the outbreak 
of war it possessed only one dry dock, and that not capable of ac- 
commodating vessels of the largest size. At Vladivostock the chan- 
nel out of the harbor could only be kept free by ice-breakers. In the 
event of naval disasters, Russia, therefore, had no possibility of 
repairing her lame ducks, while the radius of her fleet's activity was 
limited by the fact that her only supplies of coal were to be obtained 
at Port Arthur. In the situation, therefore, which presented itself 
at the outbreak of war, this powerful naval force was practically 
deprived of mobility. It could not leave Port Arthur for more than 
a short cruise; and while it remained there it must be specially vul- 

45 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

nerable to attack, lying in an open roadstead and huddled together 
in order to enjoy the protection of the guns of the fortress. 

With regard to the land forces of the two belligerent Powers, 
it was only possible to reckon with certainty those of Japan ; for it 

remained doubtful, until the progress of 

Japan on Land active operations revealed the facts, how 

much of Russia's enormous military 
strength had been concentrated in the Far East. Broadly speaking, 
Japan could put into the field in the last resort an army of between 
400,000 and 450,000 men. The standing army amounts to almost 
200,000 men, and it was immediately available for mobilization. To 
this number another 35,000 men was added by the reserve, while 
the militia of all arms could be reckoned at 200,000 men. The Japa- 
nese infantry soldier is armed with the Midji magazine rifle, and 
the artillery with the Arisaka quick-firing gun; but the adoption of 
this latter weapon has been so recent that the whole of the artillery 
is not yet supplied with it, and in this one respect at least the Rus- 
sian gunners are believed to possess a very great advantage. The 
Japanese army has been organized largely on German models. It 
proved its efficiency as a fighting machine in the Chino-Japanese 
War; while the Japanese troops that took part in the relief of the 
Peking Legations earned the unstinted praise of all the military ex- 
perts who watched their behavior. Until the present war, however, 
the Japanese army had never undergone the supreme ordeal of facing 
a European adversary. 

Of the Russian military organization, the strength and weak- 
ness have long been known to the world, and the great question for 

strategists in contemplating the present 

Russia's Army hostilities was the number of troops which 

the Northern Power could bring in^o the 
46 




ADMIRAL TOGO. ADMIRAL KAMIMURA. 

ADMIRAL MAKAROFF. 
ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF. ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY. 

JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ADMIRALS 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

field to confront her foe. Various estimates had been given, from 
the overwhelming army of 400,000 men confidently claimed by Rus- 
sia's partisans, to a force of little more than a quarter of that 
strength. But though the actual figures were in doubt, it was possi- 
ble by collating the information from various sources to arrive at an 
approximate estimate of the truth. At the time of the Boxer out- 
break in 1900 Russia had 35,000 men in the Far East, and that 
force was, within little more than a year, trebled. Since the possi- 
bility of trouble with Japan had loomed on the horizon, reinforce- 
ments had been steadily dribbling over the Trans-Siberian Rail- 
way and over seas in the volunteer transports, until the army under 
the command of the Viceroy of the Far East could not number much 
less than 150,000 men of all arms, with 286 guns. Of this force, 
at least a half must have been absorbed in the defence of the long 
line of railway communications and in garrisoning fortresses; but 
the troops available for active operations consisted largely of Rus- 
sia's most formidable fighting material — namely, the Cossacks, who 
possess an endurance and mobility which must be of the utmost 
value in such a country as that in which the present war was to be 
fought out. 

In the latter part of January the well-informed correspondent 
of the London Times at Peking telegraphed an estimate of the Rus- 
sian forces east of Lake Baikal, which, 

East of Baikal in its circumstantiality and exhaustive- 

ness, bore the evidence of truth. Accord- 
ing to this authority, Russia had available at that time a total of 
3,115 officers, I47>479 men > and 266 guns; and these numbers in- 
cluded the railway guards over the whole of the Manchurian rail- 
ways and the garrisons of the principal fortresses. The infantry 
of this force numbered 108,000 officers and men, and the cavalry 

49 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

22,000 officers and men, of whom nearly the whole were Cossacks. 
The garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostock alone absorbed 
45,000 men, and remembering that the railway line to be guarded, 
east of Lake Baikal, was over 1,500 miles in length, and traverses 
a country of which the inhabitants were more or less hostile, it is 
evident that the troops available to take the field at the end of Jan- 
uary could not have exceeded, on this estimate, more than 50,000 
men. Lake Baikal is 400 miles in length, and though a railway 
round its southern extremity was in course of construction, it was 
far from completion at the outbreak of hostilities. The lake is 
frozen over during the winter months, when transit has to be 
effected by sledges. But in the emergency the Russians laid railway 
lines across the lake, and thus by the end of February had estab- 
lished a through service of sorts. But even then the number of 
reinforcements and the quantity of supplies that could be moved up 
to the theatre of war were strictly limited by the delays inseparable 
from the working of a single track railway, and it is doubtful 
whether more than 25,000 men at the outside had been added to the 
field force by the beginning of March. 

The strategical problem which presented itself at the outbreak 
of hostilities was a comparatively simple one — for Japan at any rate. 

The power of Russia in the Far East de- 
Weak Communications pended on the maintenance of two great 

arteries of communication with the heart 
of the Russian Empire. One of these was the over-sea passage 
from the Black Sea or the Baltic through the Suez Canal and the 
East Indian Archipelago — a voyage occupying six weeks at least, 
and however feasible in time of peace, rendered particularly difficult 
and even precarious under war conditions owing to the possibility 
of interception and the absence of any intermediate coaling stations. 

SO 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The other connecting link between Port Arthur and St. Petersburg 
was the Trans-Siberian Railway, that gigantic enterprise which, 
completed in 1899, brought the capital of Russia within 15 days' 
journey of its furthermost outpost in the Yellow Sea. From Mos- 
cow to Port Arthur is a distance of some 4,000 miles, but at two- 
thirds of its length the railway is interrupted by the great inland 
sea known as Lake Baikal. At this point transshipment across the 
lake had to take place, a circumstance that offered an insurmount- 
able hindrance to rapid transit. In the building of the railway, too, 
soundness had been sacrificed to rapidity of construction; the line 
was only a single track one, with stations and sidings at intervals 
of about 25 miles; and even when the whole service was monopo- 
lized for military purposes the number of trains that could be passed 
over the railway in one day was a fixed and very limited quantity. 
Even with this line open, therefore, the rate at which Russia could 
reinforce her troops in the Far East had to be determined by other 
circumstances than military urgency, and the number of her rein- 
forcements also had to be governed by the capacity of the line to 
bring up not only men, but supplies ; for Manchuria itself does not 
provide the means of support for a large army. The experience of 
the American Army in Cuba and of the British Army in South Af- 
rica proved what tremendous difficulties may be encountered in car- 
rying supplies to a large force at a distance much less remote from 
its base than Russia's was. For years past Russia has sent out her 
troops and supplies to the Far East mainly by sea. For twelve 
months before the war broke out a constant stream of transports, 
colliers and supply ships had passed from the Black Sea to the Gulf 
of Pechili, and this stream was only interrupted on the outbreak 
of war — a significant admission of the incompleteness of the Rus- 

5i 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

sian preparations, as well as of the inadequacy of the Trans-Sibe- 
rian Railway to supply her needs. 

It was evident, therefore, that Japan's first object was to shut 
off Port Arthur from the sea, and her next to cut the railway com- 
munication to the North. This done, the 
Port Arthur Russian fortress, however impregnable to 

assault, must ultimately fall to invest- 
ment. From Port Arthur, which, as a glance at the map will show, 
lies at the very tip of Liao-tung Peninsula, the railway runs due 
north for six hundred miles through Niuchwang and Mukden to 
Harbin, where it joins the branch line to Vladivostock. Though 
Russia has for several years been in occupation of this territory, 
her hold upon it is by no means secure. The population is distinctly 
unfriendly, and for the mere defence of the line thousands of troops 
are necessary. Indeed, it was this necessity that Russia urged as 
an excuse for her military occupation of Manchuria. 

Within the triangle of which Harbin is the apex, of which the 
lines to Port Arthur and Vladivostock are sides, and of which the 

course of the Yalu River is the base, the 
Korea as Base sphere of immediate military operations 

practically had to be confined, as the ice- 
bound condition of the coast to the west of Port Arthur made a 
landing in force there impossible till the spring. The necessity of 
maintaining communications tied the Russian forces very largely to 
the railway lines. But for either belligerent the helpless kingdom 
of Korea, which lies south of a line drawn between Port Arthur 
and Vladivostock, for aggressive operations, afforded the most con- 
venient line of advance. Through Korea Russia could menace 
Japan, and through Korea Japan could most easily march against 
Port Arthur. Naturally, therefore, Russia's first care was to mass 

5 2 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

her available troops on the line of the Yalu, and concentrate rein- 
forcements at Harbin ready to be moved to whatever point might 
prove the objective of the Japanese attack. 

But the command of the sea was the essential condition to at- 
tack by land by either combatant. With the Russian fleet masked 

or destroyed, Japan could choose as a 
Command of the Sea landing-place for her armies any of the 

numerous ports on the western coast of 
Korea, and so approach in force the Yalu River, which divides 
Korea from Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula. With imper- 
fect command of the sea, Japan would have a second resource. She 
could land her troops at Masampo, separated only by a hundred 
miles of sea from her own ports, or she could, at a push, land her 
forces on the east coast of Korea, at Yuen San or Gensan. But the 
former plan of operations, would have entailed a long overland 
march before the objective was reached, and the latter the mainte- 
nance of communications over difficult and mountainous country. 
Evidently, then, immeasurable importance attached to the result of 
the first naval engagements, and to their influence in giving the 
command of the sea to the one or the other of the two belligerent 
Powers. 

On February 5th M. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at the 
Court of St. Petersburg, announced to the Government of the Czar 

that Japan could wait no longer for the 
The First Blow long-delayed Russian reply, and that 

further negotiations were broken off. 
This startling news reached Europe and America on the evening of 
Sunday, February 7th; and while its significance was still being 
anxiously discussed in every capital, and while statesmen and jurists 
were still trying to convince one another that the rupture of diplo- 

53 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

matic negotiations did not necessarily imply the beginning of war, 
there burst like a thunder-clap the further news that the first grim 
and irretrievable blow had been struck. Having decided that the 
arbitrament of war was inevitable, Japan acted on her decision with 
swift and terrible effect. On the night of Monday, February 8th, 
a daring attack by torpedo-boats was made on the Russian fleet lying 
at anchor in the Port Arthur roadstead, and at one fell swoop the 
boasted might of Russia at sea was hopelessly broken. This as- 
tounding intelligence was first conveyed to the world in an official 
telegram from Admiral Alexeieff to the Czar, couched in the follow- 
ing terms : — 

"I most devotedly inform your Majesty that about midnight 
between the 26th and 27th of January (February 8th and 9th) 
Japanese torpedo-boats delivered a sudden mine attack on the 
squadron lying in the Chinese roads at Port Arthur, the battleships 
Retvisan and Czarevitch and the cruiser Pallada being holed. The 
degree of seriousness of the holes has to be ascertained. Particulars 
will be forwarded to your Imperial Majesty." 

The stunning effect of this news was only enhanced when fuller 
details of the incident so baldly and laconically announced came to 

hand. No news of the movements of the 
Worldi-wide Interest Japanese fleet had been allowed to leak 

out, and its presence before Port Arthur 
was wholly unexpected by others as well as the Russians. On the 
3rd of February the Russian fleet had put to sea, and for twenty- 
four hours the world was agog with the news of so momentous a 
movement. But the speculation died suddenly when it appeared that 
the fleet had returned immediately to its anchorage. The Japanese, 
with charactei istic alertness, realized the splendid opportunity which 
the necessarily exposed position of the Russian ships afforded to an 
enterprising enemy. 

54 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

While everything was still tranquil at Port Arthur, and the 
Russian authorities were confidently announcing that the foe could 

not be expected for three or four days, 
A Graphic Account the blow fell. According to the graphic 
account of an eye-witness, every one at 
Port Arthur had settled down for the night, when suddenly across 
the bay reverberated the shock of three violent and successive explo- 
sions. In a moment all was bustle and confusion on the Russian 
warships. Searchlights flashed bewilderingly and wthout purpose 
across the waters, and quick-firing guns from vessel after vessel 
began a panic fusilade, which Admiral Alexeieff, in his official re- 
port, euphemistically described as "a well concentrated fire at the 
right time." 

It was midnight, and in the darkness and confusion it was im- 
possible for any one to know exactly what was happening ; but when 

the morning light broke over Port Arthur 
Russian Losses the two proudest possessions of the Rus- 

sian fleet, the powerful battleships Reivi- 
san and Czarevitch, were seen passing slowly towards the harbor en- 
trance, across which they presently lay in evidently a badly damaged 
condition. The cruiser Pallada followed, listing heavily to port, and 
she also was grounded outside the entrance to the harbor. 

It was at ten o'clock the next day, the 9th of February, that the 
Russians obtained their first glimpse of the enemy. In the distance 

three Japanese cruisers were described 
The Fight of Feb. gth hanging observant upon the Russian fleet, 

and immediately what remained of that 
once powerful squadron put to sea in pursuit of the audacious enemy. 
But, as before, this bold movement had no result, and the Russian 
ships returned to anchor. Scarcely had they done so when the 

55 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Japanese squadron of sixteen vessels, including six battleships and 
four first-class cruisers, steamed into view in fighting - formation. 
As the leading vessels at a distance of some three miles came into 
line with the harbor entrance the flash of their great guns broke 
through the mist, and for nearly an hour the Japanese shells con- 
tinued to burst over the forts, along the beach and among the Rus- 
sian ships, who replied vigorously, and whose fire was assisted by 
that "of the powerful land batteries. Again the Russian squadron 
steamed out to meet the enemy. 

Some of the cruisers advanced towards the Japanese fleet' with 
great gallantry, the Novik, the Diana, and the Askold particularly 

distinguishing themselves, with the result 

Russian Bravery that they were all rather seriously hit by 
the Japanese fire and were compelled to 
retire upon the main squadron. Several other of the Russian ships 
were damaged before the Japanese fleet drew off. 

The official dispatch of Admiral Togo to his Government upon 
the momentous achievements of his fleet during these two days was 

a model of modesty and self-restraint. 
Japanese Modesty Dated "February ioth, at Sea," it ran: — 

"After the combined fleet left Sa- 
sebo, on the 6th, everything went off as planned. At midnight on 
the 8th the advance squadron attacked the enemy's advance squad- 
ron, the latter being mostly outside the bay. The Poltava, Askold 
and others were apparently struck by torpedoes. 

"At noon on the 9th the fleet advanced to the offing of Port 
Arthur Bay and attacked the enemy for forty minutes, I believe do- 
ing considerable damage. I believe the enemy were greatly demor- 
alized. They stopped fighting at one o'clock, and appeared to retreat 
to the harbor. 

56 




GENERAL KUROKI. GENERAL OKU. 

MARSHAL OYAMA. 
GENERAL NODZU. GENERAL NOGI- 

JAPANESE GENERALS. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and its 
fighting strength is not decreased. Our casualties were 4 killed and 
54 wounded. The Imperial Princes on board suffered no narm. 

"The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike their con- 
duct at manoeuvres. 

"This morning, owing to heavy south wind, detailed reports 
from the vessels have not been received, so I merely report the above 
fact." 

This dispatch, as we know both from the Russian official ac- 
counts and from independent witnesses, really understated the extent 

of the blow which the Japanese Admiral 
Damage Understated had dealt to the Russian fleet ; the vessels 

torpedoed were not cruisers only, but the 
two crack battleships upon which Admiral Alexeieff necessarily 
placed peculiar dependence, and the "considerable damage" which 
Admiral Togo believed had been done by the subsequent bombard- 
ment had put out of action, for the time being, the battleship Poltava 
and the cruisers Diana, Askold and Novik. Of these the Poltava 
and the Novik were badly hit on the water line — damage the seri- 
ousness of which needs no comment. 

The most significant confession, indeed, of the crushing char- 
acter of the blow which at the very commencement of the war the 

Japanese had succeeded in dealing to their 
Only One Repairing Dock powerful adversary was contained in a 

subsequent dispatch from the Viceroy to 
the Czar. Telegraphing on February nth, Admiral Alexeieff re- 
ported "the Czarevitch and the Pallada were brought on the 9th 
inst. into the inner harbor. The leak in the Retvisan is being tem- 
porarily stopped. The repairing of an ironclad is a complicated 
business, the period for the completion of which it is hard to indi- 

59 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

cate" This guarded language must be read in the light of the fact 
that the Russians had only one repairing dock capable of holding 
a large ship at Port Arthur, and the terrible character of the disas- 
ter which within forty-eight hours had befallen the naval power of 
the haughty Muscovite in the Far East will be realized. The losses 
in men were not very serious, amounting in all to 10 men killed and 
2 officers and 41 men wounded, but the injury to the fleet was prac- 
tically irreparable. Seven out of Russia's best vessels had been 
placed hors du combat, her battleships' strength being reduced to 4, 
namely, the Petropavlovsk, Peresviet, Pobieda and Sevastopol (the 
last two being themselves under repair when the war broke out), 
and her already small cruiser force being reduced to two, namely, 
the Bay an and the Boyarin. The following is the list of the dam- 
aged ships : — 

Czarevitch, battleship, torpedoed. 
Retvisan, battleship, torpedoed. 
Poltava, battleship, shelled on the water-line. 
Novik, cruiser, shelled on the water-line. 
Askold, cruiser, shelled on the water-line. 
Diana, cruiser, shelled on the water-line. 
Pallada, cruiser, torpedoed. 
It should be added that the repairs to theAskold were quickly 
executed, and that she was able to take part in the subsequent opera- 
tions a few days later. 

Admiral Alexeieff's dispatch to the Czar stated that the major- 
ity of the wounded belonged to the Pal- 
Alexeieff's Reason lada.. The reason for this was that they 

for Casualties were "poisoned by gases produced by the 
explosion of the torpedo charged with 
melinite." 

The Japanese fleet, naturally, did not emerge from such an ac- 

60 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

tion unscathed. Its losses in men were officially reported as 4 killed 
and 54 wounded ; and although the fighting efficiency of the fleet was 
not seriously impaired, two armored cruisers, the Iwote and the 
Yakitmo, were injured, and, as the casualties show, several other 
vessels were struck. But the most remarkable circumstance was 
that the torpedo-boats by which the night attack had been delivered 
escaped scot-free. 

While the Russian capital was still reeling under the shock of 
this unexpected disaster, there came the news of a fresh blow struck 

by the Japanese arms in another quarter 
The Fight at Chemulpo °f the theatre of war. This was the naval 

engagement at Chemulpo — a port on the 
northwest coast of Korea — in which two of the Czar's warships and 
one transport steamer were destroyed. It is true that only one of 
these vessels had any fighting capacity, and that the conflict in itself 
was of much less consequence than the battle at Port Arthur, but 
the incident gave a further and mortifying revelation of the disor- 
ganization of the naval forces of Russia in the Far East, and of the 
total absence of anything like a bold and definite plan of operations 
from the minds of her commanders. In spite of the critical posi- 
tion in which the negotiations between the two Powers had been 
standing for weeks, the Russian fleet in the Yellow Sea was uncon- 
centrated and generally unprepared for war. The outbreak of hos- 
tilities found two vessels, the Varyag, a protected cruiser of 6,500 
tons, and the Korietz, a gunboat, old, indeed, but not without some 
use for coast defence, quietly stationed at Chemulpo, a ready prey 
for a Japanese squadron. 

On the 8th instant a Russian steamer called the Sungari, which 
was employed for the transport of stores, entered the harbor with 

61 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the news that a large fleet, which her 
The First Shot captain believed to be Japanese, was fast 

approaching. The Korietz was sent out 
to reconnoitre. The columns of smoke on the horizon did indeed 
come from the funnels of the enemy's ships. The advancing squad- 
ron consisted of a first-class battleship flying the flag of Admiral 
Uriu, and the cruisers Akashi, Takachiho, Naniwa and Chiyoda, as 
well as seven torpedo-boats, the whole convoying transports with 
2,500 Japanese troops on board. The Korietz cleared her decks for 
action and fired — one account says that the shot was accidental — 
upon the rapidly approaching foe. The latter replied by discharging 
two torpedoes at the daring gunboat, which then retreated back 
into harbor. It is interesting to note that, whether the gunner of 
the Korietz acted under orders or not, he fired the first shot in the 
war, for the incident occurred several hours before the torpedo 
attack upon Port Arthur. 

The Japanese took no further notice of the Russian ships until 
the disembarkation of their troops had been carried out, a process 

which was commenced immediately and 
Japanese Disembarkation was carried out through the night with 

great celerity and in the most perfect or- 
der. In this matter, indeed, as in all the preliminary stages of the 
war, the operations of the Mikado's forces showed how carefully 
thought out were the plans of his naval and military advisers. Not 
a detail appeared to have been omitted, every eventuality had been 
skilfully calculated beforehand, and as a result the whole machinery 
of warfare moved like clockwork. 

By four o'clock on the morning of the 9th the process of dis- 
embarkation had been successfully completed, and the soldiers had 
all found their pre-arranged billets on shore. The Japanese squad- 

62 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ron then put out to sea once more, and waited for daylight before 
taking any action. At seven o'clock, however, the captain of the 
Varyag was served with an ultimatum from Admiral Uriu declaring 
that hostilities had broken out between Russia and Japan, and sum- 
moning him to leave the harbor by midday. Should he refuse to 
do so, then the Japanese fleet would be compelled to attack the 
Varyag and the Korietz within the harbor. A correspondent of a 
London paper who was present on the spot states that the com- 
manders of the other warships stationed at Chemulpo — namely, the 
British cruiser Talbot, the Italian Elba and the French Pascal, held 
a meeting and drew up a strong protest addressed to the Japanese 
Admiral against his proposal to attack the Russian vessels in a neu- 
tral port. The message was sent out in the Talbot's launch. 

The protest, however, was not needed, for the captain of the 
Varyag, in spite of the overwhelming disparity of forces, determined 

to face his enemies in the open. It was 
A Brave Russian Captain an act of conspicuous gallantry, only to 

be expected, it must be said, from the 
representative of a country whose sons, whatever their faults, have 
never been slow to die for her sake. The manner, too, in which the 
Varyag set about her voyage to inevitable destruction was well 
worthy of the finest naval traditions of all countries and all ages. 
We are told that as the drums beat to quarters, and as the doomed 
ship steamed out amid the cheers of the foreign crews in the port, 
the band was massed upon her deck and burst into the strains of 
the Russian Hymn, the National Anthem. It was like that "flourish 
of insulting trumpets" with which Raleigh faced the guns of Cadiz, 
>and the bravado of which Stevenson said he liked "better than the 
wisest dispositions to ensure victory; it comes from the heart and 
goes to it." No one, indeed, who is capable of generous emotions 

63 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

can fail to be uplifted by the story of the Varyag's passage to 
death. It is well to know that the cold science of modern naval 
warfare and all those mathematical calculations and inventions 
which have displaced the ancient ascendency of brawn and muscle 
at close quarters have not quenched the eager spirit of the sailor, 
or diminished his "heroic superstitions and his strutting and vain- 
glorious style of fight." It was with a spirit not less high and 
intrepid that the captain of the little Korietz, disregarding the orders 
of his superior officer to remain within the shelter of the harbor, 
followed in his wake and strove desperately to meet the same fate. 
Slowly but steadily the two ships held on their course towards 
the Polynesian Archipelago, where lay in wait their powerful foe. 

The Varyag had reached Round Island, 

A Target for Japanese when at a distance of nearly two miles 

Gunners tne Japanese flagship opened fire with 

one of her big guns. The aim of the 
gunners was true. Right amidships burst the great missile, doing 
terrible execution, and shell after shell followed with relentless 
rapidity. The Varyag, wheeling around in a small circle, re- 
sponded dauntlessly with her 6-inch guns, but with little or no 
effect upon the battleship, and now Admiral Uriu's cruisers joined 
in the cannonade. Within half an hour of this fearful raking fire 
her bridge was shot away and her sides were gaping with holes, but 
she kept afloat and still withstood the onslaught, endeavoring 
heroically but in vain to find an opening by which to break through 
and escape out to sea. At last, after an hour's terrible pounding, 
she was compelled reluctantly to give up the attempt as hopeless, 
and, taking refuge among the islands, with difficulty crept back 
into Chemulpo harbor, disabled beyond repair and with her decks 
reduced to veritable shambles. Her desperate struggle had not left 

64 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the enemy utterly scathless, for there seems no doubt that one of the 
Japanese cruisers received a good deal of damage. 

In the meanwhile the little Korietz, with extraordinary bravery, 
but with absolutely pathetic ineffectiveness, had been attempting 

to imitate the manoeuvres of her consort 
The Plucky "Korietz" and to do some injury to the big ships of 

the enemy. As well might a warrior 
with a popgun try to engage a battery of field artillery. It was 
magnificent, it certainly was not war. The range was hopelessly 
beyond her powers, and perhaps it was the bitterest drop in the cup 
of her commander and crew that the Japanese soon ceased to pay 
her any attention at all, concentrating all their efforts upon the more 
dangerous Varyag. When that vessel retreated at length into har- 
bor, the Korietz followed her unharmed but undisgraced. 

The wounded of the Varyag, numbering 4 officers and 214 
men, were removed in boats to the British, Italian and French war- 
ships. The dead were left on board, for 
Wounding and Burning it was decided to scuttle the ship. At the 

same time arrangements were made to 
blow up the Korietz. Just as the Japanese fleet again appeared in 
sight the latter vessel blew up, and the shattered hull, after one 
great burst of flame and smoke, sank beneath the waters. The 
Varyag refused to sink so easily, and the Russian sailors therefore 
again boarded her to set her on fire. After a little more than an 
hour she had burned down to the water's edge and, heeling over, 
disappeared. The Sungari was the next to meet its fate, the Rus- 
sians setting fire to it also to prevent its falling into the hands of 
the enemy. 

The Japanese fleet then steamed out to sea once more, having 
left behind it no further obstacle to the landing of troops on the 
west coast of Korea. 

65 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Thus within forty-eight hours of the rupture of diplomatic 
relations, the first decisive action in the struggle for sea-supremacy 

had been fought, and the result left to 

Japan's Handicap the enterprising and intrepid Navy of 

Japan not only the immense moral value 

of a victory well contrived and unerringly accomplished, but the 

solid material advantage of a superiority in fighting strength 

which was incontestable. 



66 




GENERAL EINEVITCH. GENERAL GRIPENBERG. 

GENERAL KUROPATKIN. 
GENERAL KAULBARS. GENERAL RENNENKAMPFF. 

RUSSIAN GENERALS 



J 



CHAPTER III. 

No Rest for Russia— Port Arthur— The Russian Forts— Another Russian Dis- 
aster — Second Night Attack — Japanese Daring — Demons of the Storm- 
Moral Effect— Bottling up Port Arthur — The Fireships— Fire and Search- 
light—Rain of Shell— Russians Still in the Woods— The Blockade— Trans- 
port Problems— Secrecy of Japanese Movements — Admirable Arrangements 
— A Close Censorship— Japanese Landings— Terrible Weather — At Ping- 
Yang— Perfect Organization— At Seoul— The Korean Emperor— A Japa- 
nese Protectorate— Advantage to Japan— Railway Building— Japanese Rap- 
idity—Dismay at St. Petersburg— Alexeieff Criticised— General Kuropat- 
kin— Confessions of Weakness— Desperate Efforts— On the Yalu— Round 
Niuchwang — Martial Law Proclaimed. 

F the Russians at Port Arthur imagined that an enemy so re- 
sourceful as Admiral Togo had shown himself to be would 
I rest quietly upon his oars after the conspicuous successes of 
the 8th and 9th of February, they were greatly mistaken. 
The first course of action for the victor in such a case is to 
keep on striking and to give the harassed foe no rest — in the strik- 
ing words of Captain Mahan, to "benumb the victim." This was 

precisely the plan of campaign adopted 

No Rest for Russia by the Japanese, who continued to show 
the same remarkable skill and coolness 
of calculation, and the same dash and daring in execution as had 
characterized their naval operations from the first. On the other 
hand, the disorganization of the Russian fleet, and of the defending 
force at Port Arthur generally, showed itself more markedly than 
ever, and the incapacity of the Czar's commanders conspired to aid 
the enterprise of the Japanese. 

69 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Before entering, however, upon a narrative of the attacks upon 
Port Arthur which followed in swift succession upon the great 

battle of the 9th, it may be well to give 
Port Arthur .some description of that famous strong- 

hold. The inner harbor is oval in shape, 
and two miles long from east to west and a mile in breadth from 
north to south. The shores are protected by hills, which the Rus- 
sians had assiduously fortified since they obtained occupation of 
the place. Entrance is afforded from the south by a narrow chan- 
ner, so narrow indeed that while it has the advantage of being 
easily held against an enemy, it has the counteracting disadvan- 
tage of being somewhat difficult of navigation for the ships of the 
defending fleet. The mouth of this channel is protected on the 
southwest by two dangerous reefs, which would prove a snare to 
an unwary foe; while on the eastern shore there stands the hill of 
Kwang-chin-shan, 250 feet above the sea level, upon which frown 
the guns of several powerful batteries. Upon the lower slopes the 
Russians had established two batteries of Canet quick-firing 5. 5 in. 
and 7.5mm. guns, with a torpedo and searchlight station. The en- 
trance channel is flanked along the northwest by a narrow strip of 
land which goes by the expressive name of the "Tiger's Tail," and 
this strip was fortified with battery of 7 Canet 5.5m. quick-firing 
guns. The distance from the Pinnacle Rock, one of the reefs above 
mentioned as situated at the western corner of the entrance passage, 
to the opposite shore, is nearly 350 yards. In its course the chan- 
nel narrows, till at one point it is only 500 feet in width, but it 
widens out again at the northern end. At the northeastern end lies 
the basin, or East Port. There is accommodation here for about 
a dozen large men-of-war, and on the north side stands the one dry 
dock for repairing large vessels of which Port Arthur can boast 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

On the other side of the channel, which at this point is 430 yards 
in width, lies the mouth of the harbor proper, facing the southeast. 
To enter it, ships have to round the Tiger's Tail, not a particu- 
larly easy process for men-of-war of the largest size. Nor is the 
harbor itself yet fitted to receive a great fleet. When the Russians 
took it over they found that it was too shallow for berthing vessels 
even of a moderate size; and in spite of the feverish activity of their 
engineers in the last year or two, the dredging operations have not 
proceeded far enough to allow of accommodations for more than 
three battleships, together with minor craft. Hence the Port Ar- 
thur squadron has generally been disposed either in the East Port, 
or basin, or in the open roadstead outside the entrance channel. 
It was indeed the position of the Russian ships in this latter anchor- 
age that gave the Japanese the opportunity for their fatal torpedo 
attack on the 8th. 

The land defences of Port Arthur were exceptionally strong. 
A range of forts, of which the Kwang-chin Hill already mentioned 

was the most important, commanded the 
The Russian Forts harbor entrance; and another range of 
batteries, with the most powerful and up- 
to-date garrison ordnance, surmounted the hills which surround the 
town and protect it on the other side. Another line of forts guards 
the entrance channel on the west side, the most important being 
Wei-yuen. It seemed, indeed, undoubted that Port Arthur was im- 
pregnable from the sea, though at the beginning of the war Euro- 
pean experts were not inclined to dogmatize as to the possibilities 
of its being stormed from the land side. As for the fleet, if it were 
lying in the West Harbor or in the East Port under the shadow 
of Kwan-chin, it would probably be perfectly safe from attack; 
but, on the other hand, it will be seen that there was a danger that 

7 2 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the narrow entrance channel might be blocked up by an enterpris- 
ing enemy, in which case the Czar's ships, even if they were the 
finest in the world, would be useless for all the essential purposes 
of naval warfare. This attempt to "cork up the bottle" was, in- 
deed, nearly carried out by Admiral Togo in the course of the 
|ortnight following the outbreak of war. 

Two days after the great attack another disaster befell the 
hapless Russians. With this the Japanese fleet, which had retired 

temporarily to the Elliot Islands in the 

Another Russian Korean Gulf to refit and repair injuries, 

jy . had nothing to do. It was solely due to 

carelessness and mischance; and while 
illustrating the state of demoralization that existed at Port Arthur, 
it contributed to spread that demoralization still further among the 
already sufficiently harassed forces of the defenders. The mine 
transport Yenesei, which, with her sister ship the Amur, was en- 
gaged in superintending the mine defences of the harbor entrance, 
observing a submarine mine which had become detached floating 
on the surface of the water, approached it for the purpose of firing 
upon it and thus removing an obvious danger to the ships lying 
at anchor. Unfortunately, in the excitement of the process, Cap- 
tain Stepanoff, who was in command, allowed his ship to drift upon 
a neighboring mine. A terrific explosion followed, and the Yenesei, 
with a yawning hole in her bows, began at once to settle down. 
An attempt was made to lower the boats, but the catastrophe was 
so sudden and unexpected that little could be done. Captain Stepa- 
noff went down with his ship, and there perished also, either from 
the direct effects of the explosion or from drowning, the engi- 
neer, two midshipmen and ninety-two men of lower rank. Not only 
was this terrible disaster damaging to the morale of the fleet, but it 

73 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

deprived Admiral Alexeieff of a valuable ship and of stores which 
he could ill spare. The Yenesei was built at Kronstadt in 1898. 
She was of 2,500 tons displacement, with a speed of ijYi knots; 
was armed with five 4.7-inch and six smaller quick-firing guns, and 
was capable of carrying 500 mines. It is, of course, possible that 
she had not that full number on board at the time of the explosion, 
but in any case the loss in this respect alone must have been very 
severe. The accident throws an instructive and rather terrifying 
light upon the possible dangers of submarine mines, not only to 
the enemy who are attacking a fortified port, but also to the defend- 
ers themselves. 

Before the Russians at Port Arthur had recovered from this 
nerve-shaking disaster the tireless foe flew at their throat once 

more. On the night of the 13th a flo- 
Second Night Attack tilla of Japanese torepdo-boat destroyers 

started out to make another dash at the 
survivors of the Czar's fleet, which were still lying in the open 
roadstead, presenting for a daring and resourceful enemy a tempt- 
ing object of attack. The flotilla was under the command of 
Captain Nagai. A blinding snowstorm was raging at the time, and 
it was no wonder in the circumstances that the vessels became sep- 
arated from one another and that some lost their way altogether. 
But two, more fortunate than their fellows, hit the right course. 
These were the Asagiri, under Captain Iakawa, and the Hayatori, 
commanded by Captain Takanouchi. A snowstorm on that coast is 
enough to tax the skill and the courage of the most intrepid sailor, 
but the Japanese officers and crews were equal to the occasion. 
Right in the teeth of the awful blizzard, their decks sheeted with 
ice and snow, but with hearts on board hot with the fire of heroic 
adventure, the gallant little craft held steadily on their way. The 

74 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

navigating lieutenants had to find their course more by instinct than 
by calculation, for it was impossible to see anything clearly ahead 
through the pitch-darkness and the relentless snow. On, however, 
they crept through the terrible night, each working independently 
of the other, for under such conditions no concerted plan of attack 
was possible. 

At three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, the Asagiri reached 
the harbor mouth, and in she dashed regardless of the searchlights, 

which made broad, livid tracks even 
Japanese Daring through the storm of snow. A hot fire 

at once broke out from the fortress and 
the ships, but the aim of the gunners was wild, and, undaunted by 
the perils of his situation, Captain Iakawa drove his boat right up 
to the Russian torpedo flotilla, and discharged a torpedo at one 
of the larger vessels, from whose funnels smoke was seen ascend- 
ing. The deadly weapon went home, and after waiting to see that 
it exploded, the Asagiri engaged in a smart exchange of shots with 
the enemy's torpedo boats and destroyers, in the course of which 
she sent a "scout" to the bottom. Then, and not till then, did her 
brave commander withdraw. Turning out to sea once more, and 
still hotly replying to the Russian fire until she was out of range, 
the Asagiri safely escaped, covered with honor. 

Two hours later the Hayatori arrived upon the scene and per- 
formed the same gallant feat. Still facing the terrors of the storm, 

she approached the harbor entrance and 
Demons of the Storm steathily crept up to the fleet, which lay 

helplessly at anchor. At last the auda- 
cious little destroyer was discovered. Two vessels opened a fierce 
fire upon her, but without hesitation, though at the same time with 
the most deliberate coolness and perfect aim, she discharged a tor- 

75 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

pedo at the nearest ship. The missile was seen to explode, and then, 
like her consort, the Asagiri, fled safely to sea once more, after 
spiritedly returning the hot fusilade directed upon her from all 
quarters. 

In the characteristically restrained dispatch in which Admiral 
Togo described this brilliant feat of arms by the Asagiri and the 

Hayatori, he remarked: — "It is impossi- 
Moral Effect ble to state the definite material results, 

owing to the darkness, but the moral ef- 
fect was certainly considerable." From other sources, however, 
something was learned of the character of the material damage done 
to the Russian fleet. Not only was a scout destroyed, but the 
cruiser Boyarin was injured by one of the torpedoes, and the Volun- 
teer Fleet steamer Kay an had her upper works knocked about by 
a shell from one of the Russian guns. The exact amount of the 
damage done was not revealed on the Russian side, but there can 
at all events be no doubt that, in the words of the Japanese Admiral, 
the moral effect was considerable. It is clear from the safe return 
of these two small destroyers out of the very jaws of the enemy, 
that the Russian gunners had become demoralized, and the inef- 
fectiveness of Admiral Alexeieff's own torpedo flotilla in the face 
of an attack which it was peculiarly designed to meet points strongly 
in the same direction. 

But still a third harassing attack was in store for the Russian 
fleet. While one division of his torpedo-boat destroyers was thus 

carrying confusion and dismay into the 
Bottling up Port Arthur ranks of his opponents, Admiral Togo, 

holding his main fleet within the shelter 
of the Elliot Islands, was quietly preparing for a larger and more 
far-reaching coup. This was to be nothing less than the operation 

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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of "corking up the bottle," in other words sinking ships at the en- 
trance to Port Arthur Harbor, and blocking the fairway against 
passage of the Russian ships. It was an enterprise in some ways 
similar to the famous exploit of Lieutenant Hobson of the Merrimac 
at Santiago-de-Cuba during the Spanish- American War, but in the 
present case the blockading fleet attained less success. 

Five old steamers were chartered for the purpose. Their 
names were the Tenshin Maru, the Bushu Maru, the Buy o Maru, 

the Hokoku Maru, and the Jinsen Maru, 
The Fire Ships Two of -these, under the names of the 

Rohilla and the Brindisi, were formerly 
in the service of the Peninsular and Oriental Company. It may here 
be remarked that the spirit animating all ranks of the Japanese 
in this war was shown by the numbers of volunteers who came for- 
ward for the dangerous task of manning the doomed steamers. 
The difficulty, indeed, was not to find sufficient men, but to select 
the limited force required without giving offence to the remainder 
of the host who sought to share in the glorious risk. At last, how- 
ever, the officers and crews were chosen, and the vessels, having 
been carefully filled with heavy stones and explosives, left for 
Port Arthur on the morning of the 23rd of February, escorted by 
a flotilla of torpedo boats and destroyers. 

In the darkness of the early morning of the 24th, they reached 
the roadstead outside Port Arthur, the Tenshin Maru leading the 

way. The Russians, however, were more 
Fire and Searchlight vigilant than on former occasions, and 

their searchlights soon revealed the re- 
newed presence of their insatiable enemy. 
The Tenshin Maru, steering too far to the left, came within the 
fire of the batteries on the Tiger's Tail at close range. She was 

' 79 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

disabled by a shell, ran upon the rocks three miles to the southwest 
of the harbor entrance, and there blew up. The other steamer? 
changed their course to the northeast, but the attentions of the 
Russian searchlight operators rendered their progress highly diffi- 
cult and dangerous, and they were soon the object of a positive 
storm of fire from the forts on the Tiger's Tail, Golden Hill, and 
Electric Cliff, and also from the damaged Retvisan, which lay 
grounded at the entrance to the channel. The Bushu Maru wad 
the first to suffer from the cannonade. Her steering gear was car- 
ried away, and, staggering blindly to the west, she grounded close 
to the Tenshin Mane, blew up, and sank. The fate of the Buyo 
Maru was no better. She was raked fore and aft by the Russian 
shells, and before she could reach the coveted entrance she also, 
exploded and sank beneath the waters. 

The Hokoku Maru and the Jinsen Maru were more successful. 
They made a rush together for the harbor channel, and got close 

up to the Retvisan. Disregarding the 
Rain of Shells heavy fire directed upon them from the 

disabled but still dangerous monster, the 
adventurous volunteers calmly anchored their vessels upon the spot 
previously selected. Then only did they set the match to the fuses. 
Cheering loudly, but with no undue precipitation, they now took 
to the boats and pulled away in perfect order, in spite of the rain 
of shells and bullets showered around them on every side. The 
abandoned steamers blew up immediately afterwards and sank 
close to the lighthouse at the channel mouth. The activity of the 
Russian searchlights and the hot fire from the guns of the Retvisan 
and the forts compelled the men in the boats to take a very round- 
about course, and they could not regain the Japanese torpedo fleet, 
which in the meantime had successfully picked up the crews of 

80 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the other sunken ships. But the situation of m^ sailors of the 
Hokoku Maru and the Jinsen Maru was full of peril. To add to 
their difficulties, the wind rose to a gale towards daybreak, and 
they were driven out of their course. But they struggled bravely 
on, and, after enduring great hardships, they managed to reach 
the main fleet about three o'clock in the afternoon. According to 
the Japanese Admiral's report, all engaged returned in safety from 
this dangerous enterprise, an achievement comparable to the most 
daring "cutting-out" expeditions of olden times. It should be added 
that not a single destroyer or torpedo-boat was injured. 

Owing to 'the failure of three of the steamers to reach the en- 
trance of the channel, and the insufficient size of the two which were 

successfully sunk there, the main object 
Russians Still in the of the scheme was not attained, but it is 
Wood thought that some temporary inconven- 

ience was caused to the Russians, espe- 
cially as the position of the grounded Retvisan herself was already 
something of an impediment to navigation. Extraordinary jubila- 
tion was created in the Czar's dominions, particularly in the Capital, 
by the failure of the Japanese expeditions. It was at first thought 
by the defending force, in the darkness and confusion, that the 
merchant steamers were men-of-war, and a grandiloquent account 
was sent to St. Petersburg by an imaginative correspondent an- 
nouncing no less a disaster to the Japanese than the destruction of 
four of their battleships, after a severe engagement in which the 
wounded Retvisan had covered herself with glory. The news was 
quickly transmitted abroad by the semi-official agency, and the 
greatest excitement was caused in every capital in Europe. Cool- 
headed people, nevertheless, waited for some confirmation of this 
remarkable story, and when the truth came out the partisans of 

81 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Russia were chagrined to find what a different complexion the real 
facts wore. Admiral Alexeieff, however, after the previous disas- 
ters which had befallen his fleet, was to be pardoned, perhaps, for 
the somewhat exultant tone of his dispatch to the Czar, in which 
he attributed what he called "the complete derangement of the 
enemy's plan" to "the brilliant resistance and destructive fire of the 
Retvisan." 

Undiscouraged by the failure of this attempt to bottle up the 
enemy, Admiral Togo continued to maintain a strict blockade of 

the port, and to pursue the policy of alter- 
The Blockade nate torpedo attacks and heavy bombard- 

ments at frequent intervals. But before 
proceeding with the story of these damaging and disconcerting oper- 
ations, it will be convenient to describe the course which events 
were taking in other quarters of the theatre of war. 

The signal success of Japan at sea had reduced to compara- 
tively simple proportion the problem of the transport of her forces 

to the seat of war on land, where the cur- 
Transport Problems tain was about to rise on the most desper- 
ate act in the great drama. With half 
the Russian fleet at Port Arthur disabled, with the other half con- 
fined to the harbor by strict blockade, and with the Vladivistock 
cruiser squadron reduced to ineffective isolation, the Mikado's 
military advisers were able to choose the most convenient landing- 
places in Korea with a freedom which was only limited by the 
difficulties of the winter season. This indeed was a serious im- 
pediment to the movement of troops in large numbers. Not only 
were most of the available harbors both in Korea and on the Liao^ 
tung Peninsula blocked by the ice, but when the invading force 
landed it found the roads in such a state as to render them almost 

82 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

impassable. The country was covered with snow several inches deep ; 
the frost was biting,- and even when milder weather began to 
prevail the conditions did not at once prove more favorable to 
marching operations and to the conveyance of heavy artillery. For 
the time being, in fact, they grew worse rather than better, for the 
thaw produced a perfect sea of mud, which made progress north- 
wards a terribly slow and painful business. Anyone who has tried 
to cross a ploughed field during the break up of a prolonged frost 
can form some idea — faint, however, at the best — of the pleasures 
of marching in Korea at the beginning of spring. 

In spite, nevertheless, of all the natural difficulties of the situa- 
tion, the Japanese proceeded steadily and systematically to "weave 

the crimson web of war." Nothing has 

Secrecy of Japanese been more remarkable in the course of 

Movements these operations both by sea and by land 

than the complete secrecy with which the 
Mikado's strategists have veiled all their important movements until 
the calculated blow has been struck. In this, of course, they have 
been aided by their speedy acquisition of the command of the sea. 
All the correspondents who have proceeded to the seat of war 
agree in paying mortified tributes to the thoroughness of the Japan- 
ese press censorship. For weeks together a great army of "spe- 
cials" were condemned idly to kick their heels at Nagasaki, while 
before their eyes transport after transport, crowded with soldiery, 
was leaving that port for unknown destinations. It was, however, 
generally evident on the face of the broad facts of the situation, 
that the main objective of the Japanese armies at that time was 
the west coast of Korea; for though the ports in the district were 
undoubtedly difficult of access on account of the ice, the condition 
of things on the Liao-tung Peninsula, the other probable place of 
disembarkation, was very much worse. 

83 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Before the end of February over forty transports sailed from 
Nagasaki, and a still larger embarkation went on at Ujina, near 

Hiroshima, where a great force of horse, 
Admirable foot, and artillery were steadily detrained 

Arrangements every day and sent on board. The ad- 
mirable arrangements made by the Jap- 
anese directors of mobilization and transport were the theme of 
universal praise among unprejudiced observers. Everything had 
been carefully thought out beforehand; all the necessary material 
was ready; and consequently, when war broke out, there was no 
confusion, no undue haste — only the ordered bustle of men who 
knew exactly what they had to do and how it was to be done, down 
to the veriest detail. Special wharves had been prepared, and 
were in position within a few days, with railway lines laid upon 
them, connecting them with the main lines over which the troops 
travelled from the interior, so that the trains could be brought down 
almost to the water's edge. Here the soldiers were detrained, and, 
after a meal, embarked upon lighters and steam launches, and were 
conveyed swiftly to the ships to which they were assigned. These 
transports averaged 6,000 tons in burden, and were excellently 
fitted up for their purpose. An important part of the vessels' equip- 
ment in each case was a number of large surf-boats or sampans, 
about the most useful form of boat possible for landing troops in 
the shoal waters of the Korean harbors. 

What was taking place in the meanwhile on the other side of 

the channel, and particularly upon the 

A Close Censorship western coast of the Hermit Kingdom? 

We now know something of the strength 
and the disposition of the Japanese forces, although right up to the 
last moment before the general advance only the smallest items of 

84 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

information were allowed to pass through the narrow-meshed net 
of the censorship. 

According to the most trustworthy accounts, however, there 
seems little doubt that the chief point of disembarkation of the 

Mikado's army was Chinampo, a small 
Japanese Landings and obscure treaty port situated abom 
150 miles north of Chemulpo. We have 
already related the landing of the Japanese advance guard at 
Chemulpo on February 8th, before the naval battle which resulted 
in the destruction of the Varyag and the Korietz. This force, which 
belonged to the 12th Infantry Division under General Inouye, and 
consisted of 2,500 men, was billeted at once in the little town, and 
was followed during the next few days by the remainder of the 
Division, with transport corps, train, and engineers. When the 
Mikado's advisers had been assured of the success of the initial 
naval operations and of Admiral Togo's supremacy at sea, a small 
expedition was immediately landed near Haiju, a place situated 
about half-way between Chemulpo and Chinampo, and sent forward 
by the Seoul- Wiju road to seize Ping- Yang, a strategical point the 
importance of which was amply demonstrated in the Chino- Japanese 
war. The main body of General Inouye's Division followed with 
all possible speed from Chemulpo. 

The hardships which these troops had to face were terrible 
indeed. The weather was at its worst. Heavy rain was succeeded 

by frost, and on the top of the frost came 

Terrible Weather snow, and cruel blinding blizzards, in the 

teeth of which the little Japs, each man 

burdened with a weight of 100 lbs., had to struggle as best they 

could. In the circumstances the achievement of these forerunners 

of the Mikado's main army did an admirable piece of work. They 

85 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

did a steady march of 25 miles a day, bivouacking- in the dirty 
Korean villages by night. At last, after four or five days, the force 
reached Ping-Yang 1 and proceeded with all expedition to fortify it 
against possible attack. By the end of February a considerable 
body of troops was in occupation of Ping- Yang, and patrols were 
being pushed northwards to Anju. 

The seizure of this strong position, providing as it did against 
any immediate danger from the north, enabled the Japanese to land 

higher up the coast than Chemulpo, and 
At Ping- Yang henceforth the main work of disembarka- 

tion in this quarter was carried on at 
Chinampo, access to which is gained by an arm of the sea called 
the Ping- Yang inlet. 

Here we find the complement of the operations which at 
Nagasaki and Ujina excited such keen admiration on the part of 

foreign critics. Perfect order and dis- 
Perfect Organization cipline characterized the disembarkation 

of the Japanese, as it had characterized 
their embarkation. The Pink- Yang Inlet is difficult of navigation 
at the best of times, but the inherent difficulties were enormously 
enhanced at this period of the year by the drift ice, which rendered 
landing an awkward and, in some cases, a hazardous undertaking. 
But the Japanese showed that admirable forethought which has 
characterized every step they have taken, and the transports 
brought with them large numbers of pontoon wharves, which en- 
abled the troops to disembark from the sampans at some distance 
from the shore, and to march easily on to firm land. Here the 
hardy Japanese, in spite of the severe cold, bivouacked for the most 
part in the open, and were then pushed forward with all possible 
rapidity towards Ping- Yang. By the middle of March, as far as 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

can be estimated, at least 80,000 men had landed in Korea ready to 
advance northwards as soon as the weather would permit ; General 
Kuroki, commanding the 1st Army Corps, assuming the direction 
of affairs until the arrival of Baron Kodama, the Chief of the 
General Staff, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief. 

In the meanwhile a strong force, under General Inouye, had 
'marched upon Seoul, and without difficulty overawed the feeble 

Emperor and his corrupt Court. On the 
At Seoul 1 2th of February M. Pavloff, whose 

name had for so long been a word to 
conjure with in Korea, left the capital for Chemulpo under the 
humiliating protection of a Japanese guard. M. Pavloff, it is said, 
was thunderstruck by the news of the disasters to the Russian navy, 
and by the sudden revelation of the real strength ot the hitherto 
despised Island Empire. It was now clear to the world, and not 
least to his dupes, the Koreans, that the diplomatic Muff in which 
he, in common with his administrative chief, Admiral Alexeieff, 
had been indulging for so long was ludicrously out of porportion 
to the naval and military preparations which would ultimately have 
to support it. But the power of this able man at the Court of Seoul, 
though broken for the moment, was not by any means destroyed. So 
well had he done his work that even in the hour of Japan's triumph 
he still managed to find tools in the corrupt servants of the Em- 
peror, and when he had taken his departure for Shanghai more 
than one attempt to communicate with him had to be frustrated by 
the Japanese. 

For the time being, however, the star of Japan was unquestion- 
ably in the ascendant at Seoul. The Em- 
The Korean Emperor peror hastened to congratulate the Mi- 
kado on the victory of his fleet, and 

89 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

assured him that in view of Korea's position her satisfaction 
equalled that of the Japanese. At the same time the Korean local 
officials were ordered by the central Government to give every facil- 
ity to the invading troops. 

But a more definite acknowledgment of Japanese supremacy 
followed. On February 23rd an important agreement was signed 

at Seoul by M. Hayashi, the Minister of 
A Japanese Protectorate the Mikado, and General Yi-Chi-Yong, 

the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

By the terms of this Protocol, Korea, 
"convinced of Japan's friendship," undertook to adopt the advice 
of the Japanese Government in regard to administrative reform 
"with a view to consolidating the peace of the Orient." On the 
other hand, Japan guaranteed the safety of the Imperial family 
and the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. In pursu- 
ance of this provision, the fourth Article declared that an en- 
croachment by a third Power, or an internal disturbance resulting 
in danger to either of these interests, would justify prompt meas- 
ures on the part of Japan, who would receive assistance from Korea, 
and in order to give effect to such action Japan might occupy 
strategical points in Korea if necessary. 

The object of this agreement was, of course, to regularize 
Japan's position in the eyes of the Powers and at the same time to 

give a sop to the dignity of Korea. Its 
Advantage to Japan most important point, as far as the future 

was concerned, was the definite guarantee 
on the part of Japan of the independence and territorial integrity 
of the Hermit Kingdom. The significance of this action of the 
Mikado's Government, as foretelling the lines of their permanent 
policy in the event of a final victory over the forces of the Czar, 

90 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

was heightened by the visit to Seoul a few weeks afterwards, on a 
special mission, of Japan's most famous statesman, the Marquis 
Ito. The attention was reciprocated by the dispatch of a special 
envoy from the Korean Court to Tokio. The most important im- 
mediate effect, however, of the complete ascendancy now acquired 
by Japan at Seoul was of military rather than of civil interest. This 
was the granting of a concession to the Japanese under Article 4 of 
the Protocol, for the construction of the projected railway between 
Seoul and Wiju, on the Yalu River, while at the same time ar- 
rangements were made for the completion of the southern portion 
of the line between Seoul and Fusan, a port at the southern extrem- 
ity of Korea. 

Here the marvelous organization of the Japanese War Office 
came into evidence once more. All the preparations for acting 

upon this concession had already been 
Railway Building made. The material which had been in- 
tended for the construction of some un- 
important railways in Japan was at hand ready to be transferred 
to the seat of war, and the engineer and pioneer corps only waited 
for the conclusion of the necessary formalities to begin operations. 
On March 8th a body of 8,000 men started work on the line between 
Seoul and Wiju, and the enterprise was conducted at high pressure, 
the material being conveyed with all possible speed by steamers from 
Japan. The value of this railway for strategical purposes will be 
obvious to anyone who studies the map; and, more fortunate than 
the Russians, the Japanese, provided that they could hold the north- 
ern part of Korea at all, were not likely to be faced with the difficul- 
ties which had proved so embarrassing to their enemy, in the shape 
of brigands and train-wreckers, in Manchuria. The completion of 
the whole line as far as Fusan would furthermore make them practi- 

8* 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

cally independent of sea transport for men as well as supplies, except, 
of course, as far as the narrow Korean Channel is concerned. 

It will thus be seen that, considering the inevitable delay due 
to the severity of the season, the prepara- 
Japanese Rapidity tions for a general advance by the Japan- 
ese army had been conducted with re- 
markable celerity and success, and that by the middle of March 
great progress had been made. 

We must now turn to the Russian side of the war. 
One of the first consequences of the reverses at Port Arthur was 
a change in the commands. The unexpected collapse of the Rus- 
sian navy under the attacks of the de- 
Dismay at spised Japanese caused grave searchings 
St. Petersburg °f heart at St. Petersburg, and there can 
be no doubt that the Czar himself was 
greatly shocked by the revelation both of the lack of readiness of 
his fleet and of the strange paralysis of enterprise on the part of the 
Admiral in command. It was not long before the Imperial dis- 
pleasure was visited upon this officer, Admiral Starck. On the 
1 6th of February he was formally superseded, and Admiral Maka- 
roff, Commander-in-Chief at Kronstadt, and a sailor of proved 
energy and skill, was appointed to the command of the Pacific 
Fleet in his place. The official reason, indeed, which was given out 
for Admiral Starck's recall was "ill-health," but this ingenious 
euphemism deceived nobody, the less so because the same mysterious 
complaint simultaneously seized hold of Rear-Admiral Molas, his 
second Chief of the Staff, who was recalled in the same Imperial 
Ukase. 

The Viceroy himself did not escape criticism at the hands of 
the Russian public, and in official circles at St. Petersburg keen 

92 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

censure was bestowed upon him for his 
Alexeieff Criticized share in the disasters which had befallen 
the fleet under his control; but he still 
appeared to retain the confidence of his master the Czar. It soon 
became apparent, however, that the military problem in Manchuria 
presented difficulties of its own hardly less embarrassing than those 
which were being experienced at sea, and as the magnitude of the 
task dawned upon the Czar and his advisers, it was deemed neces- 
sary to take drastic measures. On February 21st, therefore, the 
celebrated General Kuropatkin, Minister for War, and the first 
Russian military strategist of the day, was appointed Commander- 
in-Chief of the land forces in the Far East. It was carefully ex- 
plained that Admiral Alexeieff, as a naval officer, could not be ex- 
pected to conduct great operations on land, but it was apparent to 
everyone that as these land operations were now destined finally to 
decide the issue of the great conflict, the direction of the whole war 
on the Russian side had virtually passed to General Kuropatkin. 

Some slight account of this famous captain may not be out of 
place here. Like so many of Russia's distinguished men, both in 

the past and in the present, Alexis Nik- 
General Kuropatkin olaievitch Kuropatkin has owed his rise 

rather to merit than to influence. His 
family was indeed a noble one, but it was little known, and his early 
advancement in the service was due to his own ability and industry, 
and not to high connections. When quite young, however, he was 
fortunate enough to attract the attention of the celebrated Skobeleff, 
and he became a great favorite as well as a zealous disciple of that 
famous cavalry leader. His opportunity came in the Russo-Turkish 
War, where he displayed notable dash and gallantry, risking his life 
recklessly in the terrible conflict at Plevna. In crossing the Balkans 

93 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

he captured a large Turkish force, and was promoted to the com- 
mand of a division. Towards the close of the war he became Chief 
of the Staff to Skobeleff, and in the campaign against the Turko- 
mans, which followed, and which resulted in the conquest of Turk- 
estan, he served that great General in the same capacity. His rise 
was indeed remarkably rapid ; promotion came to him while he was 
young and active enough to make the best use of it ; and although he 
had held the highest position in the army — the Ministry for War — 
for some years, his age was now only fifty-six. Like most suc- 
cessful men, he was not without his critics and detractors — it was 
said indeed that among these was to be found Admiral Alexeieff 
himself, and that there was no love lost between the two — but there 
can be no doubt of the General's immense popularity with the army. 
His appointment to the supreme command caused a universal feel- 
ing of relief to spread not only throughout the Service, but through- 
out all classes of society in Russia, while at the same time it proved 
that the real seriousness of the task which lay then in the Far East 
had at last been grasped by the Czar's Government. 

For a time indeed the haughty disdain of their puny foe, 
which had characterized Russian official circles before the war, was 
succeeded by a feeling of acute pessimism. To prepare the public 
for the worst, an official communique was issued at St. Petersburg, 

in which, after an outburst of well 
Confessions of Weakness affected indignation against the so-called 

treachery of the enemy, the people were 
warned that much time was necessary in order to strike at Japan 
blows "worthy of the dignity and might of Russia," while the 
state of unpreparedness on land as well as at sea was revealed in 
the phrase, "the distance of the territory now attached and the desire 
of the Czar to maintain peace were the causes of the impossibility of 

94 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

preparations for war being made a long time in advance." Simul- 
taneously with the issue of this extraordinary confession came the 
news that Admiral Alexeieff with his staff had left Port Arthur and 
proceeded to Harbin, at the junction of the Manchurian railway and 
the branch line to Vladivostock, there to effect a concentration of 
all the available Russian forces. 

These facts combined were generally taken as indicating the 
intention of the Czar's Government to abandon Port Arthur and 
Southern Manchuria, for the time being, to their fate, and to make 
the first real stand against the enemy on the borders of Eastern 
Siberia. Desperate, however, as the situation appeared to be in 

these early days of the war, it undoubt- 
Desperate Efforts edly improved somewhat in the next few 

weeks, and the delay which the severe 
climatic conditions imposed upon the Japanese advance necessarily 
aided the Russians. General Linevitch, commander of the Siberian 
Army Corps, to whom the direction of military affairs was entrusted 
pending the arrival of General Kuropatkin, made desperate exer- 
tions to collect an effective force as far south as possible, and it was 
regarded as highly probable, from such scraps of news as were 
allowed to creep through the censorship, that by the third week of 
March he had at his disposal in Southern Manchuria a force of 
about 50,000 men, the bulk of which was concentrated at Liao- 
Yang, some forty or fifty miles below Mukden. 

At the same time a smaller body of troops held the Yalu River, 
and patrols were sent southwards. As early as February 28th, one 

of these patrols, consisting of three Cos- 
On the Yalu sacks under the command of Lieutenant 

Lonchakoff, came into touch with a Jap- 
anese patrol outside Ping- Yang. The Japanese retreated, and the 

95 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Russians, after advancing within 700 paces of the town, retired 
also before the sharp fire directed upon them from the walls. This 
was the first land skirmish of the war; it was a small affair of out- 
posts only; and a long interval was to elapse before a more serious 
conflict could become possible. 

Important, however, as were the events occurring in Korea, 
it was felt by experts in Europe that the most momentous develop- 
ments on land were destined to take place 
Round Niuchwang on the western shore of the Liao-tung 
Peninsula, and that the advance upon the 
Yalu was really intended to cover a blow at a spot more vital to 
Russia's power. But here, by the nature of things, the movements 
of the Japanese could not be so rapid. As already indicated, the 
ice-bound condition of the Liao-tung coast prevented any landing 
operations in that quarter before the end of March or the begin- 
ning of April, when the frozen belt usually begins to break up. As 
soon as the advancing spring brought about the changed state of 
affairs it was apparent that a descent in force would become prac- 
ticable to the Japanese both at Kinchau in Society Bay, where the 
peninsula narrows down to a mere neck of land, and, more impor- 
tant still, at Niuchwang, the treaty port at the north of the gulf. 
At either of these spots it would be comparatively easy to cut the 
Manchurian railway and sever communication between Port Arthur 
and the Russian headquarters, but the seizure of Niuchwang would 
be of much greater consequence than that of Kinchau, as it would 
place the invading army within easy striking distance of Mukden 
itself. Furthermore, the very process of the break up of the ice 
at Niuchwang, as long as it lasts, is favorable in some respects to 
the landing of an army. In winter the river is frozen out to sea 
for a considerable distance, and thus, when the spring arrives, the 

96 



"3 

W 

O 

N 
> 




i-3 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

estuary presents the appearance of several square miles of moving 
ice-floes, tossed hither and thither by the swift and devious currents, 
and rendering the task of laying mines for the defence of the port 
practically impossible. Another advantage possessed by the Japa- 
nese in attacking from this quarter lay in the physical character 
of the country and in the friendliness of its inhabitants. The boggy 
nature of the land threatened to deprive the Russian cavalry of half 
its usefulness, while it was eminently suited for the movements of 
infantry, in which Japan found her greatest strength ; on the other 
hand, the Japanese had made themselves very popular with the in- 
habitants during their war with China, and could depend upon the 
natives for ample supplies. 

The extreme probability on all these grounds of a Japanese 
descent upon Niuchwang was doubtless evident to the Russians 

themselves, for they made great exer- 
Martial Law Proclaimed tions to put the port into a state of de- 
fence, and their concentration at Liao- 
Yang, fifty miles or so to the north, was clearly designed to meet 
danger from this quarter. Niuchwang itself, however, is not very 
easily defended against a strong force attacking from the sea. The 
forts are of little avail against the guns of powerful men-of-war; 
and therefore, although General Kondrotovitch, the able officer in 
command, had done his best to strengthen the defences of the town, 
and was said to have some twenty or thirty thousand troops at his 
disposal by the end of March, it seemed clear that this was a vitally 
weak spot in Russia's extended front. On Monday, March 28th, 
the Russian authorities at Niuchwang declared martial law in this 
"neutral port" in the following terms : 

According to an order issued by the Viceroy of his Imperial 
Majesty in the Far East, the Port of Ying-kow has been proclaimed 

99 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

under martial law. Until the publication of the order the follow- 
ing regulations will be enforced, and will be brought into imme- 
diate operation: 

( i ) Martial law extends over the town and port of Ying-kow, 
over the whole population, without distinction of nationalities. 

(2) All passengers and cargoes arriving must undergo ex- 
amination. For this purpose steamers, sailing vessels and junks, 
having entered the mouth of the river, must anchor at a distance 
of six miles below the fort. A steam-launch, during daylight, with 
a naval and Customs officer on board, will meet the vessels at that 
spot. They will examine the vessels and conduct them to berths 
allotted by the Customs officers. 

(3) The import of arms and ammunition is prohibited. 

(4) It is prohibited to export to any ports of Japan or Korea 
articles of military contraband. 

(5) When exporting articles to neutral ports the shipper must 
deposit with the Customs security equal to the value of the cargo, 
as a guarantee that the cargo shall not be reshipped from a neutral 
port to Japanese or Korean ports. 

(6) Lightships and leading marks will temporarily cease to 
be used at the mouth of the river. 

(7) When dealing with articles of contraband of war, the 
regulations sanctioned by his Majesty on February 14th, 1904, are 
to serve for the guidance of the military and civil authorities of the 
town and port of Ying-kow, who must be guided by the published 
regulations defending the administration of the provinces. 

(8) If beans and beancake are exported, a sum equal to twice 
their value must be deposited with the Customs. 

(Signed) Victor Grosse. 



100 



CHAPTER IV. 

Firing on the Unarmed— Snowstorms and Bitter Frost— Reconnoitring at Vladi- 
vostock— At the Mouth of the Golden Horn— Careful Japanese Calcula- 
tion—Bombardment at Long Range— Russian Ships Lying Low— Makaroff 
to the Rescue— A Chance for Russian Torpedoes— Sea Fight at Close 
Quarters — Severe Casualties— Another Hot Fight— Unprecedented Japa- 
nese Daring — Carnage Indescribable — Makaroff Outpaced — A Useless Prize 
—Bombardment by Wireless Telegraphy— Port Arthur a Hell — Golden Hill 
Silenced — Terrific Missiles — A Vivid Picture — Blood, Blood Everywhere- 
Further Naval Movements — Hoist with its own Petard — Another Attempt 
to "Bottle" — Makaroff's Feint — Wary Enemies — Russians Taking Heart — 
Individual Heroism. 

E must now return to the naval operations; but before 

W dealing with the proceedings of Admiral Togo's fleet 
off Port Arthur, it will be well perhaps briefly to fol- 
low the fortunes of the Russian cruiser squadron sta- 
tioned at Vladivostock, of which so much had been expected as an 
agency for the destruction of Japanese commerce on the high seas. 

The first news received of these cruisers 
Firing on the after the outbreak of war did indeed ap- 

Unarmed P ear to bear out the hopes which the Rus- 
sians had entertained of them in this re- 
spect; but after one solitary exploit — the sinking of a Japanese 
merchantman— the squadron disappeared from view altogether, 
and for several weeks its movements became one of the most re- 
markable mysteries of a mysterious situation. It will be remembered 
that the vessels composing the squadron were the powerful first- 
class cruisers, the Gromoboi, the Bogatyr, the Rossia, and the Rttrik, 

IOI 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

and the whole was under the command of Captain Reitzenstein, 
formerly the commander of the Askold. Apparently the orders 
given to the Commodore were to cruise about the coast of Manchu- 
ria and Japan with the object of picking off stray merchantmen 
belonging to the enemy, and it was while he was acting in pur- 
suance of these instructions that Captain Reitzenstein, on February 
nth, fell in with two Japanese steamers — the Nakonoura Maru and 
the Zensko Maru, off the Tsugaru Straits, which lie between the 
islands of Hondo — the Japanese mainland — and Yezo. The larger 
of the two, the Nakonoura Maru, was an old ship, built in 1865, 
and of 1,084 tons burden; the smaller, the Zensko Maru, of only 319 
tons, was quite modern, having been built in 1895. They were 
bound in company from Sokata, in the province of Nizan, to Otaru, 
in Yezo. The older and slower boat fell an easy prey to the Rus- 
sian cruisers ; but it would seem that she offered fight-, for she was 
surrounded by the men-of-war, bombarded, and sunk, her crew 
being taken on board the Russian ships. This act called forth a 
great outburst of indignation in Japan and also in the United 
States; for though, of course, a merchantman can justifiably be 
captured as a prize of war, it is not usual to destroy an unarmed 
ship out of hand. The official telegrams, however, gave no par- 
ticulars as to the extent of the resistance offered, and it must be 
allowed that if the Nakonoura Maru absolutely refused to surren- 
der, the Russian men-of-war would have no option but to fire upon 
her and let her take the inevitable consequences. The Zensko Maru, 
more fortunate than her consort, showed the Russians a clear pair 
of heels and escaped safely to the shelter of the port of Fukuyama, 
in Yezo. 

This insignificant feat of arms was the sole success in the way 
of the destruction of commerce which could be put to the credit 

102 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of Captain Reitzenstein's squadron in the 
Snowstorms and early days of the war, and the fates soon 

Bitter Frost proved unkind to him. The stormy 
weather which inconvenienced the Mika- 
do's fleet off Port Arthur raged in the Japan Sea with peculiar 
severity, and for three days after the destruction of the Nakonoura 
Maru the Russian squadron flew before a heavy gale, aggravated 
by snowstorms and bitter frost. An official message from Admiral 
Alexeieff reporting these facts was the last authentic news of the 
Vladivostock squadron that reached the outside world for many 
weeks. Rumor upon the subject was, of course, busy in Russia. 
Now it was reported that the activity of Captain Reitzenstein had 
reduced the over-sea trade of Japan to a standstill ; v now it was stated 
(on the best authority, of course) that the squadron had escaped, 
and evading the Mikado's ships in some marvelous fashion, had 
joined the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; still a third and wilder story 
made out that it was on its way to Europe to effect a junction with 
the Baltic fleet, which, it was declared, was to be dispatched to the 
Far East in July. The truth appears to have been that after in- 
finite trouble and hardship Captain Reitzenstein managed once more 
to make Vladivostock, and that his storm-tossed ships took refuge 
again in the harbor, into which a free passage was maintained by 
the efforts of the ice-breakers. 

The Japanese Commanders, however, were ignorant of the 
whereabouts of this dangerous force, and a strong squadron was 

therefore sent into Japan Sea to search 
Reconnoitring at it out, and, if possible, destroy it alto- 

Vladivostock gether. The fleet dispatched for this pur- 
pose consisted of one battleship and six 
cruisers, with a torpedo-destroyer flotilla. The cruisers, it should 

103 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

be observed, included the newly-acquired Nisshin and Kasaga, 
which had just been fitted up for war. Rear-Admiral Kamimura, 
Admiral Togo's second in command at Port Arthur, had direction 
of the operations, no word of which was allowed at the time to leak 
out through the ordinary channels. A careful patrol was made of 
the whole of the coast, both of Manchuria and Japan, several days 
of this close search finally bringing the Japanese squadron to the 
very mouth of Vladivostock Harbor itself. Considerable excite- 
ment was caused in Russia's northern stronghold when, at 8.50 on 
the morning of March 6th, without any previous warning of the ap- 
proaching danger, the garrison perceived the hulls of seven great 
vessels loom upon the horizon to the south of Askold Island. The 
presence of the enemy so far north was wholly unexpected, and for 
some time the real character of the advancing squadron was in 
doubt. But within an hour all speculation was set at rest and the 
approaching vessels were seen to be flying the Japanese flag. The 
great size and imposing aspect of the new cruisers led the Russians 
to take them for battleships, whence they derived the mistaken idea 
that Admiral Togo was present himself with his main fleet. As a 
matter of fact, of course, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, with 
scarcely diminished forces, was still watching Port Arthur as a 
cat watches a mouse, and the circumstance that he could without 
difficulty spare so powerful a squadron for operations in a far dis- 
tant quarter of the theatre of war was at once a striking demon- 
stration of Japan's naval strength and of the straits to which the 
Czar's fleet had been reduced. 

By noon Admiral Kamimura's ships were half-way between 
the coast and Askold Island, making straight for Ussuri Bay, which 
lies to the southeast of Vladivostock. At the southern end of the 

104 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

peninsula on which the town and fortress of Vladivostock stand, 

and divided from it by a broad channel 

At the Mouth of called the Bosphorus Strait, there is sit- 

the Golden Horn uated the Island of Kazakavitch. The 

Bosphorus Strait lies in a northwesterly 

direction, and on the north side of it are two spacious inlets, Patro- 

clus Bay and Sobol Bay. Beyond these again lies the mouth of the 

Golden Horn, the Harbor of Vladivostock. 

The Japanese squadron steamed right on into the Bosphorus 
Strait, and when opposite Patroclus Bay it assumed order of battle. 

Admiral Alexeieff, in his official dispatch 

Careful Japanese to the Czar, declared that it took up a 

Calculation position 53/2 miles from the shore and 

out of range of the batteries; but the 

truth seems to be that, with the skill which so far has characterized 

all the Japanese naval operations, Admiral Kamimura manoeuvred 

to secure a station, which, while it was sufficiently within range 

to enable him to do execution to his foe, was, on the other hand, 

outside any possible line of fire from the fortress guns, with their 

necessarily limited arc of training. These dispositions for attack 

argued not only careful calculation beforehand, but considerable 

knowledge of the construction of the Russian forts and of the 

position occupied by their ordnance. 

At half-past one the Japanese ships opened fire with their big 
guns. Forts Suvaroff and Linievitch and the town along the valley 

of the River Obyasseniye were the main 

Bombardment at objects of the cannonade, and over these 

Long Rano-e the great shells continued to burst for 

close upon an hour, while the guns of the 

defenders were reduced to inactivity and impotence by the baffling 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

tactics of the Japanese Admiral. It is true that the bombardment was 
rather in the nature of a reconnaissance than a serious engagement, 
its aim being to induce the mysterious cruisers which were suspected 
of being within the harbor to issue forth and give battle; but it was 
an uncomfortable reminder to the Russians of the vulnerability of 
their powerful fortress from the sea and of the comparative immu- 
nity which a resourceful enemy might enjoy while making a danger- 
ous attack. The only account which has been received of the dam- 
age done comes from Russian sources. It does not appear to have 
been serious. A house in the town was knocked to pieces by a 12- 
inch shell, and an unfortunate woman, who was inside at the time, 
was killed; another shell burst in the courtyard of the Siberian 
Fleet Company, slightly wounding five sailors; but this was set 
down as the limit to the depredation committed by the Japanese 
gunners. On the other hand, the Russians consoled themselves for 
the ineffectiveness of their own artillery by calculating that the 
bombardment, by its expenditure of 200 shells, cost their enemy 
at least $100,000, a somewhat minute and peddling method of reck- 
oning up the balance of losses and gains in a great war. It should 
be added that the Czar did not fail to send the garrison a rather 
magniloquent telegram of congratulation, in which he spoke of 
their bravery under their baptism of fire. 

The demonstration failed to disclose the whereabouts of the 
missing cruiser squadron, and a similar result attended the scouting 

operations of the Japanese torpedo de- 
Russian Ships stroyers which were engaged during the 
Lying Low bombardment in searching Askold Island 

and the coast along the Ussuri Gulf. It 
seemed undoubted, however, in the light of subsequent events, that 
the Czar's ships were within the harbor at Vladivostock all the 

J 06 




• 




-. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

time, and that they felt unable to cope successfully with the power- 
ful fleet which was so eagerly seeking their destruction. Admiral 
Kamimura, who retired southwards after the bombardment, re- 
turned on the following day to the same position, and attempted 
once more to lure the hidden cruisers into the open; but his blandish- 
ments were without avail. He then conducted a thorough search 
of Amur Bay, which lies on the west side of the peninsula, and 
finding no traces of the enemy, departed finally southwards, leaving 
Vladivostock, for the time, in peace. 

The interest now shifted once more to Port Arthur, where 
exciting events were on the eve of occurring. Admiral Makaroff. 

the newly-appointed Commander-in- 
Makaroff to Chief of the Pacific Fleet, arrived ar 

the Rescue Port Arthur on the 8th of March. This 
gallant Admiral's reputation stands al- 
most as high with the navy as does General Kuropatkin's with the 
army. He has gained the confidence of the men who have served 
under him to an exceptional degree, and the immediate result of his 
presence at the seat of war was the infusion of a new spirit into the 
fleet and into the defending force generally. With immense vigor 
he proceeded to hurry on the repairs of the damaged warships and to 
prepare for active operations as the best means of restoring the 
somewhat shaken morale of the force under his command. The 
effect of this bolder and more enterprising policy soon became 
evident in the movements of the torpedo flotilla, which, under the 
feeble regime of Admiral Starck, had proved such a futile branch 
of the service. An opportunity for the trial of the new tactics came 
almost immediately, for within twenty-four hours after the hoisting 
of Admiral Makaroff's flag on the Askold, a renewed challenge 
came from the unresting enemy. It was destined to lead to one 

109 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the fiercest and most sanguinary combats yet experienced in the 
course of the war, a combat of such a close and hand-to«-hand char- 
acter as to recall the desperate struggles of earlier days, when the 
rival ships were grappled together and the final arbiters of victory- 
were the cutlass and the boarding-pike. 

At midnight on the 9th two divisions of the Japanese destroyer 
flotilla crept up once more towards the mouth of the entrance chan- 
nel. The first division, consisting of 
A Chance for three vessels, the Asashio, the Kasumi, 

Russian Torpedoes an ^ tne Akatsuki, and under the com- 
mand of Captain Asai, posted itself out- 
side the entrance to guard against the approach of the Russian 
flotilla ; while the second division occupied itself in laying a number 
of mines of a new pattern in various spots carefully selected before- 
hand for the purpose. These operations were carried out with en- 
tire coolness and success, in spite of the flashing searchlights and 
the fire from the forts — fire, however, which, according to Admiral 
Togo's official report, was desultory and ineffective. The fact was 
that on this occasion the Russians were determined to rely upon 
another weapon than garrison ordnance. Admiral Makaroff decided 
to give his torpedo destroyers the chance for which they must have 
longed under the nerveless leadership of Starck, and to send them 
forth to deliver a counter-attack upon the audacious foe. 

A flotilla of six of these vessels, under the command of Captain 
Matoussevitch, accordingly issued from the harbor and went in 

quest of the Japanese. About 4.30 in the 
Sea Fight at morning they fell in with Captain Asai's 

Close Quarters Division to the southwest of the Liau- 
tie-shan Peninsula. Though his foes out- 
numbered him by two to one, the Japanese commander did not hesi- 

110 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

tate for an instant, but, confident in the skill and courage of his men, 
he ordered an immediate attack, and the Asashio, the Kasumi, and 
the Akatsuki flew upon the enemy. A fierce struggle now ensued. 
The Japanese were heavily outnumbered, it is true, but their vessels 
were stronger individually than those of the Russians, and whereas 
the latter were armed only with 3-pound ers, the former carried 
6-pounders. Moreover, both officers and men had "found them- 
selves" in previous conflicts, and were flushed with a consciousness 
of power and the memory of past victories. Their shooting, too 
was superior to that of their opponents, and speedily made its 
impression. On the other hand, the Russians, set free at last from 
the paralyzing influences which had so long cramped their energies, 
leapt to the contest with a glad eagerness, and fought with desperate 
gallantry. The combatants drew closer and closer to one another 
till they were within a few yards' distance, and the execution done 
by the quick-firing guns was terrible. So near did one of the 
Russian destroyers approach that some bluejackets standing on its 
deck were able to throw by hand a charge of explosive onto the 
bridge of a Japanese boat. Fortunately for the latter, it failed to 
explode, and the Japanese poured in a withering fire in revenge. 
Two of the Russian vessels were so severely mauled during the early 
part of the fight that they were compelled to sheer off and retreat 
to Port Arthur. The others kept up the conflict much longer, though 
they were hopelessly outclassed. But a perfect rain of shell and 
small shot fell upon the devoted Muscovites; their engines were 
rapidly becoming disabled; some of them were on fire; and at last 
it became manifest that if they were to be saved at all they must 
retire. Retreat, therefore, they did, fighting hotly all the way, with 
the enemy hanging upon their flanks like hounds upon their quarry. 
At length they came within the protection of the forts, and the 

in 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

heavy fire which was directed upon the Japanese from that quarter 
compelled them sullenly to give up their hold and in their turn retire. 

The losses suffered by the Russian destroyers, in this hand-to- 
hand conflict, which lasted for about forty minutes, were not made 

public officially, but they must have been 

Severe Casualties considerable, if we may judge from the 
damage incurred by their victorious as- 
sailants. Seven of the Japanese were killed and eight were wounded, 
some of them severely. Prominent among these was Engineer 
Minamisawa, of the Kasumi, who peculiarly distinguished himself, 
and who received injuries which were reported as likely to prove 
mortal. This gallant officer had already covered himself with glory 
in the first torpedo attack upon Port Arthur, and in the heroic but 
fruitless attempt to block the harbor entrance on the 23 rd of Febru- 
ary. The damage done to the Japanese destroyers themselves was 
serious enough, but not such as to unfit them for service in a few 
days. The Akatsuki received a shell in her stokehold, which burst 
a pipe and filled the compartment with scalding steam — an accident 
which alone accounted for four of the lives which were lost. All 
three destroyers had their hulls and upper works knocked about by 
the Russian shells, but the injuries were above the water-line, and 
were made good with little difficulty. 

An even hotter and, for the Russians, more disastrous conflict 
took place a few hours later. As the second division of the Japa- 
nese flotilla, under Captain Tsuehiya, was 

Another leaving the roadstead at 7 A. M., having 

Hot Fight concluded its work of laying submarine 

mines, it encountered two other Russian 

destroyers which had been further out to sea to reconnoitre, and 

were now returning to Port Arthur. The Japanese at once threw 

112 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

themselves across the course of the newcomers to intercept them. 
The Russians, though on this occasion the outnumbered party, were 
nothing loth to face the danger which confronted them, and ad- 
vanced to meet it with unquenchable ardor. An engagement of an 
even more terrible character than that held three hours previously 
now took place, and lasted for upwards of fifty-five minutes. The 
Russians fought with the courage of despair, and succeeded in 
putting one of their formidable opponents out of action for the time, 
though the damage done was not ultimately irreparable. This feat 
was performed by the Stereguschtshi, commanded by Captain Ser- 
gueieff, which was more heavily armed than her companion, and 
carried a 12-pounder in addition to her ordinary 3 -pounders. A 
shell from this weapon struck the Japanese destroyer on the water- 
line and flooded two of her water-tight compartments. The supply 
of quick-firing ammunition was wetted and rendered useless, so that 
the vessel was unable to take any further active share in the conflict. 
Nor was this the only injury she sustained. Another shell burst 
upon her bridge, shivering it to fragments. One man was killed; 
but a lieutenant, a sub-lieutenant, and a signaller, who were on the 
bridge at the time, in some miraculous manner escaped. The terri- 
ble missile also carried away the binnacle and the engine-room 
telegraph instruments, and sent the davits flying. 

It was clear that the 12-pounder of the Stereguschtshi was too 
dangerous a weapon to be neglected, and, therefore, the other Japa-' 

nese destroyers concentrated their fire 

Unprecedented upon it, with the result that in a short 

Japanese Daring time it was completely dismantled and put 

out of action. In these operations the 

Sazanami played the most conspicuous part. She drew up so close 

upon the Stereguschtshi' s quarter that one of her bluejackets with 

H3 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

extraordinary daring actually leaped on board the Russian vessel, 
cutlass in hand. Just as he landed on the deck Captain Sergueieff 
emerged from his cabin. The impetuous Jap rushed at him like a 
tiger, and, beating down his guard, struck him a fearful blow on the 
head with his cutlass, felling him to the deck. The Russian at- 
tempted to rise, but before he could do so his terrible opponent 
kicked him overboard and he sank beneath the waves. 

Undismayed by the death of their captain, the crew of the 
Stereguschtshi still fought on with desperate gallantry against the 

raking fire of the Sazanami. The lieu- 
Carnage Indescribable tenant took over the command, but imme- 
diately afterwards a shell carried away 
both his legs, and he fell dead at his post. To him succeeded the 
sub-lieutenant, who endeavored bravely but in vain to bring the 
little vessel, wounded almost to the death as it was, into the shelter 
of the forts. He almost succeeded in his heroic attempt, but the 
implacable foe was not to be shaken off. The man at the wheel fell 
mortally wounded, and as the young lieutenant stepped forward 
to take it from his dying grasp he became himself the target of the 
terrible fusillade and dropped dead among his fallen brothers. Now 
at last, with hardly a man out of her crew of fifty-five still living, 
the Stereguschtshi lay a helpless log upon the waters, awaiting the 
long-deferred capture, but the fire from the forts rendered the task 
of taking her in tow an extremely dangerous one. Nevertheless, a 
Japanese lieutenant and a party of bluejackets from the Sazanami 
boarded her with a rope and made her fast. The deck of the Russian 
destroyer presented a horrible spectacle. Everywhere lay the 
corpses of her gallant crew, in some cases terribly mutilated by shell. 
Even in the few hurried moments at his disposal the Japanese lieu- 
tenant was able to count thirty bodies ; the appearance of the stoke- 

"4 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

hold defied description. Two stokers jumped overboard, and were 
picked up by the Japanese. The only other survivors were two 
sailors, who, directly the enemy boarded the vessel, rushed out of 
the conning tower, and, taking refuge in the after cabin, locked 
themselves in and refused absolutely to surrender. 

Now began the slow and laborious work of towing the captured 
boat out of range of the shore batteries, whose attentions were be- 
coming embarrassing and dangerous, 
Makaroff Outpaced Moreover, a new peril threatened the Jap- 
anese. Admiral Makaroff, perceiving the 
plight of the Stereguschtshi, had hoisted his flag on the Novik, and 
sallied forth with that cruiser and the Bayan, to the rescue. The 
other destroyer, it should be mentioned, thanks to the diversion 
caused by the heroic stand made by her consort, had in the mean- 
time managed to reach the harbor. Things began to look black for 
the Sazanami, as the Russian cruisers were rapidly approaching; but 
Admiral Tog'o was not to be caught napping, and his own cruiser 
squadron was not far away. Several of his ships advanced to the 
assistance of the plucky little destroyer, and finding himself out- 
numbered and outpaced, Makaroff reluctantly abandoned his attempt 
and steamed back to the protection of the forts. 

The Sazanami, however, was not destined to* save her prize. 
The sea was rough, and the Russian destroyer, riddled with holes, 

steadily began to fill with water. After 
A Useless Prize two hours' towing it became apparent that 

her condition was desperate, and the Jap- 
anese were compelled to cut the rope. A few moments afterwards 
the hapless prize gave one last lurch and sank beneath the waves 
with her tragic freight of dead. It was impossible to reach the two 
men in the cabin, and they perished with their ship. 

ll 5 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Thus ended one of the hottest conflicts yet experienced in the 
course of the naval fighting around Port Arthur. But this san- 
guinary affair was only the prelude to 
Bombardment by more important operations. Admiral 

Wireless Telegraphy Togo had made his arrangement for a 
bombardment of the town and fortress 
of the heaviest description, arrangements which, like the manoeuvres 
of Admiral Kamimura at Vladivostock, were conceived in the spirit 
of the most scientific warfare. As long as the Russian fleet remained 
undestroyed he was under an imperative necessity to risk his ships 
as little as possible against the great guns of the Port Arthur batter- 
ies, but to conduct a successful bombardment without coming within 
the range of their fire presented obvious difficulties. An indirect 
cannonade from Pigeon Bay, on the southwest side of the Liau-tie- 
shan Peninsula, would indeed deprive the enemy of any opportunity 
of replying with effect, but on the other hand in ordinary circum- 
stances the gunners of the attacking fleet would also have to aim 
very much at random, without being able to judge the results of 
their shooting. Nevertheless this difficulty was cleverly obviated by 
the Japanese Admiral. While stationing his battleships in Pigeon 
Bay he dispatched his cruiser squadron to take a position on the 
east side of Port Arthur Bay, at right angles to the line of fire, to 
observe the effects of the bombardment, and to communicate sugges- 
tions by wireless telegraphy during its progress. The post of the 
cruisers in turn was adroitly selected so that while they could see 
what was going on, they were outside the angle of fire of the forts. 
These careful dispositions were completed by ten o'clock on 
the morning of the ioth, and at that hour once more "the red fire 
and smouldering clouds out brake." For close upon five hours a 

116 




L.d,,», .t^....; ... 



THE TOKIO MILITARY HOSPITAL— OFFICERS QUARTEPS. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

storm of shells was poured upon the devoted fortress. The defend- 
ing guns attempted to return the fire, but their efforts were inter- 
mittent and ineffective. On the otner 
Port Arthur . 

„ ,. hand, the great projectiles from the 12- 

a Hell & F J 

inch guns of the Japanese battleships 

wrought immense havoc both in the forts and in the town. A 
shell burst close to the house of a lawyer named Sidorski, 
and wrecked the building; M. Sidorski himself was killed on the 
spot. The wife of Colonel Baron Frank, who was in the house at 
the time, sustained terrible injuries, and her daughter's head was 
blown off. A young lady named Waleritsch was so seriously 
wounded by another shell that she died soon after her removal to 
the hospital. An English advocate, a Mr. Newton, was blown to 
pieces. The house of General Volkoff was completely destroyed, 
and two sentries only just escaped death. A train which was enter- 
ing the town from the North was struck by a 12-inch shell; the 
engine was shattered into a thousand fragments and the driver was 
killed. And now to add to the horrors of the situation, fires began 
to break out in various quarters of the town, and the panic-stricken 
inhabitants fled to the race course, where, behind the shelter of the 
hills, they were able to find some respite from the terrible tornado 
which had burst upon them. 

While all this devastation was being hurled upon the town, the 
forts themselves were passing through a hot time. The Japanese, 

assisted by the skilful manoeuvre before 
Golden Hill Silenced described, had found the range for their 

high angle fire perfectly, whereas the bat- 
teries of the defending force could do lit- 
tle or nothing in return. The official accounts issued from the Rus- 
sian side, while admitting the severity when the bombardment 

"9 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

visited the town, said little about the damage to the fortifications or 
the losses sustained by the garrison ; but the reports received from 
other and independent sources, while varying a good deal in details, 
agreed in representing the total result as being of the most serious 
character. It is said that twenty soldiers were killed and that many 
more were wounded. The Governor of Port Arthur himself, Gen- 
eral Stoessel, who was on the batteries during the hottest of the fire, 
had a narrow escape. A shell burst near to the spot on which he 
was standing with his staff, and bespattered the whole party with 
splinters and sand. The forts on Golden Hill suffered severely, and 
two guns were put out of action. Nor did the ships in the harbor 
come off scatheless. Heavy casualties among their crews were 
reported, and it was stated that the unfortunate Retvisan, which had 
already borne so much, received still further damage. 

The Port Arthur journal, the Novi Krai, gave a terrible picture 
of the scenes on the cruiser Bay an. 

"The bursting shells," said the writer, "bowled over man after 
man until the decks were slippery with blood. Amidst this hell the 
captain stood unmoved in the conning tower calmly telephoning his 
orders to the captains of the guns. His wonderful coolness had a 
remarkable influence on all the officers. The cockpit was soon 
crowded with wounded, thirty-nine men being brought down before 
the fight ended. 

"Amid the crash of the guns, the hiss of the flying projectiles, 
and the thunder of their explosions, the smashing of splinters, and 
the din of the working engines, the surgeons labored quietly among 
the wounded on the hospital operating table. Although some of 
the mert suffered frightful agony, few groans were heard, in spite 
of the fact that anaesthetics were only administered in one case." 

For hours that to the heart-shaken inhabitants must have ap- 

120 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




SKETCH. PLAN 



PORT ARTHURS 
MAIN FORTIFICATIONS 



121 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

peared interminable, the great shells, each of the enormous weight 

of 850 lbs., continued to hurtle through 
Terrific Missiles the air and to burst over the harassed 

stronghold. The sensations of a garrison 
in such circumstances are well described in a letter which a wounded 
Russian officer wrote from the hospital in Port Arthur to a friend 
in Russia. He is recounting his experiences of the first bombard- 
ment, but the account is so vivid and would apply so well to the more 
trying ordeal of the 10th of March that it will bear reproduction 
here. 

"The sea," he says, "is quite white from the falling shells, and 
it is impossible to hear the words of command. I cry out until my 

voice becomes hoarse, but cannot make 
A Vivid Picture myself heard above the din. There are 

more than 150 cannon belching forth 
smoke, shell and death. There is a wild, choking sound from the 
machine guns. Amid the smoke, steam and dust I hear a groan', it 
is that of a soldier whose nose has been torn away by the fragment 
of a shell. He is surrounded by stretcher bearers. Someone lays 
his hand on my shoulder, and I turn and see at my side a soldier, 
pale, and his lips trembling. He wishes to speak, but his tongue 
refuses to obey. He points with his finger, and I understand what 
has occurred. 

"There beneath the cliff I hear a little battery of rapid firing 
guns, very small and elegant. There are 12,000 bullets speeding on 

their errand in sixty seconds. They are 

Blood— Blood destined to defend our shores against the 

Everywhere landing of an enemy. The orgy is at its 

height. The shells are bursting around 
us like fireworks at a feast. A whistle, a hiss, and a sharp ringing 

122 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

noise, as they rush through the air, then smoke and a smell of burn 
ing, while the sand dances from the earth. I turn from the batterj 
and see a terribe picture. In the midst of the men a shell bursts 
One soldier is disemboweled, and another is wounded in the headi 
a third is shrieking in the height of his delirium. One steel cannon 
is broken to pieces as though it were straw. An awful picture, with 
blood — blood everywhere." 

At last, at two o'clock, the inferno ceased. A great calm suc- 
ceeded to the thunder of the guns and the screams of the shells, and 

the civilians of Port Arthur slowly and 

Further Naval timidly returned to their ruined homes. 

Movements The separate divisions of the Japanese 

fleet rejoined one another, and after the 

most destructive bombardment yet inflicted upon the land defences 

of the Russian stronghold, they quietly steamed away southwards. 

While these events were taking place at Port Arthur a detached 

squadron of the Mikado's cruisers had proceeded northeast to Dalny, 

or Talienwan, as it used to be called, and destroyed the quarantine 

buildings erected by the Russians on the Sanshan Islands Outside 

that port the Takasago and the Chihaya scouted the western coast 

of the entrance to Port Arthur in the hope that the bombardment 

would draw Admiral Makaroff's ships into the open ; but no enemy 

could be found and the two cruisers then retired in the wake of the 

main squadron. 

It was not long before a Russian vessel fell a victim to the 
mines laid by the Japanese destroyers at the harbor entrance on the 

night of March 9th. On the 1 6th the 

Hoist With its Skori, a torpedo-boat destroyer of the 

Own Petard newest pattern, was entering the channel 

when she struck upon a contact mine and 

125 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

was blown up. Out of her crew of fifty-five men, only four were 
reported to have been saved. 

After an interval of twelve days Admiral Togo made a renewed 
attack upon Port Arthur, the fifth in number since the outbreak of 

hostilities. It was not so serious an as- 

Another Attempt sault as the last, its real object being to 

to Bottle tempt the Russian fleet away from the 

protection of the shore batteries and to 
give battle at sea. In this design it was unsuccessful, but incidently 
it was useful, as revealing the strength of the squadron Admiral 
Makaroff had at his disposal after the repairs which had been 
effected upon the damaged ships. At midnight on the 21st two 
Japanese destroyers were discovered by the searchlights approaching 
the outer roadstead. The guns of the batteries at once gave tongue, 
and a violent fire was directed against the daring craft, not only 
from the fortress but from the gunboats Bobe and Otvagni; which, 
according to Admiral Alexeieff's report to the Czar, compelled them 
to retire. A second flotilla crept up at 4 o'clock in the morning, 
and this too, it was claimed by the Viceroy, was repulsed. A dif- 
ferent complexion, however, was put upon the operation by Ad- 
miral Togo's dispatch to his Government. The destroyers retired 
indeed, but seemingly not in consequence of the Russian fire, which 
left them unharmed, but as part of a preconceived plan to lure forth 
Admiral Makaroff's fleet. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief's 
words were: "The combined fleet acted according to program. 
Two flotillas of our destroyers were outside Port Arthur, as in- 
structed, from the night of the 21st till the morning of the 22nd. 
Although during this time they were under the enemy's fire they 
did not sustain any damage." It is clear from this that the aim of 
Jthe Russian gunners leaves much to be desired, for the attacking 

126 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

flotilla were able to cruise about in the roadsteads without being 
touched. 

At eight o'clock on the morning- of the 22nd the main fleet ar- 
rived off Port Arthur. The same tactics as were employed on the 

10th were adopted on this occasion, but 
Makaroff 's Feint with some modification. Only two battle- 
ships, the Fuji and the Yashima, were 
sent to Pigeon Bay to undertake an indirect bombardment of the 
town; while the Admiral, with his main squadron, took up a posi- 
tion more convenient for an attack upon the Russian fleet should it 
put out to sea. The cannonade lasted again for several hours, but 
his main purpose, that of drawing Admiral Makaroff into the open, 
was not successful. At one period, indeed, the hopes of the Japan- 
ese ran high. The Russian fleet was seen to issue from the harbor 
as if ready for battle, with the cruiser Askold, flying the flag of the 
Commander-in-Chief, at their head. It was now observed that the 
available naval force of the Czar at Port Arthur consisted of five 
battleships and four cruisers, as well as destroyers, gunboats, and 
torpedo-boats. The battleships of course included the Pobieda, 
12,674 tons, and the Sevastopol, 10,950 tons, which were undergo- 
ing repairs when the first battle took place. None of the five, it 
will be remembered, was equal to the Japanese battleships, either in 
size or in armament, and the cruiser strength was still more dispro- 
portionate. Nevertheless, they made a gallant show, and for a time 
it seemed as if they were prepared to come to close quarters on blue 
water. Admiral Makaroff, however, bold and enterprising as he is, 
did not feel in a position to take such a strong step, and, to the dis- 
appointment of the Japanese, he kept his ships well within the zone 
of protection afforded by the shore batteries, while he joined them 
in returning the fire of the enemy. 

127 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The objects of the two Admirals were indeed identical. Each 
sought to bring about a battle on his own terms, and each was too 

wary to be persuaded. The Russian at- 
Wary Enemies tempted to lure his enemy within the 

range of the forts ; the Japanese endeav- 
ored to draw the Russian away from the range of the forts; and 
neither was successful in his blandishments. Finally, Admiral Togo 
gave the order to cease firing, and his fleet retired southwards once 
more. The Russians claimed to have struck one of their opponent's 
battleships ; but Admiral Togo in his report distinctly stated that his 
ships suffered no damage, though a good many shells fell near the 
Fuji in the course of the indirect bombardment. 

Although Admiral Makaroff did not venture out to sea with 
his smaller squadron when the Japanese fleet was absolutely upon 

the spot, this did not prevent him from 
Russians Taking engaging in active operations of a much 

Heart more daring character than any his pre- 
decessor had dreamt of. On the 26th, 
for example, he took out the whole of the ships under his com- 
mand for a reconnaissance to the Hwang-Ching-Tau Islands, a 
group situated about thirty miles to the southwest of Port Arthur, 
a proceeding that must have heartened both officers and men con- 
siderably. No trace of the enemy's warships was discovered, but 
while the fleet was making its way back to Port Arthur, the Novik 
fell in with a small merchant steamer, the Hanien Maru, on board 
of which were a number of Japanese newspaper correspondents. 
The crew were transferred to the warship and the steamer was taken 
in tow and subsequently sunk. The whole Russian squadron re- 
turned safely to Port Arthur after this excursion without once com- 
ing in sight of the enemy. 

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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

But in the meantime the Japanese were busy with fresh plans. 
Unable to draw Admiral Makaroff away from the protection of the 

forts when the whole Japanese fleet was 
Individual Heroism lying in wait, Admiral Togo determined 
to use another card in this game of skill. 
The project of corking up the bottle at Port Arthur, though a fail- 
ure on the first attempt, had not by any means been abandoned, and 
on the very night of Admiral Makaroff's cruise to the Hwang- 
Ching-Tau Islands, a fresh effort was made to block the harbor en- 
trance. It resulted in operations which, although again only par- 
tially successful, were most brilliantly executed, and were marked 
not only by consummate skill, but by acts of individual heroism and 
self-sacrifice of the most inspiring kind. Nor was the gallantry 
confined to one side alone. The Russians were not slow to accept 
the opportunities for glory vouchsafed to them by the daring of 
their foe, and one of the features of the conflict was the attack by a 
solitary torpedo-boat upon six of the Japanese flotilla. 



131 



CHAPTER V. 

V jlunteers for Fireships — A Drama of Searchlights — The Devil's Caldron — 
The Sacrifice of Fire — Heroic Hirose — Undaunted by Death — Covering 
Themselves with Glory — Casualties Few but Terrible — The Hero of Japan 
—Channel Still Unclosed— The Shadows of Fate— The Great Catastrophe— 
The Story of the "Petropavlovsk" — A Double Trap — Captain Oda and his 
Mines — The "Bayan" to the Rescue — Preparing an Ambush — Makaroff 
Lured Out — Cutting off the Unwary — Weather Permitting — Into the Jaws 
of Death — Haphazard Fire — Rescue Work — The Character of the Ex- 
plosion — Accounts of Survivors — Tribute from the Japanese — On Land — 
Chong-Ju — The Advance to the North — Concentration of Troops — Kurokfs 
Line of Front — The Russian Position — Russian Confidence. 

S on the occasion of the first effort to block the harbor at 
&T^£ Port Arthur, so upon the second a spirited competition 
I— II took place among the Japanese officers and men for the 
^ «■ honor of occupying the post of danger upon the fireships. 
The claim of the gallant men who had charge of the previous at- 
tempt to finish the work which they had so well begun was finally 

conceded, their Commander-in-Chief 
Volunteers for himself deciding the question. Four 

Fireships merchantmen, larger than those already 
sunk, had been filled with stones and ex- 
plosives and were ready for the desperate enterprise. The whole 
fleet left the rendezvous on the 26th of March under the cover of 
night, and accompanied the fireships up to a distance of some miles 
from Port Arthur. There the Admiral gave his final orders, and 
escorted by a flotilla of eleven destroyers and six torpedo-boats, 
which were spread out fanwise in front of them, the doomed vessels 
started upon their last and proudest voyage, 

133 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

It was midnight when they set forth, and there was no moon. 
An inky darkness brooded over the waters, which lay still and calm 

like a village pond. No sound was heard, 
A Drama of no light was shown on the flotilla as, 

Searchlights steadily and inexorably, it pursued its 
fateful passage over the silent sea. The 
only ray of light visible came from the distant- searchlight on Golden 
Hill, set like the eye of a Cyclops, in the forehead of Port Arthur. 
Slowly and monotonously the broad refulgent beam swept back- 
wards across the bay, throwing into strong relief every object upon 
which it fell within a radius of more than two miles. Every moment 
it seemed to the tense expectancy of the advancing force that their 
presence must be revealed, but still they held on their course with 
calm and patient courage, and still the slow minutes dragged along 
without any sign of suspicion on the part of the garrison. At 
last, when the Japanese had approached so near that they could 
make out the dim contour of the fortress and the surrounding 
heights, the moving light settled for a moment upon the lines of the 
foremost torpedo-boats. Another instant and a startling change 
had come over the scene. Swiftly the searchlight flashed up and 
down, backwards and forwards it plunged and replunged upon the 
stealthy foe until the whole flotilla, approaching with such grim de- 
termination, lay exposed to the view of the Russian sentries. The 
trumpets rang out, the garrison sprang to arms, and a storm of 
shot and shell once more burst forth from the great guns of Golden 
Hill. 

As the gallant Japanese made straight for the harbor entrance 
the batteries on the Tiger's Tail joined in the fierce cannonade, and 
from more than a hundred guns a hail of shells was poured down, 
till the still waters of the bay were torn up into a maelstrom of 

&34 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

foam, "white as the bitten lip of hate." But the calm resolution of 

the attacking force was undisturbed. The 
The Devil's Caldron fan-like formation of the escorting flotilla 

opened out more widely, and the fireships, 
passing swiftly through, drove straight into the devil's cal- 
dron in front of them. A mile away stood the point for which 
they aimed, a mile charged every yard of it with destruction and 
death. But setting their teeth dauntlessly, intent only on gaining 
the fateful goal, the picked crews of the merchantmen pressed for- 
ward upon their desperate errand. 

At last they reached the harbor mouth. The leading steamer, 
the Chiyo Maru, drove straight from the east side of the channel, 

heedless of the terrible fire of which she 
The Sacrifice of Fire was the central target. Everything was 

ready ; the anchor was dropped ; the fuse 
was set; and swiftly but with precision the crew slipped into the 
boats and made off. A moment later a terrific explosion rent the 
ship from stem to stern, and down she sank through the boiling 
waters. 

The next to take her position was the Fukui Maru, which, edg- 
ing to the port side of the Chiyo Maru, let go her anchor. Now 

occurred one of the most heroic acts 
Heroic Hirose which had yet characterized the course 

of the war — an act which for cool and 
devoted gallantry has never been surpassed in the annals of Euro- 
pean seamanship. Waiting until the vessel was securely anchored, 
the boatswain, Sujino, went calmly down to the magazine to light 
the fuse. Just at that moment the Russian torpedo-boat Silni ap- 
proached and discharged a Whitehead torpedo, which struck the 

135 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Fukui Maru full in the bows and tore a gaping hole in her below the 
water-line. Sujino was killed, but his comrades on deck were un- 
aware of his fate. All they knew was that the Russians themselves 
had done their work for them and that the vessel was settling down 
on the very spot designed for its destruction by Admiral Togo. 
Commander Hirose, therefore, ordered his men to take to the boats, 
but before he left the ship himself he determined to find the brave 
Sujino if possible and save him from death. The steamer was fast 
sinking ; the water was pouring in at her bows like a mill race ; and 
she was the target of a perfect tornado of fire from the forts ; but 
the gallant commander searched through her three times for the 
missing man before he would give up the quest. At last it became 
clear that further search was useless. The vessel was on the point 
of going down, and reluctantly Hirose clambered into one of the 
boats. As the crew pushed off the Fukui Maru went down by the 
head. Success, however, was dearly purchased. The delay had 
enabled the Russians to concentrate their fire upon the boats with 
deadly effect. The chief victim himself was Commander Hirose. A 
shell struck him on the head, carrying away the greater part of his 
body, and leaving in the boat only a shapeless fragment of torn and 
blackened flesh. 

In the meanwhile, the other steamers were taking up their sta- 
tions in the order provided beforehand. The Yihiko Maru, regard- 
less of the terrible fire from the forts, 
Undaunted by Death steamed in on the port side of the Fukui 

Maru and cast anchor in her turn. The 
fuse was duly set and lighted ; officers and crew set off in the boats ; 
and the ship blew up like her fellows and sank in the channel. Now 
came the opportunity of the fourth and last of this devoted fleet, 
the Yoneyama Maru. The difficulties of the channel and the vio- 

136 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

lence of the enemy's fire led her to take a devious course, but the 
skill with which she was steered excited universal admiration. Her 
commander drove her through on the starboard side of the sunken 
Chiyo Maru and then she was compelled to turn back and slip be- 
tween that ship and the Fukui Maru. On her way she ran right 
upon a Russian destroyer and engaged it at close quarters for a few 
moments, but her duty was not to fight but to sink at a spot se- 
lected. Escaping therefore, from the clutches of the enemy, she 
rounded the Fukui Maru and the Yahiko Maru and finally brought 
up in the very centre of the fairway. There her crew prepared to send 
her to the bottom, and if the operation could have been carried out 
successfully there can be little doubt that the whole enterprise would 
have gained its object, and that the channel would, at least tempor- 
arily, have been completely blocked. But the Russian torpedo-boats 
were active. One of their deadly engines of destruction struck the 
Yoneyama Maru just as the crew were about to cast anchor, and she 
drifted somewhat to the westward before she sank, her bow point- 
ing towards the Tiger's Tail. Her crew escaped safely, but this acci- 
dent left too wide a space between the Yoneyama Maru and the 
Yahiko Maru to effect a total obstruction of the channel. 

All this time the torpedo-boat and destroyer flotilla had been 
far from idle. The destroyers consisted of the Shirakumo, Kasumi, 

Asashio, Akatsuki, Akebono, Oboro, Ina- 
Covering Themselves yuma, Ikadsuchi, Usugomo, Sayanami, 
With Glory an d Shinonome, while the torpedo-boats 
were the following: the Karigane, Aot- 
aka, Misasagi, Tsubame, Managuru, and Hato. Several of these, 
it will be remembered, had already covered themselves with glory 
in previous combats. On this occasion they fully maintained their 
high reputation. The hot cannonade which was directed from the 

*37 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fortress upon the flreships so far from deterring the escorting ves- 
sels acted rather as an attraction to them, for while one division of 
the flotilla stood by the doomed steamers in order to pick up their 
crews, the other approached well within range of the garrison artil- 
lery in order to divert its fire from the main operation which was 
proceeding in the channel. Here it was that the Silni, under Lieu- 
tenant Krinizki, came into contact with the Japanese torpedo-boats. 
Without a moment's hesitation that gallant commander engaged the 
whole six at once. The unequal combat could not be long main- 
tained, but it was fierce while it lasted. Lieutenant Krinizki himself 
was wounded, Engineer Artificer Swyereff and six seamen were 
killed and twelve other men were wounded. But still, the remainder 
fought gallantry on till a shell burst one of the little vessel's steam 
pipes and destroyed her steering-gear. Her power to continue in 
action was gone, and she was beached upon the shore below Golden 
Hill. 

The work of the Japanese expeditions was now done. The 
survivors of the flreships were by this time all picked up and the sev- 
eral vessels of the flotilla were concentrated and retired out to sea. 

In this remarkable operation the Japanese lost in all four killed 
and nine wounded. Of these latter Lieutenant Hatsuzo sustained 
very severe injuries; the wounds of the others, including Lieutenant 

Masaki and Engineer Awada, being of a 
Casualties Few slighter character. In the circumstances 

But Terrible it was surprising that the casualties were 
so few, and one more illustration was 
given of the comparative impunity with which torpedo attacks can 
be made in harbor under cover of night. The smallness, however, 
of the Japanese losses in this species of fighting in the present war, 
must, of course, be largely attributable to bad shooting on the part 

il38 




DESOLATION IN MANCHURIA. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the Russian gunners, and it would be unwise to draw too general 
a lesson from it. 

The most severe loss sustained by the Japanese was that of the 
gallant Commander Hirose, whose death, while it inflamed his com- 
rades with pride, caused universal mourn- 
The Hero of Japan ing. He had only recently been pro- 
moted for the skill and courage which he 
had displayed in the previous attempt to block the harbor. He was 
then in command of the Hokoku Maru, and regardless of the appall- 
ing fire directed upon her, he managed to rush his ship further than 
any of her companions up the channel before he blew her up and 
sent her to the bottom. An act of particularly cool, almost reckless, 
daring on his part on that occasion was now fondly recalled by his 
men. The ship was sinking, she was the target of all the Russian 
batteries, and the crew had taken refuge in the boats; but Com- 
mander Hirose had forgotten something. It was nothing less im- 
portant than his sword, which he had left on the bridge. So, in spite 
of the imminent peril of the situation, he coolly went back to recover 
it, buckled it on, and escaped into the boat just in time, for the ship 
went down a moment afterwards. Commander Hirose was well 
known in naval circles in England, for he was a visitor to those 
shores a few years before on business for the Japanese Admiralty, 
and had made many friends. His remains were conveyed to Japan 
and accorded a public funeral, and the Mikado only expressed the 
feelings of the whole nation when he posthumously conferred upon 
the fallen hero the Order of the Kite and the Order of the Rising 
Sun. 

The exact amount of obstruction caused in the channel by the 
sinking of the fireships could not be ascertained. It is, however, ap- 
parent from subsequent events that whatever inconvenience to navi- 

141 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

gation, temporary or permanent, may have resulted, it was not suffi- 
citnt to prevent the passage of Admiral MakarofFs ships. At day- 
break on the very morning of the attack 
Channel Still Unclosed he led his whole fleet out and lined it up 

in the roadstead in readiness to meet the 
Japanese fleet, which was in sight ten miles out at sea. Seeing, how- 
ever, that his enemy had no intention of coming outside the range 
of the forts, Admiral Togo was not to be tempted nearer, and retired 
with the whole of his force to the southward. For several days he 
did not give any outward signs of activity, and his ships were not 
sighted off Port Arthur, a fact which gave rise to the impression that 
he was engaged in covering the transport of fresh Japanese troops to 
the west coast of Korea. On the other hand, the vigilance of Admiral 
Makaroff showed no indication of abating. On the 6th of April the 
steamer Haimun, specially chartered for the service of the London 
Times, was overhauled by the cruiser Bay an at a distance of thirty- 
five miles to the southeast of Port Arthur. A shot fired across the 
Haimun's bows brought her to, and two lieutenants put off with a 
boat's crew and boarded her. The greatest politeness was shown, 
and after an examination of the Haimun's papers she was allowed to 
proceed. The Times' correspondent was able to observe that the 
Bayan, which was flying the flag of the Admiral himself, showed 
signs of injuries received in the recent fighting. Marks produced by 
splinters of shell were visible all over her, and a large hole had been 
rent in one of her smoke-stacks. This fact seems to bear out the 
story published in the Port Arthur Journal of the destruction 
wrought upon the Bayan by the high-angle fire of the Japanese in 
the bombardment of the ioth of March. The correspondent added 
that the officers and men who boarded his steamer "were a little fine 
drawn, but nevertheless looked good material.''* Some indication can 

142 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

be gathered from this statement of the strain which Admiral Togo's 
repeated attacks had involved upon his opponents. The constant 
anxiety had necessarily begun to tell upon the defending force, and 
many more than the officers and crew of the Bay an must have 
acquired that gaunt, tense appearance that comes from a sense of 
ever-impending danger heightened by a past experience of tragedy 
and disaster. No better illustration, indeed, of the watchfulness en- 
tailed on the Russians by the perpetual menace of their foe could be 
given than the case of Admiral Makaroff himself, who sent the 
following telegram to the President of the War Relief Society at 
Kronstadt on March 29th : — 

"Last night was a very hot one, but we cannot hope for a very 
quiet time now or in the near future. I sleep without undressing 
in order that I maybe ready for any emergency. Consequently, I 
cannot observe your medical advice to take care of myself; never- 
theless, I feel splendid." 

These words were destined soon to receive a fulfilment more 
heart-shaking than any that can have presented itself as possible 

to the mind either of the writer of the 
The Shadows of Fate letter or of its recipient. For even then 

stern Fate was standing ready with the 
abhorred shears; the shadows were gathering round the head of 
the devoted Makaroff ; and his weary watch, pursued so bravely, so 
unflinchingly, and, alas for him and his country, so unavailingly, 
was moving swiftly towards its tragic close. 

For on April 13th the telegraph wires flashed all over the 
world the news of a blow to Russia's might in the Far East, more 

appallingly dramatic in its suddenness 
The Great Catastrophe and more fatal in its consequences 

than any that had yet befallen her in the 
143 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

preceding two months of bungling and misfortune. The stunning 
intelligence was conveyed to the Czar in the following telegram 
from Rear-Admiral Grigorovitch, Naval Commandant at Port 
Arthur : — 

"The battleship Petropavlovsk struck a mine, which exploded 
and the vessel capsized. 

"Our squadron is lying under Golden Hill and the Japanese 
squadron is approaching. 

"Admiral Makaroff apparently perished with the Petrop- 
avlovsk. 

"The Grand Duke Cyril, who was saved, was slightly wounded. 

"I beg humbly to report to your Majesty that those saved from 
the Petropavlovsk up to the present are Grand Duke Cyril, six 
officers, 32 sailors, all wounded. The bodies of four officers, a sur- 
geon, and 12 sailors have been found. 

"The Japanese fleet has disappeared. Details will be supplied 
by Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, who has assumed provisional 
command of the fleet." 

Swiftly upon the track of this first message there followed the 
brief account of a further disaster, which placed another of Rus- 
sia's finest battleships hors de combat.. Prince Ukhtomsky tele- 
graped that "during some manoeuvring of the battleship squadron, 
the Pobieda was struck by a mine amidships on the starboard side. 
She was able to gain the port by herself and none on board were 
killed or wounded." 

The news of this fearful debacle created a paralyzing effect in 

official circles at St. Petersburg, and 

The Story of spread consternation among Russia's 

the "Petropavlovsk" sympathizers throughout Europe- The 

first brief reports left room for speculation 

144 




BLOWING UP OF THE PETROPAVLOVSK. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

as to the cause of the disaster, and an accident was conjectured 
such as that which had destroyed the Yenesei; but the later accounts 
and the dispatches of Admiral Togo to his Government speedily 
put the real facts beyond doubt. It then became known to the 
world that Admiral Makaroff had fallen a victim to the deeply- 
laid plans of his brilliant adversary, and, moreover, that the whole 
Russian fleet had only narrowly escaped capture or complete de- 
struction. The story of the operations which practically gave the 
coup de grace to the Czar's maritime power in the Far East is a 
remarkable one. It shows what a revolutionary effect the dis- 
coveries of modern science have had upon naval warfare, and it 
proves, too, how completely the lessons of that science have been 
assimilated by the Japanese. 

On the nth of April Admiral Makaroff, still pursuing his 
policy of activity, took the whole of his effective squadron out to 
sea, for a distance of six miles to the south of Port Arthur and ex- 
ercised it in manoeuvres. No sign of the enemy was perceived, 
and the fleet returned to the harbor in safety. 

But Admiral Togo was not far away. Despairing of ordinary 
means of tempting Admiral Makaroff into the open to meet his 

more powerful fleet, he was preparing a 

A Double Trap double trap in which to catch his wary 

foe. He hoped, by the display of a mark- 
edly inferior force, to entice him beyond the range of the forts 
and then rush in with his battleships and capture or destroy the 
whole of the Russian fleet. But in the event of failure in this 
manoeuvre, he had ready another scheme. The course taken by the 
Russian ships on leaving and returning to the harbor on the oc- 
casion of the frequent excursions which they had made of late 
had been carefully noted by the Japanese officers, and Togo had 

H7 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

determined to mine the passage extensively, so that even if the 
enemy eluded a decisive battle at sea, he still hoped to do damage 
to their ships by driving them in the hurry and confusion of a head 
long flight upon the hidden perils of his mine field. As it turned 
out, this part of his plan succeeded, and the result was probably 
even more startlingly effective than he expected ; but it was only by 
a mere chance, as already mentioned, that the other and grander 
portion of his scheme failed of realization. If he had managed to 
interpose his powerful fleet between the Russian Squadron and Port 
Arthur, there can be little doubt that, although he himself would 
probably have sustained some severe losses, the Czar's naval force 
in the Pacific, already weakened by its former disasters, would 
have been practically eliminated. As it was, indeed, the success 
he attained was sufficiently striking. By it he secured the decisive 
supremacy of the sea in the Gulf of Pechili, and rendered possible 
at last the important movements on land which the strategists at 
Tokio were waiting to initiate. 

The arrangements of the Japanese were carried out with their 
usual thoroughness. At midnight on the 12th of April, the fourth 

and fifth destroyer flotillas and the four- 
Captain Oda teenth torpedo flotilla reached Port Ar- 
and His Mines tnur roadstead, having with them under 

escort the mining ship, the Koryo Mar u. 
The Koryo Maru was a new vessel of 2,700 tons burden, specially 
constructed for topedo and mining work. Captain Oda, the offi- 
cer in command, was one of the ablest experts in this branch of 
warfare in the Japanese navy, and he had only recently been dec- 
orated for his distinguished services. He had invented a new type 
of mine of a particularly deadly description, and it was now to be 
tried for the first time in actual warlike operations. The work 

148 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of laying the mines was entered upon without delay, and with all 
the customary daring and resource exhibited by the Mikado's sail- 
ors in this dangerous class of service. Notwithstanding the relent- 
less glare of the searchlights, which threw the vessel into strong 
relief and made her the target for two hundred guns, Captain 
Oda and his men calmly went about their work unheeding. The 
torpedo-boats and destroyers in the meantime took up a position 
on the flanks of the Koryo and endeavored to attract the fire of the 
fortress to themselves, while their escort was doing her deadly work 
unsuspected. The enterprise was aided by a renewal of the extra- 
ordinary feebleness and lack of skill which had so often been char- 
acteristic of the Russian defense in the past. Not only were the 
garrison gunners unable to hit the mark so plainly presented to 
them, but the torpedo flotilla, which, despite its recent losses, still 
constituted a formidable force, did nothing to interfere with opera- 
tions which threatened so vitally the safety of the fleet. Even Ad- 
miral Makaroff seems to have been at fault on this occasion. It is 
almost inconceivable that the true nature of the Koryo' s proceed- 
ings was not guessed by him, and that the most active measures 
were not taken to put a stop to them. Whatever may have been 
the reason, however, nothing effective was done, and Captain Oda 
was able to complete his work unharmed in spite of the shells which 
were churning up the water all round him. It must be remem- 
bered, nevertheless, that the immunity which the Koryo actually 
enjoyed is no measure of the risk that she ran. No more heroic 
and devoted act illumines the long history of naval warfare than 
the laying of these mines close to the harbor, and under the full 
fire of the enemy's guns, any one of whose missiles, by exploding 
the dangerous cargo, might have sent the ship to destruction in a 
moment. But, as it turned out, the Koryo was saved by the bad 

149 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

gunnery of the Russians, and having performed his duty well and 
thoroughly, Captain Oda withdrew to the open sea. 

In the meanwhile, the torpedo-boats and destroyers, besides 
distracting the attention of the defending force from the work of 
the mine transport, were engaged in more active operations on their 
own account. At dawn the second division fell in with one of the 
enemy's destroyers, the Strashni, which was creeping stealthily 
towards the harbor mouth from the direction of Dalny. The Jap- 

. anese were on her track in a moment, 
"Bayan" to the Rescue and, cutting off her retreat, bombarded 

her with their 6-pounders, until in a few 
minutes she became a total wreck and sank. An attempt was made 
to save her crew, but the work of rescue was interrupted by the ap- 
pearance on the scene of the Russian cruiser Bayan. Admiral 
Togo's destroyers sheered off upon the approach of this formidable 
adversary, and left to her the task of picking up the drowning men, 
but the Bayan was too late to be of much service, and only five men 
could be recovered. At about the same time as this incident, a 
second Russian destroyer was encountered by the Japanese coming 
from the direction of Liau-tie-shan. A strong effort was made 
to capture her, but she was more fortunate than the Strashni, and 
managed to escape to Port Arthur in safety. 

But now began the larger and more important operations which 
were destined to end so disastrously for Admiral Marakoff and his 

fleet. Admiral Togo had ordered a weak 
Preparing an Ambush squadron, consisting of the first-class 

cruisers Tokiwa and Asama and four 
second-class cruisers, to act as a support to the destroyers, if at- 
tacked, and at the same time to serve as a lure to the Russians, 
and tempt them away from the protection of Port Arthur. He, 

ISO 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

himself, with his main fleet, lay in hiding- thirty miles away to the 
southeast, waiting for an opportunity to dash in and cut off 
MakarofFs retreat. The day was not unsuitable for such an enter- 
prise. Rain was falling, and a mist hung heavy over the sea, dis- 
guising the smoke of his great warships. 

By eight o'clock on the morning of the 13th, the Japanese 
cruiser squadron appeared on the offing and engaged in a long- 
range fire with the Bay an, which had 
Makaroff Lured Out not returned to the harbor. Admiral 

Makaroff, seeing the smallness of the 
force opposed to him, gave the order to his fleet to steam out in 
column formation and attack the venturesome enemy. Hoisting 
his flag on the Petropavlovsk, the Russian Cammander-in-Chief 
led the way himself, followed by the battleships Poltava and Pob- 
ieda, the cruisers Diana, Askold, and Novik, and the destroyer 
flotilla. In the roadstead the fleet was joined by the Bay an, and the 
whole force then set forth majestically to engage the Japanese. 

But the orders of Admiral Togo were well observed by Ad- 
miral Dewa, commander of the cruiser squadron. Gradually the 

Japanese began to retire before the su- 
Cutting Off the Unwary perior force opposed to them, drawing 

Makaroff onwards, further and further 
out to sea. The Russian fleet began a hot fire at long range, to 
which the Japanese ships replied at intervals, just sufficiently to 
keep their opponents occupied and to lure them on to greater 
efforts by the display of a manifest disparity of strength. By this 
skillful manoeuvring they succeeded in enticing Makaroff out a 
distance of fifteen miles to the southeast of Port Arthur. Now was 
the time to communicate with Admiral Togo. Wireless telegraphy 
flashed the news of the success of the ruse to the Commander-in- 

153 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Chief. His great battleships were waiting with steam up and cleared 
for action. Directly he received the message from the retreating 
squadron he signalled to the new cruisers, the Nisshin and Kasuga, 
to join him, and then advanced at full speed with eight powerful 
vessels to cut off the unwary Russians. 

The plan had been well laid and it seemed on the brink of 
success, but that incalculable factor, the weather, intervened and 

brought Togo's calculations to naught. 
Weather Permitting The wind suddenly freshened, and, blow- 
ing away the mist under cover of which 
the Japanese men-of-war were approaching, disclosed the smoke of 
their funnels to Admiral Makaroff. In a flash he saw the trap 
into which he had nearly led his fleet, and gave orders to retreat to 
Port Arthur with all haste. Back, therefore, the Russians scurried 
with the Japanese in full cry at their heels. Steam as they might 
Togo's ships were too late to catch their enemy, and great must 
have been the disappointment of the gallant Admiral and his men 
when they saw the prey slip from their grasp. But the curtain had 
not yet fallen upon the drama. Makaroff's ships had emerged from 
Port Arthur and passed over the mine field in safety ; by a singular 
stroke of luck they had eluded the Japanese battle fleet, but they 
had still a third danger to encounter — they had once more to pass 
over the deadly engines of war which Captain Oda had placed in 
their path. And here it was that the blow fell. 

By about half-past nine the fleet, with the Petropavlovsk at its 
head regained the roadstead and the protection of the fortress guns. 

Signalling to the torpedo flotilla to enter 

Into the Jaws the harbor, Admiral Makaroff turned his 

of Death own vessel towards the east and ordered 

the cruisers to follow him. The battle- 

154 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ship Pobieda was to the stern of the Petropavlovsk, on the star- 
board quarter. Close behind her again came the Poltava. The 
Commander -in-Chief was on the bridge of his ship with the Grand 
Duke Cyril, son of the Grand Duke Vladmir, and cousin of the 
Czar; Captain Yakovleff, and some other officers. Suddenly the 
horrified spectators on shore saw a great white column of foam 
rise on the right side of the Petropavlovsk. A dull report was 
heard, followed by another and more terrifice explosion under the 
bridge. A huge thick cloud of greenish yellow smoke rose around 
the doomed vessel, a topmast, a funnel, a turret and the bridge were 
hurled into the air, and the huge monster heeled over on her star- 
board side. Her poop rose up, showing the propeller working in 
the air. Fire burst out in every part, and in a moment the ship 
was a mass of flame. A few seconds more and the whole fearful 
spectacle was torn from the eyes of the paralyzed onlookers, for 
with a tremendous lurch the vessel turned further on her side, the 
waters rushed in upon her in torrents, and with a roar and a hiss 
the mighty mass plunged beneath the foaming surface of the sea. 
The Petropavlovsk had gone to her death carrying with her the 
gallant Admiral himself, his staff, and full six hundred officers 
and men. 

This terrible catastrophe threw the whole squadron into the 
utmost confusion. The other ships began a rapid haphazard fire 

in all directions to destroy the mines 
Haphazard Fire which they knew lurked in every direc- 

tion, but their shots were purposeless; 
there was no mark at which to aim, and no effect was produced. 
And then, to carry further dismay to the already nerve-shaken 
fleet, a mine exploded on the starboard side of the Pobieda. She 
listed at once, but her fate was happier than that of the Petropav- 

155 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

lovsk. No second explosion followed; the watertight bulkheads 
were shut to, and sorely wounded though she was she managed to 
keep afloat and to crawl into the harbor with the cruisers crowding 
behind her. 

The Poltava in the meanwhile had remained upon the scene 
of the disaster, and her boats put out to save any of the crew of 

the flagship who could be found. In this 

Rescue Work work they were aided by the torpedo 

gunboat Gaidamak, and their combined 

efforts succeeded in rescuing the Grand Duke Cyril, seven officers, 

and seventy-three seamen. These were the only survivors. 

The difference in the effect of the mine explosions upon the 
Petropavlovsk and the Pobieda was due to causes which could not 

have been foreseen. The terrible charac- 
The Character ter of the disaster which befell the flag- 

o£ the Explosion sm p was due to the fact that the mine 
exploded underneath her boilers, and that 
when these burst the explosion of the ammunition magazine, 
which was in the same part of the ship, immediately followed. The 
whole affair was over in less than a minute and a half. On the 
other hand, the explosion at the side of the Pobieda did not touch 
the boilers, and seriously — indeed for the purposes of immediate 
warfare, irremediable — damage as she was, the same appalling re- 
sults did not follow in her case as in the other. 

The accounts of the survivors of the Petropavlovsk all confirm 
this view. But so swift indeed was the tragedy that there was not 

much time or opportunity for the forma- 
Accounts by Survivors tion of correct conclusions upon this or 

upon any point. The narratives of the 
men who were picked up were of the kind usually met with on the 

156 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

occasion of a sudden catastrophe. They were mainly confined to 
their own personal experiences and miraculous escape. Upon the 
memories of some, however, certain outstanding incidents were 
sharply and indelibly photographed. One of the last things which 
a signalman saw upon the bridge before he was hurled off was the 
figure of an officer lying weltering in his blood. It was Admiral 
Makaroff himself. Captain Yakovleff, the commander of the ves 
sel, was hurled against a stanchion with such force that he was 
thought to be killed, but he was afterwards picked up alive. The 
Grand Duke Cyril had an escape just as marvelous. He, too, was 
knocked on the head, but he was not rendered unconscious, and 
when he was thrown into the sea he fell clear of the sinking vessel. 
He was an excellent swimmer, and in spite of the shock and injury 
he had sustained, he managed to keep afloat until he was picked 
up. Rear-Admiral Molas, Makaroff's chief of staff, was in his 
cabin when the explosion occurred, and was drowned. His body 
was one of the few that were afterwards washed ashore. Another 
picture which some of the survivors retained in their mind was that 
of "an old man with a beautiful white beard," who was standing 
on the deck just before the disaster with a book in his hand sketch- 
ing. This was the famous war artist, Verestchagin. Only that 
morning his friend Makaroff had invited him to share the hospi- 
tality of the flagship and so gain further material for his realistic 
pictures of the horrors of war! 

The full magnitude of the success which! his plans had gained 
was not revealed to the Japanese Admiral till the Russian dis- 
patches made it public to the world. He 
Tribute from saw a vessel, as he phrased it, "of the 

the Japanese Petropavlovsk type" strike a mine and 
sink, and he thought also that another 
*57 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ship — he was referring to the Pobieda — lost freedom of move- 
ment; but he did not know that with the Petropavlovsk perished 
the brain of the Russian defence, a brain which, if it had been em- 
ployed from the first by its master, the Czar, might have given a 
totally different character to the war. The death of Makaroff in 
itself brought no rejoicing to the Japanese in their hour of victory, 
but only that feeling of almost personal sorrow which brave and 
chivalrous men feel for the death of a gallant foe. No finer or 
more generous tributes indeed could have been paid even in the 
western world than were paid to the memory of the brave but 
unfortunate Makaroff by the members of this so-called yellow race. 
On the 14th Admiral Togo once more brought his fleet before 
Port Arthur, and by means of an indirect bombardment, silenced 

the new forts on Liau-tie-shan. He then 
On Land retired again to prepare for a further at- 

tempt to cork up the harbor, which 
should finally reduce the Russian fleet to a state of ineffectiveness, 
and leave the sea clear for the transport of the great army which 
was to be launched against the Liao-tung Peninsula and southern 
Manchuria. Already General Kuroki, with the First Army, was 
encamped on the south bank of the Yalu River prepared for an 
advance upon the Russian position at Khiu-lien-cheng. 

But before dealing with the momentous events which now oc- 
curred in rapid succession, both on land and sea, it will be neces- 
sary to return for a few moments to the 
Chong-Ju earlier fortunes of the First Army, whose 

advance through Korea as far as Ping- 
Yang was described in Chapter III. It will be remembered that 
a small skirmish took place between Russian and Japanese patrols 
to the north of that town on February 28th. A month elapsed be- 

158 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fore the opposing forces came seriously into touch with one an- 
other again. During that period General Kuroki slowly but stead- 
ily continued his advance in the face of terrible difficulties arising 
from the weather and the state of the roads. The mud on these 
north Korean highways in the spring makes them almost impass- 
able, but the Japanese had thought of everything, and brought 
large supplies of wood with which they practically relaid the road, 
and made it admit even of the passage of heavy artillery. The Cos- 
sack patrols retired before this persistent advance, and no real at- 
tempt to dispute it was made till the vanguard of the Japanese 
neared Chong-ju, a little town about thirty miles north of Anju 
and fifty south of Wiju. Here, on March 28th, they found six 
squadrons of Cossacks belonging to General Mishtchenko's Brigade, 
posted on an adjacent hill, prepared to dispute the forward moA^e- 
ment. A brisk engagement ensued. The small force of Japanese 
which first appeared upon the scene, according to the testimony of 
General Mishtchenko himself, gallantly held their ground in spite 
of the commanding position occupied by the Russians and the rak- 
ing cross fire which they maintained, and it was only after half an 
hour of fierce fighting that they gave way and fell back upon their 
supports which were hastening to the front. Reinforcements now 
rapidly arrived, and the Russians, finding their position untenable, 
retired along the road to the north, yielding up possession of the 
town to the Japanese. In this smart little affair the Russians, ac- 
cording to their account, lost three killed and twelve wounded, the 
Japanese casualties amounting to five killed, including one officer, 
and twelve wounded, including two officers. 

After the capture of Chong-ju General Kuroki moved forward 
rapidly, finding no resistance. On April 2nd he occupied Syoush- 
kou, a place eighteen miles west of Chong-ju, and forty miles south 

iS9 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of Wiju, and two days afterwards his scouts entered Wiju itself, 

an important town on the south bank of 

The Advance the Yalu. The Russians did not find 

to the North themselves strong enough to oppose the 

Japanese advance in Korea, and deter- 
mined instead to resist it on the north bank of the Yalu. General 
Kuroki therefore occupied Wiju without firing a shot, and 
set to work busily to consolidate his forces for the great enterprise 
of crossing the Yalu. 

The month of April was occupied by General Kuroki in the 
steady concentration of his troops and in the collection of war 

material. Pontoons were conveyed to 
Concentration of Troops the front in readiness for the operation 

of forcing the river; heavy guns were 
transported over the Korean roads with, in the circumstances, really 
marvelous rapidity; and masses of cavalry and infantry arrived at 
Wiju every day. By the end of the month the First Japanese Army 
had been brought up to its full strength, amounting probably to 
between 60,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was divided into 
three divisions, the 12th, the 2nd and the Guards. The 12th Di- 
vision, it will be remembered, was the first section of the army to 
put foot on Korean soil, being landed at Chemulpo during the first 
days of the war, after the destruction of the Varyag had left that 
part of the coast clear for the Japanese disembarkation. It may be 
well to record its composition exactly, as it is typical of all the 
Japanese divisions. It was made up as follows: — Infantry, 12,000 
(four regiments of three battalions each) ; cavalry, 500 (one regi- 
ment) ; artillery, 900 (one regiment, 36 guns, two field batteries, 
two mountain batteries) ; engineers, 700 ; transport corps, 600 ; 
hospital corps, 700; ammunition column, 500; post office corps, 




RUSSIAN CONCENTRATION ON THE YALU. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

veterinary corps, pontoon corps and balloon corps, 1,000; total, 
16,900. Attached to these combatant troops were a force of 5,500 
coolies for transport purposes, bringing the grand total of the 
division, combatant and non-combatant, up to 22,400. The whole 
was under the command of Lieutenant-General Inouye, whose chief 
subordinates were Major-Generals Kigoshi and Otani. 

As his army arrived at the front, General Kuroki began grad- 
ually to occupy a wider front on the south bank of the Yalu, his 

left wing operating at the mouth of the 

Kuroki's Line river in conjunction with a naval force 

of Front under the command of Admiral Hosoya, 

and his right extending to a distance of 
twenty or twenty-five miles up the river, past Sukuchin. 

While the Japanese were thus concentrating on the left bank 
of the Yalu the Russians were gradually strengthening their posi 

tions on the right bank, the centre and 
The Russian Position key of which was formed by the village 

of Kiu-lien-cheng. During all these 
weeks the greatest secrecy was observed on both sides in regard to 
their numbers and dispositions— as far, at least, as the outside 
world was concerned. It seems probable from after events that the 
Russians themselves were largely ignorant of the strength of the 
force which General Kuroki had at his disposal; but, on the other 
hand, that able commander appears to have been thoroughly well 
informed in every detail as to the position occupied by his enemy. 
There was the greatest diversity of statement on the Russian side 
after the battle of the Yalu upon the question of the real intentions 
of General Kuropatkin in holding as he did the right bank of the 
river. When the disastrous result of the conflict of May 1st be- 
came known in Europe the friends of the Commander-in-Chief in 

163 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the press declared that it was due to the failure of the officer in im- 
mediate command, General Sassulitch, to follow his instructions, 
which were to offer only a strategical resistance to the enemy and 
to withdraw slowly before the advance of a superior force upon 
Peng-haung-cheng, a position about thirty miles distant upon the 
Liau-yang road. If this explanation is correct, the activity shown 
by the Russians for weeks in constructing earthworks on the 
heights around Kiu-lien-cheng is rendered very remarkable, and 
equally difficult to understand is the size and importance of the 
force to which was apportioned the task of thus keeping in touch 
with the advancing Japanese army and conducting a mere strategic 
defeat. For General Sassulitch was commander of the 2nd Siber- 
ian Army Corps, and though the actual body of troops engaged in 
the fighting-line in resisting the passage of the Yalu by the Japan- 
ese did not amount to that strength, there is no doubt that General 
Sassulitch had under him in the near neighborhood a force of not 
less than 30,000 men. All the evidence, in fact, points to the con- 
clusion that the Russian Generals, including the Commander-in- 
Japanese and the skill with which they would be led when the op- 
Chief himself, wholly underestimated the fighting power of the 
posing armies came to close quarters. 

The kind of talk which responsible military men in St. Peters- 
burg indulged in before the battle of the Yalu all goes to strengthen 

this impression. On April 25th, the day 
Russian Confidence before General Kuroki began that series 

of movements which were to culminate 
in his crossing the Yalu and driving the Russians before him in 
headlong rout, there appeared in the Echo de Paris the report of an 
interview which its St. Petersburg correspondent had had with 
Colonel Vannovsky, of the Russian General Staff, and formerly 

164 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

military attache in Japan. The utterances of this sapient officer 
are amusing reading in view of what happened so shortly after- 
wards. He thought it woud still be some time before serious mili- 
tary operations could begin on the Yalu, for the Japanese, in his 
opinion, were far from having completed their concentration in 
Korea. They probably, he said, had three divisions of from 12,000 
to 15,000 men between Ping- Yang and the Yalu; and, including 
the Second Army then disembarking, they had not more than 
85,000 men near the front.. Then followed a valuable criticism of 
General Kuroki and his colleague, General Oku, the commander 
of the Second Army. Both, he reminded the interviewer, served 
in the Chino-Japanese War; but "he looked for nothing extraor- 
dinary from them, both were more than sixty years of age." On 
the whole, he thought that the Japanese would establish themselves 
in Korea ; if they crossed the Yalu it would be only to satisfy public 
opinion at Tokio. Colonel Vannovsky soon had reason to be sorry 
that he had spoken so disdainfully of General Kuroki, and with 
such sublime assurance of the Japanese plans. If the crossing of 
the Yalu was mainly dictated by a desire to satisfy public opinion 
at Tokio, it must be said that public opinion at Tokio had its 
wishes very amply gratified before many days had expired. It is 
a remarkable fact that in the history of nearly every war the great- 
est disasters follow the greatest self-confidence. And yet it can 
easily be understood how the armies that had proved successful 
against those famous fighters the Turks in the war of the seven- 
ties should despise the little dwarfish Japanese, who had hitherto 
only faced the undisciplined hordes of China. 



165. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Kuroki Completes his Plans — The Scene of Battle — General Sassulitch's De- 
fences — The Russian Dispositions — The Attacking Army — Clearing the Is 
lands — Guards Half-way Across — Parallel Movements — The Searching 
Japanese Fire — Bridging the Yalu — Confusion in the Russian Councils— 
Kuroki's Consummate Strategy — Futile Russian Opposition — Masked Bat 
teries at Work — Serpentine Line of Dark Forms — Two Thousand Deadly 
Thunderbolts — Inferno Let Loose — Howitzer High-Angle Fire — Co-opera- 
tion of Gunboats — Miserable Array of Russians — Four Miles of Japanese — 
A Moment of Tense Expectancy — The General Attack Begins — Ridges 
Alive with Flame — Surprise of the Russians — The Plunge Across the Ai — 
Overwhelming Legions — The Circling Ring of Fate — Devastating Artillery 
Bombardment — Black Mass of Human Figures — The Blood-Red Banner — 
Fight Desperately Against Fate — General Sassulitch's Retreat — The Japa- 
nese Chase— The Last Gallant Stand— Rifle Fire and Cold Steel. 

HE numerous small skirmishes between outposts which took 

T place on the Yalu and its tributaries during the earlier part 
of the month of April need not detain us. They were 
mainly encounters between small reconnoitering parties, 
and though there were losses on both sides, fortune on the whole 
leaned in favor of the Japanese. The results of these reconnais- 
sances in locating the positions occupied 
Kuroki Completes by the Russians, combined with the suc- 

his Plans ces s of the Japanese transport arrange- 
ments, which, as stated already, placed an 
army of 60,000 to 70,000 men at General Kuroki's disposal, enabled 
him to complete his preparations for the great task before him by 
the beginning of the last week in April. The night of the 25th 

167 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

found him ready at all points, and on the morrow his army entered 
upon the preliminary stages of a series of operations which, culmi- 
nating in the crossing of the river and the capture of the Russian 
position, first revealed to an astonished world the hitherto undreamt- 
of potentialities of Japan as a military power. 

Some study of the map of the scene of battle is necessary for a 
perfect understanding of the movements of the contending forces. 

It will be seen on referenoe to our map 
The Scene of Battle (page 169) that just above Wiju the 

waters of the Yalu are joined from the 
northwest by an important tributary, the Ai River, the stream 
here taking the form of a fork. At the apex of the 
triangular wedge of land which divides the Ai from the Yalu 
is situated the Hosan, or Tiger Hill, an important strategical position 
commanding the south bank of the main river. Opposite Tiger Hill, 
and running some way past it up the Yalu, is the Island of Kulido, 
which divides the river at this point into two streams, both of them 
fordable. The Ai also is fordable at a point near the hill of Yulcha- 
san, which is north of Tiger Hill and on the same bank of the 
tributary. Opposite Wiju itself the main river is two miles wide 
and is divided into three streams by two islands. Of these the larger 
Cheun-song-do, is near the right bank, and lies stretched alongside 
it for a distance of about thirteen miles, starting from a spot close 
to Antung, lower down the river, and finishing at a little distance 
up the Ai. It can be reached from the right bank at this end by a 
ford, and there is another ford lower down, opposite to Chiu-lien- 
cheng. The stream dividing the other island from the left bank is 
also fordable waist-deep, but the central stream can only be crossed 
by means of a bridge. These islands are really low, flat, sandy 

deltas, with occasional clumps of small trees and patches of shrub 

168 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

dotting their surface, which provide some cover for the concealment 
of troops. 

The Russian position extended for a distance of upwards of 
twenty miles along the right bank of the Yalu and Ai, from Niang- 

ning-chin in the south, to Yushukau in 

General Sassulitch's the north. Yushukau is a hill opposite 

Defences to Yulchasan, and lower down is another 

hill which General Sassulitch had 
fortified, named Makau (or Potientzy). Then comes the village of 
Chiu-lien-cheng itself, which formed the centre of his position, stand- 
ing at a height of about 180 feet above the river. From Chiu-lien- 
cheng a road runs in a westerly direction to Hamatan or Hoh-mu- 
tang, a distance of about five or six miles ; and another road runs 
down parallel with the bank of the Yalu to Antung. A further road 
runs from Hoh-mu-tang in a northerly direction, the most impor- 
tant post on which is Tang-lang-fang, almost due west of Yushu- 
kau. Westward of Hoh-mu-tang stretches the main road to Feng- 
whang-cheng and Liao-yang. South of Antung is the hill of An- 
tushan, and a continual ridge of hills connects this eminence with 
Niang-ning-chin, already mentioned. It will be observed that the 
high ground which the Russians occupied gives a defending force a 
great advantage in meeting an attack from the Yalu, as it easily 
commands the low-lying positions on the left bank. On the other 
hand, Makau, Shiu-lien-cheng, and the positions to the southward 
are commanded by Tiger Hill and Yulchasan, and it is therefore ob- 
vious that if once the Japanese succeeded in occupying those heights 
they must necessarily render the rest of General Sassulitch's de- 
fences along the river bank untenable. 

As far as can be gathered from the Japanese accounts and from 
the more obscure dispatches of the Russian Generals, the distribu- 
te 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

tion of the Czar's forces at the beginning 
The Russian of the operations was as follows : Tiger 

Dispositions Hill was occupied by part of the 22nd 
Siberian Regiment, under the command 
of General Kashtalinsky. The right wing, in the neighborhood of 
Antung, was formed of the 9th and 10th Regiments supported by 
two batteries of artillery; while the centre, at Chiu-lien-cheng, was 
held by the 12th Regiment. The Reserve was formed of the nth 
Regiment. The artillery were distributed at carefully-chosen positions 
along the whole front, but were massed in especial strength at Makau 
and Chiu-lien-cheng. Advanced outposts drawn from the 22nd, 
23rd, and 27th Regiments of Eastern Siberian Sharpshooters occu- 
pied the islands of Kulido and Cheun-song-do. A Russian regiment, 
it should be explained, consists of three battalions, each of which, 
when brought up to its full strength, numbers about 1,000 men. 

On the night of the 25th the Japanese army was massed on 
the left bank of the river in the following order : On the left, facing 

the island of Cheun-sotig-do, was sta- 
The Attacking Army tioned the 2nd Division ; the centre, occu- 

pying a position to the north of Wiju, 
was composed of the Imperial Guards' Division; and on the right, 
still further up the river, the 12th Division was concentrated, in 
concealment behind some hilly ground, and in readiness for an im- 
portant move upon the enemy's left, which will be described later. 

At dawn on the 26th a sharp rattle of musketry told the Rus- 
sians that the attack had begun. Detachments from the Guards' 

Division were firing upon General Sassu- 
Clearing the Islands litch's sharpshooters stationed on the Is- 
land of Kulido. The Russians replied 
briskly, but the Japanese rifle fire was heavy and well-directed, and 

173- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

at last their position became untenable, in face not only of this 
infantry attack, but of a searching bombardment opened by some 
batteries of Kuroki's artillery, which were established on a hill in 
the rear of Wiju. They therefore retreated to the mainland for 
shelter. 

No sooner had this retirement been effected than the Japanese 
prepared to cross over to the island in boats. These craft were all 
in readiness, and before long a considerable force of the Guards 

had landed on the island. When this 

Guards Half-way movement was perceived the enemy rp~ 

Across turned to dispute it ; but they were not in 

large force, and were easily repulsed. A 
squadron of Cossacks came to their assistance, but the hot fire with 
which they were received by the Japanese infantry was too much 
for them, and they were driven back in confusion to the bank below 
Tiger Hill. The Mikado's Guards continued the pursuit across 
the ford, and a smart encounter ensued beneath the hill. The fight- 
ing was not of long duration, however; the Russians retired; and 
it became evident that there was no intention seriously to dispute 
the possession of the island. The attempt made by General Sassu- 
litch's batteries to drive the daring Japanese off the island by shrap- 
nel fire was quite unsuccessful, and the whole defence on this side 
revealed an unexpected weakness. The Guards' skirmishers occu- 
pied all night the ground they had so easily gained. 

In the meantime, the advance guard of the 2nd Division had 
carried through the same operations with equal success on the Island 

of Cheun-song-do. The Russian sharp- 
Parallel Movements shooters were driven off in the direction 

of Chiu-lien-cheng, and the Japanese 

seized the delta with a small force preparatory to constructing a 

bridge over the central stream for the passage of the main body of 

the division. 

174. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

In these small but useful engagements the Guards suffered some 
slight casualties, nine men being slightly and sixteen seriously 

wounded. The 2nd Division sustained 
The Searching no casualties at all. The Russians, on the 

Japanese Fire other hand, lost more heavily. They were 
seen to carry off a considerable number 
of dead and wounded, and they left behind them ninety-five dead 
horses, which, in itself, is significant of the searching character of 
the Japanese fire. The body of Lieutenant Senyoloff, commanding 
the Mounted Scouts of the 22nd Regiment, which his comrades had 
not time to remove, was buried at Wiju by the Japanese themselves 
with all honor. 

On the following day the work of bridging the stream both at 
Kulido and Cheun-song-do was carried out, in spite of the intermit- 
tent fire which the Russian guns main- 
Bridging the Yalu tained upon the corps engaged. So inef- 
fective indeed was this cannonade that the 
Japanese artillery did not even reply to it, and their engineers 
pursued their enterprise calmly and without substantial 
interruption. On the same day the naval squadron under 
Rear-Admiral Hosoya rendered valuable assistance to General Ku- 
roki by its co-operation in the Yalu estuary. Two gunboats, two 
torpedo-boats, and two armed steamers ascended the river as far 
as Antushan and effected a useful diversion in the quarter by shelling 
the Russian entrenchments. The bombardment must have proved 
destructive, for after making a brisk reply for some time, which, 
however, did no damage to the Japanese ships, the Muscovite batter- 
ies were finally silenced. 

On Thursday, the 28th, the same tactics were displayed, and 
the position seized by the Guards' Division and the 2nd Division on 

175- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the Islands of Kulido and Cheun-song-do 
Confusion in the was consolidated. Two companies of the 

Russian Councils former, indeed, crossed over to the main- 
land and reconnoitred Tiger Hill, encour- 
aged by the silence of the enemy on that commanding eminence. To 
their surprise they found that the post had been evacuated by the 
Russians. No explanation has been offered of this remarkable step ; 
the only conclusion possible — a conclusion, indeed, strengthened by 
subsequent events — is that confusion reigned in the councils of the 
Russian commanders, and that no definite and coherent plan had 
been thought out by them. For on the next day General Kashtal- 
insky was again ordered to occupy the hill, which the Japanese them- 
selves, having other plans in view, were not yet in a position to 
seize effectively. 

On Friday, the 29th, General Kuroki began the important move 
on his extreme right, for which the 12th Division had been all this 

time kept in reserve. The operations of 
Kuroki's Consummate the Guards and the 2nd Division, useful, 
Strategy and indeed necessary, as they were for 

the purposes of a general advance, had 
acted as a screen for his consummate piece of strategy by which the 
Japanese Commander turned General Sassulitch's flank and finally 
captured the position. To the north of Wiju, about thirteen miles 
higher up the stream of the Yalu, stands the small village of Suku- 
chin. Here it was that the Japanese effected a crossing in October, 
1894, in their war with China. On that occasion the movement 
enabled them to outflank a force of 30,000 men, and it is one of tht 
remarkable features of General Kuroki's dispositions for attack thai 
they repeated in all essential particulars the tactics which proved s* 
successful ten years ago. Still more remarkable is it that the F*~"~ 

176. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

sians appear to have learned none of the lessons of the war of 1894, 
and to have fallen just as readily into the trap as did the Chinese. 
Early then on the 29th the engineer corps of the 12th Division 
started to construct two pontoon bridges over the Yalu at Suku- 
chin. Here, as in every other department of the Japanese arrange- 
ments, the organization was perfect. Not a detail had been omitted 
and the work proceeded smoothly and with dispatch. By the next 
morning both bridges were completed and the troops prepared 
to cross. 

The Russian Commander, who had at last got wind of the 
manoeuvre which was taking place at this point, had detached a 

small force to oppose the passage of the 



Futile Russian 

Opposition 



river, and when at 10.40 the vanguard 



of General Inouye's Division began to 
march on to the pontoons, a fierce fire was directed upon it from 
the opposite bank. The Japanese, however, retorted both with 
rifle fire and artillery, and the fusillade of the Russians was soon 
checked, with the result that by the afternoon the whole of the 
1 2th Division had gained the right bank of the Yalu with the loss 
of only two men killed and twenty-seven men wounded. General 
Inouye then marched forward to seize Yulchasan and Tiger Hill, 
which positions, after their first evacuation, had again been occu- 
pied by the Russsians under General Kashtalinsky. 

In the meantime, the Guards' Division, assisted by a heavy 
bombardment from the batteries below Wiju, was presing an at- 
tack upon Tiger Hill from the Island of 
Masked Batteries „ ... . , . , . .. .. 

Kuhdo, an attack which successfully di- 
at Work ' f _ J 

verted the attention of General Kash- 
talinsky from the advance upon his left, and prevented him from 
offering it any formidable resistance. The Japanese artillery in 

177. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

particular distinguished itself. Never was superiority of general- 
ship more strikingly displayed than it was by General Kuroki in 
this case. The position was admirably selected by him; the work 
of placing the batteries was carried out with such skill that the 
Russians were kept in entire ignorance of their whereabouts; and 
finally when they opened fire on the morning of the 30th the heavy 
character of the guns employed took the enemy absolutely by sur- 
prise. On the delta immediately below Wiju was a belt of trees 
of which the Japanese General had at once seen the potentialities; 
and behind its screen his engineers had constructed gun pits, in 
which were concealed several batteries of howitzers. These pieces 
of ordnance did terible execution in the Russian lines in the course 
of the day. 

To the onlookers standing on the hills behind Wiju the wide 
field of battle spread before them presented a highly picturesque 

spectacle, and as the attack developed the 

Serpentine Line of interest became intense. Hardly had the 

Dark Forms advance of the Guards begun upon the 

Island of Kulido when a long serpentine 
line of dark forms could be seen winding in and out of the heights 
on the right bank of the river to the north of Tiger Hill. They 
were the men of the 12th Division slowly but surely creeping upon 
the Russian left. For miles they pressed forward without coming 
into view of the Russian artillerymen on Tiger Hill, but at last 
the first detachments, rounding the shoulder of one of the nearer 
hills, were exposed to the enemy. Instantly a terrific burst of 
shrapnel fire broke out from General Kashtalinsky's field batteries. 
Steadily, however, and without a check the brave Japanese ad- 
vanced from height to height, and at the same time the batteries on 
the left bank above Wiju came to their aid. The fire of the Rus- 

178. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

sians had unmasked the position of their guns on the hill, and the 
Japanese artillerymen rained upon them a terrible hail of shells 
which soon reduced them to silence and effectually covered the ad- 
vance of the infantry. 

But now the Guards, who were engaged in effecting a lodge- 
ment on the lower slopes of Tiger Hill, came in for the attentions 

of General Sassulitch's field batteries at 
Two Thousand Deadly Makau and Chiu-lien-cheng. Believing 
Thunderbolts that the Japanese possessed only guns of 

the same calibre, and totally ignorant of 
the deadly engines of warfare which Kuroki had so skillfully con- 
cealed behind the innocent-looking belt of trees on the delta, the 
Russian Commander took no pains to mask his ordnance. There- 
fore when his shrapnel swept the Island of Kulido and played 
havoc among the Guards, his whole position in this part of the 
field lay exposed. At once the howitzers on the delta close to the 
opposite shore began to belch forth a terrible fire of shrapnel and 
common shell, which tore up the ground all around the Russians, 
killing their gunners and dismounting their guns. This bombard- 
ment was afterwards described by General Kashtalinsky, in a dis- 
patch to the Commander-in-Chief, as "extraordinarily violent and 
prolonged," and he added that in its course more than 2,000 shells 
were fired upon the defenders' position. The fearfully destructive 
and demoralizing effect of this cannonade was indeed patent at 
once to the observers upon the left bank of the river. The Makau 
Hill was described by one correspondent as transformed in appear- 
ance into an active volcano, from which belched forth clouds of 
grey-black smoke. 

It was Inferno let loose. The sides of the hill were riddled and 
scored, solid rocks were smashed like crockery, as the screaming 

179. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

missiles of death burst among the 
Inferno Set Loose trenches and filled them with dead and 

wounded. Yet amid it all the Russian 
artillerymen stood steadily to their guns as long as their guns were 
left in their places, and as long as any men remained to work them. 
But the best troop in the world could not endure such a murderous 
fire for long. The heavy pieces of field ordnance were knocked from 
their carriages like ninepins, the soldiers fell around them in scores, 
and at last the batteries sank into silence and the dark forms of the 
defenders were seen from afar fleeing for refuge behind the further 
line of the heights. 

This fierce artillery engagement lasted about half an hour, 
and while it produced such deadly and demoralizing effects on the 

enemy it left the Japanese practically un- 

*» n *» e harmed behind their screen ot trees. 

Fire 

Their howitzers, unlike the Russian field 

guns, could do the maximum of execution by means of high-angle 
fire and their battery emplacements were so carefully and skilfully 
masked that the shrapnel of the enemy, effective as it may have ap- 
peared to be from the right bank, did them scarcely any damage. 
Their casualties, indeed, were only two men killed and twenty-five 
wounded. It was a remarkable triumph of scientific warfare, and 
proved that in the artillery branch of the service at all events the 
Japanese had nothing further to learn from European models. 

While this bombardment was engaging the Russian centre and 
diverting its attention from the enveloping movement of the 12th 

Division on the left, and from the ad- 
Co-operation of , ., n , " _. __.„ , 

vance of the Guards upon Tiger Hill, the 

gunboat flotilla of Admiral Hosoya 

again operated with great effect against the Russian lines lower 

180. 




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p 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

down the river at Antushan and Niang-ning-chin. This simultan- 
eous attack along the whole of his front placed General Sassulitch 
in a position of the utmost difficulty. He was unable to tell from 
which part of the field the real danger would come. It is clear, 
however, from the dispatches of his subordinate, General Kash- 
talinsky, that that officer appreciated the true nature of the Japan- 
ese operations, and that he recognized the impossibility of holding 
compelled to oppose the advance of a foe which had already proved 
Chiu-lien-cheng after his flank had been turned by General Inouye's 
Division. Early on the 30th he ordered the 22nd Regiment back 
from Tiger Hill to the right bank of the Ai River and endeavored 
to strengthen the position on Makau and Yukushau, and his dis- 
patch to General Kuropatkin indicates that he represented to Gen- 
eral Sassulitch the difficulty with which even that line of defence 
could be maintained, an urged a retreat to Hoh-mu-tang At night, 
however, he received orders from his superior to remain and ac- 
cept battle at the hands of the Japanese, and he had nothing for it 
but to obey. 

It was with a miserably inadequate force that he was thus 
itself so determined and so resourceful. 
Miserable Array At the ford on his extreme left he sta- 

of Russians tioned two battalions of the 22nd Regi- 
ment. The 1 2th Regiment of the East 
Siberian Rifles held the hills behind, from Yukushan to Makau, 
supported by the 3rd Battery of the 6th Brigade of Artillery and 
a number of machine guns. General Sassulitch himself was in 
command of the 9th and 10th Regiments occupying Chiu-lien-cheng 
and the chain of hills stretching down to Antung, and the nth 
Regiment was kept in the rear as a reserve. General Mishchenko's 
Brigade of Cossacks, though in the neighborhood, does not ap- 
pear to have been actually engaged in the battle at all. 

183 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

On the Japanese side all was in readiness for the great ad- 
vance by the night of the 30th, and General Kuroki telegraphed to 

the General Staff at Tokio that the 
Four Miles of Japanese attack would begin at dawn. On the 

left, the 2nd Division, under General 
Nishi, occupied the southern end of Cheun-song-do ; the Imperial 
Guards, under General Hasegawa, held the northern end of that 
island, as well as Tiger Hill; and on their right was stationed the 
1 2th Division, facing the Ai, on a wide front extending for over 
four miles. In these positions the Army bivouacked for the night. 

By five o'clock on the morning of Sunday, May 1st, the whole 
force from north to south was on foot, and prepared to move 

like one mighty machine to the execu- 

A Moment of Tense tion of the great task before it. As the 

Expectancy grey dawn lifted the curtain upon the 

tremendous drama which was about to 
unfold itself before them, the watchers behind Wiju saw the long 
lines of black forms marshalling upon the islands and taking cover 
behind the scrub and in the hollows of the low sand hills. Far 
out beyond Tiger Hill and along the left bank of the River Ai 
the lines extended, moving out of the shelter of the adjacent hills. 
It was a moment of tense expectancy. Now for the first time were 
Japanese Infantry to be pitted against European troops armed with 
modern weapons, in a conflict on the grand scale. Would they 
come out of the ordeal with triumph? Would they in their sphere 
of warfare rival the great achievements of their naval brethren? 

But before the infantry could move forward it was necessary 
to search the Russian batteries once more and reduce them, if possi- 

184. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ble, to ineffectiveness. The howitzers 

The General Attack and field artillery, therefore, again 

Begins opened their terrible fire of shell and 

shrapnel upon the heights opposite, the 
storm raging with especial severity over Chiu-lien-cheng and the 
Makau and Yushukau ridge. But to this the enemy made no reply. 
After the awful experience of the previous day, they had been com- 
pelled to withdraw many of their guns, and the front of their posi- 
tion was, as it afterwards appeared, deprived of this defence alto- 
gether. General Kashtalinsky, as already stated, had with him 
one battery of field artillery, but taught by past lessons he declined 
to unmask its whereabouts until the advance of the Mikado's 
troops made it absolutely necessary. After half an hour, therefore, 
the Japanese ceased their bombardment for the time being, and at 
last General Kuroki gave the eagerly-expected order for a general 
attack along the whole line. Gladly the soldiery of Dai Nippon 
answered the call, burning as one man to plant the flag of the 
Rising Sun upon the soil of the territory from which ten years ago 
they had been so contemptuously driven out by the haughty Mus- 
covite. 

To the 1 2th Division fell the perilous glory of crossing first, 
in the teeth of the Russian guns. The skirmishing line advanced 

first over a wide front, keeping up a 
Ridges Alive with Flame harassing fire upon the enemy's trenches. 

A smart response was made, but the op- 
portunity of the Russians was yet to come; for it was apparent 
that the actual crossing of the river by General Inouye's main body 
would have to be performed in much closer formation, presenting 
an admirable target for artillery and rifle fire. Slowly but steadily 
the skirmishers pressed forward, taking advantage of every scrap 

185. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of cover, and soon the whole plain was dotted with puffs of white 
smoke as the bullets sped on their way. Behind them came line 
after line of the main storming force. At last the fords were 
reached, and forming into two columns the 12th Division rushed 
forward to gain their passage. At once the ridges opposite be- 
came alive with flame, and a withering blast of shrapnel and rifle 
bullets swept across their path. The column formation which the 
Japanese were compelled to adopt gave the Russian marksmen 
every chance, and terrible loss of life occurred at this point. The 
leading files were mown down like grass under the sickle; for a 
moment the head of, the column wavered under the storm and 
stood still. 

But now the Japanese artillery found the opening they wanted. 
The exact position of the Rusian guns was revealed, and at once 

they were enfiladed by a demoralizing 

Surprise of fire from the terrible howitzers near 

the Russians Wiju while at the same time they were 

attacked by General Inouye's field bat- 
teriers in front. Once again the fierce and destructive character 
of the cannonade is revealed by the dispatches of the Russian com- 
manders. Just as General Kashtalinsky, referring to the bombard- 
ment of April 30th, described it as "extraordinarily violent and 
prolonged," so General Sassulitch used similar terms in regard to 
this new bombardment. Before the day was over the Russian 
Commander had more opportunities of appreciating the "extraor- 
dinary" quality of the troops whose powers he, in common with 
more highly placed officers in the service of the Czar, had so 
fatally despised ; but it seems clear from the use of the same phrase 
independently by the two generals that the artillery tactics of Gen- 
eral Kuroki caused them more surprise than almost anything else 

186. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

in the whole of these surprising operations. It goes to prove that 
the Intelligence Department on the Russian side was not well 
equipped, for the possession by their enterprising foe of heavy 
guns so far north in Korea seems never to have been suspected 
by them. 

Supported by this tremendous cannonade, the infantry of 
the 1 2th Division pressed steadily forward. The survivors of the 

first line melted into the second line, 

The Plunge Across which was advancing quickly behind, 

the Ai and careless of death, the gallant little 

Japs plunged into the waters of the Ai 
up to their breasts, and waded across the ford. Notwithstanding 
the raking fire, however, from General Kuroki's batteries, the Rus- 
sians stuck to their posts like heroes, and the field guns of the 3rd 
Battery, assisted by a number of machine guns, ploughed up the 
ranks of the Mikado's troops, doing terrible execution. But the 
Japanese were in overwhelming force, and though men were fall- 
ing on every hand, the main body pressed resistlessly forward, 
crossed the river, and took up a position on the right bank, at 
the base of the hills. Not a moment was wasted. As the column 
reached the shore, it diverged regiment by regiment to right and 
left, spreading out in wider formation for the task of scaling the 
heights. The evolution was executed with great speed, but with 
the precision and steadiness of parade; and if anything could be 
more impressive than the gallantry of the Japanese rank and file, 
it was the skill and coolness of their officers from General down 
to company commander. Though it was exposed to a withering 
fire at comparatively close quarters, the movements of the whole 
force were executed like those of a machine. 

It will be remembered that there are two fords over the Aj 

187. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

river, the one leading from a position near Yulchasan, on the left 

bank, to a position slightly north of 
Overwhelming Legions Yukushan, on the right bank; the other 

opposite to Tiger Hill, and a little to 
the north of Makau. It was opposite to this latter ford that the 
bulk of General Kashtalinsky's force was stationed, and here in 
consequence, the greatest losses befell the Japanese. But while 
a fierce engagement was raging at Makau, the decisive movement 
was taking place on the extreme left of the Russians at Yushukau. 
The defence at that spot was entrusted to only one battalion of 
the 22nd Regiment of Sharpshooters, and it was impossible for 
such a small contingent, gallantly as it held its ground for a time, 
finally to withstand the overwhelming legions which were hurled 
against it. 

For slowly but steadily the Japanese lines encircled the hills 
with a ring of fate, creeping up the sides with infinite nimbleness 

and dexterity, pausing now to take 
The Circling Ring cover and return the Russian fire, then 

of Fate up again and climbing from rock to 

rock with indomitable courage and 
resolution. On the other hand, General Kashtalinsky bravely 
fought on against his advancing foe. With the force at his com- 
mand, it was obviously a desperate undertaking, and he had sent 
for reinforcements. But they came not, and for hours he had 
to do the best he could without them. The fact was, of course, 
that General Sassulitch himself was so busily engaged both on 
the right wing and at the centre that he could spare little assist- 
ance to his subordinate. 

For almost simultaneously with the advance of the 12th 
Division across the Ai the Imperial Guards under General Hase- 

188. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

gawa had forced the passage of the 
Devastating Artillery stream on the left, at the foot of the slope 
Bombardment which led up to the village of Chiu-lien- 
cheng, while the 2nd Division, led by Gen- 
eral Nishi, crossed lower down and menaced the Russian right. 
Four batteries of howitzers had been ferried across the stream from 
the left bank of the Yalu to the Island of Cheun-song-do, and as the 
skirmishing line of both divisions moved forward in a fan-like 
formation these powerful pieces of ordnance opened a destructive 
fire upon the enemy. A sharp rattle of musketry was the first 
sign that the Russians were prepared to contest the passage of 
the river in this quarter, but their field artillery remained silent, 
and it turned out afterwards that ail the guns which had survived 
the bombardment of the previous day had been removed to the 
rear, or to strengthen General Kashtalinsky's position. As it 
was, the rifle fire from the trenches was very galling, and the 
Japanese lost a great many men, but the devastating effects of 
General Kuroki's artillery bombardment were beyond anything 
that the Russians could produce in return. 

It was in one of these trenches on the ridge of the hills to 
the northeast of Chiu-lien-cheng that the greatest damage was 

wrought. As the Japanese infantry 
Black Mass of Human steadily advanced, General Sassulitch 
Figures ordered forward a body of his supports 

from the immediate rear to occupy this 
trench. In order to obey this command they had to round a 
small spur of the hill and pass across the open. Their appear- 
ance against the sky-line provided a target which the Japanese 
gunners were not likely to neglect. Instantly a rain of shell and 
shrapnel was directed upon the black mass of human figures. 

189. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Men were seen falling thick and fast under this withering fire; 
but still the Russians pressed on indomitably, and at the expense 
of great loss of life occupied the trench, whence they in turn 
poured a fierce rifle-fire upon the enemy below them. By this 
time, however, the Guards were swarming over the lower slopes 
of the hills around Chiu-lien-cheng, and General Hasegawa sent 
a strong force to the left of the Russian position to turn General 
Sassulitch's flank. At the same time General Nishi's men were 
climbing steadily up the ridge further south, and were threaten- 
ing the Russian right. 

It is interesting to note that the somewhat drab aspect of war- 
fare which many of the operations in the South African war as- 
sumed, accustoming us to the idea that 
The Blood-Red all picturesqueness had departed from 

Banner modern combat, and that the ancient 

gauds and trappings so dear to the sol- 
dier's heart had been abandoned for ever, was entirely absent from 
this great battle in the Far East. The opposing forces were not 
separated from one another by illimitable distances of rolling veldt 
and brown hills. They were, on the contrary, so near as to recall 
the fig-hting in the Franco-German War, or the bloody combats 
around Plevna in the great struggle between Turkey and Russia 
nearly thirty years ago. And more remarkable still, the regi- 
mental colors which in our army are kept for ceremonial purposes 
in times of peace, and do not accompany the troops into the field, 
were carried by the Japanese in the front of the righting line. 
Their presence must have assisted the fire of the enemy consider- 
ably; but there can be no doubt, on the other hand, of the inspirit- 
ing effect on the Mikado's men of seeing the blood-red banner of 

190. 



,;0 













A LAST GALLANT STANP OF RUSSIAN GUNNERS, 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

their race floating in the van and beckoning them forward to 
victory. 

Steadily indeed, and without pause, those flaming banners 
advanced upon the doomed Russian position. The swing round 
of General Hasewaga's troops to the left of Chiu-lien-cheng de- 
cided the fate of General Sassulitch's centre, and after four hours' 
fighting the Japanese, climbing up the ridges like cats, charged 
into the Russian trenches. All the defenders who remained to 
contest the charge were bayonetted or taken prisoners, but the 
main body of the 9th and 10th Siberian Regiments retreated 
stubbornly towards Hoh-mu-tang, contesting every inch of the 
ground. The heights, however, in this part of the field were won, 
and at 9 o'clock a great shout of "Banzai" — the Japanese form of 
"hurrah" — went up all along the line, as the banners of the Ris- 
ing Sun were planted upon the ridge and waved proudly in the 
breeze. 

On their left the Russians under General Kashtalinsky were, 
as we have shown, making a more desperate resistance; but un- 
able to obtain reinforcemenlts in time, 
Fight Desperately that gallant officer was compelled to 

Against Fate retire before the advance of General In- 
ouye's Division, which, by driving the 
battalion of the 22nd Regiment in rout before it at Yushukau, had 
completely crumpled up his flank. He therefore fell back slowly 
towards Hoh-mu-tang, fighting desperately against overwhelm- 
ing odds opposed to him.' It was not till noon, seven hours after 
the battle began, that reinforcements were at last sent to him. 
Then General Sassulitch ordered to his assistance the nth Regi- 
ment, which all this time had been held in reserve well in the rear 

193. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

together with the 2nd Battery of the 6th Brigade of Field Artil- 
lery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mouravsky. 

With this new force General Kashtalinsky set about the 
heavy task of covering the retreat of the 12th and the 22nd Regi- 
ments, or as much of them as was left, 
General Sassulitch's and also of checking the Japanese ad- 

Retreat vance if possible until the 9th and 10th 
Regiments had made sure of their communications along the road 
to Feng-hwang-cheng. It was now that the fiercest and blood- 
iest fighting of the day took place, and that the Russians in 
particular suffered their heaviest losses. For no sooner had Gen- 
eral Kuroki captured the whole ridge from Antung and An- 
tushan in the south to Yukushan in the north than he ordered his 
force, strengthened by the reserves, to hasten at full speed along 
three lines in the direction of the Feng-whang-cheng road to cut 
off General Sassulitch's retreat. 

A strong detachment from General Inouye's Division, there- 
fore, crossed westwards to Tan-lang-f ang ; the Imperial Guards 

marched rapidly along the main road 
The Japanese Chase from Chiu-lien-cheng ; and the 2nd Di- 
vision spread out towards Antung and 
pursued the retiring 9th and 10th Regiments. It was the Guards 
Division and the 12th Division with whom General Kashtalin- 
sky had to deal in this last brave stand. He ordered the nth 
Regiment under his chief of staff to assume a commanding posi- 
tion in the rear, from which they could fire upon the enemy from 
two sides. Lieutenant-Colonel Mouravsky's battery he held in 
reserve; and then he ordered the wearied troops of the 12th 
Regiment, the 22nd Regiment, and the 3rd Battery of the 6th 

Brigade to retire under cover of the fire of the nth. 

194 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

But before this manoeuvre could be effected the fierce pursuit 
of the Japanese had gained its object. Both the Guards and the 

1 2th Division reached the spot by I 
The Last Gallant Stand o'clock, and approaching from opposite 

sides, surrounded the hapless Rusians. 
An enfilading fire made it impossible for the 3rd Battery to retire. 
Its horses were killed, and, therefore, Colonel Mouravsky, who 
assumed the command, ordered the gunners to take up a position 
where they stood and return the Japanese fire at close quarters. 
This they did with the greatest gallantry. They fought on steadily 
till not a man was left standing, their brave commander, Colonel 
Mouravsky, himself being among the last to fall. In the mean- 
while, a company with machine guns had been ordered up to the 
assistance of the 3rd Battery. The officer in command, seeing 
the difficult situation of Colonel Mouravsky, took up a position, 
in the words of General Kashtalinsky's dispatch, "on his own in- 
itiative." He was no more fortunate than his superior officer. 
He, too, had entered the fatal ring of fire, and half his men and 
horses were shot down before he could render any effective ser- 
vice. An attempt to bring away his guns by hand and to take 
them under shelter of the hills under the terrible cross fire to 
which he was exposed, was no more successful, and the guns 
ultimately fell into the hands of the enemy. The case being evi- 
dently hopeless, the 2nd Battery, which had been brought up as a 
reinforcement to the nth Regiment, was ordered back to rejoin 
the reserve by another road, but half its horses, too, were killed, 
and, finding it impossible to ascend the slopes without them, the 
officer in command brought his guns back to their original posi- 
tion, and there bravely, but unavailingly, received the Japanese 
attack. 

I9S. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Now ensued a fierce and bloody hand-to-hand combat, in 
which the utmost heroism was displayed on both sides. Closer 

and closer pressed the Japanese till the 

Rifle Fire and opposing forces were almost looking 

Cold Steel into one another's eyes, and rifle-fire 
was abandoned for cold steel. Again 
and again the Japanese desperately dashed themselves upon the 
serried ranks opposed to them, and again and again, in spite of 
the fearful execution wrought by each charge, they were hurled 
back. But bayonet charge followed bayonet charge, and at last 
the devoted band of Russians could hold out no more. In some 
quarters of the field the white flag was hoisted and numbers of 
men surrendered. But the main body, shattered as it was and 
a mere shadow of its former strength, fought its way through. 
A broken remnant of the 12th Regiment cut its way through and 
carried off the colors in safety, torn and riddled indeed, but not 
disgraced. The same fate befell the nth Regiment, a small body 
of which, after several hours' fighting, forced a passage out of 
the melee and retreated to Hoh-mu-tang with its colors pre- 
served. But the losses of this regiment were enormous. Colonel 
Laming, the Colonel Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonels Dometti 
and Raievsky, and forty subordinate officers were left dead upon 
the field, and 5,000 non-commissioned officers and men were killed 
or wounded. More than 30 officers and 400 men surrendered. 
The casualties sustained by the Japanese were nearly 1,000 killed 
and wounded. 



196. 




CHAPTER VII. 

Russian Demoralization— On the Heels of the Enemy— Remarkable Japanese 
Strategy— The Paper Army— The Thin Black Line of Reinforcements- 
Position of the Russian Army— Kuropatkin Tied to his Railway— The Sec- 
ond Scheme of Attack— A Model of Organization— Perfect Secrecy of 
Plans— Cutting off Port Arthur— Alexeieff's Command of Language— And 
the Sober Truth— Third Blocking Attempt— Lurid Flashing of Search- 
lights—On the Bones of their Predecessors— Half the Passage Blocked- 
Honored but Unarmed— Russian Acknowledgements— Terrific Casualties- 
Togo for Liao-tung— The Japanese Landings— Escape of Alexeieff— Port 
Arthur Isolated. 

HE signal victory of the despised Japanese at the Yalu 
River filled official circles in St. Petersburg with the 
liveliest dismay and shook that determined optimism 
which had survived even the unexampled series of 
naval disasters sustained by the power of the Czar in the Far 
East. There seems never to have been the least doubt among the 

Grand Dukes and the Bureaucrats by 
Russian Demoralization whom the Emperor was surrounded 

that whatever fate might befall the 
fleet, the "yellow monkeys," as they elegantly called their foes, 
would fly headlong before the onslaught of the Russian soldiery, 
accustomed as it was to victory on many a bloody field in Europe. 
The fatuity of this overweening confidence now stood revealed, 
and it was at last tardily recognized that as stern a task awaited 
the Russian forces on land as at sea. But St. Petersburg official- 
dom, wounded in pride and shaken in nerve as it was, still pre- 
served a bold front to the world, and excuses for the disaster that 

197 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

had befallen the Russian arms were as prolific as ever. The army 
at the disposal of General Sassulitch, it was explained, was but 
a small one; that commander had blundered, and by giving battle 
to an overwhelmingly superior force, had disobeyed or misun- 
derstood the orders of General Kuropatkin; and in any case, al- 
though severe losses were admitted, the main body had retreated 
in good order to Feng-hwang-cheng, and the morale of the troops 
was unshaken. The plea that General Sassulitch was solely re- 
sponsible for the defeat which had befallen the Muscovite arms, 
and that he had failed to follow the instructions of his superior, 
has already been dealt with, and its extreme improbability has been 
demonstrated, though, even if it were accurate, it would throw 
a very unflattering light upon the powers of Russian leadership 
in the higher commands. It was soon, however, to be shown that 
the suggestion that the army of the Yalu had retired in good or- 
der and with unshaken morale was equally devoid of truth. As a 
matter of fact, the fierce pursuit of the Japanese and the heavy 
losses which they inflicted upon the retreating Russians at Hoh- 
mu-tang and elsewhere on the road to Feng-hwang-cheng reduced 
the defeat to an utter rout, and it became impossible for Sassulitch 
to make a stand at the latter point, naturally strong as it was and 
admirably calculated to resist an attack. 

After a day or two spent in recuperating his tired troops, 
whose tremendous exertions during the previous week must have 

tested their powers of endurance to the 

On the Heels of utmost, and also in bringing his heavy 

the Enemy guns and supply train across the river 

from Wiju, in preparation for the 
march General Kuroki began a forward movement into Manchuria 
with his whole army. The cavalry led the advance, operating over 
<-. 198 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER THREE MONTHS. 

The war began with the night attack on Port Arthur on February 8, but it 
was not until two months later that the Japanese appeared on the south-eastern 
border of Manchuria. On April 4 they occupied Wiju, on the 21st troops be- 
gan to land at Tatungkau, and on May 1 took place the first great battle of the 
campaign, when the Japanese forced the passage of the Yalu, and drove the Rus- 
sians back upon Feng-wang-cheng. On May 6 the latter place was occupied witli- 
out resistance. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 



> 



199 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

a wide area of country and sweeping the scattered units of the 
Russians before it. Some sharp skirmishes took place at Erh-tai- 
tsu and San-tai-tsu, but no real difficulty was interposed in the way 
of the victorious Japanese, who drove the enemy in flight before 
them. On May 6th the foremost cavalry vedettes reached Feng- 
hwang-cheng, and instead of finding the strongly held entrench- 
ments which the Russian press was even then busily assuring a 
sceptical Europe would prevent any further advance on the part of 
the presumptuous foe, they discovered that the troops of General 
Sassulitch had been withdrawn, and they entered the deserted town 
without having to fire a shot. The leading columns of the infantry, 
following quickly behind, marched in and took possession on the 
same day. Before his hurried departure General Sassulitch had 
ordered the magazine to be blown up, but large quantities of hospital 
and other stores fell into the hands of the Japanese. General Kuro- 
ki's main body was not far in the rear, and the position of the whole 
army was soon securely established at this important point. Feng- 
hwang-cheng is situtaed at a mountain pass on the Liao-yang road, 
at a distance of about 25 miles from the Yalu. As already stated, it 
possesses great strategical importance. It is the centre at which the 
roads meet, coming from Liao-yang, Haicheng, and Kaiping, places 
which are situated at about equal distances from one another along 
the Manchurian railway from north to south, and it therefore con- 
stitutes a point d'appui from which a force could be thrown against 
any of them, while it is itself a position of great strength. General 
Kuroki immediately began to entrench himself strongly at this spot 
and to consolidate his forces, while he waited for the highly import- 
ant developments which were now to take place in other quarters of 
the theatre of war. 

A wide view of the position of affairs as they now stood over 

200. 




a 

X 

u 

W 
< 

X 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the entire field of operations is necessary at this point in order to 

make clear the remarkable events that fol- 
Rernarkable Japanese lowed, and to throw into full relief the ex- 
Strategy traordinary qualities of the Japanese 
strategy — a strategy conceived after the 
most patient study of all the conditions of the problems and worked 
out in practice with almost machine-like regularity and precision. 

When General Kuropatkin arrived at Mukden at the end of 
March and took over the command from General Linevitch, he had 

on paper an army of over 250,000 men. It 
The Paper Army was made up as follows : 223,000 infan- 

try; 21,764 cavalry; 4,000 engineers; and 
artillery consisting of 496 field guns, 30 horse artillery guns, and 24 
machine guns. This large force was organized in four Army Corps, 
each with divisions of infantry and its quota of artillery and cavalry ; 
while there were also two independent divisions of Cossacks, four 
brigades of Frontier Guards, railway troops, fortress artillery and a 
number of small units not allotted. The First Army Corps was un- 
der the command of General Baron Stackelberg, the Second under 
General Sassulitch, the Third under General Stoessel, and the 
Fourth under General Zarubaieff. It was an imposing force, this 
army of Manchuria, calculated to strike terror into the hearts of an 
Oriental enemy, but unfortunately for the Russians it lacked one 
thing, and that was reality. The actual position of affairs was in- 
deed very different. To begin with, the greater part of the troops 
were not near the front at all when the Commander-in-Chief ap- 
peared upon the scene to direct operations, but were being pushed 
along the Siberian Railway with a feverish haste which at the same 
time did not denote proportionate speed. When they did arrive 
they arrived in detached fragments, and the desperate necessities 

203. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the case did not admit of adherence to the paper arrangements. 
For instance, the 7th and 8th Divisions, which should have formed 
part of the Second Army Corps under General Sassulitch, were, as 
a matter of fact, sent to assist in garrisoning Port Arthur and 
Vladivostock. Port Arthur, it will be remembered, was by this time 
under the command of General Stoessel, who was therefore unable 
to direct the operations of the Third Army Corps, which properly 
should have been entrusted to him. On the other hand, the 3rd East 
Siberian Rifle Division, which belonged to that Corps, and the 6th 
East Siberian Rifle Division, which should have been attached to the 
First Army Corps, were sent to the Yalu, where, as we have already 
seen, they took part in the ill-fated conflict of the 1st of May. It 
will be observed from these shifts — only a few of the most noticeable 
out of many — that the Army Corps system of the Manchurian Army 
had completely broken down, and that the ideal of a coherent fight 
ing force, with officers and men trained together in peace under thf 
conditions to which they would be subjected in war, had not been 
attained in the slightest degree. The lack of organization which 
prevailed in the distribution of the larger commands was equally 
manifest in the mobilization of the units of which they were com- 
posed. Regiments were not complete ; hastily- formed levies had to 
be added to bring them up to their nominal strength ; and the ranks 
of the officers had to be filled up in many cases with volunteers from 
regiments in other parts of the Empire. The result was a composite 
force very different indeed in fighting power from the splendid ma- 
chine which the Mikado's strategists had been carefully perfecting 
in time of peace in readiness for the struggle which they had so long 
foreseen. 

In bringing even this haphazard collection of unco-ordinated 

204. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

units to the front in Manchuria, the greatest difficulties had been ex- 
perienced. All that European observers 
The Thin Black Line had predicted about the working capacity 

of Reinforcements of a railway like the Trans-Siberian for 
the conveyance of a huge army for thou- 
sands of miles came true to the letter. Prince Khilkoff, the Director- 
General of Russian Railways, undoubtedly did wonders, and the 
tremendous efforts which he and his staff put forth, especially in sur- 
mounting the great natural obstacle presented by Lake Baikal, were 
worthy of all praise. But to carry an army of 250,000 men, with all 
its necessary supplies and munitions of war, into Manchuria in the 
time required for the purpose of striking an effective blow at an 
enemy like the Japanese was a task beyond the powers of any rail- 
way staff in the world. The rickety single line, with infrequent 
sidings, which stretches across the steppes of Siberia from Harbin 
to the Urals was quite inadequate for such a feat of transport. By 
the middle of May, therefore, the position in which General Kuro- 
patkin found himself— a position partly created by himself, as Min- 
ister of War, and partly created for him by the ineptitude of others 
— was widely different from that which the easy and thoughtless 
optimists in St. Petersburg had anticipated when the war broke out. 
The Fourth Army Corps was not across Lake Baikal ; 30,000 or 40,- 
000 men were shut up in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladi- 
vostock, and were not only useless for field operations, but were 
themselves liable to siege and capture; and, allowing the highest 
possible estimate, the Russian Commander-in-Chief had at his dis- 
posal for assuming the offensive in Manchuria no more than 100,- 
000 men with 260 guns. 

With this army he was holding the railway line from Mukden 
to Port Arthur, a distance of about 230 miles. His headquarters 

2 °5- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were at Liao-yang, and he held Haicheng 
Position of the and Kaiping in force, while a detachment 

Russian Army was thrown out to the south-west and oc- 
cupied Niuchwang. In the extreme south 
Port Arthur, though closely blockaded from the sea by the watch- 
ful Togo, was as yet open to communication by land, and no at- 
tempt had hitherto been made by the Japanese to secure a footing 
on the Liao-tung Peninsula. On the east of the Liao-yang — Kai- 
ping line the Russian troops occupied three important passes,' namely, 
Ta-ling, about 50 miles distant, in a northeasterly direction, from 
Liao-yang; the Motien-ling, about 25 miles away on the main road 
to Feng-hwang-cheng ; and Fen-chu-ling, half way on the road frotm 
Tashihchao to Siuyen. Tashihchao is on the railway midway be- 
tween Haicheng and Kaiping. The Motien-ling . Pass was the 
scene of a sanguinary combat between the Chinese and the Japanese 
in the war of 1894, and on that occasion the Mikado's forces had the 
greatest trouble in capturing it. Besides holding these passes Gen- 
eral Kuropatkin had pushed forward his Cossack patrols to scour 
the country as far as Feng-hwang-cheng, and constant small encoun- 
ters took place between them and General Kuroki's outposts during 
the ensuing six weeks. 

It is clear from this brief statement of the Russian position 
that the Japanese, always provided that they could retain the com- 
mand of the sea, were placed at a great 
Kuropatkin Tied to strategical advantage compared with 

His Railway their enemy. Holding their First Army 
poised at Feng-hwang-cheng, they could 
throw their Second and Third Armies upon the coast at any point 
that suited them best for the purpose of making a great combined 
movement. On the other hand, Kuropatkin was practically tied to 

206. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the railway, and, with the inadequate force at his disposal, could 
not advance against Kuroki to destroy him in detail before the 
arrival of fresh armies from Japan. He was liable to attack at 
any point, and it was the peculiar difficulty of his situation that he 
could not tell which point would be selected. As a matter of fact, 
when the blow fell, as it soon did with crushing effect, he was pow- 
erless to prevent it. 

The chapter of strategy which now opens is a fascinating one 
to any student of war, and fortunately its main features can be 

readily appreciated also by any layman 
The Second Scheme who makes an intelligent study of a map 

of Attack of Manchuria and the Liao-tung Penin- 

sula. The prime object of the Japanese 
plainly was to cut General Kuropatkin's extended line of communi- 
cations, isolate Port Arthur, and then attempt to envelope his main 
force by advancing simultaneously from the south, the east, and the 
northeast. It was consequently necessary, as a preliminary, to es- 
tablish the First Army securely in Manchuria, it being clear that 
with this menace on his left flank, General Kuropatkin would not 
be able to detach many troops to the south to prevent the investment 
of Port Arthur. Everything, therefore, depended on the fortune 
that would attend the advance of General Kuroki across the Yalu, 
and the Moltkes at Tokio, after a patient study of all the conditions 
of an intricate problem, had thought out two great alternative 
schemes to meet the eventuality either of victory or defeat. In case 
of General Kuroki's finding the task of crossing the Yalu unaided 
to be an insuperable one, the Second Army, under General Oku, 
was to be landed at Takushan, a port on the coast some miles to the 
west of the mouth of the river, and thence to strike a blow at 
General Sassulitch's right flank. On the other hand, if Kuroki 

207 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

met with success, Oku's army was to be landed at a point on the 
Liao-tung Peninsula to cut Kuropatkin's communications and invest 
Port Arthur. As we have seen, General Kuroki's signal triumph 
at the Yalu River rendered the first alternative unnecessary, and 
opened the way for the more decisive and dramatic stroke involved 
in the second scheme. 

But before anything could be done to land the Second Army, 
either at Takushan or on the Liao-tung Peninsula, it was impera- 
tively necessary to disarm the Russian 
A Model of Fleet at Port Arthur, and prevent even 

Organization the remotest possibility of its interfering 
with the operations. Here, as always, the 
two services, the army and the navy, had to work in close corre- 
spondence and interdependence. From the beginning of the war 
these separate branches of the Japanese forces had fitted into one 
another like parts of the same piece of machinery, the whole directed 
by one uniform purpose and striving towards one great common 
end. The joint schemes of the naval and military strategists at 
Tokio will ever provide an invaluable object-lesson to all students 
of the art of war; and it may be predicted that they will prove of 
valuable assistance to the strategists of our own army and navy. 
One of the most remarkable features of the war has been the cer- 
tainty and precision with which the Japanese have worked out 
their complex plans ; it is no less remarkable, and affords a further 
striking evidence of their efficiency, that they felt able, absolutely, 
to count upon that certainty and precision, and to make arrange- 
ments long beforehand, which with a less carefully organized scheme 
and less trustworthy commanders to carry it out would have been 
foolhardy, or at least wasteful. Failure in any real sense does not 
seem to have entered into their calculations. One portion of the 

208. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

plan, indeed, might miscarry, but, as we have seen, partial failure 
had been provided against, and a rapid modification of strategy 
to meet the case would have been possible. It was, in fact, one of 
the most interesting examples of the application of brains to war 
that have ever been seen in the history of the world. 

In the action and inter-action, then, of this great double ma- 
chine, the army had done all that it was possible for it to do for 

the moment; and once again it came 
Perfect Secrecy round to the turn of the navy to make 

of Plans the next decisive move. Upon the suc- 
cess of this move may be said to have de- 
pended the whole success of the after operations, but, calculating 
with absolute confidence upon the skill of Admiral Togo, the Mika- 
do's strategists had already put the Second Army into a state of 
complete preparation, and had even ordered it to be conveyed to a 
place from which it could be transferred to the front at any quarter 
at a moment's notice. Arrangements for its embarkation were be- 
gun as soon as General Kuroki reached Wiju with the First Army 
in the early days of April. When that commander was able to re- 
port that his dispositions for the attack upon the Russian entrench- 
ments on the right bank of the Yalu were well advanced, the pro- 
cess of embarking General Oku's troops was started at once. Not 
a hint was allowed to escape as to their destination ; even if the press 
correspondents, chafing under their enforced inaction at Tokio, had 
learnt the name, the censor would not have let it pass to the outer 
world ; but, as a matter of fact, it is safe to say that the secret was 
safely locked in the breasts of half a dozen men. By April 22nd 
the whole army with its transports, commissariat, ammunition train, 
and hospital corps, had been put on board ship, and said farewell to 
the shores of Japan, vanishing, for all the world could tell, into the 

209. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

inane. For more than a fortnight nothing further was heard of it. 
No one could report its landing anywhere, no one could say what it 
was doing, and day by day the mystery grew more mysterious. 
Only on May 7th was the veil lifted, when this great army fell upon 
the coast of Liao-tung as if from the heavens, and proceeeded to the 
investment of Port Arthur. The truth was that during this fort- 
night it had been lying perdu on some small islands close to the 
west coast of Korea, called the Sir James Hall group, and distant 
160 miles in a southeastern direction from the shores of Liao-tung. 
Here, briefly stated, is the manner in which the scheme worked 
out. On May 1st Geenral Kuroki triumphantly crossed the Yalu 

and stormed the heights above Chiu-lien- 
Cutting off cheng. On May 2nd Admiral Togo de- 

Port Arthur scended once more upon Port Arthur, and 

blocked the harbor completely by sinking 
eight steamers at the entrance to the channel. On the afternoon of 
May 3rd, having made sure of the thoroughness of the work, he 
set off at full speed for the Sir James Hall Islands, reaching his 
destination by early morning on the 4th. Everything there was 
in readiness for the expedition, and within a few hours the whole of 
the transports, escorted by the fleet, set sail for the east coast of 
Liao-tung. At dawn the next day they reached the point on the 
peninsula which had been selected for the landing — Yentoa Bay — 
and in a few short hours a considerable portion of the force had 
been disembarked, the resistance offered by a small detachment of 
Cossacks, the only force possessed by the Russians in the neighbor- 
hood, being entirely negligible. On the 6th the railway line was 
severed, and in a few days more the Japanese were sitting securely 
astride of the peninsula, and Port Arthur was cut off from the 
world. The scheme had been carried out like the combinations of a 

210 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

skilful chess player, or like the successive steps of a mathematical 
problem. 

It is necessary now to follow the development of these opera- 
tions more in detail. The first that falls to be described is the suc- 
cessful attempt, the third of the series, to 
Alexeieff's Command block the entrance to the harbor of Port 

of Language Arthur. But before giving the real ver- 
sion of this thrilling enterprise it may be 
interesting to quote the report sent to the Grand Admiral 
unconquerable Alexeieff, whose optimism rose superior to every 
disaster and the alchemy of whose dispatches could still transmute 
defeat into signal victory. Here is the message, so soothing to the 
nerves of his fellow-countrymen, in which he announced the event 
that enabled the Japanese to land troops at any point they desired 
up their enemy's coasts: — 

"I respectfully report to your Highness that a fresh attack 
made by the enemy last night with the object of obstructing the 
entrance to the port was successfully repelled. 

"At i o'clock in the morning five torpedo-boats were perceived 
near the coast from the eastern batteries. Under the fire of our bat- 
teries and warships they retreated southward. 

"At 1.45 the first fireship, escorted by several torpedo-boats, 
came in sight. We opened fire upon it from our batteries and 
warships. Three-quarters of ah hour afterwards our searchlights 
revealed a number of fireships making for the entrance to the har- 
bor from the east and southeast. The Otvajni, the Giliak, the 
Gremiashtchi, and the batteries on the shore repulsed each Japanese 
ship by a well-directed fire. 

"Altogether eight ships were sunk by our vigorous cannonade, 

213 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

by Whitehead torpedoes launched from our torpedo-boats, and by 
the explosion of several submarine mines. 

"Further, according to the reports of the officers commanding 
the batteries and the warship Giliak, two Japanese torpedo-boats 
were destroyed. 

"After 4 a. m., the batteries and gunboats ceased fire, subse- 
quently firing only at intervals on the enemy's torpedo-boats, which 
were visible on the horizon. 

"All the fireships carried quick-firing guns, with which the 
enemy maintained a constant fire. 

"Up to the present thirty men, including two mortally wounded 
officers who sought refuge in the launches, or were rescued from the 
fireships by us, have been picked up. The inspection of the road- 
stead and the work of saving drowning men are hindered by the 
heavy sea which is running. 

"We suffered no casualties with the exception of a seaman 
belonging to the torpedo-boat destroyer Boevoi." 

No one reading this remarkable account could imagine that it 
described an operation which ultimately sealed the doom of Port 

Arthur. For a more sober but a more 
And the Sober Truth accurate narrative we must turn to the 

dispatches of Admiral Togo. On May 
2nd, as already recounted, the Japanese Naval Commander-in-Chief 
received the news of the successful crossing of the Yalu. His plans 
were already laid and his preparations were complete. Eight mer- 
chant steamers this time had been secured for the service, and up- 
wards of 20,000 men volunteered for the glorious duty of manning 
them and dying for their country. Of these, 159 were ultimatly 
^elected. The names of the steamers were the Mikawa, Sakura, 

Totonvi, Yedo, Otaru, Sagami, Aikoku, and Asagawo. The vessels 

214 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ordered to escort the doomed hulks were the gunboats Akagi and 
Chokai, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th destroyer flotillas, and the 9th, 
10th,, and 14th torpedo-boat flotillas. The whole force, which 
was under the command of Commander Hayashi, started for its 
destination on the night of May 2nd. 

It is a melancholy circumstance, typical of the sombre, but 
ofttimes splendid, tragedy of war, that of this third and most suc- 
cessful attempt to block the harbor the 
Third Blocking narrative is necessarily the most frag- 

Attempt mentary and obscure, owing to the loss 
of life which it entailed. On the two 
previous occasions, reckless as was the gallantry of the Japanese 
and enormous as were the risks they ran, the casualties were sur- 
prisingly small, and the majority of the men engaged were able to 
return to their ships and tell the story of their enterprise. On this 
night, however, everything was against success; the Russians were 
more fully prepared to meet attack than they had ever been before ; 
their shooting was more effective; and worse still, the weather 
turned out wholly unfavorable, the ships had to proceed singly upon 
their way; and when they were sunk the difficulties in the way of 
recovering their crews proved more than usually arduous, and most 
of them were either shot or drowned or taken prisoner. In spite 
of all these adevrse circumstances a splendid success was achieved, 
but it was achieved under conditions which largely obliterated the 
record, and leaves but sparse material for the historian. 

The broad outlines of the story, however, are clear. When 

the steamers with their accompanying 

Lurid Flashing of flotillas were well on their way, a strong 

Searchlights southeasterly breeze sprang up, which 

rapidly freshened into a gale. It was im- 

215. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

possible in the circumstances to keep the vessels together, and. 
fearing that the attack would in consequence be ineffective, Com- 
mander Hayashi signalled to his subordinates to abandon the ex- 
pedition for the time being. But the weather and the heavy seas 
prevented his signals from being observed, and the gallant enterprise 
therefore proceeded unchecked. By one in the morning the 14th 
torpedo-boat flotilla reached the roadstead and pressed steadily to- 
wards the eastern side of the harbor mouth. The little vessels were 
soon exposed to the glare of the searchlights, and at once a furious 
bombardment broke out upon them from the Russian gunboats 
and the shore batteries. For the moment they retreated, drawing 
the enemy's fire upon them, while the leading steamer, which was 
close behind, made a dash for the channel. This vessel was the 
Mikawa, under the command of Lieut. Sosa. The Russians, as we 
have said, were much better prepared to resist attack than on pre- 
vious occasions. Piles" of combustibles, stationed at various points 
on the shore on each side of the harbor mouth, were set on fire, 
and cast a lurid light on the scene, throwing into strong relief the 
dark forms of the advancing ships, while the searchlights flashed 
backwards and forwards over the unquiet surface of the sea, and 
made every movement of the Japanese fatally visible to the defend- 
ers on the fortress. A storm of missiles burst over the devoted ex- 
pedition, but undeterred, intent only on reaching the centre of 
the channel, Lieut. Sosa pushed his vessel forward at the top of her 
speed. Nothing could stop him or his crew — nor raging sea, nor 
searchlight, nor even the rain of shot and shell. The Mikawa stuck 
bravely to her course, and, breaking through the boom which 
stretched across the mouth, anchored right in the middle of the 
channel. In a moment the fuse was lighted, and as the commander 
and his crew pushed off in the boats the ship blew up and sank in the 

216. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fairway. The Sakura, which was not far behind, was less lucky 
than her companion. She was driven upon a rock at the eastern side 
of the entrance, and blew up outside the channel. 

There was a short pause, and then came a fresh contingent of. 
fireships, rushing upon destruction. The aim of the Russian gun- 
ners had much improved; in the fierce 
On the Bones of glare of the searchlights and the flaming 

their Predecessors beacons every detail of the steamers was 
distinctly visible, and that they should 
have succeeded in advancing into the channel in the face of such a 
withering blast as swept across their course was little short of a 
miracle. The waters, too, were thickly sown with mines, in readi- 
ness for such an assault as this, and they did serious execution. The 
Aikoku was distant only five cables from the mouth when she struck 
one of these deadly engines and blew up, her race cut short just when 
the goal was at hand. Her commander, Lieut. Uchida, the chief 
engineer, Aoki, and eight of the crew were killed or drowned. The 
Asagawo was riddled with shot, her rudder was smashed, and drift- 
ing upon the shore beneath Golden Hill, she blew up and sank where 
the bones of so many of her predecessors were already reposing. 

But the other vessels were more successful. The Otaru and the 
Sagami reached the harbor mouth before they were sunk, and con- 
tributed a large share to the obstruction 
Half the Passage of the entrance. The Yedo did better 

Blocked still, for she got further up than these 
two others. Just as her anchor was be- 
ing got ready her gallant commander, Lieut. Takayanagi, fell dead, 
shot through the stomach ; but there was no pause in the operations. 
Sub-Lieut. Nagatu at once stepped into his superior's place, and, 
anchoring the ship with the utmost coolness, sank her in the fairway. 

217. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The Totomi did best of all, for, like the Mikawa, she burst through 
the boom in the teeth of the Russian guns, got well inside, and 
turning right across the channel from east to west, sank in that posi- 
tion, blocking up at least half the passage. 

Admiral Togo, in his brief and dignified way, thus referred 
to the magnificent services rendered by the men who had fallen in 

this great enterprise : — "The undertaking, 
Honored, but Unarmed when compared with the last two at- 
tempts, involved a heavier casualty on out- 
side owing to the inclemency of the weather and increased prepara- 
tion for defence of the enmy. We could not save any of the officers 
and men of the Otaru, Sagami, Sakura and Asagawo, and I regret . 
that nothing particular could be learned about the gallant way in 
which they discharged their duties, although the memory of their 
exemplary conduct will long survive in the Imperial navy." 

But though the Japanese Commander-in-Chief could learn 
nothing particular about the gallant way in which his men had per- 
formed their duties, the gap in our knowl- 
Russian edge can fortunately be supplied, to some 

Acknowledgments extent at all events, by the Russians, who 
bore ample and chivalrous testimony to 
the splendid heroism displayed by their foes. They acknowledged, 
said a telegram from St. Petersburg, "that the enemy attacked in 
brilliant style, seeming never to notice the murderous fire which 
greeted them." One incident in particular struck upon their minds 
and extorted from them the warmest expressions of admiration. "On 
board the fireships," they remarked, "were a number of Japanese 
cadets, who displayed extraordinary bravery. As the ships were 
sinking several of these lads rushed aloft, and sitting on the cross- 
trees of the topmasts, fired their revolvers before they plunged into 

218. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the sea." The account ends with a sentence of terse significance: 
"It is believed that none were saved." >. 

Of the total of 159 men engaged in this work of desperate 
heroism only 36 returned in safety, and of these 28 were wounded. 

Two officers (both mortally wounded) 
Terrific Casualties and 30 men were picked up by the Rus- 
sians and taken prisoners. The number 
of the killed was 75. They had not died in vain. The harbor of 
Port Arthur was now securely blocked — not permanently indeed, 
for while divers and dynamite can be obtained no harbor in the 
world can be obstructed for ever in this way; but blocked to such 
an extent that the Russians could not get any big ships through for 
weeks, even given the most advantageous conditions in which to 
carry on the work of removing the obstacles. And for the momen- 
tous operations that were to follow the Japanese required not so 
much weeks as days. 

The fleet remained off Port Arthur till the afternoon to make 
sure that all the rescue work possible had been accomplished. In 

this duty the destroyer and torpedo-boat 
Togo for Liao-tung flotillas rendered admirable service. Once 

again, happy to relate, they emerged 
themselves from the dangerous enterprise with singularly slight 
damages, and lost only two men killed. At last, having realized that 
no more remained to be done in saving life, and having made sure 
that the "bottle" had finally been "corked," Admiral Togo leaving 
behind a small squadron to watch Port Arthur, set off at full steam 
with his main fleet for the Sir James Hall Islands. There he was 
joined by the gunboat squadron under Rear-Admiral Hosoya, which 
had rendered such effective service in the lower reaches of the river 
at the battle of the Yalu. The transports, with the Second Army 

219. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

on board, were practically ready for departure, and on the morning 
of the 4th of May the whole expedition set out for the Liao-tung 
Peninsula. At daybreak on the 5th Yentoa Bay was sighted. 

Yentoa Bay is admirably suited for the landing of a large 
force, for the shelving shore, with shallow waters, presents no diffi- 
culty to the approach of boats such as the 
The Japanese Landings Japanese use for this purpose. Further- 
more, it possesses great strategical ad- 
vantages. It is within easy striking distance of the railway, while 
the country in the immediate neighborhood favors the advance of 
an attacking force and gives little opportunity for defence. The 
likelihood of a landing here, however, does not seem to have oc- 
curred to the Russians, who had prepared instead for a descent upon 
Niuchwang. The whole affair is an excellent illustration of the 
advantages conferred upon a combatant by the command of the 
sea, especially when the openings for attack are numerous, as they 
are in the case of the Liao-tung Peninsula. General Kuropatkin 
could not tell where the descent of the enemy would be made, and 
though he could defend some of the possible points, he could not de- 
fend all. The Japanese, on the other hand, could select the spot 
that suited them best without any serious risk of interference. 
Yentoa Bay was therefore practically undefended when Admiral 
Togo's fleet arrived convoying the Second Army. A troop of about 
100 Cossacks was patrolling the shore, but the gunboat squadron 
quickly dispersed it with a few shells, and the work of landing could 
then be carried through without interruption. 

The first to make for the shore was a force of marines, two bat- 
talions of whom waded through the shal- 
Escape of Alexeieff lows and occupied the rising ground 

above the shore. Within an hour the ad- 
220 




GENERAL STOESiSEL EXHORTING HIS TROOPS IN THE DEFENSE 

OF PORT ARTHUR. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

vance guard of the army itself had been disembarked, and the rest of 
General Oku's troops quickly followed ; the whole process being car- 
ried out with the smoothness and dispatch which characterized all 
the operations of this kind on the Japanese side. On the 6th, a flying 
column was sent to the northwards to seize the small port of Pits- 
zewo, and more important still, another column moved across the 
neck of the peninsula with great rapidity and, occupying Pulantien, 
broke up the railway and cut off all communication between General 
Kuropatkin and Port Arthur. But before this was done one notable 
train load of passengers managed to escape from the beleaguered 
fortress. Chief among them were the "Viceroy of the Far East, 
Admiral Alexeieff himself, and the Grand Duke Boris. They left 
only just in time. The gallant Admiral of the inventive pen had at 
last discovered that the repulse of the Japanese naval attack on 
which he had prided himself in his grandiloquent dispatch to the 
authorities at St. Petersburg was in reality no repulse at all ; that as 
a matter of fact the Japanese had done just what they wanted to do ; 
and that they were now able to proceed, in their methodical way, to 
land troops on the peninsula and invest Port Arthur. That the 
Viceroy should be shut up in the fortress, too, was not to be thought 
of — though probably it would have been better for the success of 
General Kuropatkin's strategy if his troublesome colleague had been 
safely removed out of the way for the rest of the campaign— and so 
by a desperate effort the gallant Admiral burst through the gradu- 
ally tightening cordon. 

After the first interruption of communications the Japanese 
force temporarily withdrew, and the success of the Russians in re- 
laying the line and in running a train 
Port Arthur Isolated loaded with ammunition through to Port 

Arthur revived the drooping spirits of 
223 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the official classes in St. Petersburg. The act was one of extreme 
gallantry, and reflected the highest credit on Colonel Spiridonoff, 
the officer in command, but beyond giving the garrison some greatly 
needed supplies it did not materially alter the situation. The line 
was again broken up, the Japanese occupied the neck of land in 
force, and in a few days Port Arthur was completely cut off from 
the outer world. 



224 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The First Japanese Disaster — The "Hatsuse" Strikes a Mine — Admiral Togo 
Undaunted — Rammed in the Fog — Renewed Russian Hopes — The Vladi- 
vostock Squadron — A Thrill Through the Civilized Globe — Skrydloff the 
Raider — Kamimura on the Track — Approaching Port Arthur — The Im- 
portance of Nanshan — Japanese Dispositions — General Oku's Attack — Ter- 
rific Carnage — A General Bombardment — Chances of Defeat — Rushing the 
Trenches — The Russians in Flight — Tremendous Moral Effect — Terrific Cas- 
ualties — Alarm in St. Petersburg — Fatal Russian Strategy — Old Tactics 
versus New — The Veil over the Tragedy. 

HE Japanese fleet, as we have seen in the last chapter, had 

Tonce again done its work thoroughly. The Russian fleet, 
crippled in the early days of the war and harried inces- 
santly ever since, was now for weeks to come securely shut 
up in the harbor of Port Arthur, and could do nothing seriously to 
affect the course of events. Admiral Togo, with his six powerful 

battleships and his splendid cruisers, had 
The First Japanese absolute command of the Gulf of Pechili, 
Disaster and the transports from Japan were able 

to pour troops with perfect safety upon 
the shores of the Liao-tung Peninsula. It was at this moment of 
conspicuous success that the first serious calamity of the war over- 
took the Japanese Navy, and two terrible accidents occurred which 
filled the Russians with hope, as appearing to betoken a turn at last 
in the tide of fortune and to threaten the forces of the Mikado with 
something like the cloud of misfortune that had so far hung over 

225 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

their opponents. There was, however, this notable difference be- 
tween the two cases. The losses suffered by the Russians at sea 
were almost all due to their own lack of forethought or of skill ; they 
seemed to court defeat, and defeat came to them in full measure. 
But the blow which now befell the Japanese fleet was of a kind 
which the utmost ability and precaution could hardly have prevented, 
and, moreover, serious as it was, it did not materially affect the 
main course of the campaign, although undoubtedly it compelled 
the Commander-in-Chief in some degree to modify his plan of 
operations. 

The disaster was a double one. On one and the same day, the 
15th of May, the magnificent battleship, the Hatsuse, was blown up 
by mines and sunk with fully 500 men; and the protected cruiser, 
Yoshino, colliding- with the Kasuga in a dense fog, was totally lost, 
only 90 of her crew being saved. 

It was at a spot ten miles southeast of Liaotishan promontory 
that the Hatsuse met her fate. With the Shikishima, the Yashima, 

and two cruisers, she was engaged in 
The "Hatsuse" Strikes watching Port Arthur and protecting the 
a Mine landing of troops on the peninsula. Heavy 

fogs come off the land in the Gulf of 
Pechili at this period of the year, and during the morning navigation 
had been rendered difficult owing to this reason, but by 11 o'clock 
the weather had changed and the sky was clear. No enemy was in 
sight, when suddenly, without any warning, a shock was felt under 
the stern of the Hatsuse and a heavy explosion took place, damaging 
her steering gear. She signalled to the other ships at once to stand 
by and give assistance, but before anything could be done another 
mine exploded under her and tore a great yawning hole in her plates. 
The water rushed into her in torrents, and at once the great ship 

226. 




OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

began to settle down. In a few moments, with appalling swiftness, 
she sank like a stone, with all her freight of humanity. Had the 
catastrophe occurred during the night hardly a man could have been 
saved, but fortunately in the broad daylight something could be 
done to lessen the tale of death. The boats of the other battleships 
and the cruisers were quickly upon the spot and succeeded in picking 
up 300 officers and men out of a total complement of about 800. 
Among these were Rear-Admiral Nashiba and Captain Nakao, the 
commander of the vessel. The list of the drowned included some 
of the brightest officers of the Japanese Navy, including Commander 
Tsukamoto, Commander Count Nire, and Commander Arimori. 
Besides these, five second lieutenants, five engineers, two surgeons, 
six midshipmen, four engineer cadets, and ten non-commissioned 
officers perished. 

While the work of rescue was proceeding, sixteen of the Rus- 
sian torpedo-boat destroyers seized the opportunity to come out of 
the harbor and effect a diversion, but the Japanese destroyer flotillas 
engaged them hotly, and other cruisers from Togo's fleet coming 
up with all speed, drove them back into Port Arthur. 

The Hatsuse, which was built at Elswick in 1899 a ^ ter tne typ e 
of the English ship Majestic, was a ship of 15,000 tons displace- 
ment, and 15,000 indicated horse-power. 
Admiral Togo She could steam 18 knots, her armor was 

Undaunted 14.6 inches, and the weight of her broad- 
side fire was 4,240 lbs. Her destruction 
of course meant a serious weakening of Togo's first fighting line, for 
six battleships were by no means too large a force for the work he 
had to do. Moreover, the Hatsuse, with the Asahi, Shikishima, and 
Mikasa, were the most modern and up-to-date ships of their class 
in the fleet; the Yashinia and the Fuji, which completed the list. 

229. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

being older and less heavily armed vessels. Nevertheless the grip 
of the Japanese Admiral upon the beleaguered port never slackened 
one whit, and in the event his five battleships, with their accompany- 
ing cruisers, were destined to prove more than a match for the navy 
of the Czar in the great battle in blue water which took place three 
months afterwards. 

The sinking of the Yoshino was not so heavy a blow, but it was 
serious enough in the circumstances, and the loss of life was in itself 
greatly to be deplored. This second-class protected cruiser was also 
built at Messrs. Armstrong's famous works on the Tyne. She was 
of 4,180 tons displacement, and her engines had an indicated horse- 
power of 15,750, with a speed of 23 knots, and a weight of broadside 
fire of 780 lbs. She was quite an old ship, as modern men-of-war 
go, having been launched in 1892, and taking an honorable part in 
the Chino-Japanese war of 1895. 

On the fatal 15th of May she formed one of the cruiser squad- 
ron which, under the command of Rear-Admiral Dewa, was engaged 

in the blockading operations outside Port 
Rammed in the Fog Arthur. The squadron had been stand- 
ing off the harbor during the night of 
the 14th, and early in the morning steamed southwards. 
An impenetrable fog concealed everything from view, and 
the big ships had to proceed with the utmost caution. But 
in such difficult circumstances the utmost caution is sometimes 
unavailing, and at 1.40 the Kasuga, one of the twin ships recently 
purchased from the Argentine Government, rammed the Yoshino on 
the port stern. A terrible gap was torn in the hull of the unfortu- 
nate cruiser, and at once she began to settle down to starboard. 
From the meagre accounts furnished by the survivors, it is clear, 
as indeed might have been expected, that the most perfect discipline 

230. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

prevailed on board the doomed vessel. Collision mats were quickly 
got out and placed over the hole, but the injury was too severe to be 
dealt with by such means, and the swift inrush of water made all 
efforts to save the vessel vain. Captain Sayegi, the commander of 
the ship, ordered all the crew onto the upper deck, and the boats 
were lowered without delay, but the disaster was too sudden for 
them to be of any use. Five were lowered on the starboard side 
and one on the port, but before they could get clear the cruiser listed 
heavily to starboard and went down, smashing all the five boats on 
that side to pieces. The cutter, which was lowered on the port side, 
was the only boat that escaped. With perfect coolness and self- 
devotion the captain remained on the bridge and shouted encourage- 
ment to his men as they were getting into the boats. When last seen 
he was shaking hands with his second in command, Commander 
Hirowateri. In another moment both officers had gone down with 
their ship. The boats of the Kasuga were on the spot with all possi- 
ble speed, and succeeded in picking up 90 of the crew, but the rest, 
numbering upwards of 270, perished with their captain. 

When this two-fold disaster became known, the Russians were 
naturally elated and even filled with renewed hope. Its true propor- 
tions, too, were greatly exaggerated, and 
Renewed Russian in the expectation that the Japanese would 

Hopes °e seriously hindered in their landing op- 

erations on the coast of Liao-tung, Gen- 
eral Kuropatkin countermanded the evacuation of Niuchwang, 
which had already partly taken place, and his forces once again 
occupied that port. However, as we have already stated, the loss 
he had sustained did not lessen the grip maintained by Admiral Togo 
upon Port Arthur. His weakened condition did, indeed, at a later 
period give the Russian fleet, after it had been patched up with 

23 1 - 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

infinite pains and difficulty, an admirable opportunity to break 
through the cordon, but the attempt was made with singular feeble- 
ness, and the admiral in command took his ships back to the refuge 
of the harbor without effecting anything. On the other hand, the 
destruction of the Hatsuse and the Yoshino, by necessitating the 
withdrawal of some ships from Admiral Kamimura, who was guard- 
ing the Korean Straits, indirectly gave the Vladivostock squadron 
a chance of raiding the coast of Japan for some time with impunity, 
of destroying a great deal of merchant shipping, and incidentally of 
bringing about the most serious international complications, in which 
Great Britain, as the chief trading country of the world, was the 
power principally involved. 

It will be convenient at this point briefly to advert to the ex- 
ploits of this squadron, which have necessarily been put on one side 

in the recent course of the narrative by 
The Vladivostock the claims of the more important events. 
Squadron After the destruction of two small Japa- 

nese merchantmen on the nth of Feb- 
ruary nothing more was heard of Captain Reitzenstein's cruisers 
for more than two months. In April, however, the command was 
taken over by a more highly-placed officer, Rear-Admiral Jessen, 
and a sudden burst of activity took place. With the Rossia, the 
Rurxk, and the Gromoboi, and a flotilla of torpedo-boats and destroy- 
ers, the new commander made a raid upon the east coast of Korea 
at Gensan. At that very time Admiral Kamimura's squadron 
started on a voyage northwards to search for the Russians, and 
there can be no doubt that the two would have met, but by a stroke 
of the most perverse ill-luck one of those dense spring fogs, which 
descend upon the Sea of Japan like a pall, intervened and the oppos- 
ing squadrons passed close to one another without discovering their 

232. 




A SKIRMISH ON THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

proximity. When, totally baffled by these weather conditions, 
Kamimura returned to Gensan after a three days' cruise, he found 
to his chagrin that the Russians had visited the port in his absence 
and had even sunk a small merchant steamer called the Goyo Maru. 
But of more serious importance still was the destruction of the 
Kinshiu Maru, a transport with 124 soldiers of the 37th Regiment 
of Infantry on board. She fell in with the enemy's ships on the 
night of the 25th while they were on their way back to Vladivostock. 
A summons to surrender was met by a haughty refusal. An hour's 
grace was given, at the end of which a torpedo was discharged 
against the doomed vessel, striking her amidships. Under the orders 
of their officers the men fell in upon the deck, as calmly and steadily 
as if on parade, to wait for inevitable death. The officers themselves, 
five in number, following the stern traditions of the ancient Samu- 
rai clan, went below and committed suicide; but the rank and file 
determined that they would strike one blow at the enemy before they 
died, and so they opened a gallant but ineffective fire upon the Rus- 
sians with their rifles. The cruisers made a deadly reply with their 
machine guns, tearing great gaps in the masses of men thickly 
gathered together on the deck of the transport. Still, however, the 
soldiers fought on with desperate bravery, until another torpedo 
brought the tragic drama to a swift conclusion, sinking the ship in 
a few seconds. Undaunted even at the moment of death, the Japa- 
nese went down with triumphant shouts of "Banzai" upon their lips. 
Seventy-four of the rank and file perished, but forty-five others 
escaped by means of the steamer's boats, which they found floating 
on the sea, and on the 29th they arrived at Gensan with their thrill- 
ing story. 

It was a story mournful indeed in one aspect, but in all others 
glorious and inspiring. It may be doubted, indeed, whether any 

235- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

on® event which had hitherto occurred in 
A Thrill Through the the whole course of the war so 
Civilized Globe inflamed the martial ardor of the Japa- 

nese and filled them with such high hopes 
for a successful issue from the great conflict upon which they had 
entered, as the splendid heroism and calm self-sacrifice with which 
the soldiers and bluejackets on board the Kinshiu Maru met their 
death. Who could withhold the conviction that if this was the spirit 
in which the sons of Dai Nippon advanced to the work that lay be- 
fore them, no misfortune, no temporary defeat could in the end 
prevent victory from resting upon the banners of the Rising Sun? 
Nor was the moral effect of the deed confined to Japan. The story 
sent a thrill through the whole civilized globe, and taught the nations 
of Europe and the masters of the New World that, accustomed as 
they were to acts of daring and devotion among their own people, 
a race had arisen in the Far East whose dauntless bearing in war 
they could not hope to surpass. 

Another month elapsed before the Vladivostock squadron 
proved troublesome again. It had then come directly under the 

control of the new Commander-in-Chief 
Skrydloff the Raider of the Pacific fleet, Admiral Skrydloff, 

who had been appointed to succeed the 
ill-fated Makaroff, and whose reputation in the Russian navy was 
second only to that of his distinguished predecessor. Unfortunately 
for Russia, Admiral Skrydloff arrived in the Far East too late to 
reach his main fleet. At Harbin he learnt that Port Arthur was in- 
vested both by land and sea, and that it was impossible for him to 
assume the command at the place where his services were most 
needed. He was, therefore, compelled to go on to Vladivostock in- 
stead and direct the operations of the cruiser squadron there in the 

236 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

desperate hope that at a later period an opportunity might occur 
of effecting a junction with his Port Arthur fleet. A further piece 
of bad news awaited him at the northern port. One of the four 
cruisers which were all that now furnished his attenuated com- 
mand had gone ashore in a fog a few days previously, and had be- 
come a total wreck. This was the Bogatyr. She was, indeed, the 
smallest ship in the squadron, being a second-class protected cruiser 
of 6,750 tons, but her speed was high, and her loss in the dark cir- 
cumstances of the hour was a serious blow. However, the gallant 
Admiral proceeded to make the best of the material which lay at his 
disposition, and in the course of the next two months he pursued 
most vigorous tactics, venturing southwards with great frequency, 
harrying the coasts of Japan, and bringing maritime commerce in 
that part of the world almost to a standstill. 

Admiral Kamimura with his cruisers made the most strenuous 
efforts to catch his elusive enemy, but the bad luck which had visited 

him at Gensan at the end of April con- 
Kamimura on the tinued to dog him still for a long time. 

Track Again and again a convenient fog inter- 

vened to favor the escape of the Russians ; 
moreover, the Japanese squadron had to be depleted in order to fur- 
nish aid to the main fleet which was blockading Port Arthur, and 
assisting in the landing of troops; and furthermore, the strategic 
necessity of closely guarding the Straits between Japan and Korea 
and preventing the possibility of a junction between the two Rus- 
sian fleets, severely limited the area of Kamimura's activity. In 
these circumstances Admiral Skrydloff's cruisers had an almost un- 
checkered run of success for a period of two months. The Japanese 
Admiral came in for some sharp criticism at the hands of the general 
public in Japan for his apparent lack of energy, but the authorities 

23Z 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

at Tokio, who had all the conditions of the campaign before them in 
their true proportions, trusted him thoroughly, and their trust was 
magnificently vindicated on the 14th of August, when he at last 
managed to trap the Russians into his net, and administered to them 
a signal defeat in a pitched battle on the high seas. 

A return must now be made to the land operations upon the 
Liao-tung Peninsula. Undeterred by the loss of the Hatsuse and the 

Yoshino, the Japanese continued to pour 
Approaching Port Arthur in troops at Yentoa Bay and Pitszewo. 

At the same time the 3rd Army, under 
General Nodzu, began to disembark at Takushan. But it was to 
General Oku and the 2nd Army that the honor fell of striking 
the next blow for the Mikado. This was the capture of Kinchau and 
the storming of the Russian entrenchments on Nanshan Hill, which, 
after preliminary operations lasting over some days, was finally 
effected on the 26th of May. 

The narrow neck of land, a mile and three-quarters in breadth, 
running between Kinchau Bay on the west and Hand Bay — a small 

inlet of Talienwan Bay — on the east, pos- 
Importance of Nanshan sesses great strategical importance. The 

high ground to the south of it, of which 
the salient point is the Nanshan Hill, completely commands the ap- 
proach to Port Arthur from the north, and, as it cannot be out- 
flanked by any ordinary method, it gives an admirable opportunity, 
to a defending force to resist an attack from that quarter. It is, 
indeed, commanded in its turn by an eminence called Mount Samp- 
son, which lies to the northeast; but in this instance the disadvan- 
tage was more than counterbalanced by the fact that the Japanese 
could only oppose to the heavy fortress guns which the Russians had 
mounted on Nanshan, field artillery of an inferior calibre. After 

238. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the landing of the enemy at Yentoa and the cutting of the railway 
had made clear the imminence of the peril which threatened Port 
Arthur, the governor of the fortress, General Stoessel, wasted no 
time in erecting powerful defences at this naturally strong posi- 
tion. During the ensuing weeks the Russian engineers went fever- 
ishly to work constructing entrenchments on Nanshan and the con- 
necting chains of hills, and also on a second line of eminences fur- 
ther to the south, the chief of which is named Nankuenling. These 
careful preparations might well seem to have rendered the position 
impregnable. Ten forts almost permanent in character were estab- 
lished on Nanshan, and at every available point trenches and rifle 
pits were dug and concealed with the greatest skill, and their ap- 
proaches guarded by barbed wire entanglements, while at conve- 
nient places mines were laid to entrap an unwary foe. Over 70 guns, 
many of them pieces of fortress artillery of heavy calibre, were 
placed in position here, and the whole was manned by a force of 
1 2,000 men ; the utmost number of troops that could with advantage 
be employed in such a confined area. Altogether, with the exception 
of Port Arthur itself, no more formidable obstacle has ever been 
presented to the advance of an invading army in modern times than 
was offered by General Stoessel at Kinchau. The village of Kin- 
chau itself, it should be explained, though it gave the name to the 
battle, was of comparatively small strategical importance, lying as 
it does on the low ground to the northeast of the isthmus and offer- 
ing an easy prey, but at the same time no particular advantage, to 
the enemy. 

The concentration of the Japanese army proceeded in the cir- 
cumstances with great rapidity. On the 
Japanese Dispositions 21st of May, the whole force, consisting 

of three divisions, or about 60,000 men, 
*39- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

was established to the north of Hand Bay. Under the protec- 
tion of the angle formed by the range of hills to the south of Mount 
Sampson, the troops were formed up for battle, and General Oku 
explained to his chief subordinates his dispositions for the attack. 
Careful reconnaissances during the next two days, by drawing the 
fire of the enemy, revealed the strength of the Russian position, 
which stretched from Nanshan to the west to Hushangtao on the 
east. At this latter point eight guns were stationed, commanding 
the waters of Hand Bay, so that co-operation by the Japanese gun- 
boats from this side was impossible. On the other hand, the Rus- 
sians had a gunboat themselves stationed in the bay, and this was 
able to render valuable assistance to the defending force when the 
attack developed. On the west the waters of Kinchau Bay were too 
shallow to admit of the approach of vessels of any but the smallest 
draught, but four of the Japanese gunboats were able to enter close 
up to the shore, and gave conspicuous aid to General Oku in the 
course of the operations. 

On the 25th of May the Russian positions at Kinchau and Nan- 
shan were heavily bombarded, and General Oku extended his line 

to the north as well as to the east. At 
General Oku's Attack dawn on the next day the attack began in 

earnest. A fierce and sustained bombard- 
ment, lasting for five hours, prepared the way for the advance, after 
which the Japanese made an onslaught upon the village of Kinchau, 
and drove the Russians at the point of the bayonet back upon their 
main line of defence, Nanshan. In this attack they were greatly as- 
sisted by the gunboats, the Tsukushi, Saiyen, Akagi and Chiokai, 
which brought their fire to bear upon the enemy's batteries at 
Suchiatun and Nanshan, and kept them hotly engaged. The capture 
of Kinchau, however, was only the first step in the fiery progress 

24a 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

which lay before the Mikado's troops. To dislodge the Russians 
from Nanshan itself was a work of much greater magnitude. It was 
to the 4th Division that the main part of this honorable duty was 
assigned, the centre of the Japanese line being held by the ist Divi- 
sion, and the extreme left by the 3rd. 

Another fierce artillery duel preluded the general advance. By 
1 1 o'clock the Russian batteries appeared to have been silenced, and 

the Japanese pressed forward to storm 
Terrific Carnage the heights. But it turned out that Gen- 

eral Stoessel was only reserving his fire. 
No sooner did the Japanese debouch into the open upon the slopes 
which led up to the hill than a storm of missiles swept across their 
path, mowing them down in serried masses. The wire entangle- 
ments, too, proved a deadly obstacle. Rush after rush was made 
by the gallant Japanese, but every attempt to get near to the trenches 
was vain. The carnage was terrific. The officers fell in all direc- 
tions, the rank and file lay in piles of dead at the foot of the hill, 
and the advance came for a time to an absolute standstill. 

It was clear that further artillery preparation was necessary, 
and therefore General Oku ordered a general bombardment once 

more. For hours his field batteries, sup- 
A General Bombardment plemented by the gunboats, rained shot 

and shell upon the Russian positions, 
searching the whole range of forts and trenches, and doing terrible 
execution. The Russian fire slackened under this fearful cannon- 
ade, but still the Japanese continued their bombardment. 

And now came the crucial moment of the day. The artillery 

ammunition of the attacking force began 

Chances of Defeat to give out. To bring up fresh supplies 

from far in the rear meant that before 
241. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the bombardment could be resumed night would have fallen upon the 
scene, for it was by this time late in the afternoon. When this un- 
toward intelligence was brought to him, General Oku was presented 
with a problem of the utmost difficulty and a responsibility which 
might well have seemed overwhelming. He must either hazard 
another infantry attack at once, fraught with all the possibility of 
failure, or he must temporarily withdraw his forces and wait for 
further ammunition and perhaps heavier guns. The second course 
meant only delay; the first, in the event of a repulse, meant not 
merely delay, but the possibility of a crushing defeat as well. It 
must be remembered, moreover, that the troops had been close upon 
sixteen hours in the field. In these circumstances a commander of 
less resolution and with less confidence in his men would have been 
under a strong temptation to choose the alternative which offered 
the smaller risk, but General Oku was made of different mettle. 
He knew that delay would upset the general arrangements of the 
campaign; he knew, too, that it might give a fatal opportunity for 
the advance of a relief force from the north. He therefore at once 
accepted the tremendous responsibility of ordering a resumption of 
the attack all along the line. Fortunately, a weak point in the Rus- 
sian defences had been discovered. The shallow waters of Kinchau 
Bay allowed men to wade in and approach Nanshan from the south- 
west, at a point at which, owing to the angle of emplacement of the 
Russian guns, they could do comparatively little damage to an ad- 
vancing force. It was resolved to try this plan. 

Once again, then, the bugles rang out for attack, and the Jap- 
anese threw themselves with desperate bravery upon the Russian en- 
trenchments. The wire entanglements 
Rushing the Trenches gave as much difficulty as ever, and the 

slopes of the hill were one blinding sheet 
242 



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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 
of flame ; but still the Japanese pressed forward, climbing over their 
own dead and working their way gradually through the obstacle* 
placed in their path. By a piece of good fortune the electric wires 
connected with a large mine field were discovered just in time and 
cut, and thus a dreadful disaster was averted. But brilliant as was 
the dash of the ist and 3rd Divisions on the Russian right, the de- 
fence of the Czar's troops was stubborn and hardly contested, and 
it was not till the 4th Division on the extreme left had carried 
through their flanking operation that the issue of the day was put 
beyond doubt. Here the gunboats in the bay rendered invaluable 
service. They steamed close in and poured in a heavy fire upon 
the Russian batteries, covering the advance of the infantry through 
the shallows. In this gallant operation the commander of the 
Chiokai, Captain Hayashi, was killed, and several other casualties 
were sustained by the crews engaged. But the work was accom- 
plished. Climbing the hill like cats, the Japanese soldiery broke 
through the entanglements in face of a galling fire and rushed the 
trenches, bayonetting the defenders where they stood. Nothing 
could stop that mad onslaught, and after a fierce hand-to-hand con- 
flict on the summit the flag of the Rising Sun floated triumphantly 
over the position which the Russians had so fondly, and indeed so 
naturally, deemed to be impregnable. 

General Stoessel, finding that there was no use in continuing 
the sanguinary conflict now that his flank was turned, ordered a gen- 
eral retreat. The Japanese, however, in 
The Russians in Flight spite of the tremendous fatigues to which 

they had already been subjected since 
dawn, fiercely pursued their retiring enemy, with the result that the 
Russians found it impossible to make a stand at their second line of 

245 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

defence at Nankuenling, and were compelled to flee as far as the 
immediate neighborhood of Port Arthur itself. 

The moral effect of this great victory of the Japanese was tre- 
mendous. The Russians, and with them a great many Continental 
• critics, had attempted to minimize the im- 
Tremendous Moral Effectportance of the battle of the Yalu. The 

Japanese, they said, were in overwhel- 
ming numbers, the position was one that could be easily turned, and 
General Sassulitch ought never to have tried to stand his ground. 
But such criticisms were silenced by Kinchau. The little Japs were 
seen to be equal, if not superior, man for man, to their Russian 
opponents, and the fierce, almost fanatical, fervor of their patriotism 
proved a factor in the struggle the importance of which few people 
had properly estimated. It was felt at once by military men in 
Europe, that if 12,000 Russians, armed with heavy guns, could not 
hold such a post as that of Nanshan against the onslaught of the 
Japanese, the fall of Port Arthur itself, provided there were no ef- 
fective diversion from the north, was merely a question of time. 

Nor were the material fruits of General Oku's success less 
striking. His losses in personnel, of course, were heavy, amount- 
ing to 133 officers, and 4,062 non-com- 
Terrific Casualties missioned officers and men killed and 
wounded. The casualties of the defend- 
ers were naturally not so great, but over 500 Russians were left dead 
upon the field, and it is estimated that their total losses in killed and 
wounded must have numbered over 2,000. Sixty-eight pieces of ar- 
tillery and ten machine-guns fell into the hands of the victors. 

Four days afterwards the Japanese entered Dalny and occupied 
that important station. With the exception of the great pier, all 
those enormous works upon which the Russians had been expend- 

246. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER FOUR MONTHS. 

Continuing their advance, the first Japanese Army, under Kuroki occupied 
Kuan-tien on May 14. In the meantime the second Japanese Army, under Oku, 
had effected a landing on the Liaotung Peninsula at Pitzuwo. On May 16 they 
seized the Kinchau heights, and ten days later defeated the Russians at the bat- 
tle of Nanshan. Dalny was occupied on May 30. The third Japanese Army, 
under Nodz,u, began landing at Takushan on May 19, and on June 8 occupied 
Siu-yen. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 



247. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 
ing vast sums for years were found to be intact, and the invaders 
were able henceforth to use the port as an invaluable base for their 
operations against Port Arthur. 

This series of disasters caused the greatest alarm in St. Peters- 
burg. The seriousness of the danger that threatened Port Arthur 

was realized in all its fulness at last, and 
Alarm in St. Petersburg the lofty assurance which had hitherto 

reigned supreme among the Imperial 
entourage gave place to feelings of panic. The result was that des- 
perate measures were embarked upon which only led to fresh mis- 
fortunes. General Kuropatkin himself had seen from the first the 
impossibility of relieving Port Arthur from the north until he had 
a larger force at his disposal than he was likely to secure for months 
to come. His plan had always been to concentrate his main army at 
Liao-yang, or, if necessary, at Mukden, and wait till the arrival of 
large reinforcements enabled him to advance against the Japanese 
with some hope of success. If the Commander-in-Chief had been 
left to himself it is possible that this plan would have been pursued 
consistently and a great debacle might have been avoided. Port Ar- 
thur, indeed, would have been almost certain to fall, but in the opin- 
ion of nearly every strategist who had studied the problem, nothing 
short of a miracle could now save the so-called Gibraltar of the East. 
The only sound policy for the Russians was one of retirement and 
concentration until a more favorable opportunity presented itself. 
But now the Evil Genius of Russia interposed with his fatal coun- 
sels. To Admiral Alexeieff it was unthinkable that Port Arthur, at 
which for so long he had held his haughty Viceregal state, should be 
abandoned without a mighty effort. Ever since the arrival of Gen- 
eral Kuropatkin in Manchuria had reduced him to a position of com- 
parative inferiority, he had been intriguing against that commander 

248 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

with varying success, but on this occasion he received powerful 
backing amongst the Czar's advisers in St. Petersburg. The heaviest 
pressure was brought to bear upon General Kuropatkin to induce 
him to dispatch a strong force southwards to the relief of Port 
Arthur, and in an evil hour for his country and his own reputation 
the Commander-in-Chief weakly consented to be overruled. Lieut.- 
General Baron Stackelberg, the commander of the ist Army Corps, 
with an army 35,000 strong was ordered to advance by forced 
marches into the Liao-tung Peninsula and lead a forlorn hope to save 
the doomed fortress. 

The folly of this course is obvious to the veriest tyro in military 
science. Kuropatkin's line was already too far extended for safety. 

On his left flank, creeping gradually 
Fatal Russian Strategy closer and working round to the northeast 

to effect a wide turning movement, was 
General KurokL with the ist Army; General Nodzu, with the 3rd 
Army, was advancing from Takushan in the direction of Kaichau; 
while in the extreme south General Oku, having received large rein- 
forcements, was able to hold Port Arthur securely invested and to 
march northwards with forces numbering 60,000 men, flushed with 
recent victory. The southward march of Baron Stackelberg, there- 
fore, was doomed to disaster from the first. Not only was it highly 
improbable that he would ever succeed in getting through to Port 
Arthur, but in case he had to retreat, he ran a grave risk of being 
cut off by General Nodzu, and imperilling the position of General 
Kuropatkin himself. This was exactly what happened in actual 
fact. 

The ill-fated expedition, after some preliminary skirmishing, 
met General Oku's main body at Wafangkau or Telissu on the 15th 
of June. Telissu is a village situated to the east of the railway Kne 

251 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

about 20 miles north of Port Adams. 
Old Tactics versus New Nothing could better prove the superiority 

of the Japanese over the Russians in the 
matter of tactics than the dispositions which were made for this bat- 
tle by Oku and Stackelberg respectively. Kuropatkin's lieutenant 
fought in the old-fashioned style, with his men closely packed to- 
gether over a narrow front. The Japanese, on the other hand, ad- 
vanced in an open formation over a widely extended area.. At dawn 
General Oku ordered his troops to attack. They advanced in two 
columns, the main body proceeding along the railway line against 
the enemy's centre and right, while a second and more mobile force 
worked round to the west to turn Stackelberg's right flank. The 
Russians threw themselves fiercely upon the Japanese right and 
centre, and for some hours the battle was hotly contested. But in 
the meantime the turning movement to the west was proceeding with 
entire success. Before he realized the imminence of the danger, 
Stackelberg found that his right flank was driven in, and that his 
rear was threatened. He withdrew troops from his left and centre 
to meet this new danger ; but it was too late, and he merely weakened 
his position in one part of the field without strengthening it in an- 
other. From three sides the Japanese now pressed their attack 
home, gradually encircling the Russians with a ring of fire. The 
terrible effectiveness of Oku's artillery was borne witness to after- 
wards by the Russians themselves. Their positions were heaped 
with dead. General Stackelberg in his dispatch describing the battle 
said that the 3rd and 4th batteries of the 1st Artillery Brigade were 
literally cut to pieces by the Japanese shells, and thirteen out of six- 
teen guns were rendered completely useless. A large number of 
officers were killed, and among the wounded was Major-General 
Gerngross. In spite of this tremendous pounding the Russians held 

252. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

their ground with great gallantry ; but, as the Japanese attack devel- 
oped, General Stackelberg saw that if he maintained his position 
much longer, he would be altogether surrounded. Therefore, just 
in the nick of time, he ordered a retreat. Slowly and painfully the 
retirement was conducted over difficult, mountainous country. The 
Japanese, exhausted by forced marches and two days' fighting, were 
unable to cut off Stackelberg's escape entirely, but they inflicted 
terrible losses on his retreating troops, and he only succeeded in 
reaching Kaichau some days afterwards with a shattered remnant 
of his force. The Japanese casualties in this great battle were not 
more than 1,000. On the other hand, upwards of 2,000 Russians 
were found dead upon the field and buried by the victors, and the 
total losses sustained by General Stackelberg's army, including 
prisoners taken, amounted to about 10,000. Large numbers of guns 
and regimental colors were captured. 

Thus ended this ill-advised attempt to relieve Port Arthur. 
Henceforth all hopes of succor from the north had to be abandoned. 

In fact, General Kuropatkin, instead of 
The Veil over being able to render assistance to the 

the Tragedy beleaguered garrison, was himself threat- 
ened with irremediable disaster, largely in 
consequence of this ill-fated operation. And now for upwards of 
two months almost complete darkness fell upon the tragedy that was 
being enacted round the doomed fortress. Rumors reached the outer 
world from time to time of the sanguinary combats by which the 
besiegers slowly fought their way nearer and nearer to the heart of 
the stronghold ; but rumors they remained ; and the Japanese, true to 
their policy of silence while important events were in progress, 
allowed no authentic news to percolate through the censorship. At 
last, however, the veil was partially lifted. When in the early days 

253 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of August the Russian fleet, threatened with ignoble destruction by 
the fire of the rapidly approaching batteries of the Japanese, made an 
unsuccessful dash for freedom, it was recognized on all hands that 
the end was near. 



254 



^ 




GENERAL NOGI BEFORE PORT ARTHUR. 




CHAPTER IX. 

Secrecy of Japanese Strategy— The Geographical Position— Kuropatkin's Es- 
sential Weakness— Rain Stops Carnage— Oku Rolls up the Russians— Field- 
Marshal Oyama— Keller's Failure— ioth Regiment Ambushed— Desperate 
Courage against Overwhelming Odds — Kuroki again on the Offensive — 

Capture of Niuchwang The Bloodiest Fight so Far— The Death of Count 

Keller — Kuropatkin's Heavy Loss — Concentration at Liao-yang — Kuropat- 
kin's Urgent Motives— Oyama' s Gre^t Resources — Twelve Days' Battle— 
The Great Armies in Touch— Frightful Scene of Carnage— Costly but 
Indecisive. 

HE signal defeat of the Russian army under General Stackel- 
berg at Telissu on the 15th June cleared the way for an ad- 
vance northwards by General Oku's army. It was one of 
the consequences of the secrecy which attended the Japan- 
ese strategy from first to last that until this moment General Oku's 
real objective was not guessed either by foreign observers or even 

by the Russians themselves. The general 
Secrecy of impression was, naturally, that the Second 

Japanese Strategy Army was destined for the tremendous 
task of storming Port Arthur, but a much 
larger conception of the campaign was present to the minds of the 
strategists at Tokio. Fresh troops in large numbers were poured 
into the Liao-tung Peninsula, and these, under the command of 
General Nogi were concentrated round Port Arthur, while the main 
body of the Second Army was pushed northwards to act in co-opera- 
tion with the First Army of General Kuroki and the Third Army 

257- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

commanded by General Nodzu, which, it will be remembered, had by 
this time landed at Takushan and was being gradually directed upon 
Haicheng. As soon, therefore, as his forces had been restored after 
their tremendous exertions at Telissu, General Oku set out with all 
possible rapidity along the line of railway towards Kaiping. And 
now Kuroki's long wait at Feng-hwang-cheng came to an end. It 
had, however, been well utilized. Not only had it enabled the con- 
queror of the Yalu to concentrate an army of upwards of 100,000 
men, but in the interval his engineers had been employed in con- 
structing defences, of a semi-permanent character, which, in the 
event of a subsequent retreat being rendered necessary, would make 
the position almost impregnable against Russian attack. But on the 
23rd June General Kuroki broke camp, and, leaving behind him only 
a rear guard, took the first step in that great series of operations 
which, as they advanced northwards, stained the fertile plains of 
Southern Manchuria with the blood of Japanese and Muscovite 
alike and culminated around Liao-yang and Mukden in the most 
terrific and sanguinary conflicts experienced in the annals of war 
since the great struggle between the Northern and Southern States. 
The key to the valley of the Liao River, it will be remembered, 
lies in the three passes of Motienling, Taling, and Fenshuiling; and 

these were all held in force by the Rus- 
Geographical Position sians. The first of them stands on the 

main road leading from Feng-hwang- 
cheng to Liao-yang; the second (which must not be confused with 
the pass of the same name situated north of the Taitse River at about 
60 miles to the east of Liao-yang) commands the road between 
Feng-hwang-cheng and Haicheng; and the third is on the road from 
Siuyen to Tashichao and is about 20 miles southeast from the latter 
place. The situation of the most important posts along the railway 

258. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

from Mukden to Kaiping has already been indicated, but for the 
sake of clearness it may be repeated that Liao-yang, where General 
Kuropatkin had concentrated his main army, stands about 40 miles 
south of Mukden; that 30 miles further south again is situated 
Haicheng; and that an interval of 30 miles more separates that 
town from Kaiping, or Kaichau, as it is sometimes called, Tashichao 
lying half-way between. 

General Nodzu's troops were now for the first time brought 
into action, and operated in unison with General Kuroki's army in 

the attack upon the passes. A combina- 

Kuropatkin's tion of most skilful movements made 

Essential Weakness them masters of these important defiles 

within a few days of one another. In 
each case the tactics were the same. A frontal attack was pushed 
forward by one division, while strong bodies were sent round both 
to the right and left, and, securing ground from which they could 
enfilade the Russian trenches, rendered the position untenable by 
the defending force. General surprise was felt at the ineffective 
stand made here by General Kuropatkin's troops, especially as they 
had spent at least three months in building entrenchments, protected 
by wire entanglements and all the accessories of modern scientific 
warfare. The fact was, however, that the essential weakness of 
Kuropatkin's army in point of numbers compared with its oppo- 
nents was now made disastrously apparent, and in spite of the natural 
and artificial strength of these passes, he could not prevent the 
superior force which the Japanese invariably contrived to bring 
against him at any given point from turning his flanks. Both the 
Taling Pass and the Motienling Pass, at the latter of which General 
Count Keller, who had superseded General Sassulitch in his com- 
mand, directed the Russian operations, fell an easy prey to Kuroki's 

2 59- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

manoeuvres ; but at Fenshuiling General Nodzu met with fierce oppo- 
sition. The defile was defended by fourteen battalions of infantry 
and three regiments of cavalry, supported by thirty guns, and a 
severe engagement took place, lasting for six hours. It was appar- 
ent that the strength of the Russian entrenchments was such that a 
direct attack would involve an enormous sacrifice of life; but after 
brilliant tactics, carried out during the night of the 26th June and 
the early morning of the 27th, the Japanese outflanked their enemy 
and drove them back in full retreat down the road to Simucheng, 
leaving ninety dead upon the field and losing eighty-eight prisoners, 
including six officers. On the same day a force of three battalions 
with sixteen guns made a desperate effort to recapture the position, 
but they were hurled back with heavy loss, and the pass remained 
irrevocably in the hands of the Japanese. 

At this stage in the advance further progress was delayed for a 
few days by an agency which at frequent intervals during the cam- 
paign rose superior to the fiercest energy 
Rain Stops the Carnage on the part of either combatant. The 

weather, which renders war in Manchuria 
practically impossible in winter, succeeds in giving it an intermittent 
character even in summer, and now heavy rains brought the opera- 
tions to a temporary standstill. The Japanese who were on the high 
ground overlooking the valleys did not suffer so much from the 
n ntial downpour, but the Russians in the plains had to bear its 
full force, and all movements by any arm of the service were ren- 
dered impossible by a sea of mud. By the 4th of July, however, the 
rains had stopped, and on that day a sharp fight took place at Motien- 
ling. During a dense fog at dawn, two battalions of the Russians 
ittacked the Japanese outposts and endeavored to force the position. 
But Kuroki's soldiers were not to be surprised, and reinforcements 

260. 



THE JAPAN RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER FIVE MONTHS. 

Following the railway northwards Oku came into touch with the retreating 
Russians on June 15, and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat at the battle of 
Telissu. His advance was not again opposed until he reached Kaiping, 
which he captured after some fighting on July 9. Meanwhile the armies under 
Kuroki and Nodzu had been advancing steadily, and the Mo-tien and Fen-shui 
Passes, commanding the roads to Liaoyang and Haicheng, were captured simul- 
taneously. During this month the siege of Port Arthur began on land. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 



26l 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were hurried up with all speed. Severe hand-to-hand fighting took 
place; but, finally, after three onslaughts by the Russians, the Jap- 
anese hurled them back in rout and pursued them for a distance 
of four miles to the westward. 

Two days later General Oku took up the running for the Jap- 
anese, and started to roll up the Russian forces from the south. 

Moving out from Erh-tau-ho-tse, which 
Oku Rolls up Russians is 12 miles south of Kaiping, he marched 

upon that town along the road westwards 
of the railway, driving the enemy's outposts before him. By noon 
on the 9th he had forced the Russians, who were under General 
Zarubaieff, Commander of the Fourth Siberian Army Corps, back 
upon their main position at Kaiping itself, and here it appeared that 
General Kuropatkin had ordered a stand to be made. Upwards of 
30,000 men, with numerous guns, were in the neighborhood at the 
disposal of Zarubaieff and Oku prepared for a stout resistance. But 
as a matter of fact the opposition offered to him turned out to be 
comparatively feeble. After an artillery duel lasting for four hours 
his troops advanced and seized the heights extending from Haishan- 
chai on the west to Shwangtingshan on the east, from both of which 
eminences they could command Kaiping. Reinforcements had been 
hurried up from the Russian rear, but they were soon ordered north- 
ward again, and the whole body evacuated the town under cover of 
heavy gun fire on the afternoon of the -same day. The cause of this 
ineffectual resistance on the part of Zarubaieff was the advance of 
the Third Army of Japan from Fenshuiling, which acted in co-ordi- 
nation throughout with General Oku's columns, and threatened to 
outflank the Russians. To avoid a great disaster General Zarubaieff 
was compelled to retreat, and as a consequence of this skilful man- 
oeuvring, General Oku was enabled to occupy the important position 

262. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of Kaiping with a loss which was almost negligible, another big 
step being thus gained in the progress northwards. 

On the very day which Oku began his advance on Kaiping there 
occurred an event which brought strikingly before the world the fact 

that these movements by the three Japan- 
Field-Marshal Oyama ese generals were only part of one great 

concerted plan, the vastness of which was 
not yet realized. This was the departure from Tokio for the seat of 
war of Field-Marshal Marquis Oyama, the master-mind selected 
by the Mikado for the supreme command of all his armies in the 
field. A brief description of the career of this great general, whose 
renown in Japan is second only to that of the veteran Yamagata, will 
not be out of place here. Like so many of the Japanese leaders who 
have distinguished themselves in the present war, Oyama's first ex- 
perience of fighting was gained in the old days of the Sumatsu 
rebellion, in which he took part on the revolutionary side, achieving 
considerable distinction for his gallantry. After peace had placed 
the Mikado securely upon the throne of Japan, Oyama was sent to 
Prussia as military attache, and was present at Moltke's headquar- 
ters at all the most important operations of the Franco-German 
War. There he, no doubt, gained many of the valuable lessons 
which have since been put in force both in the Chinese War ten years 
ago and in the present campaign. After the Peace of Versailles he 
devoted himself to a close study of the military organizations of 
France and Switzerland, and returning to his own country in 1875 
received an appointment on the General Staff in Tokio. He was 
selected for the command of the First Army on the outbreak of the 
war with China in 1894, and directed the operations around Port 
Arthur, which culminated in the storming of that powerful fortress. 
On the retirement of Marshal Yamagata from ill-health, General 

263. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Oyama was appointed to the chief command of all the Japanese 
forces in the field, and carried the campaign to a successful conclu- 
sion. After the signature of the Treaty of Peace the Mikado recog- 
nized his great services by conferring upon him the baton of Field- 
Marshal and appointing him Chief of the Staff. In the meanwhile, 
General Oku was preparing for his further advance northwards, 
where the next obstacle in his path was the Russian position at 
Tashichao. This town had been converted into a place of great 
strength and was garrisoned by at least 60,000 men with 105 guns. 
But before the opposing forces could meet here a fresh attack of a 
much more determined character than the last was made upon the 
Japanese army at Motienling, the Russians, under the command of 
Kuropatkin's most trusted lieutenant, General Count Keller, mak- 
ing a desperate attempt to regain possession of that important defile. 
This was the first occasion on which Kuropatkin's troops seriously 
assumed the offensive in the course of the war, and the result was a 
conspicuous success once more for the Japanese. 

The Russian Commander-in-Chief entrusted two divisions to 
Count Keller for the purpose of the attack, and that General made 

dispositions for a frontal attack along the 
Keller's Failure main road from Tawan, simultaneously, 
with movements against both of the Jap- 
anese flanks. For the main operation one division was employed, 
and the other was divided into two bodies, the first marching from 
Anping upon Hsimatang, where the outposts on Kuroki's right were 
stationed ; and the second pushing forward from Tienshuitien along 
the paths which lead through the hills to the south of Motienling, 
where the Japanese left wing was posted. This scheme of advance 
might have had some success if all the parts of the machine had 
worked together with complete smoothness, but in the actual event 

264. 




FOOD FOR THE JAPANESE ARMY. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the movements of the several columns were badly co-ordinated, and 
they came into action at different times. 

The frontal attack began at 3 a. m., when, under cover of a 
dense fog, Keller's two leading battalions fell upon the Japanese out- 
post upon the main road some distance to 
10th Regiment Ambushed the west of the pass. Notwithstanding 

the shock of the surprise and the formid- 
able disparity of numbers, Kuroki's troops held their ground with 
the utmost gallantry. The foremost files of the 10th Siberian Regi- 
ment became engaged almost at once in a hand-to-hand combat with 
a small body of about thirty or forty Japanese. Several of the latter 
were bayonetted before they realized that the enemy was upon them, 
but the survivors, taking refuge among some Chinese cottages, 
made a desperate resistance with rifle and cold steel. The din and 
the crack of musketry aroused some companies who were bivouack- 
ing in the neighboring trenches, and they quickly rushed to the sup- 
port of their comrades. One company, taking up a position in an 
adjacent temple, poured in a murderous fire upon the Russians, and 
another stationed itself on a hill on the opposite side and joined in 
the deadly fusillade. Thus the 10th Regiment, instead of success- 
fully surprising its foe, found itself in turn surprised in an ambush, 
and after a hot engagement was compelled to retreat back upon its 
main body. It was five o'clock before the Russians could bring up a 
sufficient force to drive in the Japanese outposts, by which time the 
gallant stand made by these few companies had enabled Kuroki's 
troops entrenched at the Motien Pass itself to prepare fully for the 
onslaught that awaited them. When Keller's soldiery, therefore, 
came within range of the Japanese lines, they were met by a heavy 
fire both from infantry and artillery. Two hours more elapsed be- 
fore they were properly disposed for the attack, and then, although 

267. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

they consisted of a whole division of 12,000 men, and were opposed 
by a force of no more than 4,000, their tactics proved quite ineffec- 
tive, and they could not succeed in the slightest degree in shaking 
the hold upon the defile which their enemy had gained. 

The fire which was directed upon them from the Japanese lines 
was especially galling upon their left wing, and here, shortly before 
eleven o'clock, they began to give way, and ere long the whole force 
fell back in retreat. Their active enemy then sprang forward to 
the attack themselves and attempted to push the repulse home, but 
a strong rear guard held them in check, and prevented the reverse 
from becoming a rout. It afterwards became apparent that the 
reason for this retreat on the part of Count Keller's main body was 
the complete failure of the flanking movements which he had pre- 
sumably intended to be conducted simultaneously. 

But the attack upon their outposts upon the main road at three 

in the morning had put the whole Japanese army upon the qui vive, 

and both on the right and the left flanks 

Desperate Courage preparations were made to meet such a 

^ , , . ^ , , manoeuvre as the Russian General had in 
Overwhelming Odds 

view. On the left wing, as no enemy had 

appeared in sight by five o'clock, a company of the Japanese pushed 
forward towards Makumenza to wait for their approach. There it 
fell in with a Russian battalion and engaged it at once in a hot 
conflict. A second battalion came to the aid of the first, and for a 
time the little force of Japanese was in danger of being annihilated, 
but reinforcements quickly arrived, and though they were still num- 
erically weaker than the Russians, they drove them back with heavy 
loss, and occupied the heights which commanded the approach from 
this point, completing the confusion of the enemy by directing a 
galling fire upon the main body which was now in full retreat along 

268. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




MAP SHOWING TERRITORY ADJACENT TO UAOYANQ. 



269 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the road to Tawan. On the right flank the struggle was more obsti- 
nate and sanguinary. When the attack began at eight o'clock the 
Japanese were greatly outnumbered, and for a time one company 
had to hold its own against the onslaught of a whole battalion of the 
Russians, supported by a troop of cavalry. In the deadly conflict 
which ensued, every one of the Japanese officers fell upon the field, 
but notwithstanding their terrible losses the little band fought on 
with desperate courage against the overwhelming odds. The arrival 
of another Russian battalion seemed to threaten their complete de- 
struction, but, fortunately, before long reinforcements were hurried 
up to the spot and the contest became more even. After a severe 
conflict, lasting for eight and a half hours, the Russians at length 
gave up the attempt to force the Japanese lines as hopeless, and fell 
back broken and defeated. 

Thus at every point this attack, from which General Kuropatkin 
had hoped for so much, failed completely, and the superiority of the 
Japanese soldiery over their opponents was once more strikingly 
manifested. Kuroki's casualties amounted to about 300 killed and 
wounded, but the affair was much more expensive to the Russians, 
General Keller putting his losses at over 1,000 men. 

Immediately following upon this success, General Kuroki once 
again assumed the offensive and captured the position of Hsihoyen, 

practically the last stronghold occupied 

Kuropatkin Again by the Russians on the high ground over- 

on the Offensive looking the plains of the Liao River. 

This success was the work of the Twelfth 
Division, that division which, it will be remembered, decided the bat- 
tle of the Yalu by its flank attack on General Kashtalinsky's left. 
It now covered itself with fresh glory under its skilful commander, 
General Nishi. The same tactics as had been adopted in all these 

270 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

operations against the strongly entrenched positions of the Russians 
were once more employed. The enemy were kept busy with a frontal 
attack while a column marched around their right flank and ren- 
dered their carefully prepared stronghold untenable. A general 
advance was then made, and the Russians were driven back upon 
Anping in complete rout with more than 1,000 casualties. The 
Japanese killed and wounded amounted only to half that number. 

On the 24th of July, Oku resumed his advance northwards and 
attacked the powerful Russian position at Tashichao. The skilful 
handling of Zarubaieff's large force of artillery made it impossible 
for the Japanese to carry the trenches by daylight, but, waiting till 
nightfall, they made a fresh onslaught under the beams of a full 
moon. Point after point fell into their hands, and next morning 
General Zarubaieff, feeling the hopelessness of continuing the de- 
fence, especially in view of a fresh movement by General Nodzu's 
army which threatened his left, decided to retreat. This unexpect- 
edly easy victory was gained by the Japanese at the expense of about 
1,000 casualties; but the Russians lost twice that number of men, 
and among the wounded were two officers of high rank, Generals 
Kondratovitch and Skaloff. Two days later a detachment of Oku's 
army entered Yinkow, the port of Niuchwang — a highly important 
prize, for it provided the invaders w r ith a new and most valuable 
base for the advance from the south. 

On July 31st the advance was resumed all along the line of the 
extended front of the Japanese, and each of the three armies was 

hotly engaged. Oku's steady march along 
Capture of Niuchwang the line of the railway drove the re- 
treating enemy into Haicheng. On the 
right, at Tomucheng, a more sanguinary battle took place between 
General Nodzu's army and two divisions of Russian infantry, sup- 

271. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ported by seven batteries of artillery, under the command of General 
AlexeiefT. The Russians occupied a strongly entrenched position on 
the hills to the north of Tomucheng, the work of fortification having 
occupied several months. But the result was the same here as in 
every quarter of the theatre of war. The two armies were locked 
together in a deadly struggle for nearly the whole of a 
scorching day, until the Japanese left wing, attacking with 
desperate bravery, carried the heights opposite to them 
and threatened the rear of the Russian centre. During the 
night, therefore, General AlexeiefT fell back, leaving more than 150 
dead upon the field and abandoning six guns, whrch fell into the 
hands of the enemy. The result of these combined operations of the 
Second and Third Armies was that Haicheng was occupied on 
August 3rd, and Niuchwang — which must be distinguished from the 
port of the same name — also fell into Oku's grasp. 

It was in the north, however, with the Japanese First Army 
that the bloodiest fighting ensued, and that the Russians met with 

the most signal defeat. On July 31st 

The Bloodiest Kuroki's right wing held Kushulintzu,, 4 

Fight so Far miles to the west of Hsihoyen, and his 

centre occupied Yangtzuling, 6 miles to 
the west of Motienling, both places being situated about 25 miles 
from Liao-yang. Opposite to Kushulintzu the Russians, who held 
a very strong position on the high ground, consisted of two divi- 
sions of infantry with well-placed artillery. The attack began at 
dawn and continued all day. The Japanese infantry advanced 
gradually across the open valley undeterred by the murderous fire 
poured upon them from the Russian batteries, and threw them- 
selves recklessly upon the enemy's redoubts. It was on the wings 
that the Russian defence was the weakest, and here, by sunset, the 

272. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER SIX MONTHS. 

Kuroki and Nodzu now called a halt to enable Oku to come into line with 
them. The latter, working his way steadily northwards, drove the Russians out 
of Tashichiao after three days' severe fighting. Newchwang was occupied on 
July 25, and Nodzu, having advanced his forces to Si-mu-cheng and driven out 
the Russians on July 30, the two generals joined forces and marched on Hai- 
cheng, which they occupied on August 2. A general assault was delivered on 
Port Arthur on July 26, and a few days later the Japanese captured Wolf Hill, 
Green Hill, and Takushan. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 

273 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

impetuous onslaught of the Mikado's troops carried all before it, 
nightfall finding them in possession of some of the most important 
heights. But the strength of the Russian centre was too great to 
be forced easily, and the Japanese therefore bivouacked on the 
field, and waited till daybreak to resume the attack. With the first 
rays of dawn they were ready once more for the fray, and again 
the hills resounded with the roar of artillery. For several hours 
the battle raged, the Russians making a most obstinate defence, 
but as the Japanese captured height after height the enemy could 
stand their ground no longer, and by noon they broke and fled 
westwards, leaving several field guns behind in the victor's hands. 
At Yangtzuling the conflict was even more severe. The Rus- 
sian force here consisted of two and a half divisions, with four 

batteries of artillery, and General Count 

The Death of Keller commanded in person. It was des- 

Count Keller tined to be that gallant but unfortunate 

officer's last fight, for he fell mortally 
wounded in the course of the second day's operations. 
The Japanese plan of attack was very much the same as 
in the case of Kushulintzu. In spite of the tropical sun, 
whose rays beat upon their heads without protection, their advance 
was irresistible, and throwing themselves upon the enemy with a 
fierce elan, which carried all before it, they captured some of the 
principal positions by the close of the day. Here again, however, 
a numerous body of Russians held out in the centre against the 
most desperate attacks, and the Japanese were therefore compelled 
to bivouac on the field for the night and resume the conflict on the 
succeeding day. The dawn opened with a terrific artillery duel be- 
tween the opposing batteries, and all the morning the guns belched 
forth flame and death. It was in the course of this tremendous 

274. 












wlm 



& 



/ 



DEATH OF COUNT KELLER AT YANG-ZE-LING PASS. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

bombardment that Count Keller met with his death. He was a 
man of reckless courage, and he insisted on taking- his stand to 
direct the operations in a battery which was most heavily exposed 
to the fire of Kuroki's guns. So fiercely did the shells fall all 
around that his staff represented to him that he must be the ob- 
ject himself of the enemy's cannonade, but he refused to retire to 
a less exposed position. He had hardly dismounted from his horse 
when a shrapnel shell burst within a few paces from him and 
hurled him to the ground. A sergeant rushed up to him to raise 
him in his arms, but the general motioned him away and expired 
a few monments afterwards. His wounds were of the most ter- 
rible nature. Two fragments of shell struck him upon the head 
and three others in the chest, and he had thirty-one shrapnel bul- 
let wounds in different parts of his body. The death of their com- 
mander threw the Russians into final confusion, and they retreated 
in haste, leaving a number of field guns in Kuroki's possession. 
The loss of Count Keller was a particularly heavy blow to 
Kuropatkin, for he was the most trusted of all his subordinates 

and was most deeply in the confidence 
Kuropatkin's Heavy Loss of the Commander-in-Chief. His exper- 
ience, too, of war was gained in the 
Russo-Turkish campaign, on the staff of the same famous leader, 
Skobeleff, and he actually succeeded Kuropatkin as Aide-de-Camp 
to that General when the present Commander-in-Chief was 
wounded at the Shipka Pass in 1877. Besides the signal misfor- 
tune he sustained by the death of this distinguished officer, General 
Kuropatkin had to add to his already heavy casualty list a further 
loss of 2,000 officers and men. It was an even more significant 
and discouraging fact, however, that among the troops opposed to 
the victorious Kuroki on this occasion were the most recent ac- 
cessions to the Russian army, the 10th and 17th Corps. These 

277. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

forces, which came from European Russia and were greatly su- 
perior to the Siberian soldiery both in physique and discipline, had 
been counted upon to do much to stem the tide of disaster, but 
though they made a better appearance than the troops which had 
been in action previously, all their prowess was unavailing against 
the impetuous patriotism of the Japanese, who had by this time 
proved themselves to be among the finest infantry in the whole 
world. 

It now became plain to Kuropatkin that the Japanese could not 
be stopped before Liao-yang itself was reached. He therefore con- 
centrated all his available forces at that 
Concentration at powerful and highly fortified position 

Liaoyang m preparation for a great pitched battle. 

During the months which had elapsed 
since the arrival of the Russian Commander-inChief at the seat of 
war, Liao-yang had been turned into a great place of arms. Its 
great natural defensive advantages had been skilfully improved 
upon. Every inch of suitable ground had been carefully fortified, 
and there can be little doubt from the character of the dispositions 
which had been made that Kuropatkin hoped to be able not only to 
make a stand here, but to hurl back the armies of the Mikado in 
disorder, save Southern Manchuria for the Czar, and perhaps even 
march forward afterwards to the relief of the beleaguered fortress 
of Port Arthur. 

His armies, indeed, had been tragically reduced in numbers 
in every combat that had yet taken place. The arrival of the Tenth 
and Seventeenth Army Corps had put him in a better position; 
but against this had to be set the loss of nearly 30,000 men killed 
or wounded since the battle of the Yalu proved the magnitude of 
the task which lay before him. Yet he now possessed a force of 

278 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

about 132,000 men, with 400 guns, and he held a position of enor- 
mous strength. All of his troops, indeed, had tasted the bitterness 
and discouragement of defeat in the course of the fifteen engage- 
ments which had taken place since the outbreak of the war, but 
he himself had not yet been present in person upon the field of bat- 
tle, and he might well hope that the failure which had attended 
all the efforts of his lieutenants would give place to victory when 
he took the direction of affairs into his own hands. 

At all events, whatever the issue of the battle might be, there 
could be no doubt that a retreat from Liao-yang without fighting 

was for every reason impossible. The 

Kuropatkin's Urgent Court of St. Petersburg had already 

Motives been rendered restive by the continual 

withdrawal of the main body of 
Muscovite armies to the north; his enemies were busy 
with their detractions ; and the irrepressible Alexeieff was 
always near to make capital out of the difficulties, and 
to distort and misrepresent the actions of his abler rival. But 
beyond all these personal reasons, powerful enough in themselves 
in the eyes of a man holding such a position as Kuropatkin, there 
were more worthy considerations which weighed heavily in the 
scale in favor of boldly submitting his fortunes to the cast of the 
die and risking all in one mighty struggle. The honor of the 
Russian arms and the prestige of the Empire were at stake; a 
continued retreat without a supreme effort to roll back the tide of 
invasion was politically dangerous to a Dominion which owed 
its very existence in the East to the preservation of a haughty 
and determined front; and, more serious even than the growing 
restlessness of all those Oriental races who yield unwilling alle- 
giance to the Little White Father, was the increasing discontent in 

279. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Russia itself, and the uprising once more of the forbidding spectre 
of Nihilism and revolution. A pitched battle on a grand scale 
was, therefore, for every reason unavoidable, and, in spite of all 
the risks he ran, Kuropatkin faced the prospect before him with 
calm courage and resolution. 

The state of things on the other side was very different. Here 
there was nothing to discourage, but everything to inspire hope. 

Field-Marshal Oyama, who had now 
Oyama's Great Resources reached the scene of operations, found at 

his disposal three great armies upon 
whose banners victory had consistently rested during a now pro- 
longed campaign. The organization of the whole of the forces 
was perfect, and though it was now far from its base, its supplies 
were ample and constant. The natural difficulties of the advance 
were, indeed, great, but they were no greater than those which 
had already been triumphantly overcome. His chief lieutenants 
were men of tried capacity. The subordinate officers had proved 
their efficiency in tactics on many a hard-fought field, and the 
rank and file were inspired, not only with a rare intelligence, but 
with a fanatical patriotism, which made them, perhaps, the most 
formidable instruments of warfare the world has ever seen. And 
after all the inevitable losses of the past three months, he yet had 
under his command a total field force (exclusive of the army of 
100,000 men engaged in besieging Port Arthur) of 220,000 men 
and 600 guns. It was plain that only the most desperate resistance 
on the part of the Russisans could prevent the crowning mercy of a 
great victory, and already foreign critics were anticipating a Rus- 
sian Sedan upon the banks of the Taitse River. 

Torrential rains again delayed operations for upwards of three 
weeks, but by the 24th of August comparatively dry weather had 

280. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

vance of the Japanese upon Liao-yang 

Twelve Days' Battle set in, and on the 25th the general ad- 
began. We now enter upon one ot the 
most tremendous dramas ever known in military history — the 
twelve days' battle around Liao-yang. No fighting so fierce, so 
sustained, and so bloody has been experienced since the armies of 
Grant and Lee met in their great death grapple in the Wilderness 
in the Civil War. The terrible conflict raged for the most part 
simultaneously over an enormously extended front, and an ade- 
quate description can only be given by following in turn the for- 
tunes of the separate Japanese armies. But for sake of clearness 
it will be well to attempt, first, a brief and comprehensive account 
of the main lines of the operations and their final result. 

On the 25th Kuroki's army of three divisions advanced upon 
Anping, and, after desperate fighting, drove the Russians back from 

that place to Liao-yang. At the same 
The Great Armies time the Third Army under General 

in Touch Nodzu, monceuvring with Oku's forces 
on the left, turned the enemy out 
of their strong position at Anshanchan, situated about 15 
miles to the south of Liao-yang. The advance of Oku 
was delayed considerably by the efforts of an enterprising 
rear guard left by Kuropatkin to cover the retreat, and 
by the thick mud, which made the roads almost impassable ; but on 
the 29th both he and Nodzu came into touch with the enemy in 
their main position in front of Liao-yang. Here Kuropatkin held 
an entrenched front of about five miles, with three lines of defence 
formed by separate ranges of low hills, fortified with consum- 
mate skill. 

To the Japanese, however, no obstacle seemed too great. After 

282 




EOUl 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

a prolonged artillery preparation, in which for the first time the 

Russians showed themselves equal, if not 
Frightful Carnage superior, to their opponents, the superb 

infantry of Dai Nippon were ordered to 
the attack. Then ensued the most frightful scene of carnage and 
heroic endurance. For five long days the splendid troops of Oku 
and Nodzu flung themselves upon a foe not less gallant than them- 
selves, and time after time they were held back with broken ranks, 
leaving behind great heaps of dead. And when at last they did make 
their bloody passage into the town of Liao-yang, it was only to 
learn the mortifying intelligence that their enemy had escaped from 
the toils so carefully set for him, and that for a considerable time 
their tremendous struggle had been conducted, not with the main 
body of Kuropatkin's army, but with a rear guard. 

For those incalculable factors which so often defeat the best 
laid schemes of stategy had come into play, and had seriously af- 
fected the success of the great move 
Costly but Indecisive which Kuroki was endeavoring to carry 

out on the Japanese right. In this case 
they proved to be the weather, which had swollen the Taitse River 
into a flood, and a sudden display of great tactical ability by Kuro- 
patkin, which his previous failures in the sphere of strategy had 
led no one to expect. . Upon Kuroki, of course, as holding the most 
advanced position on the Japanese right, it depended to envelope 
the left flank of the Russians and cut off their retreat to the north. 
But, unfortunately for the success of Oyama's strategy, the river 
Taitse, which runs from east to west just north of Liao-yang, 
and which had to be crosesd by the Japanese, was so flooded that a 
day or two elapsed before it could be forded, and it was not till the 
31st that Kuroki's forces were able to take up a position on the op- 

284. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 
posite bank. It was hoped, however, that a rapid march to the 
northwest would place the commander of the First Army astride of 
the railway at Yentai, and that he would thus be able to cut off 
Kuropatkin's retreat and enclose him in another Sedan within a 
ring of steel. But the delay proved fatal, for it gave Kuropatkin 
time to rescue his army from the perilous position in which it was 
placed. With a skill which must always extort the admiration of 
military critics he withdrew the greater part of his forces across 
the river in the most perfect order, unknown to the Japanese, and 
massed them on his left flank. The consequence was that instead of 
finding a division, or at the most two divisions, opposed to him, 
Kuroki was faced by the greater part of the Russian Army, estab- 
lished in strong positions on a range of hills between himself and 
the railway line. It was a masterly piece of generalship on the part 
of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and it saved the situation. 
Indeed, at one point it threatened Kuroki with destruction, for he 
was almost cut off from support, and for twenty-four hours both 
officers and men were without either drink or food except small 
rations of dried rice. But the extraordinary gallantry of the sons 
of Japan rose superior even to these conditions. Again and again 
they advanced to the attack against powerful positions held by su- 
perior numbers, and the salient point in the Russian defence, the 
hill of Haiyentai, was heaped with the dead of the heroic combat- 
ants. Despite every effort, however, Kuroki could not pierce the 
enemy's line, and it was not till a fine forced march by a division 
detached from General Nodzu's army arrived to reinforce him that 
he was able to reach the railway after four days of tremendous 
combat. But by that time it was too late. The skilful dispositions 
made by the Russian General had pulled the bulk of his force out 
of the trap, and they were in full retreat upon Mukden. It would 

287. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

be difficult to describe the horrors of that retreat, but the Japanese 
were too exhausted to make as effective a pursuit as they would 
otherwise have done, and the Russians managed to get away with- 
out losing a single piece of artillery. The losses in this tremendous 
battle, or rather series of battles, were enormous. The Japanese 
official account places their casualties at 17,539, but, if we are to 
believe the correspondents, that is an understatement. The exact 
Russian losses, including those incurred during the retreat, are 
placed by some authorities at 25,000, by others as high as 35,000. 
Unfortunately for the Japanese, all this costly expenditure of life 
was indecisive in its results, and left the main object of their strat- 
egy unfulfilled. Kuropatkin had been defeated, indeed, but he had 
not been routed, and it was apparent that the fighting would have 
to be resumed once more in the neighborhood of Mukden. 



288 




CHAPTER X. 

Closer Investment of Port Arthur— Admiral Witoft's Sortie— Tremendous 
Naval Battle— Harbors of Refuge— International Complications— Insignificant 
Japanese Losses— The Last Raid from Vladivostock— The Port Arthur 
Garrison— Fury Unparalleled in History— Kuroki Improves his Reputation 
—The Grim Reality of War. 

HILE the victorious armies of Oku, Kuroki, and Nodzu 
were pressing northward towards Liao-yang, driving 
before them the only force from which the beleaguered 
garrison of Port Arthur could look for relief, the siege 
of Russia's "impregnable fortress" proceeded with unabated de- 
termination and constantly increasing vigor. It was on June 26th 

that the general advance on Port Arthur 
Closer Investment began ; and from that date the lines of 

of Port Arthur investment were steadily drawn closer 
and closer. Siege trains were landed at 
Dalny as well as large reinforcements, but for nearly a month com- 
plete silence as to the progress of events was maintained at Tokio. 
From time to time sensational and contradictory reports of desper- 
ate fighting were received from Chifu, where Chinese refugees 
landed in a constant stream; and authentic messages from General 
Stoessel, the heroic commander of the fortress's garrison, reached 
the outer world at intervals through the medium of a wireless teleg- 
raphy installation at the Russian Consulate in Chifu. Naturally, 
these messages were of a reassuring character, and generally re- 
corded some repulse of the Japanese army of investment; but 

289 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

though no word of contradiction was uttered at Tokio, the world 
was hardly inclined to accept the Russian stories at their face value. 
When, for example, in a triumphant message, General Stoessel 
reported that a grand assault on the Russian defences had taken 
place on July 26th, 27th, and 28th, and had been repulsed at all 
points, with great slaughter, cautious observers of events waited 
for confirmation of the news; although the Czar himself hastened 
to dispatch to his gallant representative in Port Arthur a telegram 
of warm congratulation and praise. Hesitation was justified by the 
event; for two days after their alleged decisive repulse they cap- 
tured the dominant position of Wolf Hill, and thereby made the 
first important breach in the defences of Port Arthur. Wolf Hill 
is an eminence half a mile south of the village of Suei-ze-ying, 
which is some three and a half miles along the railway line run- 
ning due north from Port Arthur. The importance of the captured 
position for the Japanese was that it enabled siege guns to com- 
mand, within easily effective range, the anchorage of the Russian 
squadron on the inside of the Tiger's Tail. This meant, of course, 
either that the fleet must go to sea and fight, or must endure rm- 
potently the hammering of the I2in. shells which soon began to 
drop from the batteries on Wolf's Hill. Within a week of the 
capture of the position, the Japanese had mounted their siege guns ; 
and after a bombardment of two days, the Russian decision was 
taken to attempt another sortie. The last sortie, it will be remem- 
bered, took place on June 23rd, and ended in the inglorious return 
of the whole fleet; as the Russian Admiral, in spite of the advan- 
tage which, as we now know, he possessed over his enemy in bat- 
tle strength, did not dare to give battle. This decision which let 
slip one of the best opportunities that the Russian Pacific Squad- 
ron ever had of favorably modifying the naval situation in the Far 

290. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

East, was ill-received at St. Petersburg, where carefully planned 
dispositions were thus brought to nought ; and as soon as the con- 
templation of another sortie became immediately necessary, the 
strictest injunctions were sent to Admiral Witoft as to his course 
of action. 

The Czar emphatically ordered him on no account to return 
to Port Arthur. His object must be to inflict as much damage as 

possible on the enemy's fleet, and, if pos- 
Admiral Witoft's Sortie sible, to effect a junction with the Vladi- 

vostock Squadron ; while, if the latter ob- 
ject were incapable of accomplishment, he was to endeavor to reach 
the German port of Kiau-chau. From circumstances that have since 
transpired, there is reason to believe that an understanding had 
been arrived at between the German and Russian Governments as 
to the reception of the Russian ships at the German naval base. 
Although for the moment the Russian fugitives would, by the laws 
of neutrality, be placed out of action, they would be in the hands 
of a "benevolent" government; and would remain a factor to be 
reckoned with, if in the future Germany were to intervene in the 
settlement of the struggle. Accordingly, on the morning of Au- 
gust ioth, the Russian Squadron, in full strength except for the 
armored-cruiser Bayan, which was in too injured a condition to 
take its place in the fighting line, began slowly to pass through the 
narrow channel leading from the open sea ; and by eleven o'clock the 
ships were drawn up in battle line, and steamed away on a course 
nearly due south. The gallant little Novik, the fastest vessel in 
either fleet, headed the line, while the patched-up Retvisan came 
next, followed by the Czarevitch, the Peresveit, the Pobicda, the 
Poltava, and the Sevastopol, with the cruisers Askold, Diana, and 
Pallada, and a torpedo flotilla of eight vessels. The squadron of 

291. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Japanese light cruisers which had been watching Port Arthur re- 
treated before the advancing enemy, and signalled at once to the 
sleepless Togo, whose main battle fleet was lying forty miles away. 
This consisted of four battleships and three armored cruisers — 
namely, the Mikasa, carrying Armiral Togo's flag; the Asahi, the 
Shikishima, the Fuji, the Nishin, the Kasuga, the Jakumo, and a 
number of protected cruisers, including the Kasagi, the Chitose, the 
Takasugo, as well as a flotilla of some forty torpedo craft. Thus 
the Russians had a clear superiority in battleships partially dis- 
counted by Togo's superiority in armored cruisers. 

Thirty-five miles to the southeast of Port Arthur the opposing 
fleets came within range; and then began the most tremendous 

naval battle — measured by the offensive 

Tremendous Naval power of its combatants — that the world 

Battle nas y et seen. The naval world had been 

waiting almost with eagerness for the 
present war to afford the spectacle of a fleet action between mod- 
ern armorclads carrying modern armaments; and this un- 
precedented event had at last come to pass. The Russian 
ships were steering for the south, and the object of the 
Japanese was evidently to head them off. At a range of 6,000 
yards, or about three miles and a half, the Mikasa, the Japanese 
flagship, opened fire with her I2in. guns on the leading Russian 
battleship and immediately the action became general. Admiral 
Togo concentrated his fire on the Russian battleships, leaving the 
cruisers very much to chance; and so awful was the effect of this 
deadly rain of shell, that when at last the sun went down on that 
eventful day, the Russian fleet was in hopeless disorder, and its 
stoutest ships were almost unmanageable wrecks. The experience 
of the Czarevitch and the Retvisan, as recounted by survivors on 

292. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

board of those devoted vessels, affords a lurid picture of the ap- 
palling nature of a modern naval battle. The Czarevitch, which 
ultimately reached Kiao-chau, was bombarded at close range by 
several of the Japanese armorclads. In the course of five minutes 
she was struck by three successive I2in. shells, and that fact — which 
is an eloquent testimony to the quality of the Japanese gunnery — 
practically decided her fate. Admiral Witoft was killed by the 
first shell, and his chief of staff was mortally wounded by the sec- 
ond. The steering gear was knocked to bits, so that the ship was 
out of control and began to travel in a circle, and the foremast was 
tumbled over the side; while every man in one of the batteries 
was blown to pieces. The guns' crews were annihilated at the 
work, and the deck gear was twisted into fantastic shapes or car- 
ried away altogether; and so much of it was afterwards picked 
up that the Japanese supposed that the Czarevitch had foundered. 
Poor Witoft — as brave a man as ever sailed — met a terrible death. 
He was blown to pieces by a shell, and of his body only one leg 
was ever found. His last signal was: "Remember the Emperor's 
order not to return to Port Arthur." The decks of the battleship 
presented the appearance of a shambles; her armor-plating was 
pierced in four places; her masts were shattered and bent in the 
form of a cross; her bridge was carried away; and many of her 
guns were disabled. Steering with her propellers she managed, 
under the cover of night, to escape the attacks of the Japanese 
torpedo-boats, and to reach Kiao-chau. Hardly less severe was 
the mauling which the Retvisan received. This battleship received 
such a concentrated fire that when she attempted to break from the 
circle of her enemies, she was literally blown out of her course. 
The other four Russian battleships suffered more or less severely. 
The Pobieda, for instance, had her masts carried away, and her 

293. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

heavy guns were put out of action. When the Czarevitch got out 
of control, the Russian line was necessarily broken, and then the 
fleet seems to have suffered most severely. The command of the 
squadron passed to Prince Ukhtomsky, as second in rank to Ad- 
miral Witoft, and that of the cruiser division to Rear-Admiral 
Reitzenstein ; and between the two there seem to have been divided 
counsels. The latter decided to cut his way southwards at any cost 
in accordance with the orders of the Czar. Wtih the Askold, Novik, 
Pallada, and Diana, he became engaged with the Japanese cruisers, 
and by dint of hard fighting, in which the Askold was badly mauled, 
he managed to get clear of the enemy, and in the early morning 
of the 13th reached Shanghai, having lost sight of the other cruisers. 
The Askold had lost two of her five funnels, one of the boilers was 
injured, and her hull had been pierced in more than half a dozen 
places, both above and below the water-line. Prince Ukhtomsky 
preferred another course. When the signal had been displayed from 
the Czarevitch "Admiral transfers command," the Prince, who was 
next in seniority, signalled from his ship, the Peresviet, "Follow 
me" — an order which, as we have seen, the cruiser division did 
not obey. But the battleships answered the signal ; and the course 
steered was back to Port Arthur. In his dispatch the Prince said: 
"As my vessel had lost many killed and wounded, and her arma- 
ment, hull and electric apparatus were seriously damaged, I de- 
cided to return to Port Arthur." Through the dark night the six 
battleships steamed slowly to their haven, repeated torpedo attacks 
compelling them again and again to change course, and finally to 
disperse. The Czarevitch, as we have seen, reached Kiao-chau 
almost in a sinking condition, while in the morning of the nth, 
the Peresviet, the Retvisan, the Sevastopol, the Pobieda, the Pol- 
tava, and the cruiser Pallada arrived again at the port which they 

294 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

had left twenty-four hours earlier. A list of nearly 400 killed and 
wounded was the witness to the severity of the punishment which 
these vessels had received. But it was evident that they were not 
so damaged as to have been incapable of continuing the attempt to 
break through to the south. Their return to Port Arthur ren- 
dered all that they had suffered vain. It meant that their situation 
was as precarious as ever, while their condition was less favorable 
for enduring it. The displeasure of the Czar was not long in mani- 
festing itself. Hardly had the consternation of defeat subsided, 
than an Imeprial order was issued removing the unhappy Prince 
Ukhtomsky from his command. Recalled he could not be, because 
the means of leaving Port Arthur were denied. 

It was some time before the full measure of Russia's disaster 
could be ascertained ; for the movements of several of the dispersed 

vessels had been lost sight of. But at 
Harbors of Refuge last all doubts were resolved. The Czar- 

evitch and three destroyers reached Kiao- 
chau. The Askold and one destroyer found refuge at Shanghai. 
The Diana was able to make the French port of Saigon. Two de- 
stroyers went ashore near Wei-hai-wei and were abandoned; and 
one destroyer entered Chifu Harbor and was there seized by the Jap- 
anese and made a prize, in defiance of respect for a neutral port. The 
indomitable little Novik alone of all Russia's fleet attempted to make 
for Vladivostock. This swift cruiser had come out of the fight 
comparatively uninjured; and having put into Kiao-chau for coal, 
she steamed eastward again, and for some days was lost sight of. 
But the Japanese, though full of admiration for the exploits of the 
Novik, could not afford to let her escape, and they were on the 
watch for her appearance in the straits through which she must 
pass to reach Vladivostock. The cruisers Tsushima and Chitose 

297. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

had been searching the Soya Straits, which lie between Saghalien 
and Yezo, when at last the former vessel sighted the little Novik on 
the afternoon of the 20th of August in Korsakovsk Harbor. Imme- 
diately the attack began, and the Novik was soon compelled to retreat 
into the inner harbor, but not before she had inflicted such damage 
on the Tsushima as to compel her to draw off. Presently, however, 
the Chitose arrived, and next day completed the destruction of the 
Novik, whose crew abandoned her after running her on the beach. 
So ended the career of the one ship in the Russian Navy whose 
handling has consistently done credit to Russian seamanship. 

The appearance of fugitive vessels of the Russian squadron in 
neutral ports at once raised international questions of no little 

anxiety and difficulty. The attitude of 
International Germany in particular was jealously 

Complications watched by the Japanese; but, fortu- 
nately, in this case the behavior of the 
neutral Power was perfectly correct. The Czarevitch and the three 
destroyers in Kiao-chau were at once ordered to be dismantled, and 
their crews sent home on parole. Equally prompt and unimpeach- 
able was the action of the French Government in regard to the 
cruiser Diana; but the case of the Askold at Shanghai threatened to 
give much more trouble. It was aggravated, too, by the indefensi- 
ble action of the Japanese in the case of the destroyer Rishitelni, 
which reached Chifu on the nth, bearing important dispatches. The 
Japanese followed the Rishitelni, and believing that the Chinese 
would not be able to enforce the disarmament of the boat, and their 
demands for her immediate departure having been ignored, a Jap- 
anese officer and armed guard boarded her. A scuffle between the 
Japanese and the Russian crews followed ; and in the result, in spite 
of the protests of the Chinese, the Rishitelni was towed out of the 

298. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

harbor, after an ineffectual attempt on the part of her crew had been 
made to blow her up. The act was certainly a violation of Chinese 
neutrality; but as the Rishitelni had remained in the harbor for 
twenty-seven hours without any sign of disarming, the Japanese 
had good reason to believe that the Russian commander was not 
particularly sensitive to the claims of China's neutrality; and how 
well this belief was founded appeared in the case of theAskold, which 
found refuge at Shanghai. In insolent defiance of all right and law, 
the commander of the Askold refused either to disarm his vessel 
or to leave the neutral port. The wretched Chinese authorities, 
squeezed on one side by the Russian Government and on the other 
by the Japanese, could do nothing. One day they issued peremptory 
orders for the Russian vessel to leave; and the next day they ex- 
tended the period of grace. A grave international situation threat- 
ened ; for the Japanese were impatient at the necessity of having to 
detain several of the much-needed cruisers in watching the port, and 
they threatened extreme measures ; for all this time the Askold was 
being repaired and put into fighting trim again. But at last the 
British Minister interfered to stop the work of repairs; and then 
the Czar issued instructions that the Askold and the destroyer that 
accompanied her should be dismantled. 

In winning this signal victory over the fleet of his enemy, Admi- 
ral Togo suffered but slight damage to the ships under his command. 

In spite of the heavy fighting at close 

Insignificant range, none of the Japanese vessels were 

Japanese Losses crippled — a circumstance of the utmost 

importance to Japan, who, unlike her 
enemy, has no second fleet to draw upon, and whose losses were 
therefore irreparable. The Mikasa, in which the brunt of the fighting 

fell, lost 32 killed and 78 wounded; the Yakumo, 12 killed and 10 

299. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

wounded; the Nishin, 16 killed and 17 wounded; the Kasuga, 10 
wounded; and the rest of the fleet a few wounded only. 
These casualties altogether were far exceeded by those 
endured on the Czarevitch or the Retvisan alone; and the dif- 
ference can only be accounted for by the greater accuracy and 
efficiency of the Japanese gun fire. Of the fleet that left Port Arthur 
on the morning of the 10th of August, only a shattered remnant 
returned again — five battleships and two cruisers. But the sum of 
Russia's disasters had not been reached. It was fated that the 
Vladivostock squadron was to share the fate of the Port Arthur fleet. 
So sudden had been Admiral Witoft's resolution to attempt a 
sortie, that no arrangements for concerted action with Admiral 

Skrydloff at Vladivostock had been made. 

The Last Raid It was the destroyer Rishitelni, whose ar- 

from Vladivostock rival at Chifu caused such unpleasantness, 

that bore the message informing Skryd- 
loff of what was happening. Fortunately for themselves the Jap- 
anese seized the Rishitelni too late to intercept that message. Skryd- 
loff on the 1 2th steamed from Vladivostock with the cruisers 
Gromoboi, Rossia, and Rurik, and made straight for the Korean 
Straits. In the early morning of the 14th of August the Russian 
cruisers reached their old hunting-ground, and the critical point in 
their course — the narrow channel that separates the southernmost 
Japanese islands from the Korean promontory. In their successful 
raid during July the Vladivostock cruisers had reached the same 
point, and by good luck had evaded Kamimura's pursuit. The for- 
tune of war had hitherto been all against the gallant Japanese 
Admiral, to whom had been committed the task of watching the 
Vladivostock squadron, and in particular, of guarding the Korean 
Straits. Even on this last decisive occasion that was to avenge his 

300. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

previous disappointments, he nearly missed his prey, who had got 
to southward of his fleet. But a timely glint of sunlight revealed 
the object of his long quest, and immediately putting his ships 
between the enemy and Vladivostock he was able to say with Crom- 
well at Dunbar: "The Lord hath delivered them into my hand". 
Kamimura had with him four armored cruisers of high speed and 
powerful armament — the Tokiwa, the Adsuma, the Idzumo, and the 
Iwate. The last two vessels were of 24 knots speed, and the slowest 
was of 21 knots. In gun power all the vessels were practically equal, 
and were much more heavily armed than the Russian cruisers, to 
which they now found themselves opposed. Of these the Gromoboi, 
a huge vessel of 12,336 tons displacement, was the latest and the 
most formidable. The Rossia was her equal in every respect except 
gun protection; but the Rurik was of another class altogether in a 
direction that proved fatal to her — namely, speed. Her engines 
were only capable of developing 18 knots, and that made her a ter- 
rible hindrance to the manoeuvring power of the whole squadron. 
It was not until the Japanese had crossed the course of the Russians 
that the latter became aware of the presence of the enemy, and then 
they immediately put about and steered north. According to the 
report of the Russian Admiral, the fight began at half-past four in 
the morning a little north of the line between Fusan and Tsushima. 
The Russians attempted to make for the open sea northwards, but 
were headed off, mainly owing to the inferior steaming power of 
the Rurik, which was in the rear of the line. The Russians were in 
single column line ahead, while the Japanese steering across their 
course adopted the famous T-shaped formation which is associated 
with the name of Admiral Togo. The battle began at a range of 
five miles, and very soon the superior gunnery and heavier armament 
of the Japanese told its tale. The Russians changed course to the 

301. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

east, and immediately the ill-fated Rurik began to drop behind, en- 
abling the Japanese cruisers to concentrate the fire on her at a range 
of little more than three miles. The steering gear broke down, and 
the vessel speedily became unmanageable, while the havoc wrought 
by the rain of shells poured into her quickly rendered her guns un- 
workable. With splendid gallantry the Rurik 's consorts, seeing her 
desperate plight, returned to her assistance, and circled round her 
in order to draw the enemy's fire and to give the crippled cruiser a 
chance of effecting repairs. They suffered heavily in the attempt, 
and their sacrifice was unavailing. The Rurik burst into flames, 
which her devoted crew could not subdue. Her movements became 
erratic. She developed a heavy list to port, and then began to settle 
down by the stern. At last, after the fight had been going on for 
nearly four hours, it became evident that the Rurik was doomed; 
and her consorts, who were in sorry case themselves, left her to make 
their own escape. Both the Gromoboi and the Rossia had been 
struck repeatedly below the water line, and had been fired in several 
places by the Japanese shells, though the fires were got under. What 
finally decided their flight was the arrival of reinforcements for the 
enemy in the shape of the Noniwa and the Takachiho — two pro- 
tected cruisers of the second class. These vessels were left to finish 
off the already sinking Rurik, while Admiral Kamimura set off at 
full speed in pursuit of the Gromoboi and Rossia. For some reason, 
however, which has never yet appeared, this pursuit was not per- 
sisted in. Both the Russian cruisers were badly damaged, and there 
is no reason to suppose that they could have ever reached Vladivo- 
stock, as they did a day or two later, if Admiral Kamimura had not 
drawn off his ships. There is, of course, no doubt that there must 
have been some compelling reason to induce the Japanese Admiral 
to forego the full fruits of his opportunity, but that he should have 

302. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

had to do so made his victory much less complete and decisive. He 
returned to the scene of battle to discover that the Rurik had gone 
down, but in time to assist in saving the crew, of whom some 600 
survivors were rescued. This act of humanity was not a solitary 
instance, but it is one of the most striking instances of the magnani- 
mous temper in which the Mikado's forces both on land and sea 
carried on the war. The Russian Commander, in his official report, 
makes it clear that he was much surprised and relieved when he 
found that the pursuit of his cruisers was being abandoned. He 
states that at this stage of the battle three of the funnels on the 
Rossia were holed, and three of her boilers were rendered useless, 
so that she was not able to keep up full steam, while eleven holes 
had been made in the vessel's hull below the water-line. The Grom- 
oboi had six holes below her water-line; while on both of the cruisers 
the loss of life had been most severe. More than half the total 
number of officers had been killed or wounded, and quite a quarter 
of the crews. Thirty miles away from the spot where the Rurik 
had been left sinking, the Gromoboi and Rossia were able, by the 
mysterious drawing off of the enemy, to stop their engines and effect 
temporary repairs. On the 16th of August they arrived again at 
Vladivostock, and went immediately into dock— with the certainty 
of taking no further part in active operations for some months to 
come. Thus within a single week both squadrons of Russia's navy 
in the Far East suffered signal and overwhelming disaster with the 
effect of immediately and palpably relieving the difficulties of the 
campaign for the invasion of Manchuria. If the dispersal and re- 
pulse of the Port Arthur fleet was the more momentous event of the 
two, the shattering of the Vladivostock squadron had an immense 
value in at once restoring confidence and immunity to Japan's sea- 
borne trade, and in removing from Togo's flank, as it were, a 

303- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

menace which since the opening of the war he had never been able 
wholly to dismiss. As one result of these naval victories, the war- 
worn and storm-beaten ships of the Japanese fleet blockading Port 
Arthur were able in turn to go into dock for the execution of those 
repairs which must have become increasingly necessary; while at 
the same time it was possible to strengthen and tighten the blockade, 
and push on with perfect freedom from risk with the preparations 
for landing men and munitions at the theatre of war. 

The fall of Port Arthur, which the Japanese, in the pardonable 
confidence begotten of their uninterrupted victories on sea and land, 

had believed to be imminent long ago, 

The Port Arthur now became the object of renewed and 
Garrison desperate endeavor. Dalny Harbor had 

been cleared of mines, and. rendered 
available for the landing of siege trains ; and no sooner had the ill- 
fated sortie of the fleet been frustrated, than the Japanese settled 
down again to a fierce assault. As a preliminary, on the 16th of 
August a message was sent to General Stoessel under a flag of 
truce demanding the surrender of the fortress, and proposing that, 
in case of non-compliance, the non-combatants should be allowed 
to leave. To the former of these proposals, General Stoessel, as 
might have been expected of so brave and resolute a soldier, returned 
an emphatic and indignant negative; and the second, with much 
less reason, he equally refused to entertain. Just at this moment all 
good Russians had been gladdened, even in the midst of their dis- 
asters, by the long-hoped-for birth of an heir to the Imperial Throne, 
and General Stoessel was able to send a congratulatory message 
to the Czar, while receiving in his turn an order appointing him, 
as a mark of special Imperial favor, an aide-de-camp general. The 
determination of the Russian garrison had never abated for a mo- 

304. 




w 

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Eh 

to 
O 

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Eh 

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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

ment; and such assurances that the eyes and hopes of all Russia 
were centred on them, stirred them to the heroic pitch of endurance. 
Shut off from the outer world both by sea and land, with provisions 
and ammunition daily becoming- more scanty, and beneath the 
harassment of an incessant bombardment and fierce and desperate 
assaults, they held grimly on to the defences, and defied the worst 
that the enemy could do, in spite of his overwhelming numbers. The 
progress of the siege could not be followed easily by the external 
spectator, because the Japanese strictly kept their own counsel; 
while the reports that were brought to Chifu from time to time by 
Chinese refugees were conflicting and contradictory in the last 
degree. One thing only was undeniably evident — that the Japanese 
assaults on different sections of the main line of defence had been 
made with desperate valor and indifference to loss of life; and that, 
except in unimportant instances, these assaults had not prevailed. 
Forts were indeed captured, but had to be abandoned again, be- 
cause they were exposed to the fire of neighboring forts. Not in 
vain had the Russian engineers exercised their best brains in devis- 
ing the defences of this "impregnable fortress". Mines, wire entan- 
glements, and every other grim expedient for checking assault had 
been constructed with patient ingenuity; and, most deadly and cun- 
ning device of all, every fort in the long chain that shuts in Port 
Arthur on the land side had been so placed as to be dominated by 
the neighboring forts ; so that no enemy who succeeded in capturing 
it could hope to plant his own guns there. It is not in question that 
the Japanese suffered appalling losses in the attempts to storm these 
defences; but they persevered, though for weeks together their 
hostile activities were limited to pouring into the Russian lines a 
tremendous shell fire at long range. The fall of Port Arthur which 
had seemed possible in June, was confidently predicted for July. 

307. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Then August was fixed, and the Japanese forces, largely reinforced, 
undertook another desperate assault in the middle of that month. 
It failed; and though the dogged, impenetrable defence and the 
fierce and reckless struggle went on with few intermissions, October 
came without any perceptible change having been effected in the 
situation of the combatants. 

Two Russian officers who escaped with dispatches to Chifu, 
brought accounts of the terrible pitch to which the temper of the 
opposing forces had been wrought in their long-drawn and impla- 
cable struggle. They stated that the Jap- 
Fury Unparalleled anese losses during the last attack were 
in History enormous, and that even several days af- 

terwards wounded men were to be seen 
raising their arms by way of appeal, but that it was impossible to 
help them as the fire was incessant. As for the struggle, it was car- 
ried on with an amount of fury to which there is no parallel in his- 
tory. The Japanese dashed forward with the bayonet like madmen, 
and in serried columns, in which the shells made terrible furrows. 
Every time that they reached the Russian lines horrible melees, in 
which even the wounded fought to the death, took place. No quar- 
ter was given. Pairs of corpses were found clinging to each other, 
the teeth of the men being buried in their adversaries' throats and 
their fingers in their eyes as they had expired. In the last attack 
the 9th Japanese Division was sent forward in two columns, each 
composing a brigade, and when the first gave way under the 
avalanche of iron, the general commanding the second fired upon 
and exterminated it. So intense was the fury that when they got 
within hearing of their foes, the Japanese shook their fists at and 
insulted them. The failure of the Japanese to make headway with 
the siege of Port Arthur was the one substantially gratifying aspect 

308. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the war from the Russian point of view. Russian patriotic senti- 
ment had something to be proud of in the courage, endurance, and 
resource of General Stoessel and his troops. But, as a matter of 
fact, the fall of Port Arthur would have been a far better service 
to Russian arms than the heroic resistance of its garrison. Because 
the fortress, which from the first had exercised such a benumbing 
influence on the Russian fleet and such a distracting influence on 
military counsels, still remained as a fatal factor in the equation for 
Russian strategy. The garrison were counting on relief from the 
north, and the honor and pride of Russia were engaged to send that 
relief if possible. Consequently, Kuropatkin never had his hand 
free. He could never review the situation with a single eye to its 
supreme strategical necessities ; he must always qualify his disposi- 
tions and plans by regard for the plight of Port Arthur. It was this 
vitiating influence that brought about the initial reverses of the 
Russian armies ; and that prevented any bold and effective plan for 
meeting the Japanese advance. Finally, it was this consideration 
that induced Kuropatkin to give battle at Liao-yang, and to expose 
his entire army to a disaster from which he only escaped by the 
skin of his teeth. Allusion to that tremendous conflict, between 
forces larger than any that have ever before been opposed in mod- 
ern war, has already been made in the last chapter. But the event 
was so memorable, and has such bearing on the future course of the 
campaign, that it is permissible to return to the subject, especially 
as further light has been thrown on it by the detailed narratives of 
correspondents. Of this great battle, by the way, the world has 
received fuller descriptions than of any other feature of the cam- 
paign by land or sea; for it so happened that the sufferance of the 
war correspondents under the restriction of the Japanese military 
authorities broke down here, and several of the most distinguished 

309- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

representatives of the English press threw up their connection with 
the Japanese army after Liao-yang, and hurried back to neutral ter- 
ritory to cable home the full dispatches which the censor would not 
have permitted. 

It is perfectly evident in the light of these accounts that the 
Japanese, emboldened by their previous successes, rated their enemy 

too lightly, and without any preponder- 
Kuroki Improves ance, and indeed with scarcely an equality 

his Reputation °f numbers, they attempted to take by 
assault a position naturally strong and 
fortified by all the art and resources of the military engineer. The 
battle did indeed prove the incomparable qualities of the Japanese 
soldier ; but it did little to add to the reputation of Japanese general- 
ship; while, on the other hand, it exhibited General Kuropatkin in 
a light infinitely more favorable than any in which he had previously 
appeared. If one of Kuropatkin's subordinates — General Orloff — 
had not blundered badly in carrying out the movements against 
Kuroki on the Russian left, it is probable that the battle might have 
resulted in a decisive defeat instead of in a nominal victory for the 
Japanese. That blunder — which cost Orloff his command — enabled 
Kuroki to hold his own at a most critical juncture, and so to obviate 
the dangerous possibilities which the situation had developed. It 
was the peril of Kuroki that compelled Oku and Nodzu, who faced 
the centre and right wing of the Russian position, to press on their 
assaults with redoubled fury, even after they had been fighting for 
five days and losing thousands of men without making appreciable 
headway. In twenty-four hours Oku made three grand assaults 
upon the entrenched hills before him ; and, when the last had been 
beaten back with awful loss, the laconic order came from headquar- 
ters : "Reinforce and attack again at dawn". Such a demand upon 

310. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the endurance and morale of troops is well-nigh unexampled; and 
that the Japanese soldier responded to it speaks volumes for his 
qualities as a fighting man. His persistence prevailed in the end, 
and the Russian line was forced. But even then the retreat was 
slow and stubborn. While a rear guard held the Japanese at bay, all 
the guns and wounded were safely withdrawn, and when at last the 
Japanese came into possession of Liao-yang, it was to find the fruits 
of their dearly-bought victory snatched from them, and their own 
forces too exhausted to follow victory up. The casualties in this 
awful conflict were enough "to stagger humanity", if one may use 
Mr. Kruger's famous phrase. The Japanese losses cannot have 
been less than 40,000, and those of the Russians were perhaps half 
as many; while the expenditure of ammunition on both sides was 
terrific. More than a thousand guns belched forth their deadly mis- 
siles continuously for nearly a week, and all eye-witnesses agree 
that never before has such tremendous artillery fire been witnessed. 
Well might it be necessary for both armies to rest after such a 
titanic struggle, and to devote more than a month to reforming and 
reinforcing the shattered ranks and to refilling their ammunition 
trains. The main result of the battle was to drive the grand army 
of the Czar one step further back from the beleaguered fortress still 
counting so confidently on and waiting so anxiously for relief. But, 
as the event showed the contest had been too indecisive to destroy 
finally the Russian hope of a victorious march southwards ; and to 
that extent the Japanese might congratulate themselves. As long 
as the fatal fascination of Port Arthur was felt by Russian strategy, 
the Japanese generals could count on an invaluable ally; and very 
soon that ally was to come to their assistance again in a manner 
which their best hopes could not have conjectured. 

311. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

In order to realize the spectacle that that awful battlefield pre- 
sented, one has only to read the vivid narrative of the London Times' 

correspondent who was attached to Gen- 
The Grim eral Oku's army. This is how he de- 

Reality of War scribes the earlier and abortive attempts 
of Oku's devoted troops to penetrate the 
Russian centre: — - 

"In spite of the failure of this first attack, another was ordered 
to begin at two on the following morning (August 30th). The cold 
grey morning witnessed another scene of slaughter on the Russian 
right as the defenders again hurled the attack back. The Japanese 
attacked with valor and deserved success, but the enfilading fire on 
every salient swept each rush away before the men could even 
lay hands on the entanglements. But the 5th Division had more 
success against the Russian left. The position here was composed 
of a brush-covered hogsback, sloping to the east, defended by a triple 
line of trenches with a glacis protected by a 10 foot entanglement 
covering a honeycomb of pits containing spikes at the bottom. In 
the semi-darkness of the morning the 41st Regiment carried this 
underfeature after losing seventy-five of the one hundred pioneers 
who hacked their way through the entanglement with axes. The 
men, rushing through the gap, overpowered the sentries in the 
trenches before the supports, sleeping in splinter proofs behind, could 
reinforce them. But daybreak brought a tragedy of the kind which 
is so common in modern war. Shell fire, believed to be from Jap- 
anese guns, drove this gallant storming party from its hold, filling 
the Russian trenches with Japanese dead. But now for the fighting 
on the 31st. The weather was now fine, and the energy of this 
southern attack all the morning was concentrated in an artillery 
fire on the bushy hill that had been won and lost. At 10 o'clock we 

312. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER SEVEN MONTHS. 

The time was now ripe for the simultaneous advance of the -three Japanese 
armies, and while Oku and Nodzu attacked the Russians at Anshanchan, and 
forced them to retire, Kuroki drove the Russians out of Anping. The great 
battle of Liaoyang began on August 29, and continued until September 1, when 
Kuroki, having crossed the Taitse-Ho, threatened the Russian left flank, and 
forced them to retreat. On September 6 the Japanese occupied the Yentai 
Mines. The army besieging Port Arthur captured the Laotishan and Sushiyen 
Hills on August 15, and on the 28th took Palungshan. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 



3 T 3- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

could see the 5th Division moving up against the Russian left. 
There is a moment of intense excitement while the summit of the 
Russian position is like a miniature Mount Pelee in eruption owing 
to the bursting of dozens of Shimoshi shells. The head of the assault 
is in the gap in the entanglement. The artillery is supporting the 
assault. Three or four ground mines explode in the midst of the 
leading assaulting groups. Then as the smoke clears the black- 
coated Russians are seen leaving the position. In a moment the 
Japanese are in, and the whole of the lines in support on the crest 
are firing down the slope into the retreating Russians. But one 
swallow does not make a summer. Although the underfeature of the 
bushy hill was carried, the rest of the assault failed miserably. No 
Japanese could live within 500 yards of the bastion hill, and though 
the Japanese came out of the corn until the groups were so numer- 
ous that I can liken them only to swarming bees, it was only to be 
swept backwards into cover again, leaving behind the heavy price 
of their valor." 



3M 




CAPTURE OF THE "RESHITELNI" AT CHIFU. 




CHAPTER XI. 

The Oppossing Armies in Manchuria — The Russian Advance — Reinforcements 
for Both Sides — Battle of the Sha-ho — Two Hundred Hours of Carnage- 
Awful List of Casualties — Threat and Counterthreat — The Veil Lifted from 
Port Arthur — Capture of Forts — Devices of the Besiegers — The Undaunt- 
ed Stoessel — The Gallant Podgorsky — World-Wide Admiration — Uncer- 
tain News. 

HE great battle of Liao-yang was fought in the last week of 
August and the first week of September; and for nearly 
five weeks after that tremendous struggle the opposing 
armies remained inactive, or rather gathered up their ex- 
hausted strength for the next desperate encounter. The Japanese 
had advanced as far as Yentai, a station about one-third of the dis- 
tance^ — 40 miles or so — that separates 
The Opposing Armies Liao-yang from Mukden. The position 
in Manchuria was valuable as giving the command of 
the Yentai coal mines — a most important 
acquisition to any general with a long line of railway communication 
to maintain. The Japanese entrenched themselves along a front of 
some 25 miles, stretching from Yentai on the railway to Pensihu, 
a village in the hilly country which lies north and south between 
the two rivers Taitse and Hun. There they settled down to replen- 
ishing the exhausted supplies, refilling the depleted ranks, and 
reorganizing the dislocated commands. Above all did they make 
speed to reconstruct the railway behind them, a work which had 
diligently been carried on pari passu with the advance.. Early in 

3 J 7 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

October through trains of the new 3 ft. 6 in. gauge were running 
from Dalny to Yentai, and thus the fighting-line was brought within 
an easy six days' journey of Japan. The Russians, on the other 
hand, in spite of the completion of the Circum-Baikal railway 
towards the end of September, were still from three to five times as 
distant from their prime base ; for if the express time from Mukden 
to Moscow was sixteen days, the ordinary troop train's time was 
! much nearer thirty days. In this all-important matter of rapidity 
11 of communication the Japanese possessed an advantage inherent 
to the situation and of the profoundest strategical influence. While 
they were recuperating thus at Yentai, the Russians were busy en- 
trenching themselves behind the Hun-ho, the course of which from 
Mukden follows a line, roughly speaking, due east. At first it was 
asserted by those in the confidence of the Russian General Staff, that 
no determined stand would be made at the Hun-ho, and that Kuro- 
patkin would only hold the enemy there until the defences at Tie- 
ling were completed. But as the days passed, and the Japanese 
showed no disposition to renew their advance, and as reinforcements 
continued to pour over the Siberian railway, counsels were modified. 
In the last week of September General Stackelberg, attending a 
banquet at Mukden, proposed the toast "To the March on Liao- 
yang"; and this startling suggestion of a new development in the 
Russian plan of campaign was speedily confirmed by a remarkable 
manifesto to his troops which General Kuropatkin issued on the 
2nd of October. After the usual high-flown exordium, in which 
"the arrogant foe" was described as having suffered repeated re- 
pulse — a rather daring travesty of the facts — Kuropatkin explained 
that he had not thought the time ripe "to take advantage of these 
successes ; but", he added, "the time of retreat was now at an end. 
Hitherto the enemy in operating has relied on his great forces and 

3i8. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

disposing his armies so as to surround us, has chosen as he deemed 
fit his time for attack; but now the moment to go and meet the 
enemy, for which the whole army has been longing, has come, and 
the time has arrived for us to compel the Japanese to do our will, 
for the forces of the Manchurian army are strong enough to begin 
the forward movement. Bear in mind the importance of victory to 
Russia, and, above all, remember how necessary victory is the more 
speedily to relieve our brothers at Port Arthur, who for seven 
months have heroically maintained the defence of the fortress 
entrusted to their care." 

The world was naturally startled by such a pronouncement — 
so much easier to explain than to justify; but the Russians and their 

friends in France were overjoyed, believ- 

The Russian ing that the time of their tribulation was 

Advance at ^ ast over< The Muscovite nature has 
during this war shown an unrivalled ca- 
pacity for self-deception ; and not only the General Staff, but Kuro- 
patkin himself seem to have persuaded themselves that the enemy 
had been unable to get over the shock of Liao-yang. The perfectly 
natural delay of the Japanese in advancing was attributed to the 
discouragement caused by the enormous losses sustained in the last 
battle and to inability to make these losses good. There were other 
influences at work, as Kuropatkin's address shows. "The impor- 
tance of victory to Russia", and the necessity of relieving "our 
brothers in Port Arthur", were circumstances that evidently dom- 
inated Russian counsels; and in Kuropatkin's mind there was 
probably another consideration of a personal nature. After Liao- 
yang the Czar had ordered the formation of a Second Manchurian 
Army under a separate command, on the ground that the active 
direction in the field of such enormous forces as these two armies 

319. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

would represent would be beyond the capacity of any one man. 
General Gripenberg, a tried old soldier, was appointed to command 
the Second Army, and there was talk of sending out a Grand Duke 
to take the supreme direction of the campaign. This would have 
meant in degree the suppression of General Kuropatkin, and that 
capable soldier may well have looked with dissatisfaction on such 
a reward for his signal services. He may have argued with him- 
self that if he could only achieve a decisive victory at this moment 
his prestige would be restored and his paramountcy assured; and, 
according to the information which had reached him, that victory 
was within his grasp. But, unfortunately, that information was 
wholly erroneous. Far from being dispirited and exhausted, the 
Japanese forces were on the very point of advancing to the attack 
again when Kuropatkin formed his momentous resolution and issued 
orders for "the march to Liao-yang". If his movement was hailed 
with almost delirious enthusiasm in St. Petersburg, it was observed 
with hardly less satisfaction at Tokio, where it was at once recog- 
nized that the enemy were obligingly releasing Marshal Oyama from 
the necessity of a long march and another attack on fortified posi- 
tions. 

By this time Kuropatkin's forces — thanks to the completion of 
the Circum-Baikal railway — had reached 250,000, with more than 

800 guns. The Japanese strength, after 
Reinforcements for reinforcements both from Japan and from 

Both Sides tiie arm y investing Port Arthur, cannot 
have been much less; though at the close 
of the battle which was about to be fought Marshal Oyama asserted 
that at all points his victorious troops had been outnumbered. How- 
ever that may be, the Japanese had the advantage of a prepared posi- 
tion, the key of which was in rugged mountainous country. Unlike 

320. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the battle of Liao-yang, of which minute details have already been 
furnished, the battle of Yentai, as it was first called, or of Sha-ho, 
as it came to be known afterwards, can only be followed in rts 
broad outline, mainly because the maps available are utterly inade- 
quate. The place-names which mark the direction of the operations 
in one official report rarely agree with those in the other official re- 
port, and can only be vaguely identified. But a rough sketch-map 
is at least sufficient to give the general bearings of the operations. 
The Japanese front extended in a horseshoe formation from Yentai, 
on the railway, to Pensihu, on the Taitse River, with Oku on the 
left, Nodzu in the centre, and Kuroki on the right. The plan of 
Kuropatkin — a plan which in the light of after events we know to 
have been beyond the possibility of achievement — was to attack the 
right wing of the Japanese army under Kuroki, and roll it back upon 
Liao-yang, while the Japanese left and centre were held in front; 
then to shut up Oyama and his troops in Liao-yang, much as Sir 
George White was shut up in Ladysmith, while a rapid march 
southwards was made to the relief of Port Arthur. 

On the 5th October the Russian advance began on both sides 
of the railway from Mukden, and from Fushan against the Japan- 
ese right. The flank movement, on the 
Battle of the Sha-ho success of which all Kuropatkin's schemes 

were based, was entrusted to Stackelberg 
and Rennenkampf — Stackelberg attacking from the north, and Ren- 
nenkampf with his Cossacks, working round from the northeast. On 
Sunday, the 9th October, the first contact between the opposing 
armies was made, and Stackelberg — much to his own surprise — 
was able to occupy Bentsiaputse, a place north of the Yentai coal- 
mines, commanding the main roads to Fushan, Mukden, and Liao- 
yang. It had been expected that the Japanese would make a desper- 

321 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ate stand here, but they retreated after offering only a feeble resist- 
ance. Meanwhile, Rennenkampf fiercely assailed Kuroki's extreme 
right at Pensihu, while a force of Cossacks some 3,000 strong dar- 
ingly crossed the Taitse River and severed Kuroki's communications 
in the rear. Up to this moment everything had seemed to go well 
with the Russian plan of attack. Several important positions east 
of Pensihu were taken by assault, and Kuroki's situation seemed crit- 
ical for the moment. But Marshal Oyama appears never to have 
doubted the ability of his well-tried lieutenant to hold his own, and 
no sooner had the whole scheme of his enemy been developed than he 
decided to counter it with a vigorous offensive. Kuroki was rein- 
forced on the 10th, while a force of cavalry detached to operate 
against the Cossacks south of the Taitse-ho succeeded in driving 
the enemy off and in restoring the interrupted communications. 
As soon as the reinforcements reached Kuroki at Pensihu he put the 
possibility of his being "rolled up" beyond all doubt by fiercely as- 
sailing Stackelberg and recapturing the positions which had tempor- 
arily fallen into Russian hands. Thereafter he remained completely 
master of the situation, and the desperate but futile assaults which 
he sustained in the next few days only resulted in a tremendous 
casualty list for the enemy — a list totalling at least 20,000. The de- 
cisive repulse of the Russian flanking movement involved the frus- 
tration of the whole of Kuropatkin's plans in advancing from the 
Hun-ho. But the battle had only just begun yet, for the Russian 
right and centre, which had begun their southward march with such 
confidence, now found their role changed from attack to defence; 
and instead of the Japanese being, according to program, forced 
back upon Liao-yang, it became a question whether the Russians 
would be able to make good their retreat on Mukden. General Oku, 
advancing along the railway to the west, after two days' hard fight- 

322. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ing drove back Kuropatkin's right to the line of the Shi-li-ho ; while 
General Nodzu on the east of the railway was equally successful, and 
signalized his victory by a considerable capture of guns. Oyama's 
object now was to drive his enemy eastwards from the railway and 
back upon the Hun-ho, when it would be impossible for him to es- 
cape disaster. For some days this tremendous issue hung in the 
balance, and the Japanese forces were within an ace of accomplish- 
ing their purpose. But thanks to the dogged tenacity of the Rus- 
sian troops, and thanks still more to the terribly wasting and ex- 
hausting effect of a week's continuous fighting, the impetus of the 
Japanese attack was not quite sufficient to complete the promised 
triumph ; and at last the two great armies came to a standstill some 
ten miles south of Mukden, incapable of further action. 

From the 9th October to the 17th the relentless struggle raged 
along this wide front of more than 20 miles. Day and night the 

devoted troops on either side flung them- 

Two Hundred selves with reckless bravery on the posi- 

Hours of Carnage tions of their foes; while from nearly 

2,000 guns an incessant storm of shrap- 
nel and shell burst over the contested ground. Liao-yang had been 
terrible enough ; but from all accounts the artillery duel at the battle 
of Sha-ho even eclipsed the terrific incidents of the earlier engage- 
ments. On the 13th the Russian retreat became general, and Oku, 
capturing twenty-five Russian guns, succeeded in driving the troops 
opposed to him back from the line of the Shi-li-ho to the Sha-ho, 
where behind defences which the forethought of Kuropatkin had 
provided, they prepared to make their last desperate stand. The 
forces before Kuroki had retreated towards fustian in a northeast- 
erly direction ; and those before Nodzu in the centre, after suffering 
losses almost as heavy as Stackelberg's columns had sustained, fell 

£23 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

back in something approaching to disorder on the line of the Sha- 
ho. The position of Kuropatkin's army was now exceedingly 
critical, and it was not without cause that he issued a general order 
that the ground occupied must be held at all costs. It is evident 
that to make good the retreat Stackelberg's troops on the extreme 
east, which were far in advance of the rest of the Russian line, must 
be withdrawn first, and that the central army under Zarubaieff, 
which again was far in advance of the right wing, must be drawn 
back next ; and that during these perilous operations General Bilder- 
ling, who commanded the Russian right resting behind the Sha-ho, 
must stand firm. By the skin of his teeth, almost, Bilderling just 
managed to hold his ground. On the 13th Oku's impetuous assault 
upon the Russian lines succeeded so far as to break the Russian 
centre. Had that advantage been maintained nothing could have 
saved the Russian army. But by a tremendous effort the last re- 
serves were brought up and recaptured the ground that had been 
lost. For thirty-six hours the battle raged with varying fortune at 
this critical point; but the Russians held on, and these thirty-six 
priceless hours being gained, the Russian centre and left were saved. 
On the 14th, five days after the battle had begun, a deluge of rain 
fell — a deluge precipitated, as at Liao-yang, by the heavy and inces- 
sant firing — and the already sorely-tried troops of Oku found their 
further movements grievously impeded. For several days more, 
however, the contest on the Sha-ho raged with unabated fury. 
Again and again the Russians made fierce counter-attacks on the 
Japanese, sustaining terrible losses in consequence. One position — 
a dominant elevation on the south bank of the Sha-ho, known as 
Lonely-Tree Hill — was the scene of long-continued and desperate 
fighting, in which both armies alternately captured and were driven 
from the vantage ground. It was here that the one substantial suc- 

3 2 4 



ST 




JAPANESE OUTPOSTS RELIEVING GUARD NEAR THE SHA-HO. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

cess of the Russian arms was achieved in the capture of twelve 
Japanese guns. During Sunday, the 16th of October the Russians 
had delivered no less than seven counter-attacks on Oku's troops, 
and all of them had been beaten back with loss. In these engage- 
ments a conspicuous part had been played by a force under Brigadier- 
General Yamada, made up of troops from Nodzu's and Oku's com- 
mands, which succeeded in penetrating the Russian line and in cap- 
turing two guns. But in returning to camp after this exploit, 
Yamada's force had ventured too far and was enveloped by a 
Russian division, and was only able to win through by the sacrifice 
of its guns, after a fierce hand-to-hand encounter in which the 
casualties were nearly 1,000. 

Slowly, reluctantly, after fitful recrudescenes, the great battle 
wore itself out, and by the 20th October the two armies were left 
facing each other on either side of the Sha-ho — a line 1 5 miles north 
of that which the Japanese had occupied before the engagement be- 
gan. The net result, therefore, was a decided gain of ground for the 
Japanese, and the infliction of losses greater than had been sustained 
in any previous battle on the Russian army. Telegraphing to Tokio 
on the 15th, Marshal Oyama thus summed up the results of the 
fighting as far as it had gone — a summary which further events did 
not alter : — 

"As a sequel to a fight lasting continuously for five days, we 
have driven back the superior forces of the enemy at every point, 
pursuing him and forcing him to the south bank of the Hun. We 
have inflicted heavy losses, and captured over thirty guns and hun- 
dreds of prisoners. We have defeated his plans and converted an 
offensive operation into a radical failure." 

"Radical failure" in war means far more than defeated plans. 
It carries with it an awful and immediate penalty levied in killed 

3 2 7 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

and wounded, and when the tale of losses 
Awful List of Casualties came to be counted it was found to ex- 
ceed even the most pessimistic anticipa- 
tions. The Russian dead left on the field alone numbered no less 
than 13,333; and as the wounded, at the lowest estimate, cannot 
have been less than four to one, it is apparent that the total casual- 
ties suffered by General Kuropatkin's troops must have been be- 
tween 60,000 and 70,000. An index to the severity of the fighting 
is afforded by an analysis of these returns, which shows that more 
than 5,000 Russian dead were found before both Oku's army and 
Kuroki's. Even the Russian General Staff, which has shown a de- 
cided tendency to minimize losses, did not venture to place those sus- 
tained at Sha-ho at less than 45,000 rank and file and 800 officers. 
The total Japanese losses, on the other hand, though heavy, were 
but a fraction of their foe's. Oyama placing them at 15,879. But 
the loss in life was not the only disastrous result of the battle for the 
army of the Czar. The Japanese captured 709 prisoners and 45 
guns, with large quantities of arms and ammunition; and against 
these captures are to be set the twelve guns lost at Lonely-Tree Hill, 
rechristened by the Russians Putiloff Hill in honor of the officer 
who achieved the success, and who was immediately decorated by 
the Czar. In one sense the battle of the Sha-ho may be regarded 
as indecisive, in that it left the two contending armies again at a 
deadlock. At Liao-yang the strategy of both generals had failed, 
and in a less degree the same result was reached at Sha-ho; for 
Oyama's initial success could not be followed up to its legitimate and 
triumphant conclusion. But, on the other hand, Kuropatkin's effort 
to march to Liao-yang and make a diversion in favor of Port Ar- 
thur had signally failed; and the army which he had ostentatiously 
declared to be strong enough to take the offensive and had been 

328. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

hurled back by "the arrogant foe," who were at last to be "compelled 
to do the Russian will." It was in that circumstance that the real 
measure of the Japanese victory was to be found — that after eight 
months of war the armies of the Czar were still unequal to the task 
committed to them. Had Kuropatkin been even in a measure suc- 
cessful in this, his first great offensive movement, the moral effect 
could not have failed to be incalculable. As it was, it inflicted one 
more discouragement on troops that had experienced nothing but 
retreats and reverses from the opening of the campaign. The tem- 
per in which the Japanese accepted the new laurels which their 
army had won was eminently characteristic of a nation which has, 
in spite of all temptations to vainglory and exultation, comforted 
itself with perfect sobriety and self-restraint. The Mikado issued 
a rescript to his people, the terms of which are worth giving, if only 
for the contrast which they offer to some of the addresses issued 
from St. Petersburg and the headquarters of Alexeieff :— 

"Since the outbreak of the war our army and our navy have 
demonstrated their bravery and loyalty, while both officials and peo- 
ple have acted in unison to support the cause. So far, success has 
attended our cause, but, the ultimate accomplishment being yet far 
distant, it is necessary to be patient and steadfast in the pursuance of 
our action, and thus aim at the final accomplishment of our pur- 
pose." 

Another and even more striking testimony to the inflexible de- 
termination of the Japanese people was supplied by the Army 

rescript issued at the end of September in 
Threat and Counterthreat connection with the expansion of the 

Japanese military system. The Govern- 
ment of the Czar had demonstrated its intention to prosecute the war 
unflinchingly by the creation of a second Manchurian Army. Jap- 

3*9- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

an's answer to this menace was to extend the period of service with 
the colors in the Japanese army from nine to fourteen years, by 
which act the available reserves for the army in Manchuria were 
increased at a stroke by nearly half a million men. But though 
Japan could answer promptly and adequately the steps which her 
foe had taken to strengthen his armies in the field, it was not so easy 
to recompense herself for the elimination of a source of weakness 
in her enemy's counsels. Admiral Alexeieff, whose fatal influence 
had been as valuable as several battleships and army corps to the 
Japanese, was finally recalled to St. Petersburg at the end of Octo- 
ber. On the 26th of that month the Viceroy issued an address to 
the troops, announcing, in his usually inflated style, that on his own 
request he had been relieved of the duties of Commander-in-Chief, 
while being retained in the office of Viceroy and assured of the con- 
tinuance of the Imperial confidence and favor. In less than a week 
from the issue of that manifesto, it was announced that Alexeieff 
and his staff were on the way to St. Petersburg by express train, 
and that there was no probability of their return, while Kuropatkin 
was left in supreme command. 

No sooner had the echoes of the great battle of the Sha-ho died 
down than the attention of the world was turned again to Port 

Arthur, where the long and desperate 
The Veil Lifted siege was continuing with undiminished 

from Port Arthur determination on the part of the attack 
and invincible heroism on the part of the 
defence. For months together little authentic news of the progress 
of events had been allowed to leak out; but suddenly, in the begin- 
ning of November, the Japanese censor removed his restrictions, and 
a vivid and circumstantial narrative of the operations was allowed 

330- 



tHB JAPAN-RVSSiA WAR. 

to come through. By the end of June the Japanese forces of in- 
vestment had occupied a line across the Kwang-tung Peninsula 
running from Ingentsi Bay, on the north, southeastwards to a point 
on the south coast-line some ten miles east of Dalny. After another 
month's diligent assault they had advanced the line nearly five miles 
— from Vostikorablei Bay on the north to Takhe Bay on the south, 
Another advance in the beginning of August brought the extreme 
right of their line down to Louisa Bay on the west, and roughly 
round in a semicircle to Takhe Bay, confronting the main line of 
the formidable Russian defences. The great assault of the 28th 
August was, on the whole, unsuccessful, and achieved nothing on 
the east. But on the west the line of investment was drawn still 
further sotuh until it rested on Pigeon Bay. It is now necessary to 
understand more exactly the nature of the task with which the 
Japanese army of investment was confronted. Port Arthur lies in 
a sort of amphitheatre formed by ranges of hills varying in height 
from 1,300 feet to 1,500 feet. These hills sweep round from Golden 
Hill — the promontory which on the east commands the entrance to 
the harbor — northwards for a distance of nearly three miles. Then, 
where the railway line and road pass through them, they turn west- 
wards and southwards, extending down the toe of the Kwang- 
tung promontory to a point parallel with the base of the Tiger's 
Tail ; while further south still is the formidable Liao-tie-shan range, 
some 1,500 feet high. On all these hills the Russians had con- 
structed huge fortifications strengthened with every device which 
the military engineer's art could suggest, and armed with the most 
powerful artillery. It is true that some of the correspondents who 
paid hurried visits to the great naval fortress before the actual out- 
break of hostilities were inclined to belittle the strength of the de- 
fences. Thus Mr. Bennet Burleigh, of the London Telegraph, in a 

33i- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

most interesting account expressed his belief that the Russian 
stronghold was over-fortified, and that it would be possible for those 
who captured outlying defence to command the inner forts. On the 
other hand, it must be remembered that the most skilful engineers 
in the world had been employed by the Russians in the construction 
of the forts, and the fact that such a magnificent and substantial 
resistance was offered to ten times the number of soldiers as cleared 
out the Chinese in a few days, proves that the soundest military prin- 
ciples were adhered to. The main positions were defended by ad- 
vanced works surrounded by deep moats, in which "were built bomb- 
proof defences, roofed with steel plates, and by fanfasses, or mines 
filled with huge stones, which could be exploded by the pressure of 
an electric button. The approaches were rendered almost inaccessi- 
ble by barbed-wire entanglements, pits planted with sharpened 
stakes, and by transverse works and trenches which commanded with 
an enfilading fire every possible line of advance. The broad scheme 
of the fortifications may be easily grasped. Fronting Takhe Bay 
on the east is the Petushan group of forts, with the Keekwan-Urlong 
forts commanding the approaches from the north and the north- 
east, and preventing the Petushan forts from being taken in reverse. 
West of these forts and on the other side of the parade-ground anH 
railway are the Antszshan and the Etseshan forts, which 
prevent any attack from the northwest, while a chain of 
forts from Antszshan to Sunghslwo, running southeastwards 
down to the inner harbor, command the parade-ground and railway 
line. Another line of forts stretches due south from Etseshan to 
White Wolf Hill on the west side of the west port, while yet another 
series of heavy fortifications surmounts the high ground along the 
Tiger's Tail. Well might the Russians boast that their fortress was 
impregnable, for if any place of arms could be. justly so described, 

33 2 - 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Nature and military ingenuity had combined to earn that title for 
Port Arthur. At the outset of the investment, Port Arthur's gar- 
rison numbered, all told, some 35,000 men. It was made up of the 
3rd, 4th and 7th East Siberian Rifle Brigades, with part of the 
6th, and with the East Siberian Rifle Artillery Division, and, of 
courie, with the crews of all the men-o'-war lying imprisoned in the 
harbor. The numbers were none too great to man adequately the 
great chain of works behind which Port Arthur's security lay; but 
the troops were of the best quality, and they had the invaluable in- 
spiration of such, a leader as General Stoessel, with such a capable 
and gallant lieutenant as General Fock. Stoessel, the hero of the 
Russian army in the present war, is descended from an old military 
family. His grandfather was a general in the Swedish army, who 
afterwards settled in Russia. Stoessel himself, who was born in 
1848, entered the Russian army as a cadet at the age of ten, and 
received his commission eight years later, at the same time, curiously 
enough, as Kuropatkin. He served with distinction in the Russo- 
Turkish War, and afterwards held important commands in Siberia, 
while since 1899 he had been stationed at Port Arthur. To the as- 
sault and investment of the fortress, the Japanese, under Nogi, 
brought up at first 60,000 men, and, as the operations advanced, 
large reinforcements which not only made good the enormous losses 
sustained, but swelled the fighting strength to nearly 100,000 men. 
This number fluctuated to some extent, for at least two divisions 
were drawn off from the siege to reinforce Oyama at the battle of 
the Sha-ho ; but at no time can the total forces before Port Arthur 
have been less than 60,000, and then superiority in numbers to the 
defence gradually increased until from a proportion of two to one, 
it had reached the proportion of six or seven to one. This growing 
dispaiity, of course, was due to the fact that while the Japanese 

333. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

could replenish their exhausted ranks, the Russian garrison could 
not fill the gaps caused by wounds and sickness ; while a further re- 
duction of at least 5,000 men in the forces at Stoessel's command 
was made by the naval sortie on August 10th. That feat, of course, 
deprived Port Arthur of the services of the crews of all the vessels 
that escaped to neutral ports. 

In the great assault of the ic)th-26th August the Japanese lost 
14,000 men, and succeeded only in capturing the Banjushan fort, 

which is east of the Urlungshan forts. 
Capture of Forts General Nogi then settled down to steady 

siege operations, drawing his parallels 
nearer and nearer to the Russian main position, and capturing the 
all-important Kuropatkin fort early in September. This fort, which 
stands on Division Hill half-way between Wolf Hill and the harbor, 
not only commanded the parade-ground, but gave the Japanese 
the possession of the waterworks from which the garrison drew the 
main water supply. Up to this moment General Nogi's heaviest 
guns had been 4.7 and 6in. pieces of the naval type, and they had 
been quite unequal to the heavy guns of the position mounted in the 
Russian works. But now heavy siege guns and 11 in. howitzers ar- 
rived from Japan, and immediately their effect began to make itself 
felt, so that by the 19th September another assault was resolved on. 
This was directed against three points of the ring of defensive works 
— against the metre-hill forts on the west, and (the outworks, as it 
were of the great Etseshan and Antszshan forts) against the ad- 
vanced works of Urlungshan on the northeast, and against the lun- 
ettes in the Shuishi Valley which connects the Antszshan and the 
Urlungshan forts. At this last point some of the fiercest fighting 
of the whole siege took place. The Shuishi Valley was defended 
by a series of strong lunettes connected by advance works, within 

334- 



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£■1 ■'■'i'":: 

■ : '!;■■, ■:! 
:, ■' '■"*. 'I. 







JAPANESE SCALING FORT AT PORT ARTHUR. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fifty yards of which the Japanese had advanced their parallels. On 
the evening 1 of the 19th September four desperate assaults were 
delivered against the westernmost lunette. All, however, were 
beaten back. At dawn the assault was renewed with greater 
strength, and the western lunette was carried, mainly by the employ- 
ment of dynamite grenades. The Russian garrison were driven out 
of the trenches, losing three quick-firers, four machine guns, and two 
mortars, but inflicting on the victors losses amounting to over 400 
killed and wounded. At the same time a determined assault was 
made on 203 Metre Hill and the adjoining ridge by three iegimenta 
of the right division. The assaulting parties reached the dead 
ground beneath the ridge, but there they were compelled to remain 
during the night. At dawn on the 20th a terrific bombardment on 
the position began and continued till evening; and when the night 
had fallen the Japanese rushed the trenches oil the eastern extrem- 
ity of the crest line after a fierce hand-to-hand fight in which not 
only bayonets but even stones were used. But only part of the 
work had been won. The fort on the southwestern slopes of the 
ridges was still untaken, and though a small party of the besiegers 
penetrated the defences here, they were driven out again next day, 
and four more assaults delivered during the next two days proved 
equally unavailing though terribly costly in life — the casualty list 
at this point alone amounting to 2,000. The defences of this ad- 
vance fort on 203 Metre Hill were typical of the obstacles which the 
Japanese had to overcome in the prosecution of their assaults. 
The bomb-proofs connecting the network of trenches which seared 
the slopes of the hill were made of steel plates covered with earth, 
and a triple row of wire entanglements made the ground in front of 
the trenches impassable. In the operations from the 19th to the 
26th September the Japanese lost more than 4,000 killed and 

337 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

wounded. In the assault at the same time on the advanced works of 
Urlungshan the parallels of the Japanese had been carried to within 
fifty yards of the defences, but the assault still proved a costly busi- 
ness. Again and again the assaulting rushes were swept back by 
rifle and machine-gun fire; but the indomitable spirit of the Mika- 
do's troops at length prevailed, and the redoubt was carried at the 
point of the bayonet. The position thus gained in front of Urlung- 
shan enabled the Japanese to mount their heavy howitzers in such a 
way as to bombard not only the main forts but the harbor with 
great effect ; and in the course of a few days several of the warships 
lying at anchor were severely damaged by the high-angle fire. By 
hard fighting and diligent sapping the investing army now continued 
to make steady progress against the Urlungshan forts which lie' 
just east of the road and railway and command their approach to 
Port Arthur. On the ioth October the attack managed to establish 
itself on the crest of the East Urlungshan fort, and on the 16th the 
entrenched hill between Urlungshan and Banjushan, the latter of 
which was already in Japanese hands, was taken by storm. On the 
25th October the glacis of East Urlungshan was stormed and held 
in spite of repeated counter-attacks on the part of the Russians. In 
front of these forts on the northeastern side the fiercest fighting con- 
tinued all through the latter part of October and the early part of 
November, the general result being that the Japanese saps were 
brought within less than 300 yards of the main positions while the 
fire from the howitzers finally silenced the great forts of Urlungshan 
and Shunshusan. But these successes, though considerable, were 
insufficient to make a really serious breach in the main lines of the 
defence, as long as the great forts on the west — Antszshan and Etse- 
shan — held out, and forthwith the Japanese attack was diverted to 
the latter of those two strongholds. Meanwhile, the heavy and in- 

338. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

cessant fire directed on the harbor and the town had been most 
destructive. The naval repairing works had to be abandoned, and 
both the old and the new Chinese towns were rendered uninhabitable 
where their buildings were not razed to the ground or consumed by 
the fires started by the bursting shells. 

For the first time in history a fortress constructed according to 
the latest principles of military science, and defended by modern 

long-range artillery, was being besieged; 
Devices of the Besiegers and like the old walled cities of the 

17th and 1 8th centuries, its defences could 
only be overcome by sap and mine and parallel. So much the as- 
sailants had learnt to their cost in their earlier and futile attempts at 
taking the place by storm. The exigencies of these operations led 
to the adoption of many ingenious devices by the forces on both 
sides — such, for instance, as a steel bullet-proof shield to protect the 
pioneer engaged in cutting wire entanglements; and the deadly 
grenade charged with dynamite, flung into the enemy's trenches by 
the hand or by means of wooden mortars bound with bamboo. At 
first the Japanese had chosen the night time for their assaults, but 
this plan had to be abandoned owing to the effective employment by 
the Russians of searchlights and star shells, the former having the 
effect not only of exposing the assaulting troops to the fire of the de- 
fenders, but blinding them in their advance on their objective. 
Throughout the siege the defenders had shown not only indomitable 
courage, but inexhaustible resource, and in spite of all the discour- 
agement which the steady and inexorable advance of the Japanese 
might have been supposed to inflict, they continued equal to every 
demand on their fortitude. From time to time supplies reached 
them by means of blockade-runners, but this was but a precarious 
and inadequate means of replenishing the stores on which such a 

339- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

long and severe strain had been made. And yet, in spite of all 
rumors to the effect that ammunition was running short, the great 
guns continued to hurl their defiance at the Japanese artillery, and 
never in any single instance was the defence weakened by a failure 
of powder and shot. Though the Russians had failed to foresee 
many things which the course of the war has proved to have been 
fairly obvious, no one can pretend that they failed to equip their 
great stronghold in the Far East in a manner worthy of its claim to 
rank as "the Gibraltar of the East." After nearly six months of 
close investment and almost continuous bombardment, the fortress 
still held at bay an enemy who had proved himself, not only before 
the defences of Port Arthur, but in many a stricken field beside, to 
possess fighting qualities rarely equalled and never surpassed in the 
world's history of warfare — an enemy, too, who possessed every 
resource of military science, and who had studied in the best mili- 
tary schools. The fact that the Japanese, who had confidently ex- 
pected to take Port Arthur before the end of the summer had not 
even by the middle of November made a decisive breach in its main 
defences, speaks volumes for the character of those defences. But 
even the strongest fortifications that human ingenuity can construct 
are only formidable when men of high spirit man them; and the 
chief credit for having baffled so long the most desperate efforts of 
Japanese skill and courage must ever be given to General Stoessel 
and the men who, serving under him, became infected with his spirit 
and inspired by his example. By the middle of November the Jap- 
anese lines had, indeed, been drawn very close round the devoted 
citadel of the Czar. They were in possession of the eastern ridge, 
and held practically at their mercy that great ring of fortified hills 
which shuts in Port Arthur from the Dalny side. They had cut the 
main water supply of the garrison, and they had possessed them- 

340. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

selves ©f important ground to the north of the old town, and their 
siege guns were able to render the dockyards and the harbor unten- 
able for ships of war. To the west the advance had been less 
signal, and their foothold on the great ridge which commands the 
fortress on the western side was at best slight and precarious ; while 
not even the faintest impression had been made on the great chain 
of fortifications at Liau-tie-shan, in the extreme south corner of the 
peninsula. 

Tremendous efforts had been made to achieve the capture of 
the place by the 3rd November, the birthday of the Mikado; but that 

auspicious day passed without the fall of 
The Undaunted Stoessel Port Arthur seeming to be in any de- 
gree nearer, while General Stoessel con- 
tinued to send cheerful and undaunted messages to his Imperial 
master whenever a boat succeeded in running the blockade of the 
Japanese fleet and in reaching Chifu. Through all these protracted 
and strenuous operations, the losses of the Japanese had been very 
severe; they cannot have been less than 40,000 men, and they may 
have been considerably more. The garrison had suffered less se- 
verely, but in the absence of reserves their losses were even more 
serious, and by the middle of November the total effective force was 
little more than 10,000 men. It will ever be a mystery how a force 
so utterly inferior to its enemy, defending a wide perimeter of forti- 
fications, every point of which was daily liable to fierce assault and 
bombardment, could for so many weeks endure the awful strain to 
which it was subjected. Yet the indomitable garrison was never 
quiescent or passive in its resistance. Besides repelling assault, it 
engaged in continual sorties and counter-attacks, and often, when 
driven from an essential position succeeded in recapturing it at the 
point of the bayonet. A remarkable instance of this offensive capa- 

341* 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

city was furnished in the course of the great assault from the 19th 
September to the 26th September. In operating from the north 
against the defences of the Shuishi Valley, which lies between 
Antszshan and Urlungshan, the Japanese, after their first success, 
pressed on against High Hill, a position of the most vital importance 
to the defence, as it permitted the principal forts on the west of the 
town to be taken in reverse. As any attempt to retake the hill must 
be a desperate enterprise, General Stoessel refused to issue an order 
for its recapture, but called for volunteers. The requisite number 
were at once forthcoming, and led by Lieutenant Podgorsky, they 
attacked the Japanese with grenades and drove them from the posi- 
tion which they had already begun to entrench. 

In his dispatch of the 23rd September, this is how General 
Stoessel reports the affair: — 

"The last assault on High Hill was repulsed to-day at 5 
o'clock in the morning. The enemy had actually occupied some of 

the defences of the High Hill position and 
The Gallant Podgorsky had placed machine-guns in them, which 

they directed against our troops. Lieu- 
tenant Podgorsky was dispatched to this part of the field by General 
Kondrachenko with a force of chasseurs and engineers, who under 
the direction of Colonel Irmann hurled grenades filled with pyrox- 
iline into the works held by the Japanese. These exploded among 
the enemy, who fled in panic. Captain Sytcheff, of the 5th Regi- 
ment, pursued the flying foe with chasseurs. Colonel Irmann at- 
tributes the principal share in the work of compelling the enemy to 
withdraw entirely from High Hill to Lieutenant Podgorsky. The 
Japanese lost over 10,000 men. All our troops distinguished them- 
selves. General Kondrachenko, Colonel Irmann, Captain Sytcheff, 
and Lieutenant Podgorsky won special distinction. The troops 

342. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fought heroically, particularly the 5th Regiment. The whole garri- 
son down to the last man is resolved to defend Russia's bulwark in 
the Far East to the last drop of blood." 

But even the greatest heroism cannot achieve the impossible; 
and in spite of Stoessel's persistent optimism, it became evident that 

his powers of resistance were daily dimin- 
World-wide Admiration ishing. An attempt on the part of the 

Japanese General to induce the garrison 
to capitulate in spite of their leader, met with no response; but 
throughout the civilized world, whose sympathy and admiration had 
been deeply stirred by the heroic stand of Port Arthur's garrison, 
voices were lifted to urge that no more useless sacrifice of noble life 
should be permitted ; and that the men who had done so much for the 
honor of the Czar should be spared at least the last mortal agony of 
the struggle with the inevitable. 

On the 15th, however, a Russian torpedo-boat bearing dis- 
patches from Stoessel managed to elude the blockade and to reach 

Chifu, pursued by Japanese destroyers. 
Uncertain News The boat was warned that it must leave 

the neutral harbor within twenty-four 
hours or be disarmed, and rather than submit to either of these alter- 
natives, the officer in command blew his vessel up. But his work 
had been done; and his dispatches containing the latest accounts of 
the position at Port Arthur reached St. Petersburg. Immediately 
afterwards the report arrived that General Kuropatkin had been 
empowered to treat for terms of capitulation for Port Arthur. But 
whether that was in fact the result of Stoessel's message, or whether 
the Czar's Government received from it encouragement in the be- 
lief that Port Arthur could hold out till the arrival of the Baltic 
Fleet, is a question which is still unanswered. 

343- 




CHAPTER XXI 

The North Sea Outrage— Seizures of Neutrals— The Case of the "Malacca"— 
The Baltic Fleet— Departure at Last— Russian Alarms— In the North Sea 
— Bringing Home the News — Russian Allegations — Naval Preparations — 
Supplementary Information— The Baltic Fleet Proceeds to Madagascar. 

O sooner had the echoes of the terrific battle of the Sha-ho 
begun to subside than the attention of the civilized world, 
which had so long been concentrated on the vicissitudes 
of the Titanic struggle in the Far East, was suddenly 
focussed on a spot separated from the theatre of war by more than 
half the circumference of the globe, and on an incident fraught, as 

it seemed, with more direful and tremen- 
The North Sea dous consequences even than the momen- 

Outrage tous rupture between Russia and Japan. 
On the 15th of October, Russia's Baltic 
Fleet — which for many months had been preparing as a reinforce- 
ment to the Pacific Squadron — at last left port on its voyage to the 
Far East; and within six days of its departure it had so effectually 
asserted itself as a factor in the naval situation that Europe, 
shocked and startled, woke up one morning to find itself hanging on 
the perilous brink of that Armageddon which has been the night- 
mare of statesmen for the last twenty years. In passing through 
the North Sea, the Russian fleet — for causes which have yet to be 
fully elicited — fired on a flotilla of British fishing-boats engaged in 
trawling on the Dogger Bank; killed and wounded several of the 

347- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

fishermen; sunk one of the trawlers, and more or less grievously 
injured others. When the news of this amazing outrage was pub- 
lished a storm of indignation and resentment swept over England 
such as has not been known for more than a generation ; and feeling 
was embittered and intensified to a truly dangerous pitch, first by 
the callous indifference displayed by the perpetrators of the outrage, 
and next by the indisposition of the Russian Government to offer 
those immediate apologies and amends which alone could palliate 
so wanton a breach of the comity of nations. It seemed for the 
moment that Russia had deliberately designed to provoke England 
to hostilities, in the hope of redeeming her own desperate position 
by extending the area of the conflict and by dragging into it first 
the ally of Japan, and by consequence her own ally, France. The 
prospect, though almost too terrible to contemplate, did not for a 
moment quench the resolution of the people of England, where men 
of all parties were found standing shoulder to shoulder in the de- 
mand for ample reparation. What made the situation especially 
dangerous was that public patience had at last been well-nigh ex- 
hausted by the repeated provocations of Russia — provocations which 
the North Sea outrage was only the crown and culmination. To 
understand this fact, it is necessary to go back a little. 

When Russia found that she could not hope successfully to 
contest the supremacy of the sea with Japan, she turned her atten- 
tion to the subsidiary enterprise of corn- 
Seizures of merce-raiding. In this task the Vladivo- 
Neutrals stock Squadron were particularly active, 
and, unsated by the destruction of such 
Japanese transports and trading vessels as they encountered, seized 
or sunk many vessels flying neutral flags. On the 16th of June the 
Vladivostock cruisers seized the Allanton, a British steamer, carry- 

348. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ing coal from Hokkaido Island to Singapore. There was nothing 
contraband in the cargo or destination of this vessel, as the subse- 
quent decision of the St. Petersburg Prize Court proved, yet the 
Allanton was confiscated, and her crew held prisoners at Vladivo- 
stok for months. The real reason for this high-handed conduct 
was that the Allanton had previously carried a cargo of coal from 
Cardiff to Japan — but she had been chartered for that voyage before 
the outbreak of war. On the 16th of July the Indo-China Steam 
Navigation Company's steamer, the Hispang, was wantonly sunk in 
Pigeon Bay by a Russian torpedo-boat. The Hispang was engaged 
in a lawful trade; there was no suggestion that she carried contra- 
band ; and indeed no examination of her cargo was even attempted. 
She was flying the British flag, and she stopped directly she was 
ordered to do so. But in spite of these facts, a Russian torpedo- 
boat came straight out to her and sunk her — the captain, officers, 
and passengers being rescued with difficulty. It was afterwards 
confessed by the Russian officer that did this deed that his orders 
were given under the impression that the Hispang was the steamer 
Haimilrn, which was being employed by the London Times' corre- 
spondent. On the 26th of July an equally gross outrage was 
perpetrated by the Vladivostock Squadron, who, besides unjustifi- 
ably seizing the Chalcas, deliberately sunk on the 23rd of July the 
British steamer Knight Commander. This vessel was carrying rails 
for Japan; and even if such a cargo could be regarded as contra- 
band, there was no excuse for sinking the vessel. Such an act, in 
the words of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, constituted "a 
grave breach of international law"; and it was aggravated by the 
circumstances in which it was committed. The captain and crew 
were ordered to get clear of the vessel in ten minutes, and such 
was the haste with which they, were compelled to ieave the boats in 

349- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

order to save their lives, that nearly all the personal effects had to 
be sacrificed. The growing irritation with these acts was brought 
to a head in England by the famous case of the Malacca — a P. 
and O. mail steamship which was seized by Russian cruisers in the 
Red Sea on the 19th July. At the beginning of June two vessels 
of the Russian Volunteer Fleet in the Black Sea — the Petersburg 
and the Smolensk — were "designated for Government service out- 
side the Black Sea." Even their commanders were kept in the 
dark as to their destination and the nature of the service that they 
were to perform. The two vessels, which, as warships, would 
not by international treaty have been able to leave the Black Sea, 
passed through the Dardanelles under the commercial flag, and then 
steered straight to the Suez Canal, where the non-belligerent charac- 
ter was still maintained. But it seems that on reaching Constanti- 
nople the commanders had been informed that their ships had been 
raised to the rank of second-class cruisers in the Russian fleet ; and 
no sooner had the Red Sea been reached than the Petersburg and 
the Smolensk put off their commercial disguise and put on the 
character of ships of war. They flew the naval flag, and mounted 
the armament of 5'in. quick-firers, which had been up to that mo- 
ment securely stowed away. The Government service for which 
they had been designated was that of searching for contraband on 
neutral vessels, and the soi-disant cruisers lost no time in demon- 
strating their zeal. All this time, by the way, the Russian Admiralty 
was strenuously denying that the Petersburg and the Smolensk had 
left the Black Sea at all. On the 15th July the commerce-raiders 
began operations, rather tactlessly, by stopping and seizing the 
German mail steamer, Prinz Heinrich, and by confiscating the 
Japanese mails. The indignation and astonishment of the German 
public had only begun to make itself heard, when it was distracted 

350- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

by the intelligence that the P. and O. steamer Malacca had also 
been stopped, and had been actually brought back to Suez in charge 
of a Russian prize crew. The vessel^ .flying the Russian flag, 
reached Suez on the 19th July, and on the 20th the English Govern- 
ment, moved thereto by the clamor which began to be heard both in 
Parliament and in the press, addressed to the Government of the 
Czar a strongly-worded protest against the seizure and a demand 
that the Malacca should be instantly released. The demand was 
based on the irregular position of the Petersburg — a vessel which, 
if a ship of war, ought not to have passed the Dardanelles, and 
which, if not a ship of war, had no right to stop and search neutral 
vessels. This contention was unanswerable; for it is evident that if 
a ship could be permitted to change its character at will, it could 
perform all the functions of a ship of war and still enjoy all the 
privileges of a non-belligerent at neutral ports. 

Incidentally it was pointed out in Lord Lansdowne's dispatch 
that the ammunition found on board the Malacca belonged to the 

British Government, and was intended 
Case of the "Malacca" for the China Squadron. It subsequently 

came to light that the seizure of the 
Malacca was no mere accident ; but that the vessel had been waited 
for by the Russian cruisers acting on secret information from Rus- 
sian agents at Antwerp. For several days no reply was vouchsafed 
by the Russian Government, and feeling in this country rose to 
such a height that the situation became dangerous. While the 
whole British nation was chafing under the indignity and affront, 
the Malacca was being navigated by her prize crew, with almost 
deliberate insolence, through the Suez Canal on the way to the 
Baltic port of Libau. A British liner, in the eyes of the whole 
world, was made an ignominious captive, and, like a pickpocket in 

35i- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the clutch of a police-constable, was dragged away to judgment. 
The humiliation of the situation was aggravated by the fact that at 
Suez — a port of the English Protectorate of Egypt — the Russian 
officer in charge of the Malacca demanded to be supplied with coal, 
water, and provisions. In spite of the strong representations which 
had been made by the British Government, nothing was done at 
St. Petersburg to alleviate the situation. The Malacca reached 
Suez on the 19th of July and Port Said on the 20th, and on the 21st 
she sailed unconcernedly for her destination, which was ostenta- 
tiously announced to be Libau. Then at last the Russian Govern- 
ment broke the silence. Having inflicted the greatest possible hu- 
miliation on this country, they were pleased to accept the assurances 
of the British Government that the prize had no contraband on 
board, and to consent that the Malacca should not be brought before 
a Prize Court. A claim for damages for detention was to be ad- 
mitted, and the vessel was to be handed over to the British authori- 
ties at "some Mediterranean port," after formal examination in 
the presence of the British Consul. On the 27th July the terms of 
this agreement — so extravagantly indulgent to Russia — were car- 
ried out, and the incident of the Malacca closed ; but there remained 
still unsettled the fundamental question of the status of the volun- 
teer cruisers, Smolensk and Petersburg. Meanwhile, for the Ger- 
man liner Scandia, which had been seized on the 23rd July, very 
different treatment was reserved — she was released on the follow- 
ing day. The only public recognition of the protests of the British 
Government which was given by the Government of the Czar was 
the publication on the 3rd August of an official communication de- 
claring that "the special commission" of the cruisers Petersburg and 
Smolensk had "expired;" and these vessels promptly disappeared 
from the Red Sea. But their mischievous career was not yet at an 

35 2 - 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

end. Although the Russian Government had specifically promised 
that they should not be employed in searching neutral shipping any 
longer, the world was startled at the end of August to learn that 
the British steamer Comedian had been stopped 80 miles from East 
London and 10 miles only from the coast of British territory by a 
mysterious Russian cruiser. The unpleasant impression in Eng- 
land was deepened when it was discovered that this strange 
cruiser was no other than the Smolensk of Red Sea fame. Well 
might Mr. Balfour, who received at this moment a deputation of 
British shipowners, declare that the incident had produced "a pain- 
ful impression" in the minds of the English Government. Repre- 
sentations to the Russian Government produced the characteristic 
excuse that the messages sent to the Smolensk and Petersburg had 
not reached their destination. There is, indeed, good reason to be- 
lieve that the Russian Admiralty, which had done its best to thwart 
the Russian Foreign Office, had taken particularly good care that 
the messages should be delayed until the Petersburg and Smolensk 
were out of reach. But realizing the gravity of the situation, and 
protesting their own helplessness, the Russian Government now in- 
vited the British Government itself to communicate to the raiders 
a cypher message of recall. Accordingly the cruisers on the Cape 
Station were sent out to find the delinquents; and on the 5th Sep- 
tember they were discovered coaling in the territorial waters of 
Zanzibar with German colliers in attendance. Their whereabout 
was at any rate sufficiently well known for them to command the 
means to replenish their bunkers, and as soon as they saw a British 
warship, they prepared for instant flight. But H.M.S. Forte man- 
aged to communicate to them the orders of their own Government, 
and as these were too unequivocal to be disregarded, the raiding 
career of the Petersburg and Smolensk forthwith came to an end. 

353- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

But they had done enough, in conjunction with the Vladivostock 
Squadron, to rouse feeling in England to a high pitch of irritation ; 
and to make it ill-prepared to endure with patience or forbearance 
the greater and still more wanton outrage with which the Baltic 
Fleet was to inaugurate its voyage to the Far East. 

The dispatch of this fleet had been the feverish pre-occupation 
of the Russian Admiralty from the moment that the first disasters 

befell the Pacific Squadron at Port Ar- 
The Baltic Fleet thur. Naval reinforcements were on the 

way, it will be remembered, at the out- 
break of war, and had reached the Red Sea ; but they were recalled 
when the news of the successful torpedo attack on the Port Arthur 
Fleet reached Europe. It was realized how vital must be the com- 
mand of the sea to the achievement of victory; and Russia at once 
set about preparing an Armada which should restore to her the 
naval preponderance so suddenly lost. At first the intention, 
which was so loudly proclaimed, was not taken quite seriously; 
but it was decidedly encouraged as the weeks went on and as the 
resisting power of Port Arthur to assault gave hopes that the new 
fleet might still find a warm-water port to receive it. At first the 
departure of the Baltic Fleet was announced for June; though 
everyone knew the design, only formed perhaps to reassure public 
opinion in Russia, was incapable of fulfilment. Then June came, 
and the date of departure was again postponed; and in July the 
world was informed that there was "no hurry;" and that it had 
been thought advisable to "test thoroughly" the new ships and to 
familiarize the officers and crews with their work. All through 
the summer the game of fixing the day of departure and then post- 
poning it went merrily on; but on the 15th August Admiral 
Rozhestvensky, on whom supreme command of the fleet had been 

354- 



O 

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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

bestowed, went on board the flagship with his staff; and received 
from the Port Admiral at Kronstadt by signal a formal message 
of farewell. But nothing more happened, except that on the 20th 
August it was announced that the Baltic Fleet would not leave be- 
fore the 28th September. 

On the 26th August the fleet went for a trial trip with the 
most discouraging results, for several of the new ships broke down 

.' and the battleship Orel ran aground, in- 
Departure at Last flicting structural injuries on herself. 

Early in September there was another 
false alarm. Danish pilots had been procured, and on the nth 
September the fleet again put to sea; but it only got as far as the 
port of Libau, and the next news was that it would remain there 
"some weeks longer" for firing practice and manoeuvres. The 
next definite date fixed was the 7th October; but two days later 
than that the fleet had only got as far as Reval, where it was in- 
spected and blessed by the Czar in person. On the 15th October, 
however, the long delay at last came to an end, and the fleet, con- 
sisting of thirty-six vessels, actually left Russian waters. 

It is necessary now to describe the fleet in which Russia had 
placed so many of her hopes. The class and character of the prin- 
cipal vessels is best realized from a table: — 

Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun Pro- W'ght of 
merit horse- speed in tec'n in b'side fire 
BATTLESHIPS. in tons. power, knots, inches, in lbs. 

Kniaz Suvaroff (flagship).... 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 

Alexander III 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 

Borodino 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 

Orel 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 

Ossliabia 12,674 !4,5oo 18 10.5 2,672 

Sissoi Veliky (flagship) 8,880 10,400 " 16 12.5 3,186 

Navarin 9,476 18,206 16 12.5 3404 

357. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun Pro- W'ght of 
merit horse- speed in tec'n in b'side fire 

in tons. power, knots, inches, in lbs. 

ARMORED CRUISERS. 

Admiral Nakhimoff .-. 8,500 9,000 16.7 6 944 

Dmitri Donskoi 5,893 7,000 16 6.2 444 

PROTECTED CRUISERS. 

Oleg 6,675 19,500 23 4 872 

Aurora 6,630 1 1,600 20 4.5 632 

Svietlana 3,828 8,500 20 4 476 

Almaz 3,285 7,5oo 19 — 184 

Jemtchug 3,200 7,000 24 — 184 

Izumrud 3,200 7,000 24 — 184 



In addition to these ships there was a torpedo flotilla of 7 de- 
stroyers of 28 knots speed, and 8 torpedo-boats; the following ves- 
sels of the Volunteer Fleet: Kiev, 
Strength of Baltic Fleet Vladimir, Voronej (each of 10,500 tons 

and with a speed of 12 knots), Tambov, 
and Yazvslar (each of 8,640 tons and with a speed of 12 knots) ; 
13 transports armed with light guns; and a hospital ship, the Orel 
— not to be confused with the battleship of the same name. On 
paper, at least, this was a very formidable fleet; but its fighting 
efficiency appears much reduced on analysis. There were four 
modern battleships of a powerful type and of homogeneous de- 
sign; but their value is much discounted by the fact that some of 
their consorts are distinctly less powerful; and in naval warfare 
the manoeuvring power of a fleet becomes that of its weakest item. 
This was proved very signally on the occasion of the engagement 
betwen Admiral Kamimura and the Vladivostock Squadron, when 
the Russian cruisers Gromoboi and Rossia suffered most severely 
from having to stand by the Rurik, the lame duck of the squad- 

353 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ron. The Ossliabia, it is true was not much inferior to the battle- 
ships of the Knias Suvaroff class. She was a sister ship to the 
Peresviet and Pobieda, sunk in the harbor of Port Arthur, and 
was launched in 1898. But the Sissoi Veliky and the Navarin both 
dated from 1891, and were distinctly inferior in the all-important 
matter of speed, even their nominal speed never having- been at- 
tained. The only armored cruisers with the Baltic Fleet — the Ad- 
miral Nakhimoff and the Dmiti Donskoi — were barely entitled to 
their description, as they have a low speed, light armor, and com- 
paratively small gun power. Certainly they were not fit, like the 
best armored cruisers of to-day, to lie in the line of battle. Some 
of the other cruisers were little more than armed merchantmen, 
and none of them were formidable warships. Another circum- 
stance that detracted from the fighting value of this fleet was the 
character of the officers and crews. All Russia's best and most 
highly-trained sailors and marine engineers were sent out before 
the war to the Pacific Squadron; and she had no adequate reserve 
to draw on. The modern man-of-war's-man — whether he is in 
the engine-room or on the gun-deck — is a highly specialized pro- 
duct, and he cannot be turned out at a moment's notice. Stokers, 
artificers, engineers, as well as torpedo lieutenants, gunners, and 
even admirals, have to be carefully trained for years before they 
become efficient, and the inefficiency and inexperience of the scratch 
crews and raw officers put on board the Baltic Fleet was the main 
cause of the long delay in that fleet's departure and of the disaster 
that occurred immediately after the start had been made, and that 
nearly brought the voyage to a tragic and ignominious conclusion. 
When all these circumstances were taken into consideration, it be- 
came obvious that the Baltic Fleet was hopelessly inferior to the 
fleet which, on reaching Far Eastern waters, it would have to en- 

359- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

counter in order to wrest from the Japanese their command of the 
sea. But one question, even more urgent than that of the fate 
which would befall the fleet on arrival, was how it was to over- 
come the difficulties of the voyage. Russia had no coaling sta- 
tions; and coaling at sea from attendant colliers has not yet be- 
come a feasible operation for a great fleet. The larger vessels 
would require from 5,000 to 6,000 tons of coal each, and the 
smaller cruisers from 2,000 to 3,000 tons in the course of a voy- 
age of nearly 13,000 miles, occupying at least 100 days, and very 
possibly 30 days more. But the coaling difficulty proved less in- 
superable than it had appeared, and Russia's energy and ingenuity 
in overcoming it were the first symptoms that she meant the Baltic 
Fleet to be taken seriously. Negotiations for the supply of coal 
were opened with English firms; but our Foreign Office ruled that 
such contracts would be an infringement of neutrality. The Ger- 
mans, however, were much more complaisant; and their attitude 
of "benevolent neutrality," as Count Von Bulow called it, enabled 
them to meet all demands of Russia. Large orders for English 
coal to be delivered to German consignees at neutral ports were 
received at Cardiff; and this coal was then transferred to the ports 
at which the Baltic Fleet was to call. According to the strict in- 
terpretation of international law these facilities for coaling in port 
ought not to have been extended to the fleet of a belligerent. But 
Russia was a close neighbor of the Powers concerned, and the 
ally of one of them, while her enemy was a long way off; and 
so it happened that Admiral Rozhdestvensky suffered no more in- 
convenience than if he had been engaged on a yachting cruise. He 
and his fleet put into any port that they fancied, and stayed, prac- 
tically, as long as they had a mind to ! 

The Baltic Fleet was divided into three divisions, and on the 

360. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

1 6th- 1 8th October the first division left Libau. The daring sur- 
prise attacks of the Japanese torpedo- 
Russian Alarms boats at Port Arthur had filled the 
minds of the Russian naval authorities 
with every kind of misgiving; and by some means not yet disclosed, 
they had become possessed of the idea that the Japanese meditated 
an attempt on the Baltic Fleet during its passage through the nar- 
row waters of the Danish Straits and the North Sea. Rumors of 
mysterious Japanese agents, endeavoring to charter vessels in ob- 
scure Danish and Norwegian ports filled the Russian newspapers. 
On the 14th October Admiral Wirenius, the Chief of the Russian 
Admiralty, solemnly declared to an interviewer that the narrow 
waters of the Belt and the Sound were particularly favorable for 
a surprise attack; that officers of the Japanese Navy were known 
to have left for Europe; and that there was reason to apprehend 
an attempt to throw mines in the track of the Russian Squadron 
in the Danish Straits. The state of "nerves" to which the Russian 
naval officers had been reduced by these apprehensions was shown 
when, as the Russian fleet passed through the Kattegat, an attempt 
was made to deliver to the Russian Admiral a cypher dispatch that 
had arrived from St. Petersburg. Two fishermen were sent out 
with the dispatch in a motor-launch, but when their vessel ap- 
proached the flagship the searchlights were turned on, and blank 
charges fired to forbid a nearer approach. The dispatch was taken \ 
in by a boat launched by the battleship for the purpose. 

On the 19th of October the first division of the fleet passed 
through the Kattegat; and by the 21st of October all the ships had 

left Danish waters and entered on their 
In the North Sea course down the North Sea. Imme- 

diately followed an occurrence almost 
361 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

without parallel in naval history — an occurrence that was only saved 
from inextinguishable ridicule and contempt by the tragic conse- 
quences which it unhappily involved. On this memorable night of 
Friday, the 21st of October, some fifty vessels of the Hull fishing 
fleet were engaged in trawling on the Dogger Bank — one of the 
places in the North Sea most frequented by the fishermen not only 
of Great Britain, but of Germany, Denmark, Holland and Norway. 
It is a prominent figure in all charts of the North Sea, and to every 
sailor and seafaring man its situation and character are perfectly 
familiar. The Hull fishermen, of the Gamecock and Great Northern 
Fleets, had their trawls down and were thus deprived of the possi- 
bility of rapid movement, when about midnight they sighted a 
number of warships steaming from the northeast. At first they did 
not suspect that it was the Russian Baltic Fleet that had come their 
way, because in that event the fleet must have been navigating some 
40 miles out of the true course; but very soon their ignorance was 
enlightened. While the men were watching the passing warships, 
searchlights were suddenly flashed on the trawlers, and then, to the 
horror and amazement of these innocent fishermen engaged peace- 
ably in their lawful occupations, a sudden storm of shot and shell 
broke upon them from unknown men-of-war. The steam-trawler 
Crane was sunk and its skipper and mate were decapitated by a shell, 
and all but one of the crew were injured; while the trawlers Moul- 
mein and Mino were seriously damaged, the latter vessel having no 
fewer than sixteen holes in her. From the evidence given at the 
subsequent inquiries the following facts were elicited : All the trawl- 
ers had their own lights up — namely, a lantern showing a white 
light ahead, a green light on the starboard side, a red light on the 
port- side. Several vessels also had lights in the fishing pound so 
that the men could work on deck. None of the trawlers were with- 
<~ 362 ' 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

out lights. As the approaching vessels came nearer they were seen 
to signal to one another in a way that conveyed to the minds of the 
trawlers that they were warships. Some of the vessels were in 
advance of the others. The exact number was very difficult to tell, 
but in the first division there were probably four or five. They 
passed the trawlers to the westward, where the admiral's trawler, 
the Ruff, was, and to the eastward of a few of the trawlers. One 
of them, at any rate, showed a searchlight. They passed on, and 
nothing happened. It was noticed that they were signalling to the 
other vessels behind, and that the other vessels were repeating the 
signals and signalling to each other. These other vessels then came 
on to the eastward of the admiral's ship, Ruff, but there were trawl- 
ers on both sides of them. Then, without any warning to the 
trawlers, these vessels opened fire. The crews on the trawlers were 
at first under the impression that it was a sham fight in some 
manoeuvres, but they soon discovered that it was live shot. Some 
of the warships fired from both port and starboard side. After the 
firing had begun, this second division of vessels came more to the 
west, and there were others which came down more to the east. The 
third division, which came furthest to the eastward, came near some 
of the outlying trawlers, who were more to the south and east. They 
turned their searchlights upon them. A great many of the trawlers, 
in the attempt to get away from the firing when it began, lost their 
trawls or damaged them. 

On Sunday night, the 23rd of October, two steam trawlers, one 
of them flying her flag at half-mast, and both riddled with shot, 

entered St. Andrew's Dock at Hull. Their 

Bringing Home own condition, and the lifeless and muti- 

the News la-ted bodies that they brought with them, 

were ghastly confirmation of the amazing 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

tidings that they had to tell ; and next morning-, not only England, 
but all the world, was ringing with the news of the Baltic fleet's first 
warlike exploit. Amazement quickly gave place to indignation — 
an indignation of passionate intensity ; and with one voice the people 
of England cried aloud for retribution at any cost on the perpetra- 
tors of so wanton an outrage. Nor was this indignation confined to 
the countrymen of the victims. In the United States, in France, 
and even in Germany, unsparing reprobation of a deed so unjusti- 
fiable was freely uttered; and the belief was confidently expressed 
that the only possible explanation was to be found in the undiscipline 
and probable drunken frenzy of the Russian naval officers. Be it 
remembered, too, that the heinousness of the offence was infinitely 
increased by the fact that the Russian ships, whose commanders 
must have discovered their grievous blunder before leaving the 
neighborhood of the Dogger Bank, made no effort to ascertain the 
injury they bad inflicted, or to render help to their innocent victims. 
Neither did the Russian Admiral condescend to make the least report 
of the circumstances. He and his fleet proceeded on their way as 
if the sinking of fishing-boats and the slaughtering of fishermen 
were too trifling an incident to engage serious attention and notice; 
and when the news of the outrage reached London, the Baltic 
Squadron had already been sighted in the Channel. No Government 
could sit down under such provocation as this, and the English min- 
isters, who realized well enough the dangerous pitch to which public 
feeling had been wrought, lost no time in addressing the strongest 
demands for immediate redress to St. Petersburg, accompanied by 
the intimation that the situation was one not admitting of delay. 
Their action was emphasized by that of King Edward himself, who, 
in sending a subscription of 200 guineas for the relief of the suffer- 
er*, declared that he had heard with, profound sorrow of the 

364 




THIRSTY JAPANESE TROOPS CROSSING THE SHA-HO. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"unwarrantable action" to which the North Sea fishing fleet had been 
subjected. The principal witnesses of the outrage were summoned 
at once to the Foreign Office, and Lord Lansdowne had long 
audience of the King, while the Prime Minister, who happened to be 
in Scotland, came back post-haste to London. On the 25th of Octo- 
ber Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
called at the British Embassy in St. Petersburg and requested the 
British Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, to convey to King Ed- 
ward and the British Government a message from the Czar, who, 
while he had received no message from the Admiral in command 
of the Baltic Fleet, could only attribute "the incident in the North 
Sea to a very regrettable misunderstanding". It was added that the 
Czar wished to express his sincere regret for the sad loss of life that 
had occurred, and to say that he would take steps to afford complete 
satisfaction to the sufferers as soon as the circumstances of the case 
were cleared up. These assurances, though far from adequate, 
would have done something to calm the temper of public opinion in 
England if they had been accompanied by any sign of a similar 
spirit in the Czar's advisers. But the latter seemed inclined to be 
as intractable as the Russian press was impenitent. While the Rus- 
sian Government pursued a policy of delay and evasion, the Rus- 
sian newspapers roundly denied that any blame attached to the 
Baltic Fleet, and scouted all idea of reparation; and all the time 
Admiral Rozhdestvensky was proceeding serenely on his voyage. 
On the 26th of October his battleships arrived at Vigo Harbor, 
where at last he took the trouble to communicate his report of what 
had happened to St. Petersburg. The statement is such an amazing 
one that it may be given in full. It was communicated to the world 
under the authority of tbt Russian Naval General Staff, and ran as 
follows : — 

367- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"i. — The incident in the North Sea was provoked by two tor- 
pedo-boats which, without showing any lights, under cover of 
darkness, advanced to attack the vessel steaming at the head of the 
detachment. When the detachment began to sweep the sea with its 
searchlights and opened fire, the presence was also discovered of 
several small steam vessels resembling small steam fishing-boats. 
The detachment endeavored to spare these boats and ceased fire as 
soon as the torpedo-boats were out of sight. 

"The English press is horrified at the idea that the torpedo- 
boats of the squadron, left by detachment until the morning on the 
scene of the occurrence, did not render assistance to the victims. 
Now, there was not a single torpedo-boat with the detachment and 
none were left on the scene of the occurrence. In consequence, it 
was one of the two torpedo-boats which was not sunk, but which 
was only damaged, which remained until the morning near the small 
steam craft. The detachment did not assist the small steam craft 
because it suspected them of complicity, in view of their obstinate 
persistence in cutting the line of advance of the warships. Several 
of them did not show any lights at all. The others showed them 
very late. 

"2. — Having met several hundreds of fishing-boats, the squad- 
ron showed them every consideration, except where they were in 
company of the foreign torpedo-boats, one of which disappeared, 
while the other, according to the evidence of the fishermen them- 
selves, remained among them until the morning. They believed her 
to be a Russian vessel, and were indignant that she did not come to 
the assistants of the victims. She was, however, a foreigner, and 
remained until the morning looking for the other torpedo-boat, her 
companion, either with the object of repairing her damage or from 
fear of betraying herself to those who were not accomplices, 

368. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

. "If there were also on the scene of the occurrence fishermen 
imprudently involved in this enterprise, I beg, in the name of the 
whole fleet, to express our sincere regret for the unfortunate victims 
of circumstances in which no warship could, even in time of pro- 
found peace, have acted otherwise." 

But before this preposterous and long-delayed explanation was 
vouchsafed, the British Government had taken steps to prove that 
they were not in the mood to be trifled with, and that the subjects 
of the greatest naval power in the world were not to be shot down 
with impunity. To the intense satisfaction of the whole nation, 
an instant mobilization of the British fleets in European waters was 
ordered. The Home Fleet, which had been cruising away to the 

north of Scotland, was ordered south; 
Naval the Channel Fleet, lying at Gibraltar, was 

Preparations warned to be in instant readiness for ac- 
tive sen ice; and the Mediterranean Fleet 
was instructed to join up with the Channel Fleet with all speed. 
The naval dockyards were kept working night and day to prepare 
the reserve fleet for commission, and to be ready for the demands 
which an immediate outbreak of war might involve. In forty-eight 
hours every requisite preparation had been completed, and three 
fleets, any one of them capable of dealing faithfully with Admiral 
Rozhdestvensky's squadron, were ready for instant action. Directly 
in the path of the Baltic Fleet, now assembled at Vigo, lay the 
Channel Fleet under the command of Lord Charles Beresford, and 
so acute was the crisis that it seemed as if at any moment that fleet 
might be ordered to take the sea. Among the secret preparations 
made was the dispatch of four battleships from the Channel Squad- 
ron at Gibraltar to Portland and the assembly of all available subma- 
rines at Dover. What made the situation especially dangerous was 

369- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the conflict which in this hour of desperate emergency was being 
waged between the Russian Admiralty and the Russian Foreign 
Office. The former department, which had done so much to aggra- 
vate the case of the Malacca and to flout the assurances which had 
been given as to the withdrawal of the Petersburg and Smolensk, 
was now determined that no surrender should be made to the 
British demands for satisfaction in the matter of the North Sea 
outrage; and for several days the more pacific Foreign Office 
wrestled with these fire-eaters in vain. War between England and 
Russia, with the prospect of indefinite extension to other countries, 
seemed inevitable; but thanks largely to the friendly offices of the 
French Government, who, as the ally of Russia and the friend of 
Great Britain, had exceptional claims to act as an intermediary 
between the disputants, a settlement was at length arrived at. On 
the 28th of October, Mr. Balfour was able to announce to the world 
that that morning an agreement had been arrived at which averted 
all further apprehension of the rupture of peaceful relations. Great 
Britain and Russia had consented to refer the case in dispute to an 
impartial International Tribunal of Inquiry ; the terms of the Con- 
vention, which were signed after much further negotiation on the 
24th of November, being as follows : — 

I. — The Commission is to consist of five members, namely, 
officers of Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and France. 
The fifth Commissioner is to be selected by agreement between them. 
If they cannot agree, the choice to be entrusted to the king of a 
country subsequently to be determined upon. 

2. — The Commission is to report on all the circumstances relat- 
ing to the disaster and to establish the responsibility. 

3--=-The Commission is to have power to settle all questions 
of procedure. 

370. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

4. — The parties bind themselves to supply the Commission with 
all necessary information, facilities, &c. 

5. — The Commission is to meet at Paris as soon as possible 
after the signature of the Convention. 

6. — The report of the Commission is to be officially communi- 
cated to the respective Governments. 

Not the least interesting part of Mr. Balfour's statement was 
that in which he examined and dealt with the justification which 

Admiral Rozhdestvensky had put for- 
Russian Allegations ward, and in particular with the allega- 
tion that the Russian fleet had been at- 
tacked by torpedo-boats. This allegation, as Mr. Balfour pointed 
out, involved a charge of bad faith on the part of Great Britain, and 
such a charge he indignantly resented. If only one torpedo- boat 
was sunk, what, he pertinently asked, had become of the other ? The 
world did not require to be convinced of the essential absurdity of 
this story; but the Russians persisted in it with determination. The 
most circumstantial narratives were presently forthcoming from the 
four officers who had been detained to give evidence before the 
International Commission. One narrator stated that information 
of the presence of Japanese torpedo-boats in the Norway fiords, and 
of the Japanese having hired fishing vessels in Hull, Southampton, 
Hamburg, and Christiania, had been received by the Russians. He 
proceeded as follows : "We lodged information of the Japanese 
intentions with the Governments of those countries where the Jap- 
anese were making their preparations, but it was only in Denmark 
and Germany that we found any readiness to interfere with them. 
.... Before leaving the Scaw the Russians received a number of 
alarming messages from their agents. All these messages agreed 
in stating that in one very deep Norwegian fiord four Japanese tor- 

37i- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

pedo-boats had been seen, and that these vessels were afterwards 
observed a short distance to the west of the Scaw. The Russians 
left the Scaw in the morning, proceeding in different divisions. All 
the torpedo craft went on ahead, in two divisions, making for Cher- 
bourg. Next came Admiral Folkersahm with the four older battle- 
ships making for Tangier. The small cruisers were under orders 
to proceed to Arosa, 40 miles north of Vigo, while the large cruisers 
with the transport Kamchatka, under the command of Admiral En- 
quist, had instructions to make for Tangier like Admiral Folker- 
sahm. 

"Last of all we put to sea with the four best battleships, Suva- 
roif, Alexander III., Borodino, and Orel. Our destination was 
Brest, where we were to coal. Observe, therefore, that there was 
not with us a single torpedo-boat or a single small vessel. All such 

were far ahead of us On the 8th of October, at 8 o'clock in the 

evening, when it was already quite dark, we received a wireless mes- 
sage stating that 30 miles behind us was the transport Kamchatka, 
which had fallen behind her consorts (the cruisers Dmitri Donskoi 
and Aurora) in consequence of an injury to her engines, and that 
several torpedo-boats were following her closely, but had not dis- 
charged any torpedoes. Admiral Enquist, who was in front with 
the two cruisers, was at once ordered by wireless message to slacken 
speed and wait for the Kamchatka, or to continue his course in order 
not to expose himself to the torpedo-boats, which, of course, also 
received our messages, but did not know from what spot they were 
sent. The Japanese, however, attempted to find out our where- 
abouts. While we were exchanging messages with the Kamchatka 
we suddenly received a succession of telegrams, in excellent Russian, 
purporting to come from the Kamchatka : 'Where is the squadron ?' 
'Give your latitude and longitude.' 'Where is the Suvarofff These 

372. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

telegrams appeared to us suspicious, and, in order to assure ourselves 
that they were really sent by the Kamchatka, instead of answering 
we asked for the name of one of the officers of the Kamchatka. To 
this no answer was returned, and we continued our conversation 
with the Kamchatka in cypher. At 12.55 A. M. we suddenly saw 
in front of us ... . two long dark silhouttes, emitting quantities of 
smoke and evidently steaming at high speed. At the same time we 
saw a yellow-red rocket, such as is generally sent up by vessels in 
distress. A moment later a searchlight was thrown upon us from 
ahead .... We at once turned our searchlights on the torpedo-boats 
and opened fire on them. As soon as they saw that they were dis- 
covered, they turned aside, but came under the fire of the Alexander 
III.. Borodino, and Orel, which were following us. About the same 
time our searchlights began to fall from time to time on some small 
vessels, apparently fishing craft, whose behavior, however, was very 
suspicious. They showed no lights, there was not a man on their 
decks, and they obstinately remained under the bows of our ships, 
barring their course. They were thus in a position to launch float- 
ing mines. In spite of this, however, the Admiral, as soon as he 
caught sight of them, ordered that the searchlights on board the 
Suvaroff should be turned skywards, which was a signal to cease 
firing. 

"To remain where we were after the torpedo-boats had disap- 
peared in order to aid the steamers would have been the height of 
imprudence. We should have risked the most formidable part of 
our fleet, and as there were several steamers they were in a position 
to aid each other. As far as could be perceived, one of the enemy's 
torpedo-boats was sunk." 

The narrator argued that either the fishing vessels were accom- 
plices or the Japanese took advantage of their proximity without 

373- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

their knowledge. He inclined to the former alternative, and asked, 
"Why Hull fishing boats so far from England — almost off the Dan- 
ish coast?" 

The best commentary on this narrative was supplied by the 
Russian Government themselves, who, six weeks after the North 
Sea outrage, published the following significant admission of facts, 
which had, of course, been perfectly well known to them almost 
from the first : — 

"According to supplementary information from Admiral Rozh- 
destvensky concerning the North Sea incident of the 2-1 st of 

October, after the Kniaz Suvaroif had 
Supplementary ceased firing there suddenly appeared on 

Information tne ^ft °f the ironclad division the two 
searchlights of the cruisers Dmitri Don- 
skoi and Aurora, lighting up the division. The Dmitri Donskoi 
showed her night signals, whereupon for fear lest projectiles from 
the hindmost ships of the division should hit our own vessels, either 
directly or by ricochet, a general signal to cease fire was made from 
the ironclad Kniaz Suvaroif, and was at once carried out. The 
whole of the firing lasted less than ten minutes. Communications 
by wireless telegraph stated that five projectiles had struck the 
cruiser Aurora, some ricocheting and others hitting her direct. 
Three were 75-millimetre and two 47-millimetre shells. The chap- 
lain was seriously injured, and a petty officer was slightly wounded. 
The former subsequently succumbed at Tangier." 

This communication bears out the theory advanced in the first 
instance that the Russians in the panic had mistaken their own ships 
for hostile torpedo-boats, and had opened fire on the "two long, 
dark silhouttes emitting quantities of smoke" without stopping to 
ascertain what they belonged to. 

374- 



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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

After leaving Vigo, the Baltic Fleet divided into two squadrons 
— one proceeding down the West Coast of Africa, and the other 

through the Suez Canal. By the end of 
The Baltic Fleet December (two months and a half from 

Proceeds to Madagascar leaving Libau) they had completed barely 

one-half of their voyage; and by that 
time, not only was Vladivostock frost-bound, but Port Arthur was 
dominated by Japanese guns, and the remnants of the Pacific Fleet 
lay shell-riddled on the mud of the harbor. Before the International 
Commission of Inquiry met for business, all hope of the Baltic 
Fleet's achieving any serious purpose had been dissipated ; for while 
it was still mustering at Madagascar, the news arrived that the fall 
of Port Arthur was at last an accomplished fact. 



>v 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Progress of the Siege — Siege of Port Arthur — The Japanese Progress — The 
Japs Attack Metre Hill — The Russian Fleet between Two Fires — A Jap 
Hero — Tunnels and Hand-grenades — The Japs Capture Urlungshan — The 
Surrender of Port Arthur — "Great Sovereign! Forgive!" — The Japs Oc- 
cupy the Fortress — Discreditable Surrender — The End of the Siege of Port 
Arthur. 

N spite of such distractions as the campaign in Manchuria and 

I the career of the Baltic Fleet, Port Arthur remained the real 
focal point of the world-wide interest which the tremendous 
struggle in the Far East had aroused. The progress of the 
siege, which had been veiled in obscurity during the earlier months 
of investment, owing to the severity of the censorship, was suddenly 

and frankly revealed to the world in the 
Progress of late autumn, and from that moment the 

the Siege salient incidents of this thrilling drama 
could be followed almost from day to day. 
Winter's icy grip, which had brought to a pause the headlong train 
of the campaign in Manchuria, caused no interruption to the impla- 
cable contest for mastery between the heroic troops of General Nogi 
and the dauntless garrison commanded by General Stoessel. Not 
for an instant was there the least relaxation of effort on the part of 
the besiegers or of endurance on the part of the besieged. Rather 
was the resolution of both combatants screwed to a higher pitch by 
the knowledge that time might be the deciding factor in the conflict. 
The departure of the Baltic Fleet gave General Stoessel hopes of 

379- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ultimate relief as the reward for holding on, and threatened General 
Nogi with the stultification of all his sacrifices. With Port Arthur 
remaining in Russian hands, the recovery by her of the command 
of the sea must always be a menacing possibility for the Japanese ; 
while the fall of Port Arthur meant not only the destruction of the 
last remnant of the Russian Pacific Squadron, but the loss of the 
only practicable base for any future naval operations. The whole 
Japanese plan of campaign must rest on a more or less precarious 
foundation as long as Russia had a fleet in being in Eastern seas, 
for the vital lines of sea communication must be liable to severance. 
With the Russian flag swept from its last refuge, Japan must remain 
invincible to the mightiest armies that Russia could assemble in 
Manchuria. 

The story of the siege of Port Arthur has already been related 
in this narrative up to the moment immediately preceding the cap- 
ture of 203-Metre Hill — an event that 
Siege of marked the turning-point of the whole 

Port Arthur protracted operations, and that proved to 
be the real beginning of the end. Before 
describing in detail the action that led to this signal victory for Gen- 
eral Nogi's troops, it may be well to give a brief resume of the 
situation as it then existed. 

The investment may be said to have begun on June 26th, and 
between that date and the end of October a series of more or less 
desperate and costly assaults on the Russian outworks had 
carried the Japanese lines closer and closer to the permanent de- 
fences with which the town and the harbor of Port 
Arthur were secured from attack by land. In the great 
attacks of August 28th and September 20th, some progress 
was made to the east and north ; but no great impression was mad« 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




i*ip-iIi"" "'II - 1 11! i.illiliHilllTJiJlJflliiiOl^lilJIHl 



3** 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

m the formidable chain of forts; and even on October 30th, when 
another assault was delivered, on the Keekwan and Urlungshan 
forts, the Japanese were repulsed with the loss of 2,000 men. On 
September 20th a determined assault had been made on 203-Metre 
Hill — the highest eminence of that ridge which runs between Louisa 
Bay on the west and the great forts, Itszshan and Antszshan, domi- 
nating the western approaches of Port Arthur. The attempt was 
almost successful, but not quite, and all that remained to reward the 
Japanese for their terrible sacrifice of life was the possession of a 
height, a little to the north, known as Namaokoyama, or 180-Metre 
Hill. This is due east of 174 Metre Hill, captured in August. At 
the same time the Japanese, however, succeeded in taking possession 
of the Sueishi lunettes, which defend the valley through which the 
railway runs, and of Fort Kuropatkin, which commands the water 
supply of Port Arthur. This was the position when, on November 
26th, General Nogi ordered another assault on the fortress, with the 
especial object of capturing 203 Metre Hill. The possession of this 
height was of immense importance to the besiegers — not because it 
would threaten the great forts of Antszshan and Itszshan, but be- 
cause it would afford a complete view of every corner of the harbor, 
and enable the fire of heavy guns to be directed on the last refuge 
of the Russian fleet. More than that, the position would command 
the branch line running from Port Arthur to Liau-tie-shan, whither 
the Russians were daily conveying stores, as if in preparation for 
a last stand in this inaccessible stronghold. Although not one of 
the permanent fortifications, the defences of 203 Metre Hill were 
of the most formidable kind. On the crest, and cut out of the hill 
itself, were two redoubts on the two distinct peaks, each mounting 
heavy guns, while the slopes leading up to them were traversed with 
trenches and wire entanglements. 

382 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

After his repulse in September, General Nogi had abandoned 
all further attack on the west ; but the importance of effecting a lodg- 
ment there, together with his equal lack 
The Japanese Attack of success in the east, induced him to 
Metre Hill return to his earlier plan. But this time 
the methods of attack were changed. To 
prevent the concentration of the garrison at one point, assaults were 
delivered simultaneously on the two opposite sides of the perimeter 
of defence; and, instead of trusting to the mere weight of numbers 
to overcome resistance, the resources of the military engineer were 
drawn upon to facilitate approach to the critical points. At the last 
assault the Japanese infantry had moved forward in close formation 
over the open ground separating their forming point from the 
trenches of the enemy, and they had been swept down in hundreds 
by the concentrated fire from a dozen batteries. But early in No- 
vember the Japanese engineers set to work to construct parallels 
from the low hills at the foot of the Metre range across the interven- 
ing valley and up the southwest corner of 203 Metre Hill, dominated 
by that, one of the twin peaks which was known as 210. To con- 
struct similar approaches on the northeast side was rendered impos- 
sible by the fire of the neighboring fort Akasakayama. On Novem- 
ber 27th fresh troops were brought up for the attack, and a tremen- 
dous artillery fire was concentrated on the summit of the Metre 
ridge. Field guns, firing shrapnel, and naval guns and howitzers, 
firing enormous shells, poured their deadly hail on the forts and 
trenches ; but though they diminished they could not utterly subdue 
the fire of the intrepid defenders, and the Japanese casualties were 
very heavy as soon as their devoted infantry, emerging from the 
parallels, endeavored to climb the steep face of the hill. But after 
nearly seven hours' fighting the crest was won, and the southwestern 

383. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

peak fell into the hands of the Japanese. This success was the sig- 
nal for an immediate and determined assault upon the 203 peak, 
but it proved futile. A deadly fire from the neighboring forts made 
the retention of the southwest peak impossible for the gallant men 
who had won it. They were driven down to the reverse slope again, 
and were thus unable to assist in keeping down the fire of the garri- 
son of 203 peak. An attack on the Akasakayama works also failed, 
and thus the troops assailing the northeastern face of the hill were 
exposed to a flank fire as well as to a direct fire from above, and 
were driven back with heavy loss. But the Japanese managed to 
retain their position just below the crest of 210, and here they con- 
structed trenches which made the reoccupation of the summit by the 
enemy impossible. But the Russians still disputed possession/ and 
the opposing forces, behind sandbag defences erected. within a stone's 
throw of one another, maintained an incessant fight with bullets, 
bayonets and hand-grenades. The proximity of the combatants 
compelled the artillery on both sides to desist from taking part in 
the encounter. The Japanese guns confined themselves to shelling 
the crest of 203 peak and the reverse slope of 210, in order to prevent 
reinforcements reaching the troops that still disputed the possession 
of that eminence. At this moment occurred one of those tragic 
incidents which throw such an ironic light on the best laid schemes 
of generals and the noblest self-sacrifice of soldiers. A party of 
Japanese managed at last to establish themselves in a trench on the 
slope of Akasakayama; but no sooner had they attained this hard- 
won position than they found themselves exposed to a merciless hail 
of shrapnel, not from Russian guns, but from those of their own 
countrymen. The Japanese artillerists had not observed the lodg- 
ment that had been made in the enemy's trenches, and they persisted 
in their bombardment with such deadly effect that their luckless 

384 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

comrades were compelled to relinquish the advantage they had 
gained, and to make the best of their way back to the main body 
under a double fire. On December ist a renewed attack on both 
the 210 and 203 peaks was made, but with no success; and during 
the next few days the Japanese engineers were busy in extending 
their parallels and trenches, in order to allow the assailing troops to 
approach close to their objective before coming under fire; and while 
this work was going on the Russian positions were subjected to a 
furious and incessant bombardment. This bombardment reached 
its height on the morning of the 5th, when every preparation for the 
renewed assault had been completed. The Metre Hill, it is said, 
resembled a smoking volcano under the storm of shell that burst 
over it. This assault was to be a supreme effort, and every Japanese 
soldier who took part in it was conscious of the responsibility de- 
volving on him, as, after saluting the regimental standards, he 
moved forward to take his place in the ranks that lined the parallels 
and advanced trenches. Early in the afternoon a simultaneous rush 
was made towards both of the crests of the Metre range. The mo- 
ment was one of acute suspense, and with breathless anxiety the 
Japanese staff watched the far-off line of khaki-clad figures swarm- 
ing up the hillside and climbing over the breastwork of the Russian 
trenches. The issue was not long in doubt. Meeting with scarcely 
any resistance, the storming parties swept on until they reached the 
crest of both peaks, and found themselves at last in undisputed pos- 
session of the long-coveted position. The explanation of this 
unexpectedly easy victory was not far to seek. The bombardment 
of the previous three days had been so severe that it had been 
impossible for the defenders to live under it. The 500-lb. 
shells from the howitzers had blown the place to frag- 
ments, and except for three men taken prisoners, every soul who 

3*7- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

manned the guns and trenches had been killed or forced to fly to 
the forts in the rear. Torn and mutilated bodies, mingled with piles 
of debris, lay about in hundreds, and the scene was rendered the 
more appalling by the presence of corpses, in every stage of decom- 
position, which had been lying on the ground since the attack on 
September 20th. But the Japanese were not left long in undisturbed 
possession of the ground they had won. General Stoessel, realizing 
as fully as his enemy the importance of 203 Metre Hill, made des- 
perate efforts to recapture it. Six separate counter-assaults were 
delivered, and for hours the fiercest and most sanguinary hand-to- 
hand fighting raged. But the Japanese had stronger reinforcements 
than their adversaries, and their numbers and gallantry prevailed 
at last. After losing nearly 3,000 men, the Russian General realized 
that the case was hopeless, and left his enemy in possession of the 
stricken field. Immediately their position was assured the Japanese 
dragged up their guns and proceeded to pound the neighboring 
height Akasakayama, from which the Russians were forced to retire 
with all speed. While this substantial and, as it turned out, decisive 
victory was being won in the west, an equally determined assault 
was proceeding in the east against the great forts of Urlungshan, 
Sungshushan and East Keekwanshan. The Japanese carried their 
parallels within charging distance of the front of the forts, and then 
began to mine. Having reached a point beneath the counterscarp, 
they exploded their mines, and then rushed into the breach thus 
formed. But the Russians, though losing heavily by the explosions, 
were prepared for the emergency. They had machine guns placed 
in position to command the outer defences, and the assailants only 
gained the breach to be mown down by a hail of bullets. In this 
assault the Japanese had recourse to the traditional weapon of their 
ancient chivalry. Under the lead of Generals Nakamura and Saito, 

388. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 
trained bodies of swordsmen of the famous Samauri, or warrior- 
caste, charged into the imminent deadly breach, endeavoring to 
close in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with their stubborn foe. 
But even the traditional gallantry of Japan's knighthood was spent 
in vain in this enterprise, and the parapets of the forts remained 
inaccessible to assault. But the Japanese, whose resource in this 
protracted siege had only been equalled by their indomitable deter- 
mination, had by this time learned the secret of success against such 
tremendous fortifications as those with which Port Arthur was 
begirt. Since gallantry and the sacrifice of life could not prevail, 
patience and ingenuity must be tried, and the engineers were called 
upon to carry further still the sapping operations which had already 
breached the outer works. As in the adoption of those deadly hand- 
grenades, which played so important a part in all the battles of the 
siege, so in the construction of parallels and the tunnelling of mines 
the world saw a return to the practice and methods of the 17th cen- 
tury. To find a counterpart to these huge forts of Port Arthur, 
with their scarps and counter-scarps, their glacis and cuponnieres 
and ravelins, one has to go back to the system of the great military 
engineer Vanban, who carried the science of fortification to its high- 
est perfection. There was only one assailant to which these mighty 
works were not impregnable — and that assailant was the explosive 
power of dynamite. This resistless auxiliary the Japanese made 
speed to enlist in their service. 

Meanwhile, leaving the sappers to their insidious task on the 
east, the Japanese artillerists were swift to take advantage of the 

new position won for them on the west. 

The Russian Fleet From the summit of 203 Metre Hill, the 

between Two Fires whole town and harbor of Port Arthur 

lay revealed, and the remnant of the Rus- 

339- 



TMM JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

sian fleet which lay sheltered there, could no longer escape the 
searching attentions of the Japanese shells. The great howitzers, 
firing their 500 lb. projectiles, and the big naval guns were quickly 
moved into position, and, directed from the observation station on 
203 Metre Hill, they began to drop shot after shot on the helpless 
men-of-war. So perfect was the command, that it was possible for 
the besiegers to count every day the hits they made, and to specify 
the particular ships against which they had been recorded. One 
after another these mighty vessels succumbed to the incessant 
pounding that they received, and in a few days the four battleships 
Retvisan, Peresviet, Pobieda and Poltava, and the armored cruiser 
Bayan were reported sunk or damaged so as to be unseaworthy. 
Only the Sevastopol remained, and she temporarily escaped to the 
outer roadstead, with consequences that will be related presently. 
These ships were the real objective of the siege. Their disablement 
preserved Japan from her most serious menace; but next to that 
consummation, their capture was a point of primary importance. 
The Japanese naturally desired not only to render these powerful 
vessels useless to their adversaries, but to make them useful to 
themselves. Accordingly, having made sure that the ships were 
injured beyond the power of the Port Arthur docks to repair them, 
the besiegers were careful to inflict no further damage on them. 
By the 12th the Japanese gunners had attained their object, and the 
Sevastopol was the only seaworthy survivor of the Russian squad- 
ron ; and attention was forthwith turned to her from another direc- 
tion. Admiral Togo, whose fleet had been cruising outside Port 
Arthur to shut off the natural avenue of escape for the wretched 
Russian fleet, now directed his torpedo-boats to attack the battle- 
ship Sevastopol as she lay at her moorings in the outer roadstead. 
Her position was exactly that which the whole Pacific squadron had 

390 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

occupied on the fateful night of February 6th, when the first stroke 
of war was delivered, and Russia's best two battleships were put out 
of action. But this time the advantage of a surprise attack was out 
of the question. The commander of the Sevastopol well knew what 
to expect, and had taken his precautions accordingly. An enormous 
boom had been constructed round the hull of the warship, and an 
elaborate system of netting had been hung from it to defy the 
approach of any torpedo. On the other hand, however, the fire of 
the' shore batteries was no longer a substantial auxiliary in repelling 
torpedo attack ; and the whole organization of the port defences was 
more or less impaired, if not destroyed. On the night of the 12th of 
December, and thrice again on the night of the 13th, the intrepid 
torpedo-craft of the Japanese fleet steamed into the roadstead and 
fired their terrible engines of destruction at the ill-fated battleship. 
But the boom proved on these occasions an impenetrable defence; 
so the attack was again renewed — this time in a blinding snow- 
storm. Two flotillas were engaged. The one lost its direction 
owing to the snow and the glare of the enemy's searchlights; but 
the second flotilla reached its mark, and discharged torpedoes at the 
Sevastopol, on which at least two took effect. The boats became 
separated in the storm, and one never returned to the main fleet — 
being either sunk by a shot or swamped by the very high seas that 
were running. To add to the difficulty of the enterprise, the weather 
was bitterly cold, and the decks of the vessels were coated with ict 
from the freezing of the spray that broke over them. When morning 
broke, those who had been engaged in this desperate enterprise were 
rewarded by the sight of the Sevastopol perceptibly down at the 
stern. A few days later the vessel was so disabled that she had to 
be run aground. The spirit in which this daring attack was carried 

39i- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

out may be gathered from the following extracts from Admiral 
Togo's official dispatches : — 

"While retreating, one torpedo boat was struck several times. 
Her commander, Lieutenant Nakahara, and five other men were 
killed. The boat lost her freedom of motion, and Lieutenant Naka- 
hara's boat went to the rescue. Notwithstanding a heavy fire, she 
continued her effort to save the disabled vessel. When she had her 
in tow, the hawser was severed by the enemy's shells, and Lieuten- 
ant Nakahara's boat was also hit, and one man killed. Subsequently 
several shells hit and almost disabled Lieutenant Nakahara's boat, 
and forced him to abandon his sister ship, which was in a sinking 
condition. Lieutenant Nakahara, however, steamed back and res- 
cued the crew, who were abandoning the boat. Commander 
Kawase's boat, of the same flotilla, was struck by a shell, which 
killed one man and wounded Lieutenant Takahashi and two sailors. 
Lieutenant Shoro's boat was also hit, one man being killed and five 
wounded. The boat was temporarily disabled, but the ships com- 
manded by Lieutenants Wataehe and Mori stood by her and rescued 
all the men. The other vessels, bravely facing the enemy's fire, 
succeeded in delivering their attacks without sustaining damage. . . . 
It is a source of satisfaction that our torpedo attacks were delivered 
without the least confusion; each boat rendered material assistance 
to her comrades. The skill in manoeuvring and the bravery displayed 
by our officers and men inspire me with a deep feeling of satisfaction 
and confidence." 

Commander Yezoe's flotilla was under repairs when the attack 
was planned. He succeeded in putting one of his torpedo-boats into 

fighting condition, and steamed to the 
A Japanese Hero rendezvous, where he found that the other 

flotillas had already left. His entreaty 
392. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that he should be permitted to join in the attack was granted, and 
steaming - alone through the blinding snow, he succeeded in locating 
the Sevastopol. Approaching close enough to hear the Russians 
talking, he fired a torpedo, and then, going in still closer, he dis- 
charged another torpedo at the battleship. A shell from the Sevas- 
topol struck Commander Yezoe in the abdomen, and cut his body in 
two. His remains were saved and brought back to the fleet. 

The complete destruction or disablement of the remnant of the 
Russian fleet seems to have had a dispiriting effect, as well it might 

have, on the defenders of Port Arthur, 
Tunnels and for from this moment the vigor of their 

Hand Grenades resistance to assault perceptibly waned. 
In proportion the confidence and resolu- 
tion of the Japanese increased, and before long their unremitting 
exertions were rewarded with another substantial success. Hitherto 
their assaults on the eastern defences of Port Arthur had met with 
but little success. In spite of all their sacrifices the great perma- 
nent forts stood firm; but by the middle of December their new 
methods of sapping and mining achieved the long-desired breach 
in the iron ring, and East Keekwanshan fort was captured. A mine 
had been tunnelled right up to the parapet of the fort, and in the 
afternoon of December 18th the mine was exploded, bringing down 
an avalanche of earth and masonry that filled up the ditch in its fall, 
and made a rude but practicable staircase up the deep counter-scarp 
into the interior of the fort. The Japanese troops, lying ready in 
their trenches, sprang forward to the breach before the garrison 
could recover from the discomfiture of the explosion, and poured 
into the inner works, flinging their terrible hand-grenades at all who 
opposed their impetuous charge. But after the first surprise, the 
Russians recovered and stood their ground, and by turning machine 

393- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

guns on the assailants, held them for a time at bay. While the issue 
still hung in the balance, however, General Samejuna, at the head 
of the Japanese reserves, flung himself into the fighting line, and a 
last great charge swept the fort clear of its dogged defenders. The 
fight lasted for no less than ten hours, and immediately it was won 
the Japanese entrenched themselves to make their hold secure. The 
attack, in this case, was entrusted to two bodies of volunteers, who, 
in calm anticipation of their probable fate, had fastened to their 
clothing badges of identification, so that the corpses should be recog- 
nizable in spite of the disfiguring effects of the explosion of hand- 
grenades. One-half of these devoted men charged from their 
trenches too eagerly after the mine had been fired, with the result 
that most of them were buried beneath the falling debris. The na- 
ture and extent of the mining operations which made the capture 
of East Keekwanshan practicable may be gathered from the fact that 
two tunnels 40 feet long had been dug out, and that both tunnels ter- 
minated in four branches, in each of which a separate mine was laid. 
Four quick-firers, five field guns, and four machine guns, and a 
large quantity of rifles and ammunition, were among the spoils that 
fell to the victors in this assault. Only twenty men of the garrison 
escaped down a covered way, which they blocked behind them by 
the explosion of mines. The fort captured, though not one of the 
strongest of those on the eastern ridge, was yet of great importance 
to the besiegers, because it opened the way to the greater forts be- 
yond, and this success was speedily followed by others on the other 
side of Port Arthur. Operating between Pigeon Bay and the 
Metre range, the Japanese captured several minor heights on which 
the Russians had mounted guns. Thus they continued to advance 
steadily to the isolation of the western defences ; and the only com- 
fort which the anxious authorities in St. Petersburg could enjoy was 

394- 




JAPANESE ELEVEN-INCH MORTAR BEFORE PORT ARTHUR. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that to be derived from a dispatch of General Kuropatkin, in which 
the Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria announced that, according 
to Chinese reports, the garrison of Port Arthur had recaptured 203 
Metre Hill, "with the guns placed there by the enemy." The Chinese 
do nothing by halves, not even lying. 

Undismayed by this announcement, the Japanese continued 
their investment with increasing severity, and on December 28th, 

or four weeks after the capture of 203 

The Japanese Capture Metre Hill, they achieved the great tri- 

Urlungshan umph of wresting the mighty Urlungshan 

from its stubborn defenders. This, the 
greatest and most formidable of all the eastern forts of Port Arthur 
'had defied many previous assaults, and had cost the army of the 
Mikado many hundreds of gallant lives. But like the northern fort 
of East Keekwanshan, it succumbed to the irresistible persuasion 
of dynamite. At 10 o'clock in the morning of December 28th, the 
mine which had been laid beneath the parapet was exploded, and 
the Japanese rushed in through the breach. Under the cover of 
artillery fire from the rear, the assaulters then constructed defen- 
sive works; and having thus established themselves and received 
reinforcements, they rushed forward again and captured the heavy 
guns of the fort. From this point another charge had to be made 
before the defenders could be driven out completely; but by half- 
past seven in the evening the task was accomplished, and the whole 
fort was in the hands of the Japanese, whose losses amounted to at 
least 1,000 men. The spoils included four big guns, seven smaller 
guns, thirty quick-firers, and two machine guns. The tunnels for the 
mines which were exploded under the parapet had to be cut through 
the solid rock, and no less than two tons of dynamite was used for 
the exploding charge. The result was that half the garrison of 

39Z 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

500 men were killed on the spot. Next to the great Urlung fort, 
Sungshushan was the most formidable permanent work on the 
eastern ridge, and three days later this fell to the Japanese in much 
the same way. On the morning of the last day of the expiring year, 
dynamite mines were exploded beneath the parparet of the fort, 
and within an hour the whole fort was in the secure possession of 
the Japanese. Over 300 of the defenders were entombed in one of 
the galleries by the explosion, and of these only a half were rescued 
by the victors, the remainder perishing miserably. Other forts in the 
immediate vicinity fell almost immediately afterwards, and it be- 
came evident that the whole of the forts on the eastern ridge were 
practically doomed. Nothing now could stay the victorious, on- 
slaught of the Japanese, and the capitulation of Port Arthur, which 
but a little while before had seemed so remote and conjectural, now 
loomed in the immediate future. But even yet the world was hardly 
prepared for the end which was imminent. Up to the last, General 
Stoessel's dispatches had been confident and defiant, and it was 
thought to be quite likely that even yet he would reveal some hither- 
to unsuspected resources. 

In his somewhat rhetorical dispatches to the Czar, General 
Stoessel had repeatedly declared his determination to fight to the 

death, and although the signal successes 
The Surrender of of the Japanese during the month of De- 

Port Arthur cember had evidently reduced very largely 
the resisting power of the garrison, the 
general expectation was that the hopeless struggle would still be 
carried on, and that Stoessel and his troops would in the last resort 
retire to the fastnesses of Liau-tie-shan. While deprecating this 
desperate counsel, as involving the useless shedding of blood, the 
world would have applauded its heroism. But as it happened, other 

39S 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

counsels prevailed. On the morning of the first day of the new 
year General Nogi received a letter from General Stoessel proposing 
negotiations for capitulation, and the proposal was immediately 
accepted. But operations were not at once suspended. The Japan- 
ese attacked the same morning the Fort of Wantai on the East 
Ridge, and captured it after only slight resistance, while several of 
the forts in the vicinity were blown up by the defenders. In fur- 
ther recognition of the fact that all was lost save honor, the Russians 
then proceeded to explode mines on all the warships in the harbor, 
in order to ensure that they should be useless to the enemy into whose 
hands they were about to fall. Of the destroyer flotilla, only four 
vessels remained serviceable. These put to sea on the night of Jan- 
uary ist, and, managing to evade the blockading squadron, reached 
Chifu, where they were immediately dismantled. Then at last a 
truce was proclaimed, and for the first time for six long months the 
thunder of the great guns rolled no longer about Port Arthur. 
Immediately news of the proposed surrender was received in St. 
Petersburg, the Mikado magnanimously expressed his high appre- 
ciation of the loyalty and endurance displayed by General Stoessel 
on behalf of his country, and gave orders that all the honors of war 
should be extended to him. 

On January 2nd the capitulation agreement was signed, its 
essential terms being as follows;— 

The whole fortress, ships, arms, ammunition, military build- 
ings, materials and other Government property were to be sur- 
rendered. The Japanese reserved free action if those objects 
were considered to have been destroyed or injured after 
the signing of the agreement. Plans of forts, torpedoes, 
mines, military and naval officers' lists, &c. were to be 
delivered over. Soldiers, sailors, volunteers and other officials 

399- 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were to be taken prisoners, but, in consideration of the brave defences 
they had made, military and naval officers and civil officials attached 
were to be allowed to bear arms, keep their private property of 
immediate necessity of daily life, and also to return to Russia upon 
parole not to take, till the end of the war, arms or action opposed to 
Japan's interest. Forts Itszshan, Antszshan and the others out- 
standing were to be surrendered to the Japanese before noon, Janu- 
ary 3rd, as a guarantee. 

The whole world was filled with sympathy and admiration for 
the gallant soldiers whose valor and endurance had withstood so 

long such heavy odds and such a fearful 

"Great Sovereign ! strain. These feelings were intensified 

Forgive!" by the lurid accounts which, now that 

concealment could no longer be of service, 

were published of the awful sufferings of the garrison during the 

later stages of the siege. An officer of one of the destroyers that 

escaped to Chifu on January 1st thus described the conditions which 

had compelled surrender: — 

"Port Arthur falls of exhaustion — exhaustion not only of am- 
munition but also of men. The remnant left was doing heroes' work 
for five days and five nights, and yesterday it had reached the limit 
of human endurance. In the casemates of the forts one saw every- 
where faces black with starvation, exhaustion and nerve strain. 
You spoke to them and they did not answer, but stared dumbly in 
front of them. Lack of ammunition alone would not have prompted 
any attempt to arrange terms. Lack of ammunition has been com- 
mon in the fortress during the past months. Many forts had noth- 
ing with which to return the fire of the enemy. The Russians sat 
in the casemates firing no more than one shot to the Japanese 200. 
Then, when the assault came, they repulsed the enemy with the bayo- 

40© 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

net. But the men themselves, feeding for three months on reduced 
rations, were so worn that it is marvelous that they stood the final 
strain so long'." 

In his last dispatches, written just before the capitulation, Gen- 
eral Stoessel himself said : — 

"The position of the fortress is becoming very painful. Our 
principal enemies are scurvy, which is mowing down the men, and 
i i-inch shells, which know no obstacle and against which there is no 
protection. There only remains a few persons who have not been 
attacked by scurvy. We have taken all possible measures, but the 
disease is spreading. The passive endurance of the enemy's bom- 
bardment with n-inch shells, the impossibility of reply for want of 
ammunition, the outbreak of scurvy, and the loss of a mass of 
officers — all these causes diminish daily the defence. 

"The tale of losses of higher officers is an indication of the 
enormous losses which we have sustained. Of ten generals, two, 
Kondrachenko and Tserpitsky, have been killed ; one, Raznatovsky, 
is dead; two are wounded, myself and General Nadeine; and one 
Gorbatovsky, is suffering from contusions. The percentage of other 
superior officers who were killed or died of disease or were wounded 
several times is enormous. Many companies are commanded by 
ensigns, and on an average each company is at present composed 
of not more than sixty men." 

It was stated that of the original garrison of 35,000 men, no 
less than 11,000 had been killed, while 16,000 were sick or wounded, 
and 8,000 remained in the forts, of whom, however, 2,000 were 

unable to fight. 

These are the words in which General Stoessel announced to 
the Czar the surrender of Russia's "impregnable stronghold": — 

"Great Soverign! Forgive 1 We have done all that wm 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

humanly possible. Judge us, but be merciful. Eleven months of 
ceaseless righting have exhausted our strength. A quarter only of 
the defenders, and one-half of these invalids, occupy twenty-seven 
versts of fortifications without support and without intervals for 
even the briefest repose. The men are reduced to shadows." 

Even the Japanese were at first impressed with the same view 
of the situation, for they reported that of 25,000 combatants, 20,000 
were sick or wounded. 

The greatest good feeling prevailed between the two armies 
after the surrender had been completed. The soldiers fraternized 

freely, and the Japanese did all in their 
The Japanese Occupy power to deprive the situation of all 

the Fortress trace of humiliation for their vanquished 

enemy. General Stoessel and General 
Nogi lunched together and exchanged fraternal compliments, but the 
bearing of the two men was strongly contrasted. There was a note 
of theatricality in the Russian's conduct which was significant. Hav- 
ing mounted his favorite charger and shown its paces to the Japan- 
ese victor, he begged to be allowed to present it to him — a proposal 
which General Nogi put by with the matter-of-fact observation that 
the horse already belonged to the Japanese Army, and that he could 
not accept it as a personal gift. But still all the world rang with 
praises of the heroic Russian garrison; and the German Emperor, 
with characteristic impetuosity, constituted himself a sort of supreme 
umpire, and with a great flourish of trumpets presented to the leaders 
of the two contesting forces in this historic siege the Prussian 
Order, "Pour le Merite." The Russians marched out of Port 
Arthur on the 7th of January, and the Japanese entered on the fol- 
lowing day; and then the reports as to the condition of Port Arthur 
•uddenly underwent a remarkable change. It slowly leaked out that 

402 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the surrendered force amounted not to 20,000, most of whom were 
hors de combat from wounds or disease, but to 48,000, of whon: 
878 officers and 32,000 men were still available for the defence of 
the fortress. There were also discovered no less than 80,000 tons of 
coal and enough rice and flour to provision the garrison for two 
months. The troops, morever, descovered no sign of starvation or 
exhaustion. They were found to be in splendid condition and well 
fed. Even the ammunition was very far from being exhausted. 
For the guns in the forts 82,670 rounds remained; 30,000 kilo- 
grammes of powder; and 2,266,800 cartridges for rifles. "There 
are no signs of privation," wrote one correspondent. "The sur- 
render is inexplicable." The town itself showed few signs of 
bombardment ; and the only serious deficiency in stores was in meat 
and medical comforts. Then the sinister report came that the real 
weakness of the garrison was in the conduct of many of the regi- 
mental officers, who habitually applied for leave when attacks were 
expected, and left the command to sergeants. It was also declared 
that General Stoessel, far from having been coerced by his staff into 
surrender, had himself overridden their protests against capitula- 
tion. The real hero of the siege, it appeared from the same account, 
was not General Stoessel at all, but General Kondrachenko, who 
was killed by a shell on December 18th. After that calamity the 
spirits of the garrison never recovered. One of the Russian Ad- 
mirals who was made prisoner at Port Arthur is responsible for this 
version of the facts, and his view was summarized in the following 
words: "It is difficult for a Russian officer to talk about the end. 
It was worse than a mistake, it was a disgrace. The fortress could 
easily have held out another month. We had food and ammunition 
sufficient for that period, and if Kondrachenko had been alive we 
should have held out for months longer. In Kondrachenko the 

403 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

garrison lost not only a leader, but the one man who had the power, 
through his tremendous earnestness, to control General Stoessel." 

This view, startling and disconcerting as it is, was strongly 
confirmed by Dr. Morrison, the famous Peking correspondent of 

the London Times, to whom special facil- 
Discreditable Surrender ities for inspecting Port Arthur were af- 
forded immediately after the surrender 
had taken place. He was immensely impressed with the stupendous 
strength of the positions held by the Russians, and of the incredible 
heroism displayed in their capture, but he could find no explanation 
for the surrender. There were, he said, 25,000 able-bodied soldiers, 
and several hundred officers unscathed by wound or disease. Only 
200 officers were killed all through the siege, and of those found in 
hospital a number were undoubted malingerers. As to the failure 
of ammunition, Dr. Morrison pointed out that thousands of rounds 
were fired off aimlessly for two days before the surrender, that 
thousands more were thrown into the harbor, and that yet a large 
quantity was found in store by the Japanese. The largest of the 
naval magazines was discovered "full to the roof" with all kinds 
of ammunition. Food was plentiful and the new town was unin- 
iured by bombardment. 

"Those who have witnessed the condition of the fortress," Dr. 
Morrison summed up, "contrasting the evidence of their eyes with 
the astounding misrepresentations of General Stoessel, had their 
sympathy turned into derision, believing that no more discreditable 
surrender has been recorded in history." 

If it is difficult to disbelieve statements of this kind coming 
from several independent and well-accredited sources, it is painful 
to have to accept them. But whatever record leap to light, nothing 
ean detract from the splendid gal lantry and dogged tenacity of tha 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Russian common soldiers who fought 
The End of the Siege in a manner worthy of the greatest tra- 
of Port Arthur ditions of their race. Thanks to their qual- 

ities, such a redoubtable foe as the Jap- 
anese had been held at bay for six months, and his victory had only 
been obtained at a cost of life truly appalling. Officially the casual- 
ties of the besieging army were put at 55,000 from first to last; but 
this number was probably very largely exceeded. Heavy as was the 
price that had been paid, however, it was not too heavy for the 
advantage obtained. First there was the satisfaction to the national 
sentiment of pride in recapturing the fortress which, after having 
once been won by force of arms, had been filched away by diplomatic 
intrigue. Next there was the wresting from the enemy of the 
emblem of his dominion in the Far East, and the only base on 
which his naval power could rest. The loss of Port Arthur was to 
Russia not only the loss of a great fortress but the denial of all 
access to the sea. Finally, and most immediately important, was the 
capture in a more or less battered condition, of five battleships and 
two first-class cruisers, which might at any time have helped to turn 
the balance of naval power against Japan. An examination of the 
derelict warships revealed the fact that in spite of all the hammering 
they had received, four might possibly be repaired and added to the 
navy of Japan. The Sevastopol, the Retvisan, and the Pobieda were 
injured beyond hope; but the Peresviet, the Poltava, the Pallada and 
the Bay an were possibly recoverable. So ended one of the most 
memorable sieges in the history of the world — to prove that, in 
spite of all the inventions of scientific warfare, no defences that can 
be constructed by man are impregnable to man when he unites, like 
the Japanese soldier, the qualities of fearlessness, discipline, pat- 
riotism and high-training. 

407 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 




AFTER TWELVE MONTHS. 

The battle of the Sha-Ho, October 10 to 18, began by a Russian advance, 
but ended in a victory for Japan. The rival armies then settled down into win- 
ter quarters, and, save for an occasional skirmish, remained quiet until the end 
of January, when the Russians made a futile attempt to turn the Japanese left 
at Sandepu. The siege of Port Arthur, meantime, was carried on vigorously. 
High Hill (203 Metre Hill) was captured on November 30, East Keekwan Fort 
on December 18, and Erlungshan ten days later. On the last day of the year 
Sungshushan was taken, and on January 1 the fortress surrendered. 

The shaded portion shows the Japanese advance. 



4O8 




CHAPTER XIV. 

End of First Year — Changes of a Year — Year of Disaster for Russia — The 
Cause of the War — Japan Acts Swi ftly — The Land Campaign — Battle of 
Liao-yang — Battle of Sha-ho River — The Naval Campaign — Vladivostock 
Ships Defeated — Siege of Port Arthur — Port Arthur Surrendered — A 
Campaign Analysis — Gaining Mastery of Sea — Japan's Main Ambition — 
The Rival Armies— The Cost in Men— The Cost in Dollars— The Cost in 
Ships — International Incidents — Lessons of the War — Chronology of the 
First Year of War. 

T this point it may be well to pause long enough to review 
briefly and summarize what had been accomplished in 
a year of the most tremendous fighting the world has 
ever known. One year of the Japan-Russia War had 
gone into history. On February 5, 1904, diplomatic relations be- 
tween the two nations came suddenly to an end. On February 7, 

Japan seized Masanpho, Korea, as a mil- 
End of First Year itary base, and on February 8 and 9 

were delivered Togo's memorable blows 
to the Russian Asiatic fleet at Port Arthur. Thus the curtain went 
up on what since has proved one of the world's greatest war 
dramas. 

The record had been one of uninterrupted triumph for Japan. 
The year had yielded a score of battles, of greater or less im- 
portance. The story of each had been defeat for Russia. Judged 
by the objects for which Japan entered the struggle, her task was 
practically complete. But Russia, humbled again and again, re- 
mained obdurate. The war was not ended and could not be ended, 
declared those who seemed to speak with authority, until the tide had 

409 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

turned and Russia was mistress of the East, as she believed herself 
a year before. 

What changes had followed Japan's victories, Russia's de 
feats ? 

A year before Russia in addition to her own vast Siberian ter- 
ritory across all of Asia to the Pacific, was lessee of Port Arthur 

and the extremity of the Liaotung 
Changes of a Year promontory. Port Arthur had been 

rebuilt and fortified, and the in- 
vestments plus the value of the fleet in its harbor was fully 
$270,000,000. Dalny had been built and fortified as an 
auxiliary harbor to accommodate developing commerce. Here 
$100,000,000 had been expended. From these vantage points Rus- 
sia looked out over China and Japan and claimed dominance over 
the Orient. Her fleet stood sponsor for the claim. For the de- 
fenses of Port Arthur impregnability was claimed. It seemed that 
the Slav had completed a peaceable conquest and was immovably 
intrenched, invulnerable against war, irresistible for commercial 
gain. 

Further eastward her agents had penetrated to the northern 
boundaries of Korea. Slowly the Slav with his land-thirst was 
learning to covet the Hermit Kingdom. Commercial domination, 
political preponderance, each spreading in force and effectiveness, 
marked the first steps in this direction. 

This was a year before. A year later Japan's flag was flying 
over Port Arthur and Dalny. Russia's fleet was destroyed. 

Her armies had been driven step by step 

Year of Disaster northward 250 miles to the Sha-ho 

for Russia River. Japan was master in Korea. A 

protectorate had been firmly established, 

410 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

and Russia's dream of predominance there had probably been dis* 
sipated for all time. Japan's fleet was supreme in the Orient. 
With Russia's covetous eyes no longer looking out from Golden 
Hill toward Pekin, toward Seoul, toward Tokio, Japan had come 
into her own again. 

This was the situation as the first year of the war drew to a 
close. Japan's task, on the face of it, seemed accomplished. 

Russia's aggressive policy in Manchuria and growing prestige 
in Korea alarmed Japan. Events which in February, 1904, culmi- 
nated in war began ten years be- 
The Cause of the War fore when Port Arthur, won by 

Japan from China, was wrested away 
and returned to China by intervention of the Powers, notably 
Russia. The leasing of Port Arthur and vicinity to Russia and 
the granting of railroad concessions completed the wrong which 
rankled in the heart of Japan. Finally the Mikado's Government 
proposed to Russia a settlement by diplomacy of questions of para- 
mountcy and trade privileges in Manchuria and Korea. Japan 
proffered recognition of paramounntcy in Manchuria for Russia 
in return for preponderance by Japan in Korea. The "open door" 
in each territory was proposed with right of railroad extension 
through Korea to join the Manchurian and thence the Siberian 
roads. 

Russia refused to discuss her attitude in Manchuria and jug- 
gled with words relating to Korea. Negotiations ended when it 
became obvious that Japan's demands were not to be granted. 

War was the alternative, and Japan acted swiftly. On Feb- 
ruary 8 and 9, at Port Arthur and Che- 
Japan Acts Swiftly mulpo, the Japanese navy dealt the 

first blows. Korea was invaded by an 
411 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

army at once, and the march to the Yalu was begun. Man- 
churia was invaded after the victory at the Yalu of May I. A 
dual campaign from that moment was developed. The supreme 
object was the capture of Port Arthur. To facilitate that task 
the Russian armies in Manchuria were prevented from march- 
ing to the relief of the garrison there. Blow after blow was ad- 
ministered by the Japanese armies, culminating in the great bat- 
tles of Liaoyang and the Sha-ho River, each a disastrous defeat 
for the Russians, each to be numbered among the greatest mili- 
tary struggles of history. 

Chronologically, the battle succeeding that of the Yalu, May 
I, was fought at Pitsewo, May 5. Here the second Japanese army 

defeated the only Russian force oppos- 
The Land Campaign ing an advance on Port Arthur, until 

at Nanshan Hill and Kinchow, May 
26-27, the garrison of the fortress was encountered in its outer- 
most position. After the defeat at Nanshan Hill the Russians 
withdrew to the outer perimeter of Port Arthur, giving up Dalny 
without a struggle. At Vafangow, June 14-15, the Russian Gen- 
eral Stackelberg, who had been sent southward by General Kuro- 
patkin to raise the siege at Port Arthur, was defeated. His re- 
treat northward amounted practically to a rout. The Japanese 
victory, as succeeding events proved, completely isolated Port Ar- 
thur, its defenders and the besiegers, and the great drama of the 
siege went on without even an attempt at interference on the part 
of Russia's Manchurian army. 

The Japanese fought a brilliant campaign of a score of bat- 
tles between June 17 and July 31, which compelled the concentra- 
tion of the Russians at Liaoyang, and precipitated the great battle 
there. Motien Pass was taken by General Kukori on June 17. 

412 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

On June 30-31, after a tremendous struggle in the mountain- 
ous region southeast from Liaoyang, Yangze Pass, likewise, was 
captured. The Japanese armies, through these defiles poured in- 
to the vast basin drained by the Liao River, and at Haicheng dealt 
Kuropatkin a severe blow, which drove his lines northward to 
Liaoyang and compelled the evacuation of Niuchwang. 

Haichang was a prelude to Liaoyang. After fierce fight- 
ing, the actual struggle before this strongly fortified position be- 
gan on August 25. The Japanese army 
Battle of Liaoyang numbered 200,000 men against a probable 

165,000 Russians. Generals Oku and 
Nodzu delivered fierce and incessant frontal attacks from the south, 
while General Kuroki made a wide turning movement north to en- 
circle Kuropatkin and to cut off his retreat to Mukden. The Rus- 
sian General ultimately was compelled to meet this turning move- 
ment by withdrawing his entire army across the Taitse River, 
abandoning Liaoyang to the Japanese. General Kuroki was 
checked and the Russian army was extricated from a grave pre- 
dicament in a masterly manner after a memorable retreat and 
rearguard battle of more than fifty miles. The battle had been de- 
signed as a crushing blow to the Russians, and would have proved 
such had Kuroki's turning movement been completely successful. 
As it turned out the Japanese had won a costly but indecisive vic- 
tory. The Japanese losses are estimated at 30,000 men The 
Russian losses were about 20,000 men. 

General Kuropatkin fell back to Mukden and there rested and 
reinforced his army. On October 4, he began a forward move- 
ment against the Japanese, which re- 
Battle of Sha-ho River suited in a new disaster to his army, 

the battle of Sha-ho River, October 8- 
413 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

1 8. The result of this long, sanguinary struggle was again highly 
indecisive. The Russian advance was checked at the Yentai 
mines, and thereafter Kuropatkin was forced step by step to the 
Sha-ho River. After ten days of battle human endurance reached 
its limit. Almost face to face, the exhausted armies halted. Sub- 
sequently the opposing lines stretched out along a line, generally 
northeast-southwest, for a distance of forty-five miles. The Rus- 
sian army was reinforced to about 250,000 men, while the Japan- 
ese army numbered perhaps 300,000 men with reinforcements 
from Japan and from Port Arthur. 

The opening of the war found the effective ships of Russia's 
Asiatic fleet divided among Port Arthur, Vladivostock and Che- 
mulpo. In the battle of Chemulpo, 
The Naval Campaign February 8-9, the Variag and Korietz 

were sunk, narrowing naval interest to 
Port Arthur and Vladivostock. On August 10 was fought the 
greatest naval battle of the war. The Russian fleet off Port Ar- 
thur was defeated and dispersed, and Vice-Admiral Witoft was 
killed on the bridge of the Czarevitch. The fragment of the 
fleet which returned to Port Arthur never again assumed the ag- 
gressive, while from that date until the surrender of the fortress 
Togo's squadron had only blockade duty. 

Other naval operations there consisted of desperate dashes to 
the harbor entrance by Japan's smaller craft and the sinking of 
merchant ships in the entrance to the harbor. A sortie by Ad- 
miral Makaroff resulted only in the flight of the Russians to 
port without giving battle. The disaster to the Petropavlovsk 
happened just as the flag ship sped under the guns of Tiger's 
Tail and Golden Hill. Japanese credited the destruction of the 
ship to their mine-laying operations. 

414 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The Vladivostock squadron was defeated August 14 in the 
Sea of Japan. The cruiser Rurik was sunk. The two other ships of 

the squadron ultimately reached Vladivos- 
Vladivostock Ships tock riddled with shells. Repairs were said 

Defeated to have been completed. A renewal of the 
naval campaign would probably involve an 
attack on the sole survivors of the Russian fleet. A final naval 
engagement was the sinking of the cruiser Novik, of the Port 
Arthur Squadron, which escaped after the battle of August 10. 
Cruisers of Kamimura's squadron overtook her off Kamchatka, 
and the ship was beached there, a complete wreck after a fourteen 
hours' battle. The last act of the naval campaign was the de- 
struction of the Russian battleship Sevastopol outside the harbor 
of Port Arthur. The Sevastopol took refuge under the Tiger's 
Tail. Repeated dashes were made by Japanese torpedo boat flo- 
tillas and the ship was riddled. Her final destruction, however, 
was accomplished by the Russians, who mined the ship to pre- 
vent possibility of salvage on the fall of Port Arthur. 

Japan's greatest and only decisive achievement had been the 
taking of Port Arthur. The investment and actual opening of 

the seige began May 30, when the 
Siege of Japanese occupied Dalny, with their lines 

Port Arthur spreading westward to Louisa Bay, 
completely across the Liao-tung Penin- 
sula. Between May 30 and November 30 the Japanese were en- 
gaged in taking position from which the attack on the main de- 
fenses of the fortress could be directed. It was tedious work. 
Probably between 30,000 and 40,000 Japanese lives were sacri- 
ficed. In the meantime Fort Kuropatkin, an outer defense north 
of the Urlung Mountain group of forts, had been captured, while 

417 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

on the west the Japanese, after tremendous efforts, had stormed 
and taken 203-Metre Hill. The final assault was delivered from 
saps which had been driven through limestone, up the steep slopes 
of the hill, a task of enormous difficulty which compelled the vic- 
tors to share laurels with the engineers who at prodigious cost in 
men and labor made the assault possible. The capture of 203- 
Meter Hill gave the Japanese an observatory which looked down 
on most of Port Arthur. Their artillery, largely 11-inch howit- 
zers, no longer fired at random. Sighting was scientifically di- 
rected from the vantage point. Within a week the entire Rus- 
sian fleet had been destroyed and the whole city lay at the mercy 
of the irresistible 11 -inch shells flung over the mountains with un- 
erring aim. 

From Fort Kuropatkin on the north the miner and sapper 
honeycombed the mountain sides with zig-zag trenches, which inched 
toward the crests, slowly, indeed, but surely. Outer works, one 
after the other, fell, and higher and higher the Japanese lines crept 
upward toward the fort-crowned summits. The climax came De- 
cember 30. Vast mines under the main Urlungshan fort were 
fired. Before the smoke cleared the Japanese were flinging them- 
selves over the shattered walls. In one grand climax to all the 
bloody work of the siege they annihilated the defenders of the 
fort and finally flung their flag from its battlements. With Ur- 
lungshan on the north and 203-Metre Hill on the west in their 
hands, Port Arthur lay completely at the mercy of the besiegers. 
The entire northeastern groups of forts fell in a day. 

Then came the end. On January 2, General Stoessel surren- 
dered Port Arthur to General Nogi. The 
Port Arthur Surrendered city, forts and fleet, represented a value of 

$270,000,000. The cost of the siege to 
418 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Japan was $100,000,000. More than 30,000 men were 
killed, while 70,000 who fell, wounded, increased Japan's casual- 
ties to 100,000 men. Russia's original garrison of 38,000 men 
was cut down during the eight months by 11,500 killed and 17,- 
500 wounded. 

The terms of the surrender were deemed liberal. All officers 
were offered freedom in return for their parole. Others were 
taken to Japan as prisoners of war. 

Following the movements of the Japanese armies and fleets, 
it was easy to recognize the objects in view from the start, and 

to see that the campaign had been con- 
A Campaign Analysis ducted with singular fidelity to the plan 

adopted at the beginning. The results 
were quite as complete as could reasonably have been looked for. 
There can be no doubt that a year before Russia had no serious 
thought of war; her policy was clearly one of bluff and diplomatic 
evasion and delay. With great foresight the Japanese Govern- 
ment had seen that war was inevitable and the sooner it came the 
better would be the position of Japan in the struggle for suprem- 
acy in the East. Her preparations had been made as carefully 
and completely as those of Bismarck when he chose his time to 
force war upon Louis Napoleon ; and she moved with even greater 
celerity and skill than the Germans showed in the attack upon 
France. 

Japan's initial problem was to gain the mastery of the sea 
at the outset as an absolute essential; without it the employment 

of land forces would either be impos- 
Gaining Mastery of Sea sible or carried on at an enormous and 

perhaps fatal risk in the transporta- 
tion of troops from the Japanese islands to the main- 

419 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

land of Asia, or in supplying and reinforcing them when 
landed. The sea must be cleared of hostile warships before the 
war could really begin; and the complete success with which this 
problem was solved at surprisingly small cost rivals the brilliant 
achievements of the British navy which deprived the first Na- 
poleon of any chance of success in war outside the European 
mainland, ruined his campaign in Egypt and made hopeless an at- 
tack upon the British Islands. 

Reviewing the results of the whole campaign, we can see 
that the main objective was the capture of Port Arthur; this 

largely from the military point of view, 
Japan's Main Ambition still more largely from the standpoint 

of sentiment, national pride, prestige 
with the world at large, and from considerations of statecraft. 
Japan had taken Port Arthur once before, from China, and was 
obliged to relinquish it to Russia. Its recapture this time no 
doubt meant more to the Mikado's subjects than any other result 
of the war; whatever else might happen, that was triumph 
enough. 

To the outside world Japan could hardly present a more 
striking proof of her prowess than the reduction of this fortress 
supposed to be impregnable; while in the final settlement at the 
end of the war its possession would mean an immensely impor- 
tant diplomatic point of vantage. From the strictly military view- 
point, the loss of Port Arthur took away from Russia the only 
hope of an effective naval base to which her Baltic fleet could 
safely resort, and from which she might nope to rebuild her shat- 
tered sea power. Vladivostock being manifestly inert ective, from 
its position to the north of Japan, as well as because it is ice- 
bound during a great part of the year. Oyama's campaign is thus 

420 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

seen to have been chiefly to give General Nogi a free hand at Port 
Arthur, keeping Kuropatkin well away from the chance of reliev- 
ing the fortress. If the Russian army could be destroyed or seri- 
ously crippled, so much the better; but Oyama had evidently been 
quite content to take no risk of disaster to himself by trying to 
do too much. 

This seems to explain the apparent slowness and the ineffec- 
tiveness of his movements at times. He seems to have been satis- 
fied to keep Kuropatkin simply in a position where he could do 
nothing to raise the siege of Port Arthur. 

The avowed purpose of Japan in beginning war was simply 
to drive Russia out of the Chinese dominions, which it had agreed 
to evacuate in the autumn of 1903, but had failed to carry out 
the agreement. The first year of war ended with the accomplish- 
ment of that purpose in as forward a state as could have been 
reasonably expected. 

It is estimated that during the year Japan in all has had 
490,000 fighting men in her armies and navy. Of these 100,000 

invested, besieged and captured Port Ar- 

IThe Rival Armies thur. Three hundred thousand made up 
the armies in Manchuria. Sixty thousand 
are along lines of communication and in garrison at strategic points, 
while naval forces at bases and with the fleets numbered about 
30,000. On land Japan's united armies were commanded by Field 
Marshal Marquis Oyama, while right, centre and left — each a 
completely organized army — were commanded respectively by 
Generals Kuroki, Nodzu and Oku. 

The Port Arthur army, then dwindled from 100,000 men to 
a mere garrison and police force, was commanded by General 
Nogi. 

421 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The united Russian armies were commanded by General Kuro- 
patkin. Prominent divisional leaders were Generals Stakelberg, 
Gripenberg, Linevitch and Mistchenko, the latter commanding 
the Cossack forces. Port Arthur was defended by General Stoes- 
sel, then homeward bound on parole to undergo court-martial., 
though commanding the world's admiration for the defense of 
Port Arthur. 

At sea Admiral Togo and Vice-Admiral Kamimura had led 
the Japanese fleets to uninterrupted victory. Russia's naval com- 
manders had been Vice-Admirals Makaroff, Wirenius and Witzhd- 
oft, while Read Admiral Rozndestvensky commanded the Baltic 
squadron. 

The year's fighting had been enormously costly in men, and 
only estimates could be given. The total number of killed was 

estimated at 125,000, of whom 65,- 

The Cost in Men 000 were Japanese and 60,000 were 
Russians. The wounded numbered ap- 
proximately 265,000, and with the missing the total casualties were 
swelled to 400,000 men. Of the wounded a very large per- 
centage recovered. The Japanese losses exceeded the Russian, 
particularly at Port Arthur and in the battle of Liaoyang, the 
Russians being protected by fortifications which the Japanese at- 
tacked from the open. At the battle of the Sha-ho River the cas- 
ualties were nearly even, the armies fighting under the same con- 
ditions. The accuracy of the Japanese artillery and rifle fire is 
accountable for the fact that the Rusian loss is not far less, pro- 
portionately. 

Of casualties among her more prominent leaders, Japan has 
been remarkably free, while Russia has suffered heavily. Among 
her fallen leaders were Generals Rutkozsky, Krondrachenko, said 

422 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

to have been the real defender of Pet Arthur, and General Count 
Kellar. Admiral Makaroff went down with the Petropavlovsk 
at the entrance to the harbor of Port Arthur; Admiral Witoft 
was killed on his flagship in the naval battle of August 10. A 
loss in which all the world shared was that of the Artist Vassili 
Verestchagin, who perished with Makaroff on the Petropavlovsk, 
The actual outlay of both nations for the first year of the 
war was about $800,000,000. Russian expenses were $500,000,- 

000 and Japan's $350,000,000. To 
The Cost in Dollars Russia's losses must be added the value 

of fortifications, property of all kinds, 
stores and munitions captured by Japan at Port Arthur, Dalny, Niu- 
chwang, Haicheng and Liao-yang. These represent an outlay of ap- 
proximately $500,000,000, in which is included the value of the ships 
destroyed in the harbor of Port Arthur. Russia's provisions for 
war expenses to the end of 1905 comprehended a total expendi- 
ture of $850,000,000. Japan's total outlay for two years was es- 
timated to fall $200,000,000 below that figure. Both countries 
had negotiated foreign loans running from seven to twenty-five 
years, so that another generation would still feel the financial bur- 
den of the war then in progress. 

The war had spelled complete disaster for Russia's Asiatic 
fleet except for two patched ships of problematical effectiveness then 

at Vladivostock. Russia had lost thir- 
The Cost in Ships ty-five vessels of war of all classes. 
Of these the chief were: Battleships-— 
Petropavlovsk, destroyed by mine at Port Arthur; Retvizan, Pobi- 
eda, Poltava, and Peresviet, sunk by guns from 203-Metre Hill; 
Czarevitch, disarmed at Shanghai; Sevastopol, blown up by the 
Russians at the fall of Port Arthur. 

423 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Cruisers — Boyarin, Bayan, Pallada, Varyag, Rurik, Rossia, 
Lena, Novik, Giliak, Bogatyr, sunk, beached or destroyed; As- 
kold, Diana, Gromboi, disarmed in Chinese ports. 

Gunboats, etc. — Korietz and Yenesei and twelve others in- 
cluding torpedo boats and destroyers, destroyed. 

Japan's losses in battle were confined to torpedo-boats and tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers, sixteen of such craft having, been destroyed 
in attacks on Port Arthur. The battleship Hatsuse was sunk, as 
were also the cruisers Usiyako, Saiyen and Yoshino.. Three 
transports were sunk by ships of the Vladivostock squadron. 

On the outbreak of the war Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, 
proposed to the Powers that, jointly, they agree to guarantee the 

neutrality of China and call upon the 
International Incidents belligerents to restrict the war zone ac- 
cordingly. Counter charges of viola- 
tions had been made by Russia and Japan. It was conceded that 
China had earnestly striven to fulfil her obligations under try- 
ing circumstances. 

On July 17 Russian auxiliary cruisers stopped, searched and 
seized neutral ships in the Red Sea, precipitating a grave crisis 
in which Great Britain took a conspicuous part. On representa- 
tions of the British Foreign Office, Russia released captive ships 
and recalled the ships. The fact that they had traversed the 
Dardanelles for a warlike purpose was the basis of the protest. 

On October 22, the Russian Baltic fleet, passing through the 
North Sea en route to the Indian Ocean, fired on the Hull fishing 
fleet. Two men were killed, a number were wounded and one 
trawler was sunk. 

The firing was alleged to have resulted from an attack on 
the Russian ships by Japanese torpedo-boats. After a week, in 

424 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

which war seemed certain, the question of culpability was en- 
trusted by consent of born Governments to an international com- 
mission, to sit at Paris. A German vessel was also fired on by 
the Russian fleet, but Germany accepted Russian explanations 
and the owners were indemnified. 

Some of the practical lessons gleaned from the actual war- 
fare were these: 

(i) That torpedo-boats were craft 
Lessons of the War of immense possibilities, capable of 

even greater development. 

(2) That the destroyer had proved a failure; of the 24 vessels 
of this type in and before Port Arthur not one made a hit. 

(3) That battleships were necessary to successful naval war- 
fare. 

(4) That "team work" in armies, as exemplified in the 
Japanese movements, was a matter of primary importance. 

(5) That short range fighting was decidedly not a thing of 
the past, as had been believed. 

(6) That the use of hand grenades promised to introduce a 
new and particularly horrid form of attack and defense. 

(7) That modern fortifications were impregnable to direct 
assault, however effective a preliminary bombardment. 

(8) That the success or failure of sieges of modernly forti- 
fied positions depended upon the effectiveness of the engineer, 
miner and sapper. 

(9) That the floating mine was an instrument of destruction 
against which the most powerful ship was helpless. 

(9) Wounds inflicted by modern arms heal readily. While 
the war had demonstrated anew that one man in five was killed in 
battle, it had shown that an amazing proportion of the wpunded 

427 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were soon back on the firing line. The clean wound of the steel 

rifle projectile yielded to treatment even when vital organs were 

pierced. The medical records of the war were among its most 

notable features. 

February 5 — Japanese and Russian 

Chronology of First representatives at St. Petersburg and 

Year of War Tokio given their passports. 

February 7 — Japanese seize Masanpho. 

Korea as a troop base. 

February 8-9 — Varyag and Korietz destroyed in Chemulpo har- 
bor, and Togo attacks Port Arthur fleet. 

Februay 10 — Czar declares war. Japanese occupy Seoul. 

February 11 — Japan declares war. The United States announces 
neutrality. 

February 12 — Sinking of the Russian mineboat Yenesei; 96 lives 
lost. 

March 1 — Kamimura's squadron bombards Vladivostock. 

March 27 — Kuropatkin reaches Mukden. Japanese take Chongu. 

May 1 — Kuroki crosses the Yalu, driving back Sassulitch. 

May 4 — Japanese take Feng-hwang-cheng. 

May 5 — Japanese land at Pitsewo and begin to invest Port Ar- 
thur. 

May 11 — Russians evacuate Dalny, destroying the town. 

May 26-27 — Battles of Nanshan Hill and Kinchow; loss, 5130. 

May 30 — Japanese occupy Port Dalny. 

June 14-15 — Oku defeats Stackleberg at Vafangow; loss, 11,000. 

June 17 — Battle of Motien Pass; Russians driven back. 

June 18 — Japanese take Kinsan Heights. 

June 30-31 — Battle of Haicheng; loss, 5700. 

July 17 — Russian cruisers seize neutral vessels in the Red Sea. 

428 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

July 25 — Russian forces driven out of Niuchwang. 

July 31 — Kuroki wins the Yangze Pass; General Count Keller 

killed. 
August 10 — Sorties from Port Arthur harbor. Russian fleet dis- 
persed and in part destroyed. Vice Admiral Witoft killed. 
August 14 — Kamimura defeats Vladivostock squadron ; Rurik sunk. 
August 17 — Stoessel refuses to surrender Port Arthur. 
August 30-September 4 — Japanese, under Oyama, defeat Kuropat- 

kin at Liao-yang; 365,000 men engaged; loss, 35,000. 
September 11 — Baltic fleet sails from Cronstadt under Rozhdest- 

vensky. 
October 8-18 — Kuroki defeats Kuropatkin at Sha-ho River. Total 

casualties, 61,000, with 23,000 killed. 
October 20 — Armies go into winter quarters in and before Mukden. 
October 25 — Kuropatkin replaces Alexeieff in supreme command. 
October 22 — "The Doggerbank outrage". Two British fishermen 

killed. 
November 30 — Japanese take 203-Metre Hill by storm, losing 12,- 

000. 
December 30 — Japanese capture Urlungshan fort. 
January 2 — Stoessel surrenders Port Arthur to Nogi. 

The siege of Port Arthur takes high rank in the history of all 
war. Its capture was the most brilliant achievement of Japanese 
arms and its defense perhaps the most glorious page in Russian 
annals. Invested on May 5, 1904, the fortress held out till failing 
ammunition forced the surrender of January 2, 1905 — 242 days. 
Direct attacks opened on August 19. City, fort and fleet have been 
valued at $270,000,000 ; all were destroyed, at a cost to the besieg 
ers of $100,000,000 and more than 30,000 lives; fully 70,000 Jap- 
anese were wounded in the various attacks. 

429 




CHAPTER XV. 

After Port Arthur — Raids in Manchuria — The Battle of Sandepu — Kuropatkir. 
Asks for Reinforcements — The North Sea Inquiry. 

CTH the fall of Port Arthur, the Russo-Japanese War en- 
tered upon an entirely new phase. Although the situa- 
tion of the gigantic armiesthat faced one another across 
the Sha-ho River remained unchanged, the strategic 
problems to be solved by their instrumentality were in effect trans- 
formed. The struggle for the possession of the great naval fortress 

had operated as a vitiating factor in the 
After Port Arthur military counsels of both belligerents. 
Japan had sacrificed between 50,000 and 
100,000 of her best soldiers in bringing the six months' siege to a 
triumphant issue, and in doing so had, by dividing her armies, more- 
over, forfeited the opportunity of dealing a crushing blow at her 
adversary. The magnificent infantry that broke themselves in so 
many vain assaults upon the fortifications of Port Arthur might 
have enabled Oyama to turn the Rususian retreat at Liao-yang into 
a rout, or to drive the Russians, after the battle of the Sha-ho, back 
beyond Mukden. On the other hand, Kuropatkin had found himself 
hampered at every turn by the instructions imposed on him from 
St. Petersburg to attempt the relief of the beleaguered fortress, by 
which was symbolized so much of the pride and prestige of the 
Russian Empire. In the game of chess a strong player, to handicap 
himself against a weaker, will sometimes undertake to mate with a 

43 l 



THE TAP'AN-RUSSlA WA&. 

certain piece. If the piece is lost, the game is lost, and therefore the 
player's defence is awkwardly compromised by being divided in 
aim — between protecting his vital piece and at the same time shield- 
ing his king from checkmate. Very similar was the task imposed 
on the unhappy generalissimo of the Czar, who, while trying to 
baffle Oyama's vigorous combination, had to keep one eye always 
on Port Arthur. The fall of Port Arthur at least set free both com- 
batants from a distracting preoccupation, and to that degree it was 
a strength to either side. But its ulterior effects were much less 
evenly balanced. The capture of Port Arthur at one stroke de- 
prived Russian arms of the possibility of complete triumph, 
whatever issue future military operations might have ; and it secured 
Japan from the last lingering fear of disastrous defeat. When the 
remnant of the once powerful Pacific Squadron fell into the hands of 
the Mikado's soldiers, Russia's last hope of recovering, during the 
present war, the command of the sea expired utterly; and without 
the command of the sea, Kuropatkin's boast of "settling the terms 
of peace at Tokio" could obviously never be fulfilled. Even if invin- 
cible armies swept Oyama out of Manchuria, out of Liao-tung 
Peninsula, and out of Korea itself, there would still be the impassa- 
ble Straits of Korea to render the victory barren and to impose 
their inexorable "Thus far and no further". As a matter of fact it 
became evident to the whole world that, with Japan supreme by 
sea, the continuance of the war would only be a costly futility for 
Russia, in which she had everything to lose and nothing to gain — 
a struggle in which she was exhausting herself to no possible pur- 
pose. Her adversary had already won the odd-trick, and the only 
doubt that remained to be solved was how near she would get to 
making grand slam. But the blind arrogance and reckless folly 
which had precipitated Russia into a wanton war for which she 

432 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

was utterly unprepared, were still obdurate to conviction even by 
the logic of such disastrous events. Nothing is more stubborn than 
wounded pride, or more blind than baffled vanity. The more desper- 
ate the situation, the more perversely bent became the bureaucracy 
of Russia in prolonging it, and in refusing to recognize facts which 
impeached the competence and sagacity of the existing regime. 
Already the strain of maintaining the army in Manchuria had 
begun to have its effect at home in widespread distress and growing 
discontent among the peasant and industrial classes. The character- 
istic remedy of the governing clique was to attempt not a cure, but 
a diversion. Kuropatkin was ordered to renew his activity and to 
achieve something that could be represented as a victory at any cost. 
Since the last great battle in October — the battle of the Sha-ho, 
when Kuropatkin's ill-advised offensive had been converted into a 

perilous retreat that almost degenerated 
Raids in Manchuria into disaster — the two opposing armies 

had been practically quiescent. Before 
they. had either recovered from the exhaustion of their last tremen- 
dous struggle — before their awful losses could be repaired and their 
depleted stores and supplies could be replenished — the inexorable 
grasp of the Manchurian winter had fallen upon them and frozen 
them into mobility. While the last critical acts in the siege of Port 
Arthur were being enacted, the troops of Oyama and Kuropatkin 
were occupied only in maintaining a jealous vigilance on each other, 
and in digging themselves into their winter quarters. In a climate 
that is almost Arctic in its severity, where the temperature is regu- 
larly for weeks and months together 30 and 40 degrees below 
freezing-point, active campaigning would be impossible, even if the 
deep snow under which the face of the country is buried did not 
make transport impossible. Each army proceeded to entrench itself 

433 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

securely and to construct huts or dig out shelters in the ground in 
which the troops could find it possible to sustain life. The sufferings 
of the devoted soldiers during these months of inaction must have 
been intense, and on both sides the roll of casualties from exposure 
and frost-bite was appalling. Week after week went by without 
any incident other than trifling affairs of outposts being recorded 
in the meagre dispatches given to the world by the authorities at 
Tokio and St. Petersburg. It has always been the Russian habit, 
however, to cloak failure in essentials by proclaiming success in 
trifles ; and from General Kuropatkin came a steady trickle of trivial 
information about brushes between patrols and pickets, wherein the 
Japanese were always worsted, with the loss of a horse and rifle, 
or perhaps even of a cooking-stove. But on the very day that the 
negotiations for the surrender of Port Arthur were opened, a serious 
interruption to the long inactivity on the Sha-ho occurred. The 
Russians attempted for the first time a raid on the Japanese line 
of communications. It was an attempt that an enterprising enemy 
would have made long before ; for it is to be remembered that every 
mile of the Japanese advance from the sea rendered them increas- 
ingly dependent on the railway which they had taken from the 
Russians. Their army on the Sha-ho was, roughly speaking, more 
than one hundred miles from the nearest sea-base, Niuchwang ; and 
any interruption to that vulnerable line of communications must 
inflict much inconvenience at least on Marshal Oyama. The Rus- 
sians, of course, were exposed to the same risk, and the long line 
between Mukden and Harbin had, in fact, frequently been cut by 
the Chunchuses — roving bands of fierce native horsemen, whose 
hatred for the Muscovite invader had proved a valuable auxiliary 
to the Japanese. Their activity, in many cases organized and 
directed by Japanese officers, compelled Kuropatkin to guard jeal- 

434 




w 

> 

ca 
O 
O 

o 

a 

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THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ously every mile of the railway in his rear, and especially every 
bridge and culvert, and this necessity of maintaining large forces 
on the lines of communication seriously detracted from the effective 
strength of his armies in the field. The Russians' idea of giving 
their enemy tit-tat was at first merely tentative, however. A couple 
of officers, practically unattended, managed to make their way 
southward almost as far as Hai-cheng, which is itself some forty 
or fifty miles south of Liao-yang. There they succeeded in blowing 
up a culvert and tearing up some yards of railway line — damage 
which, though not serious in itself, was enough to encourage similar 
attempts on a larger scale. Kuropatkin knew that the bulk of the 
army which had been engaged in the siege of Port Arthur was 
about to be entrained northward, and that with these reinforce- 
ments for Oyama were to go the great siege trains which had been 
employed in battering the ships and fortifications of the captured 
fortress into submission. To cut off these reinforcements, perhaps 
to capture train-loads of men and destroy some of the enemy's most 
formidable artillery, would evidently be a great counter-stroke to 
the effect produced by the fall of Port Arthur ; and so a great Cos- 
sack raid was authorized on the Japanese lines of communication. 
The scheme was admirably conceived and organized, and it achieved 
at least the first and most important condition of success — namely, 
a complete surprise. At the outbreak of the war it was predicted 
in many quarters that what must certainly turn the scale in favor 
of the Russian arms was Russia's overwhelming superiority in 
cavalry. The experience of the Boer War had left fresh in every 
mind the incalculable value of mobility. Now Russia, in her hordes 
of Cossack horse, possessed a cavalry which had the reputation of 
being unique in the world. "Other countries have infantry, artillery 
and cavalry; but Russia is alone in possessing Cossacks," said one 

437 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

battle line until the fighting had swept over the mountains into the 
Valley of the Hun. What with artillery of a thousand guns and an 
army of 75,000 men only called upon to defend positions of vast nat- 
ural strength, there was little wonder then when the open guns of 
the battle rolled over the plains in the west, General Kuropatkin 
concentrated his attention to the centre and gave little thought to 
events on his left. As it turned out the General's confidence was 
well founded. In all the war no braver or more stubborn or more 
successful fight has been waged by any Russian force than was 
waged by the army under Lieutenant-General Linevitch and Gen- 
eral Rennenkampff on this flank- It has been said that the Jap- 
anese were fought to a standstill. That statement is literally true, 
and only the beginning of the Russian retreat made it possible for 
General Kuroki, the Japanese Commander here, to play any con- 
spicuous part in the total disaster which befell the Russian Army. 

To summarize, the position in which General Kuropatkin found 
himself at the opening of the battle was an admirable one from 

every standpoint. His defensive lines fit- 
Russians Had ted in well with the topography of the 
Advantage of Position country. Broad rivers, rugged mountains, 

apparently impregnable mountain passes, 
commanding hills on front and flanks promised to aid materially in 
his defence. His army was nearly of equal strength with that of 
the enemy, while superior natural positions compensated for the 
slight deficiency of men. In the long winter months every possible 
means of communication from one to another of the units of his 
army had been perfected, while, apparently unassailable, stretched 
a great railroad behind him offering ready link between the front 
and the Russian base of supplies for all of Manchuria. His army 
had been recuperated, was eager to fight, and would be called upon 

438 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

this war has left nothing unforeseen and nothing unprovided for— 
the Japanese had organized a plan for giving instant warning of a 
raid on the line to the troops guarding all the depots and the lines 
of communication, in case of any surprise attack such as that devised 
by Mistchenko. Great beacon fires had been laid at intervals up and 
down the country, and the kindling of one of these — the signal of 
approaching danger — was sufficient to set the whole plain from 
Niuchwang to Liao-yang ablaze with warning flame. No sooner 
had the Cossacks made their first capture than a house in the village 
which they had entered suddenly began to emit heavy columns of 
black smoke, followed by leaping tongues of fire; and so well had 
the house been filled with combustibles, that every effort to ex- 
tinguish the fire was vain. Nor had the portent been unobserved. 
As soon as darkness closed on the scene, the horizon north, south and 
east was illuminated with the answerable flash of innumerable 
beacons that passed on from one to another the tidings of the ene- 
my's approach. All hope of surprise being now at an end, the only re- 
source left was to strike swiftly before troops could be hurried down 
from the front to the threatened points on the railway. Mistchenko' s 
division separated into three bodies — one moving due south towards 
Niuchwang, another making due east for the railway above Hai- 
cheng, and the third striking southeast towards Tashichao, where 
the branch-line from Niuchwang meets the main line running north 
and south. The third body almost immediately encountered a force 
of Chunchuses, 500 strong, armed with Mausers and led by Japanese 
officers. This force, though overwhelmingly outnumbered, fought 
with desperate bravery until they were cut to pieces. At another 
village, held by 500 Japanese infantry, the raiders again encountered 
a stubborn resistance which they could not overcome ; but they swept 
on southwards, and reached Old Niuchwang at noon on January 

439 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

I ith. Here some 50 Japanese soldiers, the only garrison, shut them- 
selves in a house, and, refusing to surrender, held their own. But 
they could not prevent the enemy from wreaking destruction on the 
stores which had been accumulated in the town; and many large 
transports were burnt. Yinkow, or the port of Niuchwang, had for 
many months been the principal base of supplies for Oyama's army, 
as being the seaport nearest to the front, and to work havoc at this 
vital depot was the principal purpose of Mistchenko's raid. On Jan- 
uary 1 2th the Cossacks approached Yinkow Station, where army 
stores of enormous value had been accumulated, and opened fire 
with their six batteries. But the promptitude of the Japanese com- 
manders foiled the attack at this critical point. In spite of the cutting 
of the line north and south of Hai-cheng, reinforcements had been 
got through, and the attack on Yinkow Station was resisted by 
1,000 riflemen, well entrenched. Against their accurate and well- 
sustained fire Mistchenko's Cossacks, in spite of artillery support, 
could make no headway; and as the casualty list mounted up, the 
Russian general was obliged to draw off, lest the mobility of his 
retreat should be encumbered by too many wounded. Some damage 
was done to the station buildings, but it was trivial compared with 
that which the raiders had set out to effect ; and from that moment 
the only concern of Mistchenko was how to make good his escape 
from the forces that were rapidly concentrating upon his line of 
retreat. He had failed not only to destroy the stores of the enemy, 
but even to inflict any serious damage on the railway line. The boast 
of his detachments detailed for the latter purpose that they had torn 
up 600 yards of line north of Hai-cheng, and had blown up the 
bridge at Tashichao, were obvious exaggerations; or it would not 
have been possible for the Japanese to move down the reinforce- 
ments that secured the repulse of the attack on Yinkow Station. 

440 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

With the whole country roused against him, Mistchenko, encum- 
bered as he was with many wounded, might have found it difficult to 
break back over the 80 or 100 miles to be traversed before he could 
count himself in safety. His horses and men were both more or less 
exhausted with the five days' continuous marching and fighting ; but 
an easy and convenient resource was open to him by simply invading 
and passing through neutral Chinese territory. On the outbreak of 
the war, the belligerents, at the instigation of the Powers, led by the 
United States, had agreed to respect absolutely the neutrality of 
China, and to confine military operations to the left or eastern side of 
the great Liao River. But necessity knows no law, and Mistchenko, 
finding that his road northward from Niuchwang was blocked by a 
strong force detached by Oku for the purpose of intercepting his 
retreat, promptly wheeled westward and crossed the Liao River 
some miles below its junction with the Hun-ho. Thenceforth his 
progress was easy. It was as if a football player were to run down 
the field behind the touch-lines in order to reach the goal. The 
flagrancy of the stratagem would have called for less remark if 
Russia had not chosen this precise moment to address representations 
to the Powers complaining of acts done by the Japanese in violation 
of China's neutrality. As it was, the casualties suffered were 
heavy — at least 500 all told — and though it was ostentatiously an- 
nounced from St. Petersburg that such raids would in future be of 
frequent occurrence, this descent upon Niuchwang remained a soli 
tary as well as a barren enterprise. 

But again the inactivity of the armies was to be broken before 
the month of January had come to an end. The second Manchurian 

army, the command of which had been 
The Battle of Sandepu committed to General Gripenberg, had 

now been brought up to strength, and 
441 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

almost immediately proceeded to put itself in evidence. On the 25th, 
General Kuropatkin telegraphed to the Czar announcing briefly two 
facts — that the offensive had been begun against the enemy on the 
right (or western) flank; and that the thermometer registered 16 
degrees of frost. The full significance of this message only appeared 
a few days later, when it was revealed that an attempt in force was 
being made to turn the Japanese left. The main objective of the 
Russian attack was the village of Sandepu, the main northwest posi- 
tion of the Japanese left army. It will be remembered that after 
the battle of Yentai or the Sha-ho, which took place in October, the 
Japanese were letf holding a front of fifty miles or more along the 
south bank of the Sha-ho, a tributary to the Hun-ho, running 
roughly due east and west at a distance of ten or fifteen miles south 
of Mukden. The Russian position faced the Japanese on the other 
bank of the Sha-ho, and then inclined away northwest in the direc- 
tion of Hsinmintun, a Chinese town on the west bank of the Liao 
River, from which the Russian army had for a long time been draw- 
ing large supplies, in contempt of the neutrality of China. Sandepu 
is over thirty miles south of Mukden, and lies in the angle made by 
the Hun River with the railway. It consists of some hundred 
houses, or farmsteads, each surrounded by high walls of sun-dried 
bricks, about three feet thick. Loop-holed for musketry, these walls, 
form an admirable defence, especially as the surrounding country is 
quite open and flat. But at this season of the year, the Hun-ho, 
which is a natural defence to the flank of an army resting on Sande- 
pu, is frozen over to a thickness of several feet, and can be safely 
crossed both by men and transport. The Russians, 85,000 strong, 
and with no less than 350 guns, moved southwards down the right 
bank of the Hun-ho until they reached a point a few miles southwest 
of Sandepu, and there they crossed the frozen river and occupied two 

442 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

villages in which the Japanese had stationed outposts. On the 26di 
the Russians, who had at the same time crossed the Hun at Chang- 
tau, again advanced, encountering a steadily increasing resistance^ 
and seized after a fierce fight the village of Sha-ho-pu, a few miles 
northeast of Sandepu, and from that moment the action became gen 
eral. The capture of Sandepu was essential to any attempt to roll 
up the Japanese left, and to this object the Russian forces now set 
themselves with fierce determination. On January 27th, after giv- 
ing an account of much promiscuous fighting, General Kuropatkin 
announced to the Czar that "in the evening, after a desperate fight, 
our troops having, with the help of the sappers, surmounted all arti- 
ficial obstacles entered the village of Sandepu, which is large and 
strongly entrenched." Unfortunately, however, for the triumph oi 
the Russian arms, this announcement proved to be premature — or 
rather to be an incomplete version of the actual fact. The Russian 
troops entered Sandepu only to be d r 'v*n b-ack after a J ^esj>erate 
struggle; and the indom'^Me Japanese infantrymen wno manned 
the loop-holed waW* si the hamlet were never dislodged from their 
position. This s-txcessful stand was the turning point of the battle. It 
checked the flank movement of the Russians and gave Oku time to 
bring up his reinforcements and deliver his counter-stroke. The 
Russian attack had been from the west and northwest, the object 
being to envelop the Japanese extreme left. The movement was met 
by an extension of the Japanese left, which in turn threatened to out- 
flank the outflankers. On the southwest of Sandepu the Russians 
were driven back along the line of the Hun-ho, and soon the battle 
centred about the village of Heikautai, a few miles southwest of 
Sandepu. That this was no mere affair of outposts may be gathered 
from the fact that the Russian force was made up of two divisions 
of the Eighth Army Corps, two brigades of Russo-European Rifles, 

443 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

one division of the Tenth Army Corps, part of a division of reserve 
infantry, and part of the First Siberian Army Corps, and a large 
force of Cossacks under Mistchenko. On the 27th and 28th, the 
fighting became desperately fierce and after the Japanese had suc- 
ceeded in carrying Heikautai and the surrounding positions, they 
were exposed to repeated night attacks before the Russians at last 
made up their minds to accept defeat. From Russian sources came 
the usually inconsistent story — a story in which a long series of 
unbroken successes culminated inexplicably in an admission of fail- 
ure and retreat. It now appeared that far from capturing Sandepu, 
the Russian column that attacked that place lost twenty-four officers 
and 1,600 men killed and wounded by coming unexpecedly upon "a 
triple row of artificial obstacles" on the ground swept by artillery and 
machine-gun fire which the Russian gunners could not subdue. This 
intelligence came as a severe disappointment to the friends of Rus- 
sia, who had begun to believe that the tide of war had at last begun 
to turn, and that Russian arms were about to secure their first vic- 
tory. Eager strategists in St. Petersburg pointed out that Sandepu 
was only twenty or thirty miles from Liao-yang, and that its reten- 
tion would be such a serious menace to the Japanese line of retreat 
that the evacuation of the whole position on the Sha-ho would be a 
necessity. Alas! while these fascinating speculations were being 
indulged in, the Russian Army of the right was already in full re- 
treat, and was indeed suffering appalling losses in the effort to 
extricate itself from the toils of the enemy. The fighting round 
Heikautai lasted five days, and the issue almost to the last hung in 
doubt. The capture of Heikautai had become necessary to the 
security of the Japanese position, but repeated attacks on it had been 
repulsed. The spirit in which the emergency was met is revealed in 
the laconic words of Marshal Oyama's dispatch. "Our object had 

444 




ON THE SLOPES OF OJIKEISHAN, BEFORE PORT ARTHUR. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

not been attained, so I encouraged all the columns to make night 
attacks. All the columns of the attacking parties expected annihila- 
tion. We attempted several attack movements, but suffered heavily 
from the enemy's artillery, and especially from the machine-guns, 
but all the columns continued the attack with all their might. The 
enemy was unable to withstand our vigorous attack, and began to 
retreat at half past five in the morning. Our forces charging into 
Heikautai, occupied the place firmly and entirely by half past nine in 
the morning." The net result of the battle was to give the Japanese 
secure possession of a line east and west of Hun-ho and south of 
Mukden, and to inflict on the Russians casualties which certainly 
exceeded 10,000, and probably reached 15,000. In war especially 
"the attempt and not the deed" confounds. It is not the first step 
but the last that costs — not the attack, but the retreat after repulse. 
No sooner had the failure of this big attempt on the Japanese left 
been fully confirmed than it became known that the movement 
had been directed by General Gripenberg, the commander of the 
Second Manchurian Army. When, after the battle of Liao-yang, 
the Czar sanctioned the formation of this Second Army and com- 
mitted the command of it to General Gripenberg, there was a great 
flourish of journalistic trumpets in the Russian and French press. 
At last Kuropatkin would have not only an "Army worthy of 
the might and dignity of Russia," but would have a lieutenant 
worthy of himself to share the tremendous strain of directing nearly 
half a million of men. The two Generals exchanged cordial mes- 
sages, and then Gripenberg set out for Harbin to superintend the 
gradual organization of his Second Army. By the end of the year 
its units had been completed, and then the impatience of General 
Gripenberg to assert himself appears to have become uncontrollable. 
He conceived the movement against the Japanese left — a movement 

447 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that might easily have achieved substantial results if the Japanese 
had not been so well prepared for it — and his direct responsibility 
for it was made patent to the world by the angry and undignified 
recriminations between him and Kuropatkin that followed the re- 
pulse. General Gripenberg immediately asked to be relieved of his 
command, ostensibly on the ground of ill health, but really as he al- 
lowed to be perfectly manifest, in dudgeon at the treatment which he 
alleged had been meted out to him by his supeiirv officer. He claimed 
that his flanking movement had in fact succeecf*^, and that he only 
needed reinforcements to maintain the position h« nad won. He com- 
plained loudly that he applied very urgently for ti.ese reinforcements, 
but that they were withheld, and that he was not even supported in 
his retreat by a diversion in other parts of the field. A great victory 
had been within his grasp, General Gripenberg represented, and it 
kad been snatched from him simply by the perverse inactivity of 
General Kuropatkin. So strained were the relations at headquarters 
that General Gripenberg's request to be relieved of his command 
was immediately complied with, and the General set off post-haste 
back to St. Petersburg to lay his complaints personally before the 
Czar. The quarrel was conducted practically in public by the advo- 
cates of the two rivals ; and General Kuropatkin's friends were not 
slow to put forward his side of the case. According to this account, 
General Gripenberg's costly defeat was caused directly by his delib- 
erate disobedience to instructions. He had been permitted to embark 
on his movement against the Japanese left on the strict understand- 
ing that it was to be only in the nature of a reconnaissance in force, 
and that a general action was not to be forced. While nominally 
accecpting these limitations, General Gripenberg had in his heart 
rebelled against them, and had not hesitated to commit his army to a 
pitched battle beyond the reach of support, and in conditions of 

448 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

weather which made the movement of troops most undesirable. 
Finally it was contended that General Kuropatkin had done all he 
could to relieve the pressure on General Gripenberg by bombarding 
the Japanese right and centre, and threatening an advance in those 
directions. The wrangle could not but be ignominious, but at lea.it 
more dignity pertained to the disputant who remained at his post 
and strove to repair the blunder that had been committed than to 
the disputant that threw down his responsibilities and went home 
in a pet. This view of the case seems to have prevailed with the 
Czar himself, whose reception of General Gripenberg was not cor- 
dial. According to the reports *bat came from well-informed French 
sources, the Czar took General Kuropatkin's part very decidedly, and 
•Administered to General Gripenberg a severe rebuke for his insub- 
ordination. Whatever the character of the frequent audiences 
which the disappointed General had of his Sovereign, the fact re- 
mained that Kuropatkin was maintained in the supreme command 
of the armies in Manchuria, and that while General Gripenberg 
lingered in St. Petersburg, if not in disgrace, at least in inactivity, 
General Kaulbars was definitely appointed to the command of the 
Second Manchurian Army. 

If this five days' desperate fighting scarcely affected the position 
of the two armies, it inflicted on the Russian armies the discourage- 
ment of another defeat at the hands of a 
Kuropatkin Asks numerically inferior force, and the moral 

for Reinforcements effect of adding to this unbroken sertes 
of reverses is not easily computed. With 
troops less dogged and devoted than those of the Czar, demoraliza- 
tion would have set in long before. The anxieties of Kuropatkin 
were now aggravated, too, by circumstances which no generalship 
on his part could alleviate and remove. All through the autumn 

449 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

reinforcements had been pouring along the Trans-Siberian Rail- 
way, the carrying capacity of which had been stretched so wonder- 
fully by Prince Khilkoff. But even the resources of engineering 
genius have their limits. They cannot contrive a pint pot in such a 
way that it will hold a quart; and the number of trains that can be 
run over a single line is fixed inexorably by circumstance. Kuropat- 
kin's urgent and incessant demands for more and more reinforce- 
ments had been met in large measure, but only at the expense of the 
other traffic, including the carriage of military stores. The enor- 
mous supplies required to provision and maintain at war efficiency 
armies numbering half a million of men may be imagined, and for 
these supplies Kuropatkin had become increasingly dependent on the 
railway. The more reinforcements he received the more mouths he 
had to feed ; and the longer the campaign endured the less reliance 
was to be placed on what a devastated and exhausted countryside 
could provide. During the earlier months of the war, some relief to 
the strain on the railway could be found by drawing supplies from 
Vladivostock, which in turn could be fed from over-seas; but no 
sooner had the destruction of the Port Arthur fleet been completed, 
than the inexorable Japanese established a strict blockade of 
Vladivostock, and cut off this last resource. While the 
wretched troops amid all the rigors of the Manchurian 
winter were in need of such ordinary necessities as proper 
clothing fuel, and even food, vast accumulations of stores, 
more than sufficient to supply all their needs, were lying 
rotting on the sidings of the Siberian Railway, immovable 
because of the congestion of traffic on the already overburdened 
line. To add to the anxiety of the situation came the grave dislo- 
cation caused by the riots and strikes which broke out in all the 
great industrial and distributive centres of Russia after the fall of 

450 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Port Arthur, and which revealed an internal crisis even more men- 
acing than the military crisis which confronted the army in Man- 
churia. For weeks together, just at the moment that prompt and 
vigorous action was demanded, the whole administrative system 
of Russia was paralyzed, and the energies of its directors were 
absorbed in staving off domestic revolution instead of in organizing 
the measures for conducting a foreign war. On the other hand, the 
Japanese generals had not only the strategic advantage of being 
within easy distance of several sea-bases, but they also were able 
to rely on a system of supply which is perhaps the most perfect that 
has ever been seen in war. The minute prevision with which the 
necessities of a campaign on such an enormous scale had been pro- 
vided for is well exemplified by the organization of the Army Medi- 
cal Service. In spite of all the hardships and exhaustion to which 
General Oku's army had been exposed, for instance, the Chief 
Surgeon was able to report that from the date of its landing on the 
Liao-tung Peninsula on May 6th to the end of January there had 
only occurred 40 deaths in its ranks from disease. The cases of 
typhoid numbered but 193, and the cases of dysentery no more than 
342. The marvelous character of this record may be realized by 
remembering how appalling were the ravages of disease during the 
South African campaign. Typhoid and dysentery in that war car- 
ried off infinitely more victims than shell or bullet; and if some- 
times in their assaults on fortified positions the Japanese have 
seemed shockingly reckless of human life, it is to be remembered 
that in another and not less important direction they have shown 
themselves infinitely more careful of it. Such were the conditions 
as the long winter months drew to their close, and as silently the 
Japanese armies girded themselves for the great stroke which was 
in a few weeks' time to eclipse both in magnitude and consequence 

451 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

everything that had hitherto marked the progress of this epoch- 
making campaign. 

Meanwhile the unhappy Baltic Fleet protracted its embarrass- 
ing sojourn in Madagascar waters. Having got so far on the road 

its Admiral. The nearer Rozhdestvensky 
The North Sea Inquiry came heroic resolution on the part of 

to its appointed revenge, discretion over- 
came to his task of wresting the command of the sea from Admiral 
logo, the less he appeared to like it ; and finally the Armada which 
had begun its voyage with such a sensational progress through the 
North Sea, decided to continue to avail itself of French hospitality 
until it should have received the reinforcements of the third Baltic 
Squadron. While the Russian fleet was thus ingloriously hung up 
at Diego Suarez, the International Commission appointed to in- 
quire into the circumstances of its exploits in the North Sea met at 
Paris, and having heard exhaustively the evidence in support of the 
British and Russian cases, at length issued its report. In spite 
of the preliminary rumors that the conduct of the Russian Admiral 
had been vindicated, the event proved that the justice of the British 
case had been as completely sustained as it could be by any judg- 
ment which was more diplomatic than judicial in character. The 
Admirals of the Commission, with the exception of their Russian 
colleague, found that there were no hostile torpedo boats present on 
the Dogger Bank; that the British trawlers did nothing to provoke 
attack; and that the firing to which they were subjected was un- 
justifiable. To coat this rather unpleasant pill, the Commissioners 
amiably added, in contradiction of the direct implication of their 
own findings, that their report threw no discredit either on the mili- 
tary quality or the humane sentiments of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. 



452 




CHAPTER XVI. 

Rigors of Manchurian Winters — In Winter Quarters — Ear Muffs Won by Yan- 
kee Thrift — Hot Baths and Hot Meals — Disease Conquered in Camp — 
Wonderful Sanitary Record — Civil War Comparisons — The Japanese Sci- 
entific — No Detail Overlooked — Wounded Rarely Die. 

FTER the Battle of the Sha-ho River the two armies went 
into winter quarters prepared to face a Manchurian sea- 
son with thermometer readings of 35 degrees below 
zero not uncommon and with a snowfall of enormous pro- 
portions to contend with. The Russians were better prepared to 
meet the situation than the Japanese since a large proportion of the 

Russian army hailed from Siberia or the 

Rigors of northern provinces of Asiatic and Euro- 

Manc.hurian Winters pean Russia and hence were inured to 

rigorous winters. Some thousands of 
the Japanese had come from the northern provinces of Japan and 
they, too, were well experienced in cold. But a large majority of the 
Japanese troops were from the southern islands of Japan, where 
rigorous winters are unknown. The Japanese army administration 
was thus confronted by a very serious problem. The story of the 
manner in which the problem was met and solved is among the 
most interesting of the chapters of the history of the war. 

When the positions of the various units of the army had been 
definitely fixed the whole army began, as a preliminary step, to bur- 

453 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

row into the earth. Before mid-Noven> 
In Winter Quarters ber the Japanese camp was no longer 

stretched over the hills south of the Sha- 
ho but had vanished from view under the hills. Along the whole 
front that stretched for nearly sixty miles underground galleries 
were excavated barely high enough even for a Japanese to stand 
erect. These were open at one end and at the entrance to each a 
charcoal burning stove was placed. A fire was kept burning contin- 
ually in each of these thousands of stoves. The stove pipe, instead 
of jutting a foot or two into the air was extended along the roof of 
the dug-out to its end, then passed upward through the eight feet of 
soil that formed the roof. Fronting the open end long trenches, 
were dug and over them heavy protective bomb proofs of timber 
and earth were erected as a protection against the shells which with 
greater or less activity were hurled into the Japanese lines by the 
Russians throughout the winter. These underground homes solved 
much of the question of withstanding cold for in them the men were 

reasonably comfortable. Special cloth- 
Ear Muffs Won by ing, too, was provided, and in connec- 
Yankee Thrift ^ on w * tn ^ ur ear-muffs with which each 
man was provided an interesting story 
is told, one typical of the Yankee-like thrift of the Japanese. Five 
years before, the plague had been introduced into Japan from the 
Malay Peninsula. A vigorous fight was made and the disease was 
finally conquered but in the course of the fight the sanitary officials 
became convinced that the germs of the disease were being spread by 
rats. A prize was put upon the heads of the dangerous rodents. 
Millions were killed by the boys of Japan who delivered the rats, 
collected the bounty and gave no thought to what became of the 
carcasses. Nor did anyone, but when the army faced a Manchurian 

454 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 
winter those millions of rat furs reappeared as warm ear protec- 
tors while a smile went around the world. So completely, in a 
thousand ingenious ways did the army officials conquer the cold and 
safeguard the army that throughout the winter it was even possible 
for every man in the army to have two hot baths a week. The bath 
in Japan is almost a religious rite, but the trooper bade good-bye to 
it, as he supposed, when he started for the front. Not so. Circular 
metal tubes were provided. These were sunk in the ground level 
with the surface. Ten feet away at the bottom of a trench a stove 
was placed heating a coil of pipes which went inside, around and 
around the sides of the tube. The tube served as the tub. It was 
filled with water and in a few minutes the hot bath was ready. In 
protected spots all along the lines Nippon could be seen hastily strip- 
ping beside the steaming hole in the ground. Then he would vanish 
until only his head was visible. As well as he could he scrubbed him- 
self. Comrades raised him swiftly from the tube and swathed him 
in heavy blankets, wraped in which he vanished over the edge of the 
trench and so into his underground home, clean and happy. 

Hot meals were cooked at the doors of the dugouts for the fifty 
occupants on improved portable camp kitchens. Telephones con- 
nected every batallion headquarters with 
Hot Baths and Hot Meals its regimental headquarters and so 

throughout the army, every unit with the 
next largest and all with the general headquarters at Liao-yang. 
Great fur overcoats, pure wool underclothing, heavy uniforms well 
adapted for comfort and warmth ; in every detail the Japanese were 
splendidly equipped for the ordeal of cold. Thousands of slight 
cases of frost-bite reached the hospitals after occasional sorties de- 
manded by fitful attacks of Russian scouting parties, but there was 
none of this in the normal life of the vast army of nearly 300,000 
men. 

4SZ 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The Japanese medical department during - the winter made a 
wonderful fight against disease, that bane of armies, and continued 
under these un record of the actual campaign. 

Until now disease has always been much more destructive than 
shot and shell. During the brief conflict with Spain 268 Americans 

died of bullets and wounds, while mortal- 
Wonderful Sanitary Record ity from disease reached the appalling 

number of 3,862, or about fourteen to 
one. In the Boer War 7,792 English were killed in action or died 
of wounds, while 13,250 fell victims to disease. Of the Turkish 
army operating in Thessaly seven years ago, 1,000 men were lost 
in battle, while 19,000 died at the front of disease. Twenty-two 
thousand others were invalided home, and of these 8,000 subse- 
quently died. This was a ratio of twenty-seven men killed by dis- 
ease to one by bullets. Even more frightful was the experience of 
the French expedition to Madagascar in 1894. Only 29 were killed 
in action, while over 7,000 perished from disease. Compare these 
frightful experiences with the record of the Japanese. During the 
last nine months of 1904, throughout a difficult campaign, in a coun- 
try noted for lack of sanitation, only forty deaths from disease occur- 
red in the immense army in Manchuria commanded by General 
Oku. It is a wonderful lesson in sanitation Japan has taught to the 
world. 

While disease scored but forty victims in nine months among 
the soldiers of General Oku, no fewer than 5,127 officers' and men 
were killed and 21,080 wounded. This shows that the period was 
one of great activity, of hard campaigning and severe fighting — 
which makes the low disease death rate all the more astonishing. 
Soldiers in the field cannot be looked after as carefully as those in 

458 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

camp ; hygiene and sanitary surroundings are only temporary, and, 
therefore, more crude; dietetic regulations are more difficult to en- 
force. Of course, there were many cases of disease in Oku's 
army — 24,642 in all — but the majority were of bronchial troubles, 
resulting from climatic conditions. Of beri beri, a malady peculiarly 
Oriental, 5,070 cases were reported. But the progressive Japanese 
seem to have gotten the mastery even of this, once notable, because 
of its mortality. It is, however, in battling with those most dreaded 
scourges of an army — typhoid fever and dysentery — that the Japan- 
ese have scored their greatest triumphs. Of typhoid fever they have 
had only 193 cases, and of dysentery only 342 cases. 

During the first year of the American Civil War typhoid fever 
attacked 8 per cent, of the Federal troops, killing 35 per cent, of the 

white and 55 per cent, of the negro 
Civil War Comparisons soldiers who contracted it. But here is 

an army in the wilds of Manchuria 
larger than that of McClellan before Richmond, which had only 
forty deaths in nine months. The great American conflict was one 
of the bloodiest in history. In the Federal ranks, 1 10,070 men were 
killed in battle or died of wounds, while 249,458 were sent to their 
graves of disease. Why is it the little brown islanders of the East 
were so successful in fighting the unseen foe? 

"Every death from preventable disease is an insult to the in- 
telligence of the age," says Major Louis L. Seaman, late surgeon 
in the United States Volunteers, who returned from Japan during 
the war. 

"When it occurs in an army, where the units are compelled 
to submit to discipline, it becomes a governmental crime." 

"Disease bacteria," asserts another writer, in discussing the 
medical aspects of the Boer War, "are even more dangerous than 

4S9 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Mauser bullets shot off with smokeless powder. Both hit without 
giving a sign to the eye whence they come, and of the two, the 
Mausers hit less often and hit less hard." It was through prompt 
recognition of these propositions that the Japanese held down their 
death rate from disease. Major Seaman relates that, in conversa- 
tion with a Japanese officer early in the conflict, the subject of Rus- 
sia's overwhelming numbers was mentioned. 

"Yes," admittted the officer, "we are prepared for that. Rus- 
sia may be able to place 2,000,000 men in the field. We can fur- 
nish 500,000. You know that in war four men die of disease for 
every one who falls from bullets. We propose to eliminate disease 
as a factor. Every man who dies in our army must fall on the 
field of battle. In this way we shall neutralize the superiority of 
Russian numbers and stand on a comparatively equal footing-" 

When Japan started out to make war she did so upon a scientific 
basis. For many months in advance the store rooms of Tokio 

were crowded with surgical materials, 
The Japanese Scientific cots, tents, bedding, ambulances and all 

kinds of hospital supplies, ready for any 
emergency, and under the personal example of the Empress the 
women of the land made bandages for those who might be 
wounded. Japan realized also that the keystone to the health of 
the army lay in the character of the ration provided for the indi- 
vidual soldier. So she set about to master that problem. First of 
all, the ration evolved was suited to the climatic conditions of the 
campaign. It consisted largely of rice, compressed fish, soy, army 
biscuits, a few salted plums, tea — all of which necessitate the drink- 
ing of large quantities of boiled water — a few ounces of meat and 
some juicy, succulent pickles. 

N© more thorough or efficient medical preparation could be 

460 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

imagined that Japan made for her great conflict. Not only was 
the ablest of medical counsel obtained, but the members of that 
staff of the army were given rank and full authority to enforc 
their decrees. The Japanese had a medical director who ranked 
as a lieutenant-general. Six medical officers ranked as major-gen- 
eral. With every 20,000 men in line a surgeon ranking as 
brigadier-general, and all have power to enforce their orders. Every 
body of moving soldiers, however small, was accompanied by one or 
more medical officers, who were almost omnipresent, and were 
always watchful. Field and line officers and men were obliged to 
obey them without question. The solution of the greater problem 
engaged the attention of the medical corps. This was in preserv- 
ing the health and fighting value of the army. Nothing seemed 
too small to escape the vigilance of the medical officers, or too 
tedious to weary his patience. He was with the first line of scouts, 
with his microscope and chemicals, testing and labelling wells so 
that the army to follow should not drink water that was contami- 
nated. When the scouts reached a town, he immediately insti- 
tuted a thorough examination of its sanitary condition. If con- 
tagious or infectious disease was found, he quarantined and 
placed a guard around the dangerous district. Notices were posted, 
so that the approaching column was warned and no soldiers were 
located where danger existed. Violations of such a notice was as 
great an offense as disobedience to a line officer on a battlefield. 
An officer with only the rank of a lieutenant might post the notice, 
and yet General Oku himself dared not disregard it. No foraging 
party ever set out to gather supplies unless accompanied by a medical 
officer- 
He sampled the various kinds of food, fruit and vegetables 
told by the natives along the line of march long before the arrival 

a6i 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the army. If the food was tainted, 
No Detail Overlooked or the fruit over ripe, or the water ought 

to be boiled, notice was posted to that ef- 
fect In camp, too, the medical officer was always busy, lecturing 
the men on sanitation and the hundred and one details of personal 
hygiene — how to cook, to eat, and when not to drink ; to bathe, and 
even to directions as to paring and cleansing the finger nails to pre- 
vent danger from bacteria. More than any other preventive, the boil- 
ing of all drinking water was insisted upon. Every Japanese soldier 
carried a small copper camp kettle with a double bottom. By the use 
of it he was enabled to boil water even in a gale. Charcoal was 
burned on the inside, the water being heated between two layers of 
copper. Great kettles for similar use in camps were also provided. 
Large bathing basins, or kettles, formed an important part of 
the equipment of each company. They were placed upon the 
ground and are ready for use in a few minutes after camp was 
made. In this way personal cleanliness was maintained. A troop 
might encamp beside a small stream, the water of which was 
needed for several different purposes- It was not scooped up in- 
discriminately, but the flow was divided into separate channels — 
one for drinking or cooking, another for bathing, a third for 
laundry service, and so on. 

Up to July i, 1106 wounded were taken to Tokio, and of 
that number not a single man died. These men were shot in al- 
most every possible way; six had bullets 
Wounded Rarely Died through the brain, nine had bullets 

through their chests, and six had bullets 
through the abdomen — and yet all got well. The medical service 
of the United States in its war with Spain was not any more 
discreditable when compared with that of Japan than the medical 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR 

service of the English Army during its war with the Boers. The 
report of the English Hospital Commission, which inquired into 
the medical end of that conflict, shows that there was "an immense 
amount of needless suffering and misery." There is no attempt 
"to hide incompetency and unpreparedness under the platitude that 
'was is war.' " Just as in the Spanish-American War, a large 
number of civil surgeons were employed for army work in South 
Africa. They had no knowledge of military duties nor of military 
methods and discipline. Consequently, they were ineffective, ex- 
cept when accompanied and, to some extent, controlled by officers 
of the service. They were absolutely without authority. Perhaps 
all these lessons were observed and absorbed by the keen-eyed Jap- 
anese. In any event, they have given the world the most pro- 
nounced examples of scientific warfare that the hoary oid globe has 
ever seen- 



4$t 







JAPANESE TROOPS CAUGHT IN BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENT. 




CHAPTER XVII. 

The Greatest Battle of History — Rout and Disaster for Russia — The Ancient 
City of Mukden — The Tombs of the Manchus — A Flourishing Mart — Be- 
twixt Winter and Spring— The Line of Battle— Lone Tree Hill— The 
Russian Position — The Japanese Task — Mukden the Real Battleground — 
Russian Flanks Strongly Protected — Well Protected on the East — Battled 
for Mountain Passes — Russians Had Advantage of Position — The Outlook 
for Oyama — Busy Preparations During Winter — Oyama's Plan of Battle — 
Nogi to Strike Culminating Blow — "Out of the Way for Us" — Master 
Stroke of the Battle. 

OT only the climax of the Japan-Russian War, but a climax 
to all wars was reached in the Battle of Mukden, fought 
February 19-March 13, 1905. This memorable struggle, 
resulting in a sweeping victory for Japan, was practically 
a campaign in itself. The results, a cataclasm which overwhelmed 
the Russian army, were not merely what had been expected for this 
one battle, but comprehended all that the Japanese had hoped for a 
year's campaign. It was more than rout. It remains a grisly monu- 
ment to the potentiality of war to write horror on the pages of world 
history. It was more than defeat, retreat, disaster, it was practical 
annihilation for Russias power of resistance in the Far East. Her 
vaunted military power was trailed in the dust, was obliterated. 
When the smoke ©f the contest had rolled away Oyama stood mas- 
ter of Manchuria with only a demoralized horde of the enemy 
"without form and void" fleeing in panic with no thought but to 
shake off a foe to whom no resistance could be offered. 

No nation in the world's history has faced a greater blow to 

467 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

its military prestige, and from the standpoint of the Japanese — nd 

military force has achieved for its nation 
The Greatest a more sweeping or more complete vic- 

Battle of History tory. The Battle of Mukden is destined 
to occupy a unique place in the story 
of the nations for these and other reasons. In point of the terri- 
tory involved; in point of the number of men engaged; in point 
of the duration of the struggle; in point of the lessons, the au- 
thentic history of the world has no peer for its record. 

General Kuropatkin, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, had at 
the beginning of the struggle an army of 300,000 infantry; 26,700 
cavalry, and 1,368 guns. This is the estimate of the Japanese in- 
telligence bureau. On the other hand the German Military Review 
credited Kuropatkin with a total of 370,790 men of whom 36,790 
were cavalry. The Germans estimate that the Russians had a total 
of 1,598 field guns, and 72 heavy guns. Somewhere between these 
two estimates the actual figures, carefully concealed by the Rus- 
sians, may be taken to lie. Marshal Oyama had 500,000 men of 
all arms and artillery equal to that of the Russians with a pre- 
ponderating number of big guns, a great many having been moved 
from Port Arthur to the nothern battleground. In the two armies 
therefore, there were in round numbers a total of about 800,000 
men. 

The battle developed into a struggle for possession of Mukden, 
the ancient Manchu capital, near which lie the Imperial Tombs 

of the founders of the Manchu dynasty, 
Rout and Disaster a spot sacred throughout the length and 

for Russia breadth of China. The battle lines 

around this city stretched for one hun- 
dred miles. The fighting began on February 19. On March 7th 

468 



THE JAFAN-WSSIA WAR, 





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469 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

the Russians already seeing disaster in the advance made by the 
Japanese under General Nogi, toward cutting off the line of re- 
treat north of Mukden, fell back from the centre along the Sha-ho 
River and on March 10 evacuated Mukden, beginning a retreat 
that was turned into a disastrous rout by the desperate flank at- 
tacks of the Japanese from both sides- 

The Russian losses to March 13, when the Battle of Mukden 
actually came to a close, were 175,000 men, killed, wounded and 
prisoners ; 60 guns ; 25,000 rounds of small arm ammunition and 
immense quantities of stores. The Japanese casualties to March 
12 were 41,222 killed, wounded and missing and several hundred 
of the missing were recovered in the capture of Mukden. The 
Japanese sent 43,000 prisoners to Japan as one of the results of 
the victory. 

Mukden, round which the greatest battle in history raged, is, 

without exception, the most interesting place in the whole of 

Northern China. In the eyes of all Man- 

The ^S !*? 4 City ° f churians it is the one holy city in the 
Mukden J J 

world, for it is here that the tombs of 
the founders of the Manchu dynasty are situated. For this reason 
the Chinese Government demanded that the sacred precincts of 
the Imperial Tombs must not be violated by foul warfare, and both 
sides engaged in the horrible work of killing, entered into solemn 
undertakings to respect the sanctity of the famous burial grounds. 
The great city stands in the middle of a vast alluvial plain, 
surrounded by rich and highly cultivated land. The population of 
Mukden is over a quarter of a million, and the city is modelled on 
a similar plan to that of Peking, presenting an imposing appear- 
ance, in spite of the decay into which many of the ancient build- 
ings have been allowed to fall. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The railway, which runs north to Harbin, does not pass within 
a mile of the city, the Chinese having refused to allow the neigh- 
borhood of the sacred tombs to be desecrated by the construction 
of an iron road in the immediate vicinity. The station is conse- 
quently about a mile away from the city, but on alighting from the 
train, one is immediately struck by the sight of the tremendous 
brick walls, 60 feet high, which surround the inner town. This is 
built in the form of a square a mile wide, and entrance is gained 
through eight enormouse brick gates, surrounded by watch-towers 
and batteries. Outside this, suburbs extend for about a mile in 
every direction, and the whole is surrounded by a mud rampart 
from ten to twenty feet in height- 

A little to the north of the city is the sacred shrine of Na Ta, 
and a mile to the east of this is the Temple of Heaven, where sac- 
rifices of black cattle and white sheep are offered up in the Empe- 
ror's name. To the east of this pagoda, buried in the midst of a 
grove of fir trees, is the famous tomb of the great Chinese con- 
queror, Tai Tsung. Access to the tomb is gained through a great 
gateway, roofed with red and yellow tiles, down a long avenue 
flanked by colossal stone figures of animals, great marble columns, 
and stretches of high wall. 

The other great tomb lies due east of the city, in the heart 
of a great forest. Here, amid similar walls, figures of animals, 

and decayed marble columns, lie the re- 
The Tombs of the mains of Nao chu, the father of Tai 

Manchus .«'.,, j 

Tsung. The fact that both these sacred 

relics were surrounded by acres of forest made it likely that no 
violation, either by Russians or Japanese, would take place, though 
the possible misdirection of a shell from one of their heavy guns 
might very easily have ruined either of them. Such an accident 

471 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

would very probably have stirred the somnolent Chinese to their 
very depths. 

For an Eastern city Mukden is extremely clean and well kept. 
The Manchus are well known for their cleanly habits, which are 
often in striking contrast with those of the southern Chinese. The 
streets are well scavengered, and there are many most imposing, 
if not beautiful, private mansions belonging to wealthy mandarins. 
There are also a great number of handsome shops, and the centre 
of the city is always busy with the incessant movement and bustle 
which are only to be found in prosperous trading centres- 

For Mukden is the centre of an enormous trade between the 
north and the south of China. From the north come enormous 

quantities of fur, and from the south 
A Flourishing Mart millions of bushels of all sorts of grain, 

while in the immediate vicinity wheat, 
barley, tobacco, melons, and cucumbers are grown in the fertile 
plain which stretches away on all sides. The silkworm, too, is cul- 
tivated all round Mukden, so that there is never any lack of trade 
from one source or another, whatever the season. Mukden, in the 
Manchu language means "flourishing," and for centuries the city 
has lived up to its name. 

Two miles to the south of the city is a wide, sandy stretch of 
ground, twenty miles long, through which runs the Hun River, 
which can be forded almost anywhere. This approach to Mukden, 
forming the Russian center, was strongly held with sand-bag bat- 
teries. On the west of the town the very high railway embank- 
ment, running north and south of the river for many miles, was 
used to protect Mukden against attack from the west. The most 
vulnerable point in this line was the bridge over the Hun River, 
against which the Japanese delivered incessant attack. Mukden 

472 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

was strongly fortified by General Kuropatkin. The fortifications 
extended for nine miles, with forts and redoubts at intervals of i 
mile. The redoubts were ail cleverly masked, and the line of forti- 
fication was protected by deep ditches and pits, all with stakes at 
the bottom, by wire entanglements, land mines, and a line of 
felled trees. 

Winter still howls over Manchuria when February is draw- 
ing to a close, but the early days of March, just as through the 

central United States, bring the first 
Betwixt Winter and Spring flush of spring. The ground remains 

locked in the grip of a frost that turns 
earth to steel to a depth of seven feet. The rivers are still securely 
ice-bound, but overhead the sun begins a mastery over the over- 
powering cold. If the nights remain bitterly cold, the days are in- 
creasingly warm and throughout the daylight hours conditions are 
ideal for the work of the soldier. The weather, therefore, fairly 
trumpeted a call to arms to the two vast armies that confronted 
each other south of the Sha-ho River. The earliest moves were 
made over whitened plains with snow storms still driving over 
hills and plain out of the bleak north. Marshal Oyama, the Jap- 
anese commander, evidently realized that the struggle would be 
long and, indeed, before its end winter had, in fact, given place 
to the opening days of spring. The advantages were many. The 
movement of artillery was facilitated by the hard surface of frozen 
ground and the ease with which ice-covered streams and rivers 
could be crossed. Lack of foliage deprived the army of the protec- 
tion that so greatly aided the advance on Liao-yang, and so effec- 
tively shielded the artillery in that struggle. The broken nature 
of the country, the heavy calibre guns, firing from one to five miles 
with accuracy, minimized the disadvantage of fighting over a bare 

473 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

land and if lack of protection of foliage and growing crops added 
to the Japanese losses it failed to check the vigor or relentlessness 
of the advance once it had begun. 

The lines of the two armies on the eve of the great battle, 
stretched from the Hun River, on the west, in a southeasterly di- 
rection south of the Sha-ho River, along 
The Line of Battle that stream, then bending more south- 
ward, across the Taitse River, near Ben- 
sihu, at a point thirty-five miles east of Yentai Station, on the 
Harbin — Port Arthur Railroad. These lines had been determined 
by the battle of the Sha-ho River, October 6-13, the end of the 
compaign of 1904. Strategically the advantage lay with the Rus- 
sians. Though defeated in the memorable battle along the Sha- 
ho, General Kuropatkin had secured a position south of Mukden 
far superior to any below Tie Pass, the gateway to the great plains 
around Harbin, always regarded as the ultimate decisive battle- 
ground of Manchuria. 

The whole lay of the land was adapted to defensive fighting. 
Along most of the front lay the Sha-ho River, broad enough and 

deep enough to demand bridging except 
Lone Tree Hill when frozen over. The culminating 

event of the battle of the Sha-ho had 
been the recapture by the Russians of Lone Tree Hill, a mile east 
of the railroad, just south of the Sha-ho, at the very centre of the 
battlefield. From this point the Russians commanded a territory 
five miles in radius. The hill, naturally adapted for defense, was 
strongly fortified to a point nearer impregnability even, than 
achieved by any of the boasted fortifications of the mountains around 
Port Arthur. Thousands of Japanese were ultimately to immolate 
themselves on the slopes of Lone Tree Hill in vain efforts at its 

474 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

capture. It still stood invincible when events elsewhere 
demanded retreat and its abandonment. Westward the Russian 
line spread across a rolling country dotted with Chinese villages. 
The low, stoned walled cottages of these clusters of hamlets 
formed the basis for defenses which were well calculated to offer 
enormous resistance to troops advancing across the wide-stretch- 
ing flats along the Sha-ho, and the east bank of the Hun, the only 
approach for the Japanese. 

Eastward from the Sha-ho the defense line followed the foot 
hills that become mountains thirty miles east of the Sha-ho. In 

front flowed a river for twenty miles of 
The Russian Position the distance, and a vast level plain ap- 
proached the river from the south, over 
which the Japanese right flank must make its advance- The Rus- 
sian position was enclosed in a vast triangle with the upper angle 
between Mukden and Fushan, northward, its base the eighty-mile 
line from Madyanapu, on the Hun River, to Tsenketchen, thirty- 
five miles east of Yentai. Mountains protected the left flank; the 
Hun River protected the right flank, while Lone Tree Hill, and 
the Sha-ho River were chief elements in the strength of the centre. 
All the genius of the Russian commanders was exerted to find the 
weak spots in this long line. Artillery of the heaviest types, 
ranging through all the grades of siege and field guns, and the 
more mobile and most deadly machine guns were scattered with 
prodigality across the whole vast front then in receding lines to the 
apex of the triangle, where were arranged the defenses of Mukden 
and Fushan. To facilitate communications over the battlefield, two 
hundred miles of light railroad track was laid, and thousands of 
light cars for horse or man propulsion were in constant use carry- 
ing munitions, provisions, guns or whatever was needed, to depots 

477 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

from which every part of the battlefield was readily accessible. 
Telephone and telegraph wires connected the headquarters, just 
north of the Sha-ho River, with every command along- the entire 
line. Crowning all, an army of 350,000 men rested on its arms, 
elbow to elbow, along the front, as bulwarks to the flanks, and 
northward, thronging Mukden and Fushan, the reserves. This was 
the immediate situation on the Russian side that confronted Mar- 
shal Oyama. 

The Japanese task, however, was more than to defeat the 
Russian army. Criticism had followed the victory of Liao-yang 

because, despite the awful defeat admin- 
The Japanese Task istered, the battle had been indecisive. 
The Russian general had been able to ex- 
tricate his army and by a masterful retreat, to realign his forces in 
a new position with no alternative but to follow and prepare to 
renew the struggle left to the Japanese commanders- The Battle 
of Mukden must be estimated in the light of an effort to prevent a 
recurrence of this feat by the Russians. The chief world interest 
centers about the strategy of Marshal Oyama to encircle his foe, 
to cut off his retreat completely and to force the alternative of an- 
nihilation or surender. The geography of the country, its strategi- 
cal features far afield from the actual Russian positions, therefore, 
become matters of moment which must be understood to permit a 
comprehensive understanding of the battle and its results. 

Marshal Oyama's problem, as has been said, was to envelope the 
Russian armies. It was as though the Russian triangle were a bot- 
tle into which a cork must be driven. On 
Mukden the Real the neck of the bottle, ten miles apart, 

Battleground are Mukden, on the West, and Fushan, 

on the east. Between these points the 
478 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Russians would be compelled to disgorge in a retreat 
northward should the center be broken and a retreat be- 
came necessary. Here, then, was the Japanese objective. To 
take Mukden and Fushan, to drive the forces there southward to- 
ward the Sha-ho, and to place a force northward to be the cork 
in the bottle, driving back the retreat on the advance of the center, 
right and left armies, thus surrounding the Russians with a hoop of 
men and guns that would make escape or victory impossible. Thus 
it is that a battle that centered twenty-five miles southward on the 
Sha-ho River becomes officially known as the battle of Mukden, 
for here centered the really vital struggle of the whole memorable 
engagement. The Russian line of communication centers at Har- 
bin, where the railroad which pierces Manchuria and the Liao- 
tung Peninsula to Port Arthur, branches southward from the Si- 
berian railroad, the artery through which flows life from St. 
Petersburg and European Russia to the Far Eastern armies. The 
whole Manchurian campaign has moved northward along this 
railroad, the salvation of the Russian army always depending on 
its ability to keep open at its rear this means of sustenance, of 
ammunition supply, of reinforcement supply, of transport of every 
kind, whether advancing or retreating. The railroad reached the 
actual Russian lines just west of Mukden and then continued 
southward to the Sha-ho, branching here and there to various field 
depots convenient to the various army units. Marshal Oyama's 
plan of battle comprehended, as its greatest achievement, the cut- 
ing of this railroad north of Mukden before a retreat could be made. 
This was the first and most vital contribution if the ultimate plan 
to envelop the Russians was to succeed. This plan failed and hence 
the prize of decisive, final victory slipped from the grasp of the 

479 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Japanese commander, however great the blow he dealt to the Rus- 
sian army. 

General Kuropatkin was fully alive to the dangers on his 
flanks as well as at the front. His right flank rested on Mukden. 

but the actual lines to which were given 
Russian Flanks the task of preventing the turning of the 

Strongly Protected right flank were far afield from the ac- 
tual city. To the southwest they ex- 
tended to the Hun River, thirty-five miles away, while the far out- 
post was within touch of Sinmintin, a Chinese city, thirty-five miles 
westward of Mukden on the banks of the Liao River. Sinmintin 
is actually in the territory which was excluded from the theatre of 
war by the famous agreement proposed to the European Powers 
by John Hay, the Amercian Secretary of State, by which the neu- 
trality of Chinese territory was assured. Nevertheless, while not 
actually occupied by the Russians, Sinmintin was to all intents and 
purposes within their lines and was continually used as a receiving 
point for supplies bought or commanded in the Mongolian prov- 
inces. Cossacks in large force remained in close touch with the 
city while the road leading from Sinmintin to Mukden, a famous 
caravan route, was occupied by large forces of Russians and was 
regarded as an effective bulwark for the Russian right flank. 

The Russian defences on the right, or west wing of their 
army began just west of the Sha-ho River, extended thence west- 
ward for thirty-five miles to the Hun and then bent due northward 
across the left side of the Liao River Valley to a point a few miles 
east of Sinmintin; thence along the Sinmintin-Mukden road to 
Tatchekiao, five miles northward of Mukden ; thence due westward 
until the line intercepted the railroad, a few miles north of Muk- 
den. Lieutenant General Baron Kaulbars was commander of the 

480 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

army of nearly 100,000 men which made up this wing of General 
Kuropatkin's forces. The left wing's divisional commander was 
General Linevitch, who, with General Rennenkampf, stands among 
the greatest of the Russian commanders. Occupying a position to 
the Russian left flank exactly similar to that of Mukden on the 
right, is Fushan, ten miles east of Mukden. With this position 
firmly held at center and on its flanks it would be impossible for the 
Japanese to drive in their cork in the neck of the bottle between 
Fushan and Mukden. To the average strategist, indeed, univer- 
sally among strategists, the view would prevail after a glance of 
the battlefield as it lay at the opening of the struggle that there 
was the real vital point to the attack as well as to the defense. In 
the opening days of the battle events all shaped themselves to bear 
out this view. General Kuropatkin manifestly thought so. Here 
he threw the weight of vast numbers of troops and thought vic- 
tory near when the Japanese attack from this quarter had been 
fought to a standstill. Logically, Fushan was the chief danger 
point, and the fact that Marshal Oyama, the Japanese commander, 
chose another strategical solution for the problem is among his 
achievements that have resulted in the appellation of "The Napo- 
leon of the Orient." 

Just as on the west, the Russian lines were far afield from the 
actual key position at Mukden, so on their left, or eastern positions 

their lines formed a far-reaching pro- 
Well Protected on tective barrier, 20 miles away. As has 
the East 

been said, the main front on the east 

stretched away from the Sha-ho, thirty-five miles eastward to the 
Taitse River, which winds in a general northeasterly direction from 
Liao-yang. The defensive position of importance was at Tsink- 
etchen, in the foothills of the Sierras, which run across Manchuria, 
and finally reach the east coast of Korea- 

481 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The only practicable path northward for the Japanese army 
was to skirt these foothills to the passes, northeast from Tsinket- 
chen and Bentsiaputze and then debouch into the valley of the Hun 
River and fight their way northward to Fushan, the rugged nature 
of the country eastward from that place practically preventing any 
opportunity for play of strategy in a turning movement to strike 
northeast of the city. One of the wonders of the war and one of 
the most amazing of the feats constantly accomplished by the Jap- 
anese has been the skill and success with which they have attacked 
and captured mountain positions. General Kuroki in the cam- 
paign which, after a few months followed the victory of the Yalu, 
repeatedly drove the Russians from veritable Thermopylae and 
in the fighting on every front which preceded the surrounding of 
the Russian army at Liao-yang the Japanese were constantly con- 
fronted with the necessity of making frontal attacks on mountain 
defiles which seemed to offer impregnable shelter to the defenders. 

So also in the campaign on the east in the battle of Mukden. 
General Kuropatkin chose his defensive positions with skill. No 

pains were spared in fortifying the gaps 

Battled for in the mountain ridges through which 

Mountain Passes tne Japanese must pass. The principal 
routes open were through Da Pass and 
Gauto Pass. While these were the main defensive positions the 
Russians pushed fifteen miles further southward toward the enemy, 
and the earlier reverses at Tsinketchen were only fairly unimportant 
preludes to the battling at these mountain passes. The Russian line 
on the east had less geometrical reguarity than the line of the west 
owing to the nature of the topography. The lines from the front 
extended to the foothills, as has been pointed out, and then were 
concentrated at the passes, the danger points, offering only a limited 

482 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR., 

distinguished general shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. But 
as the campaign progressed, critics began to revise their judgments. 
The terrible Cossack horsemen, for some reason or other, failed to 
play any considerable part in events. They attempted a raid in 
Korea from the northeast, but without any result, and in the subse- 
quent fighting they found no' opportunity for asserting themselves. 
The campaign was an infantry and artillery campaign entirely; and 
the notorious weakness of the Japanese army in cavalry was no im- 
pediment to their victorious advance. The war in Manchuria proved 
in fact that the conditions of the war in South Africa had been 
peculiar and exceptional. But at last the Cossacks were to be given 
an opportunity of showing their mettle. On January 8th a force of 
6,000 Cossacks under General Mistchenko crossed the Hun-ho ana 
began to march rapidly southwards. This formidable force, com- 
posed of three brigades, was accompanied by six batteries of light 
artillery, and in its organization everything had been done to give 
to it the maximum of mobility. The Hun-ho, which Mistchenko's 
division crossed immediately after setting out, is a tributary of the 
Liao River, into which it flows some forty or fifty miles above Niu- 
chwang. While the course of the Liao is roughly due north, that of 
the Hun is northeast, or almost directly in the line from Mukden to 
Niuchwang. The severity of the weather had moderated and was 
most favorable for the movement of such a great body of mounted 
men, who swept down the vast Liao plain on a front extending for 
five miles. By the second night Mistchenko's three brigades had 
reached the confluence of the Liao and the Hun, and there they made 
the first contact with the enemy. A Japanese convoy was captured, 
but the escort succeeded in making its escape, and from that moment 
it was impossible to conceal knowledge of the movement from the 
enemy. With their characteristic thoroughness — which throughout 

483 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

to defend fortified positions, heavily supplied with artillery, a posi- 
tion which, as history plainly proves, brings out the best qualities 
of the Russian soldier. So far as the centre was concerned he had 
no fear. Lone Tree Hill, or, as he renamed it for the Russian who 
led the charge that had recaptured it from the Japanese, had been 
made as nearly impregnable as men and arms could make a position 
made by nature for defensive fighting. So westward, so eastward, 
topography, the condition of his army, the whole aspect of the field, 
spoke only of a repulse to the Japanese attack. Then would come 
the offensive against a worn-out army, then the victory for which 
all Russia was clamoring and upon which depended the future of 
the Commander-in-Chief himself. 

So much for the Russian viewpoint. 

When the smoke of the battle of the Sha-ho cleared away it 
left the Japanese armies masters of practically the same territory 

they had occupied at the conclusion of the 

The Outlook pursuit of the Russian after the victory 

for Oyarna at Liao-yang. General Kuroki, command- 
ing the Japanese right army, had fallen 
back from Bentsiaputze to Bensihu, a distance of twenty miles ; but 
this move had been made to correct the alignment of the army with 
the centre, at the Sha-ho River as a basis. Certainly, no great 
effort was made to advance this force after the initial Russian suc- 
cesses on this flank after the battle of the Sha-ho. Some advan- 
tages attached to the position finally occupied by General Kuroki, 
hence the view that he was impelled by strategic reasons when he 
had failed to advance, rather than by inability to retake the lost 
positions farther north. At the centre, which followed the south 
bank of the Sha-ho River, the Russians had succeeded in retaking 
Lone Tree Hill in the closing hours of the battle, and had a decided 

484 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

advantage. Every possible effort was made to retake the position, 
but when called upon for this effort the Japanese were exhausted by 
twelve days of incessant fighting, and they failed. Marshal Oyama, 
at the centre, therefore, was confronted by a practically impregnable 
position. Westward, on the left flank of the Japanese Army, the 
Russians were less aided by natural features of the country than at 
any other point. Their lines crossed the Sha-ho just west of the 
railroad and then spread northeastward through a series of villages 
dotting a comparatively level plain lying between the Sha-ho and 
the Hun Rivers. Of all the positions on the entire Russian front 
this seemed to offer the best opportunity for attack, for while an 
advance would have to be made over an open country, approach to 
the Russians' positions was facilitated by the innumerable villages 
in this fertile river plain. On the other hand, the Japanese were 
open to the same style of advance, and both commanders made 
unusual preparations to defend this angle of the great battlefield. 

The Japanese lines along the front were merely a parallel of 
the Russian lines which have been described, except that while on 
the west and on the centre the entrenchmnts were only a few hun- 
dred yards separated, the lines farther east, except for outpost posi- 
tions, were separated by distances ranging from five to fifteen miles, 
as developed when the operations of the Battle of Mukden were 
actually under way. 

To the Japanese Commander-in-Chief the general situation 

could not have been particularly reassuring, except that he could 

count on the indomitable efforts of an unbeaten and fanatically 

brave army. So far as the topography was concerned, the enemy 

had every advantage. In all a very difficult and interesting problem 

was presented as the Mikado's hosts settled down for their long 

winter inaction- 

487 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Liao-yang was made the Japanese base after the occupation of 
that city, and the Engineer Corps performed a notable feat in the 

speedy manner in which the railroad run- 
Busy Preparations" ning northward from Port Arthur r A as 
During Winter made over for the use of Japanese engines 

and cars. The Russians had a five-foot 
gauge, while the Japanese rolling stock was built to the standard 
measurement. This fact made necessary the relaying of the entire 
line, a task which was promptly completed, thereby affording the 
inland army base ready communication with the general supply 
base at Dalny and at Port Arthur after the capture of that port. 
In addition to this line of communication the Japanese had a line 
to the Yalu. Stores for the right army were landed at the mouth 
of the Yalu River, and then were transported overland on a light 
railroad for which horses were the motive power, to points well in 
reach of General Kuroki. Both of these lines of communication 
were vital to an army that had now penetrated two hundred miles 
inland and were the first consideration when the flanks and protective 
units were being placed in their winter quarters. The Liao-yang- 
Yalu line proved to have been safeguarded against danger, but 
Cossack raiders in January twice encircled the Japanese left army, 
penetrated to the railroad at Yinkow, and damaged the line. In 
each case the damage done was quickly repaired. The second raid- 
ing party was so nearly cut off and so nearly annihilated in its 
flight to the Russian lines and activities on a broader scale so soon 
after were begun, that no further attempts of the kind were at- 
tempted. Such trifling inconvenience resulted from these perilous 
raids that it would seem that the Russians were hardly recompensed 
for the sacrifice of life. Certainly, the vast bulk of all needed stores 
and ammunition were already within the Japanese lines before the 

488 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

attempts were made, and Marshal Oyama, in all probability, could 
have fought the entire battle of Mukden without further need of 
the railroad, particularly as no Japanese retreat resulted from that 
struggle. The incidents only bore out the long held reputation of 
the Cossacks for reckless bravery. Indeed, the Japanese have 
repeatedly expressed their admiration for the Cossacks as a foe 
worthy of their steel- 

With his front well aligned, and with every possible precaution 
taken to safeguard his lines of communication, the question then 

before the Japanese Commander-in-Chief 

Deciding the was the strategy to mark a resumption 

Way to Strike °f hostilities. At Liao-yang, despite the 

sweeping nature of the victory, there can 
be no doubt that the Japanese were bitterly disappointed when, de- 
spite tremendously determined efforts to prevent their escape, prac- 
tically the whole Russian Army had disentangled itself from a 
well-set net and had escaped to occupy new positions there to be 
fought all over again. The first thought in all of the planning of 
the new campaign that was to succeed the winter of inactivity, was 
to accomplish the actual envelopment of General Kuropatkin, forc- 
ing upon the Russian Commander a surrender as the only alternative 
to annihilation. The line of action decided upon is fully revealed 
in the details of the battle to be told later. This program of com- 
plete destruction stands out even more plainly than at Liao-yang. 
It came far nearer realization than in that struggle, and was not 
concluded with the mere taking of Mukden; but like the tentacles 
of a great octopus, Marshal Oyama's grim determination for com- 
plete annihilation of the foe spread far northward beyond the 
scene of the initial victory and relentlessly realized in large measure 
all that he had hoped. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

In brief, the plan was to hold the Russian centre in a combat 
which, however desperate and bloody, was only a feint. While this 

struggle went on with apparent success 
Oyama's Plan of Battle to Russian arms, the right and left flanks 

as aligned east and west of the Sha-ho 
were to press home an attack calculated slowly to bend back the 
Russians toward their line of retreat northward from Mukden. 

But the culminating fact in the entire plan was an entirely 
separate blow at the Russian rear north of Mukden by an army 
which, while it no doubt figured in the Russian calculations of 
probabilities, eventually burst into the plain eastward from Sin- 
mintin with a fury of surprise attack which ultimately crumbled 
the entire scheme of Russian defence. 

That army was made up of the conquerors of Port Arthur. 
The fall of that fortress released a host of 80,000 seasoned fighters, 

flushed with a victory that filled the 
Nogi to Strike world with awe and admiration. Just 

Culminating Blow so soon as the details of the surrender 
had been completed this force was under 
way northward to reinforce Marshal Oyama. At its head was the 
savagely brave Nogi, who had just won for himself undying place 
in the history of Japan by successfully reducing the Gibraltar of 
the Orient. Swift from the scene of one great triumph he was 
speeding to another. It was in the disposition of this force that all 
of the genius of Oyama was expended. When he sent Nogi west- 
ward in a wide circuit to swing completely around the Russian right 
army, to plunge northward by forced marches as far as Simintin 
and then bend eastward to burst upon the Russian rear, sweeping 
within five miles of their lines before an adequate defence could be 
provided, he settled the fate of Russia's great army of nearly a half 

490 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

million men. He struck a blow that made an awful rout possible, 
and the blow that made possible the final disaster, the forced aban- 
donment of Tie Pass, that left the Russian Army a demoralized 
horde of panicked troops facing northward into the bleak stretches 
of Northern Manchuria. 

By this blow he added the final humiliation to Russia's greatest 
soldier, Kuropatkin, and lost that erstwhile leader with half of a 
century of popular adulation behind him, the command of Russia's 
Armies in Manchuria. He ended every hope of an offensive cam- 
paign in Manchuria, achieving at a stroke every result that for 
which a year's campaign had been allotted. 

Nogi's army swept into the ranks of the opposing Russians, 
shouting, "Out of the way for us; we're from Port Arthur". To 

them fighting in the open country face to 
"Out of the Way face with the enemy was as child's play 

for Us" compared with the horrors they had faced 
in scaling the bristling mountainsides 
north of Port Arthur. There they advanced against hidden terrors 
that lurked behind dull gray walls of huge forts; they braved the 
cunningly devised high priests of death that are hidden underground 
and work havoc and disaster when victory seems within grasp. They 
had looked death in the face in a hundred hidden forms unflinch- 
ingly, had fought and conquered a foe behind vast walls. Here 
there was only man to man. Shells burst overhead, scattering 
deadly shrapnel, but what was that to the rain of ponderous steel 
from siege guns that tore out the face of hillsides and annihilated 
regiments at a single puff. These were the men who, with a stri- 
dent battle cry of scorn for the ease of the task, swept through 
thirty miles in a single day, trampling Russian regiments under 
foot, storming oyer fortified towns as though no men or guns were 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

there, right up to the gates of Mukden, right where their guns 
could search the huddled ranks of Russians, fleeing from the de- 
structible force that was welding a ring around them. Nature 
finally "checked them. Up from the Manchurian plains a mighty 
wind swept a blinding simoon that halted their irresistible host at 
the monent when they were driving home the last fatal blow. For 
a day the whole battlefield was wrapped in a blinding curtain of 
sweeping sand. When once again Nogi's men could take up the 
work they had begun the bulk of the Russian force had fled past 
Undaunted they swept northward, and four days later, when the 
beaten and dispersed army was reorganizing its ranks from the 
chaos of the flight, it was Nogi's men, springing once more out of 
the west, that set Kuropatkin's whole remnant in flight again, 
leaving behind them the last fortified position in Southern Manchu- 
ria. Oyama planned, but the palm for the victories of Mukden and 
the further flight from Tie Pass belongs to Nogi and the host that 
took Port Arthur. 

This was indeed the master stroke of the battle, nevertheless 
a way had to be prepared for it by tremendously desperate work 

on every quarter of the long battle line. 

Master Stroke As vigorous as was the assault made on 

of the Battle tne Russian front, there can be no doubt 

that this was nothing more than a feint. 
The readiness with which the Japanese Commander-in-Chief sacri- 
ficed thousands of lives in assaults of a secondary nature is one of 
the significant things of the story of the battle. Such methods are 
reminiscent of Grant's massed attacks in the closing days of the 
Civil War, when life was counted as nothing when in the scale 
beside the value of victory. No pang for the sacrifice reached the 
heart of Oyama or the Generals under him who were directing the 

492 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

assaults. Victory was the stake, and the soldiers were there to die, 
if need be. They died by files and ranks and regiments. But vic- 
tor}'' was won. Over against the total of the blood-letting in their 
own ranks was the awful slaughter of the enemy, here, as in every 
battle of the war, far heavier in the Russian totals than with the 
Japanese. Two generations have come since the famous struggle 
of Gettysburg, yet statisticians are still struggling to determine the 
exact number who fought and died there or who remained alive, as 
victor and vanquished. The actual figures are still only approxi- 
mately known. Multiply the difficulties of accounting for the less 
than two hundred thousand who fought at Gettysburg an hundred- 
fold, and something of the difficulty of getting at the actual facts 
of the battle at Mukden begin to be realized. Ultimately, the Jap- 
anese may give the details, but no actual statement of the number 
of Russians engaged, of the losses in killed, wounded and missing, 
may be expected. The story forms too tragic a page in the history 
of the nation ever to be willingly spread broadcast. 



493 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

Prelude to the Great Battle — Gripenberg Fails and Quits Army — The Battle 
Begins — The Struggle on the East Front — The Battle at the Center — 
Battle Culminates on the West — Village by Village Taken — Russian Artil- 
lery Impotent — When the Crushing Blow Fell — A Cloud in the West — 
Kuropatkin Ignores Danger — Center Positions Abandoned — Japanese In- 
genuity Marvelous — Retreat a Carnival of Slaughter — Oyama's Prophecy 
Fulfilled. 

HERE was a prelude to the actual battle fought early in 

T January by a portion of the Russian right flank under 
General Gripenberg, which is chiefly interesting for its 
effect in the Russian ranks. Whatever may have been the 
purpose of the attack, it failed- Heiketau, a town in the angle of 
the Hun and Liao Rivers, was the scene of the opening attack. 

Here the Japanese had an outpost in sight 
Prelude to the of the Russian lines. Resistance was made 

Great Battle to the advance until it was seen that the 
Russians were in earnest and that a large 
force was actually about to give battle. Thereupon the Japanese 
outpost fell back on the main position at Sandiapu, three miles 
away, the Russians following. For two days a severe fight waged 
around their position, and General Gripenberg made enough gains 
on the first day to give rise to the belief that he was in position to 
break the entire Japanese line, divide their army, flank the centre, 
and compel a retreat. He sent an urgent representation of the sit- 
uation to General Kuropatkin, asking for reinforcements, and, 
taking for granted that these would be sent, he plunged in on the 

497 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

second day to win, at last, a victory for Russia. The force against 
which he had thrown three divisions consisted of a single division 
of the Japanese, who counted on stopping the advance by dint of 
the earthworks protecting Sandiapu. Before morning of the second 
day General Oku, exhibiting the rare initiative and resourcefulness 
common to all of the Japanese generals, was ready to deal a crushing 
blow to Gripenberg, and the Russian General in his eagerness to 
take advantage of the opportunity which he believed had been 
opened by the apparent advantages of the first day of the fight, 
fell into one of the most deadly of the many traps from time to time 
set for Russian commanders. 

To make sure that the Russians would not fail to renew the 
attack, General Oku caused a decoy battery of useless guns to sweep 
into position in full view of the Russian lookouts. The bait was 
too tempting. Gripenberg advanced on the dummy battery into a 
triangle of death. Batteries on three sides held their fire until the 
Russian lines had swept into practically point blank range. Then 
there burst over them a rain of shrapnel and a deadly sweep of rifle 
fire which spread confusion as hundreds were mowed down- Retreat 

from the death zone became rout, and 
Gripenberg Fails General Gripenberg, with Oku's men in 

and Quits Army full pursuit, left ten thousand dead and 
wounded behind him in their flight to 
safety within the main Russian lines north of the Sha-ho. The 
fight was unimportant in itself, but it led to a personal encounter 
between Generals Kuropatkin and Gripenberg, which added to the 
demoralization already existing among the officers of the Russian 
Army. General Gripenberg bitterly assailed Kuropatkin for having 
failed to send reinforcements. Kuropatkin declared the only possi- 
ble value of attack at that time and place was to uncover the 

498 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

strength of the enemy and to reconnoitre his positions, that a general 
engagement was folly and could not hope to achieve anything. For 
be it known, the initial advance had been made in a driving blizzard. 
General Gripenberg gave up his command and left the front for St. 
Petersburg to lay charges of incapability against the Commander- 
in-Chief and to join the group at the Russian Capital engaged in 
intrigue for the downfall of Kuropatkin. 

In the army the line and staff officers took sides in the bitter 
controversy that followed, and possibly the fight at Sandiapu, itself 
so insignificant, did more in the end to bring the disaster of Mukden 
and Tie Pass than can be estimated. A commander-in-chief, with- 
out the confidence of the officers of staff and line, can hardly hope to 
command the confidence of the men in the ranks. To say the least, 
the incident, coming so soon before the army was to be locked in 
a life and death struggle, was not calculated to add to the chances 
that victory would crown Russian arms. 

The battle was actually begun on the initiative of the Japanese. 
By February 19, Marshal Oyama believed he was ready to begin 
the struggle for Mukden. He prefaced the battle by the prophecy 
that Mukden would be occupied by his army on March 10, a proph- 
ecy which caused only merriment in Rus- 
The Battle Begins sia, but which was literally fulfilled. To 

General Kuroki was given the honor of 
firing the first guns of the renewal of the campaign. General 
Kuroki, after the battle of the Sha-ho River, had wintered on the 
southern bank of the Taitze River, the centre of his army resting 
in the neighborhood of Bensihu, thirty-five miles east of Yentai. 
The Russian line was ten miles north, and the first place to be 
taken was Tsinkhetchen, at a point where the level river country 
began to rise to the Tie range of mountains, running in a generally 

499 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

northwest-southeast direction across all of Manchuria, into Mongolia 
northward, and into Korea southward, passing along the eastern side 
of the Russian triangle. The task assigned to Kuroki was to drive 
the Russians from Tsinkhetchen into the foothills to the passes of 
the mountains, then to take these and to debouch his army on the 
plains of the Hun River, twenty miles east of Mukden, and east- 
ward of Fushun, then to strike northwestward toward the railroad 
and line of retreat of the Russian Army northward from Mukden, 
joining at the railroad the forces under Oku and Nogi, which were 
to attack from the west. 

Kuroki's army got under way February 19, crossing the first 
of the rivers, the Taitse, without opposition. Then the advance 
was made northward to the Sha-ho, and here the Russian lines 
were encountered. A surprise night attack cleared away the Rus- 
sians guarding the Sha-ho at Vanupudza, ten miles east of the rail- 
road. Kuroki then bent northeastward toward the outermost 
position of the Russian left, avoiding the forces commanding the 
hills north of the Sha-ho. 

On February 24 his army delivered a tremendous assault on 
the Russian positions at Tsinkhetchen, preceding the infantry ad- 
vance by a bombardment of great force and effectiveness. Three 

lines of entrenchments were literally 

The Struggle on destroyed by the fire of siege guns which 

the East Front na -d been brought from Port Arthur, and 

despite the tremendous difficulty involved 

had been placed within range of the Tsinkhetchen positions. The 

Russian defence was stubborn, but the Japanese were irresistible, 

and after a few hours of awful carnage General Rennenkampff, 

commanding the Russians, ordered a retreat. Kuroki failed in an 

effort to envelop the position, and the Russians reached in safety 

500 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

their main position on this flank at Da Pass. Here one of the 
bloodiest struggles of the war followed, opening on February 28 
and continuing until March 1, when, despite one of the most gallant 
resistances credited to the Russians, General Kuroki flanked the 
Pass notwithstanding insuperable obstacles offered by the rugged 
nature of the country. Then followed a retreat and pursuit, every 
step of which was marked by fighting of the most desperate nature, 
thousands of bodies carpeting the gradually rolling country, which 
finally became the plains along the Hun. Fushun was the Japanese 
objective. Kuroki bent every energy to roll back the front which 
Rennenkampff presented, but for ten days after the plain had been 
reached his army was fought to a standstill. General Linevitch, 
commanding the division of which Rennenkampff's command was 
part, checkmated every attempt made to cross the Hun and flank 
him, while at his front he rolled back as many as thirteen infantry 
assaults in a single day. This section of the field was remote from 
the main battle line and few of the details reached the world. With 
the slow filtering of the story of this fighting it has become apparent 
that here was waged a struggle even more desperate than that 
which made history west of Mukden. Kuropatkin appreciated the 
vital necessity of preventing the turning of his left flank at Fushun, 
and it must be said to the credit of the Japanese that they were 
fighting here a force twice the size of their own and one that was 
continually being reinforced by every battalion that could be spared 
from the west. The marvel is that Kuroki's army was not utterly 
annihilated. It was the tremendous fight he made that compelled 
Kuropatkin to weaken his right to support Linevitch, and it was 
the fact that the right had been so weakened that made possible the 
brilliant victories won by the Japanese on the west. Hence, in addi- 
tion to credit for the great fight he made in carrying out his own 

501 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

share in the battle, Kuroki stands for credit in drawing strength 
from other positions which materially aided in the ultimate outcome. 
Nevertheless, until fateful March 10, his army had been fought to 
a standstill within five miles of Fushun, its objective. The outcome 
here even encouraged Kuropatkin in the belief that the battle was 
going his way- v , 

It is necessary, in recording the story of the battle, to leave 
Kuroki, still fighting in vain to take Fushun and open the road to 
the Russian rear, and to record events on other parts of the field. 

The battle line, when both armies had 

The Battle at actually been joined, extended for a dis- 

the Center tance between eighty and one hundred 

miles. Every event at every position 

dovetailed into the whole strategy of the battle, yet a vast difficulty 

is imposed in collating all of the scattered events into a continuous 

story. No one observer, possibly not the Generals-in-chief themselves, 

could follow all of the swift moving events, and the best and at 

that a most difficult achievement was to follow the main trend of 

events interpreting separate achievements, advances, retrogressions, 

as they bore on the grand object of each army. 

The battle of Mukden was, in fact, four battles in one. One 
of those battles was fought between Kuroki and Linevitch on the 
east. The second battle within the battle of Mukden was fought 
between the centre armies and focussed in the beginning of the 
conflict at Lone Tree, or Putiloff Hill, just east of the railroad, 
forty-five miles south of Mukden. Here General Nodzu commanded 
the Japanese and General Kuropatkin in person and General Zassu- 
litch, divisional commander, directed the Russian defence. The 
battle here began on February 24, the date on which General Kuroki 
delivered the attack on Tsinkhetchen. General Nodzu's immediate 

502 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

task was to keep the Russian centre too well occupied and in fear of 
a general assault, thus preventing the sending of reinforcements to 
the flank, where Kuroki was at his important work. The artillery 
duel which waged around the centre positions has never been 
equalled in the history of war. The Russians had at this point alone 
530 guns, fifty of them siege guns on permanent emplacements 
firing eight-inch shells- Putiloff and Novgorod Hill bristled with 
field and machine guns, and these commanding hills were flanked 
east and west by fortifications upon which five months' work had 
been expended and which are perhaps the finest defensive works 
ever erected on a battlefield. 

The Russian centre was the hope of the Russian Commander. 
He claimed impregnability for it, and impregnable it proved. Nev- 
ertheless Nodzu sent scores of assaults at its steep slopes, and the 
later advances were made by the Japanese over the bodies of com- 
rades who had fallen in earlier efforts. The Russian centre resisted 
without a break, and only left its positions March 7, when events 
elsewhere resulted in the order to fall back north of the Sha-ho. The 
story of the struggle here is an exact replica of many which waged 
in the bloody days of the siege of Port Arthur, though here the loss 
of life was heavier, since none of the protective engineering devices 
used at Port Arthur were resorted to. The assaults were simply 
dashes by Japanese infantry up the bare slopes of a hill rising five 
hundred feet in the air. It was man unprotected against -^teel in 
armor, and the man lost. Behind the Russians was the Sha-ho 
River. Their second line of defences was sunk in the hillsides and 
hilltops there. With the river in front, the ice weakened until it 
was questionable whether men in any numbers could make safe 
crossing, this position was only a little less strong than the first. 
All in all, it is little wonder that the Japanese Commander elected 

503 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

only to feint here and deal his blow at other positions. The second 
line, however, availed the Russians little except to hold in check 
the pursuit and leave General Nodzu to be only a minor factor in 
the culmination of the disaster that finally befell the Russians. The 
centre army, while it played no conspicuous part in the battle, 
while it was not called upon to repel, and was not expected to take 
the Russian positions as a vital part of the Japanese strategy, possi- 
bly even greater credit belongs to these men who died in droves, 
knowing that they were being sacrificed as a matter of secondary 
importance, that upon others elsewhere, miles and miles away, was 
falling the really great events and upon whom would fall the glory. 
Whether they knew it or not, there was no faltering. With cries 
of "banzai" they stormed up Putiloff Hill, up Novgorod Hill; by 
regiments they fell, and regiments as loyal and heroic took their 
places, apparently satisfied that all the sacrifice was only to prevent 
reinforcements from the centre from being sent to the lines north- 
east, northwest, where their brothers were writing victory in blood 
across Manchuria's plains. War is essentially waste ; waste of men, 
waste of money. Here the spirit of waste was fully exemplified, yet 
the waste was a factor if victory was to be won, and Oyama sent 
his armies to their work bent on victory as perhaps never an army 
was bent on victory. 

The battle of Mukden, as the whole struggle has been officially 
called, had its climax on the west. The strategy of Marshal Oyama, 
as has been explained, culminated in the attack by the army of Port 
Arthur veterans, commanded by General Nogi. This attack was 

but part of the assault on the Russian 

Battle Culminates right. The actual Japanese left army was 

on West commanded by General Oku, and during 

the long winter season had occupied a 
504 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

position extending westward from the Sha-ho River to the Hun, 
upon which at the front the Russian right rested, though when the 
battle had gotten under way this line was extended fifteen miles 
farther west to the banks of the Liao River. General Oku's lines 
and also the Russian lines, which he opposed, occupied a series of 
unmapped villages, most of them only occupied during the spring, 
summer and fall, when the fertile river valleys are in cultivation, 
the products of the region being similar to those of the Northern 
Central United States, east and west from Chicago as a centre. The 
village huts are built of rough hewn stone, the walls being of 
primitive build and oftentimes twelve inches thick. Stone walls 
around fields are of common occurrence, so that while the country 
generally was level, it had in these houses and walls many features 
offering protection to soldiery. To-day not a wall or fence in the 
whole region but shows the signs of the struggle that waged around 
them. Immediatey after the battle heaps of dead marked every 
one of these shelters, showing where hand to hand struggles had 
taken place, as the Japanese, foot by foot, from house to house, 
from wall to wall, from village to village, had advanced across the 
plain. 

General Oku's attack was ferocious. To him had been as- 
signed the task of turning the Russian right back upon Mukden at 
the centre to make it impossible for this force to assume an offensive 
initiative and swing northward to cut off Nogi when the culminating 
attack had been delivered. Sandiapu, that had been the scene of 
the desperate failure of Gripenberg, was the pivot for the Japanese 
attack. General Oku avoided the Russian right centre just left of 
tht railroad, because these positions were in part commar.ded by 
Putiloff Hill, and the taking of the Russian fortifications here would 
only mean a falling back under the protection of Russia's impregna- 

507 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Lie centre. With Sandiapu as a pivot, however, Oku drove the 
attack in a northeasterly direction, rather than northward, parallel 
to the Russian lines. His assaults began simultaneously with 
Kuroki's attack at Tsinkhetchen, and in one tremendous dash the 
Russian line was broken, crumbled in the plain five miles north of 
Sandiapu, and the struggle had begun which after ten days' fighting 
had doubled the Russian flank back until its line, beginning at a 
point five miles west of the railroad, was bent back at right angles 
to the line it had occupied at the opening of the battle. This 
achievement had been accomplished in the face of a determined 
resistance. Throughout the struggle the artillery was rendered use- 
less for hours at a time, while the infantry engaged in hand-to-hand 
struggles. The story of the attack on a single of the score or more 
of villages is typical of all of them. 

There was a brief lull just at dawn. Then for an hour field 
guns roared all along the line searching for the infantry lines and 

batteries of the enemy. House and walls 
Village by Village were the targets- Shells in deadly show- 
Taken ers ground walls to dust, ploughed the 
fields, shaved the crowns from broken 
ground that might hide creeping lines of troops. An hour of sys- 
tematic, sweeping bombardment, then the army was ready for the 
business of the hour. From cover on every side little squads of 
Japanese troops dashed into the open. Ten yards they sped then 
threw themselves prone on the ground wherever any approach to 
protection could be found. 

Now it was the turn of the Russian guns to bark. From all 
along their lines in the dusk of dawn resounded the din of artillery. 
The open, when the advance had begun, instantly grew lividly aflame 
with bursting shrapnel. It seemed that nothing could live under 

508 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that awful baptism of steel. Then the din subsided before the 
Japanese, glasses glued to their eyes, could catch telltale feathers 
of smoke that even the smokeless powder sends out from big guns. 
The echoes of the guns are still reverberating far away among the 
foothills, when up from the ground again spring those lithe, invin- 
cible shadows that speed once more ten yards or more and then 
vanish as they hug the earth. Where there were five, three have 
survived ; here and there a single one gets up to continue the advance 
where a group had been. But from behind others are making these 
short dashes, too. The plain finally is fairly alive with troops, 
dashing forward, taking cover, dashing forward again- Five hun- 
dred yards away when they started, their numbers are already 
thinning when the first hundred yards has been crossed. Others fill 
the gaps and two hundred yards are crossed, and in the growing 
light it can be seen that strewn all along the line of the advance 
are forms that lie stark and still when the living spring to action 
for those unhalting sprints. 

Now Russian riflemen are heard from. Rifles crackle from 
every side, and then death begins high carnival. But the advance 
goes on. No rising now and speeding those few yards. The Jap- 
anese are crawling. The living use the bodies of the dead for 
protection. Often pushing these before them they cover yard by 
yard, the zone of death. Now only a hundred yards divides them 
from the outermost huts of the village. Hotter and hotter becomes 
the fire of the defenders. In a moment the assault has begun. A 
hundred, two hundred, are on their feet. Bullets eat holes in their 
ranks, but only the dead falter. Presently, with the ring of steel 
on steel, the ranks close. The rifle fire is fitful in the disorder of 
hand-to-hand fighting. Then up from all parts of the open rise 
scores of Japanese. They sweep into the midst of the fray, whole 

509 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

companies still coming press the fight. Back through the village 
from house to house, from wall to wall, goes on the hand-to-hand, 
man to man duel. Never once did the Japanese fail in the early 
days of the struggle to drive back the Russian defenders, for when 
one such attack failed there were countless others eager to begin 
again the same tactics. 

The Russians seemed demoralized by the apparent impotency 
of their artillery to prevent these advances. Often the Russian lines 

suffered by their shrapnel, so thoroughly 
Russian Artillery was the ground in front of their positions 

Impotent searched by their gunners. Nevertheless, 

the guns had hardly hushed before men 
seemed to spring from the ground and speed on toward them. To 
the more superstitious there was something uncanny about this little 
foe. The only solution was the open ranks, the each-man-for-him^ 
self, the use of every fragment of shelter. Russian solid formations 
fairly melted as they rushed into the Japanese shrapnel fire. A 
single shell mowed down a score. It took ten shells at least to dis- 
able a single Japanese because of the way they scattered out over 
the field. 

Just behind the final advance of the main force which never 
moved until the skirmish attack had engaged the Russians too 
closely for either artillery or a destructive rifle fire, came the engi- 
neers with telegraph and telephone equipment. Bamboo poles were 
swiftly in place, and yard by yard the wire followed the advance. 
Presently at Oku's headquarters, usually the shelter of a hut within 
a mile of the actual fighting, would come the thick click, click of the 
telegraph or the jingle of the telephone. "We have taken the vil- 
lage" was usually the message. 

Thus village after village was taken in this memorable struggle, 
until, as has been told, the Russian line had been driven from miles 

5IO 



THE TAP'AN^RUSSfA WM. 

of positions upon which months of labor had been expended and 
in the closing days of the battle were paralleling the railroad from 
the Sha-ho to a point five miles northwest of Mukden. Oku had 
done his part. 

Thus we have told the story of the battle on the Japanese 
right, centre and rear, up to the time when the assault of the Port 

Arthur army was to be launched. The 
When the Crushing battle had continued without intermission 

Blow Fell from February 24 to March 5. The Jap- 
anese on the right or east front had 
driven back the enemy from his advanced positions across the 
rugged hills of the Tie range and was battling to drive back that 
flank on the railroad and to effect an advance to reach a position 
in the rear of Mukden. At the centre a struggle had gone on with- 
out decisive result because, largely, the Japanese only planned to 
keep this part of the enemy's line busy with righting until the flank- 
attack armies achieved positions, either in the rear of Mukden or 
near enough to strike, and strike hard at the foe should he be com- 
pelled to retreat. Oku's army, we have seen, came nearest to ac- 
complishing this task. So far as the actual results of the fighting of 
these three armies were concerned, while the Japanese everywhere 
had outfought and had outgeneralled the Russians, there was noth- 
ing accomplished which made the situation particularly alarming 
to Kuropatkin. His left flank, eastward had been driven in twenty 
miles but with the aid of heavy reinforcements he had checked the 
enemy five miles away from Fushan and when March 5 drew to a 
close the reports from that direction to the Commander-in-Chief 
not only recounted that every assault by the Japanese had been re- 
pulsed but that after thirteen bloody reverses on March 4, Kuroki 
seemed to be drawing away to the south. 

511 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Hope rose high in the mind of the Russian General. He be- 
lieved that this attack on the east had been the real strength of the 
Japanese attack. He perceived that the Japanese had not been In 
earnest at the center and he attributed reverses on his right to the 
fact, that he had withdrawn a full division from Lieutenant-General 
Kaulbars, commanding there and he hoped, now that Kuroki seemed 
to have given up the struggle, that he could withdraw a force from 
the east, throw it into the fight west of the railroad, turn the tide 
against Oku and win a negative victory by defeating the manifest 
purpose of the Japanese to drive him from the Sha-ho River posi- 
tions. While his right flank had been bent back through an arc of 
ninety degrees from the original position on the Hun River they still 
held a strong line five miles west of the railroad. The falling back 
of these troops had resulted in a loss of ground but had also resulted 
in a strong concentration and his lines were capable of greater re- 
sistance as a result. Then, too, the Japanese had been fighting con- 
tinuously for twelve days and must be near the limits of human en- 
durance. Altogether when the sun went down on the field the 
Russian Commander felt that victory was near. He did not expect 
a decisive, positive victory but after so long a series of disasters even 
that sort of victory which consisted only in having prevented the 
enemy from forcing the abandonment of a position, would have sent 
a thrill of joy and hope through the army and the Russian nation. 
It would have inspired the army with confidence for its work. It 
would have been a weapon at home against the revolutionist, the op- 
ponent of the war, the foes of the dynasty. For the General him- 
self it meant a return of confidence in his leadership on the part of 
the army, on the part of the Emperor. It would go far toward wip- 
ing out the record of unbroken defeat, retreat, disaster which had 

$12 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

marked the entire campaign. Victory was more vital to Kuropatkin, 
personally, than to Russia. The General was fighting as much for 
personal vindication as for the glory of Russian arms. To him, there- 
fore, the outlook for even a negative success was charged with per- 
sonal happiness. 

This was the outlook when day dawned, March 5, 1905. By 
nightfall of that same day a cloud, no larger then than a man's 

hand, was rising in the west that was to 
A Cloud in the West break in a storm, crushing the Russian de- 
fense, banishing the dreams of Kuropat- 
kin. That cloud was the army of General Nogi. 
The tale must be told from the beginning. 
Port Arthur capitulated January 2, 1905. A week later Gen- 
eral Nogi stood within the heart of the Russian settlement there and 
reviewed companies from the various army units that had partici- 
pated in the siege. Out to the world went the message that Nogi's 
great task was accomplished. But there was other work for Nogi. 
Within three weeks after the Gibraltar of the Orient had fallen, 
80,000 troops, released by that event were bound northward to join 
the armies under Marshal Oyama, then in winter quarters facing 
Kuropatkin. The army had been reinforced largely from Japan with 
fresh troops who had not known the smell of smoke. Enough of 
these had been sent to equal any possible reinforcement that could 
be sent to Kuropatkin, as nearly as this number could be estimated. 
Nogi's army meant reinforcement of an entirely different kind. 
Here were men inured to the rigors of campaigning by eleven 
months of as arduous fighting as ever fell to troops in all of the 
history of war. By the first week in February the entire army had 
reached its new position west of Liao-yang, ready for whatever mis- 
sion might be assigned to it. That task was the actual capture of 

513 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Mukden. More than that, Nogi's men were called upon to break the 
defence on the east, to strike the railroad north of Mukden, to inter- 
cept the line of retreat and to join with Kuroki in the enveloping of 
the Russian army. It was the crowning work of the battle. It was 
a tribute to the bravery and skill of the men who had humbled Port 
Arthur. It was one that meant hardship, all but superhuman exer- 
tion, but if they succeeded it meant that chief credit for another 
great victory would belong to this army of veterans. 

Nogi's work did not begin until the battle had been well de- 
veloped on every front. His was to take up the work begun against 
the Russian right flank by Oku and with a fresh army carry it to 
a conclusion. As has been shown, Oku prepared the way in a splen- 
did manner. He broke the Russian lines and rolled back the flank 
from the plains east and west of the Hun River. When this had 
been accomplished Nogi's army got under way. Leaving their posi- 
tions west of Liao-yang, the veterans sped northwards. They crossed 
the Hun at a point a few miles above the junctionof theHunandLiao 
Rivers where two days before Oku had begun forcing back the 
Russians. His army after the crossing, was divided, one small de- 
tachment, amply supplied with artillery moving swiftly northeast- 
ward to the Liao; thence northward to Sinmintin, thirty-five miles 
due west of Mukden. This city was outside the limits of the war 
zone as laid down by the Powers in their agreement to preserve the 
neturality of China. Nevertheless it had been a veritable supply 
depot for the Russians, caravans of foodstuffs of all kinds and even 
of ammunition coming from Chinese points on the Siberian border 
and from southern coast cities to deliver contraband here to waiting 
bands of Cossacks. As a result of this use of the city by the Rus- 
sians the Japanese did not hesitate to enter there. They found a few 
Cossacks and a great horde of Russian civil officials together with 

5 1 * 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

great stores of supplies most of it in carts as it had reached the city 

ready to start westward for the Russian base at Mukden. Some 

prisoners were taken but no goods that were not actually in the 

possession of Russian civil and military officials were seized. 

The detachment then began the dash westward along the 

Sinmiritin-Mukden road toward Mukden. On the morning of 

January 5, they formed a junction with 
Kuropatkin Ignores the main force that had marched north _ 
Danger 

ward on a line parallel with the railroad, 

twenty miles west of the Russians and, of course, had met no oppo- 
sition, so effectively had Oku prepared the way. The news of the 
arrival of the Japanese at Sinmintin, March 5, was the first intima- 
tion of this movement and General Kuropatkin ignored the news 
imagining that the force had only been a handful of Japanese cav- 
alry raiders. They were raiders, in fact, but there were 80,000 of 
them and they were under orders from Marshal Oyama to enter 
Mukden as conquerors on March 10. 

In their four days' march northward Nogi's army covered 30 
miles the first day, 25 miles the second day, 23 miles the third day 
and 28 miles the fourth day, and after that tremendous feat their 
real work was before them. The army turned eastward at the Sin- 
mintin-Mukden road, twenty miles from Mukden, and five miles 
nearer Mukden they met the first resistance. As a protection to 
Mukden, Kuropatkin had thrown three lines of protective works east- 
ward. Nogi's army came upon the first of these March 6. His 
troops, swept over the Russian defenders like the sea over a sunken 
wreck, so swiftly had come the overwhelming attack. March 7, the 
veterans covered the distance to the second line of defences. In 
the meantime Kuropatkin had awakened. He saw that he was in 
danger of being overwhelmed from this unexpected quarter. His 

SIS 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

visionsofvictoryof March 4,werealready fleeting- and only two days 

had gone by. Every available squadron 

Center Positions c , \ ^ a. * i ' l 

., , , from centre and left were ordered post- 
Abandoned L 

haste to meet the danger. The Russian 
lines that up to this time had only been called upon to concentrate by 
orderly retrograde movements were called upon to reform the whole 
line, falling back from his impregnable position at the center, south 
of the Sha-ho. There was movement everywhere. On the east 
regiment after regiment moved out and the remaining regiments 
realigned themselves. This fact is important because it brought 
Kuroki's opportunity to fulfil the mission that had been entrusted 
to him and will be told later. Meantime Nogi's veterans rushed on 
unchecked until March 8, when the Russian resistance showed the 
strength that had come with the reinforcements. Baron General 
Kaulbars took immediate command, met and placed the arriving 
Russian regiments and displayed finer generalship than any general 
in the entire Russian line throughout the battle. On the east Ren- 
nenkampf had splendid plans for offensive movements until Gen- 
eral Kuroki made a move, then his plans crumbled like houses of 
cards and he fought only a defensive fight from start to finish, bril- 
liant though his resistance may have been. But Kaulbars, when his 
force had been completed, met Nogi manfully and the duel be- 
tween these great captains forms a notable addition to the history 
of military achievement. 

For all the magnificent offensive ability of the Russian Gen- 
eral, however, Nogi's veterans would not be denied. The first fif- 
teen miles of their advance was like the rush of a hurricane. Then 
came the real fighting. This continued March 8, 9, 10, in which 
time the Russians had been forced back literally step by step on 
Mukden. Calmly the Japanese General ordered assault after as- 

5i6 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

sault on the Russian lines ignoring the heaps of the dead that, when 
the third day of the battle had brought decisive victory, numbered 
20,000 choked into the narrow line of advance through those last 
five miles to Mukden. The shells from his artillery swept the rail- 
road and the Trade Road that runs beside the railroad over which 
the Russian center was retreating. If Nogi, in those three days 
saw 20,000 of his brave men fall and if this imperturbable soldier 
felt any pang there was balm in the fact that he had inflicted a 
loss on the enemy of three for every one of his own men who had 
fallen. 

In the course of the three days whole new chapters were written 
into books of strategy. The Japanese General and troops answered 

once for all the accusation that they were 
Japanese Ingenuity mere imitators of western methods. 

Marvellous Among the uncanny tricks that they 
successfully used many have no equal 
in military annals. Taking advantage of the first dust which 
began to rise on the second day and played an important 
part in the whole of the battle, a Japanese force turned 
their backs on the Russians and fired into the ranks of their 
own men pushing on behind them. The Russians took the force thus 
engaged for reinforcements and valorously aided them in holding off 
the Japanese pursuit. Meantime, back, back, step by step this mock 
Russian battle line drew nearer and nearer the duped Russians. 
Presently when only a few yards separated them they turned with 
the savage battlecry that had carried them over the ramparts of 
Rihlung fort and practically annihilated the victims of the ruse. 
This was only one of many unheard of acts which marked the path 
of Nogi to victory. When shells from his artillery began to reach 
the railroad his battle front turned as on a pivot around the little 

5*7 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

town of Tatchekiao and the advance was directed not directly to- 
ward Mukden but to a point five miles north of that city as part of 
the effort to envelop the Russians and more particularly to cut off 
the retreat. Thereupon the Russians resistance was redoubled in 
fury. With reinforcements that had been sent to this danger point 
the Russians outnumbered the Japanese two to one. But just as it 
was of more and more importance for the Russians to hold Nogi in 
check so it was more and more important for Nogi to crush the 
resistance and to drive his wedge in on Mukden. The struggle at 
every moment was hand to hand. The artillery on both sides fired 
into the indiscriminate masses of struggling men. Absolute frenzy 
marked the struggle as waged on both side. 

Slowly but surely the Russian resistance weakened and with 
dismay Kuropatkin saw that his flank could not withstand the 

weight of the incessant attack. If the 

Retreat a Carnival flank should be broken it meant annihila- 

of Slaughter ti° n or surrender for his entire force. 

Retreat would be impossible except 'at 
inhuman sacrifice of life. Already shells were reaching the rail- 
road while the battle was swinging northeastward toward the line 
of retreat and every possible man had been thrown into the defence. 
There was only one thing to be done — retreat, and the order went 
forth on the evening of March 7. Under cover of darkness every 
available car had been loaded with stores, guns, whatever could be 
saved. Troops in Mukden piled into miles of box-cars that soon 
after midnight began the dash northward. The rearguard was or- 
ganized of the troops then opposing Nogi and such of those from 
the center as could be made available. These retreated eastward 
from Mukden leaving as the last of the center army passed north- 
ward toward Tie Pass, the next station. The flank that had so long 

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MUKDEN 



T7ffl 



XKE RETREAT FROM MUKDEN. 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

opposed Kuroki in the last crumbling of the Russian defence was 
completely cut off. The disorder along the front occasioned by the 
hasty withdrawal of reinforcements for the hard pressed right 
flank west of Mukden has been mentioned. Kuroki, who amazed 
the Russians by the readiness with which he interpreted every 
move that they made, saw in this disorder his opportunity. He had 
been battling for an opportunity to pierce the Russian line and join 
with Nogi, but fairly had been checked and held by the tre- 
mendous resistance of Rennenkampf. A brigade fell back from in 
front of the left flank of his army. Another stood ready to fall 
into its place. But while the very manoeuvre was being carried out 
Kuroki struck hard directly between the two forces. His wedge 
went deep into the Russian ranks and the Japanese General threw 
in behind them every available unit of his army. Desperately the 
Russians struggled to crush the foe and rejoin their broken lines 
but the Japanese, every man of them, knew that their hour had 
come. Thousands fell but thousands took their places. Mile by 
mile went Kuroki's wedge and by March 10, when on the west Nogi 
was forcing the vanguard of his fighting line into Mukden, Kuroki 
at last had won a position from which to strike the long line of 
Russians now surging northward in a retreat that had now become 
a rout. 

Mukden had been taken. Nogi had fulfilled Oyama's prophecy. 
So far as the long struggle had been for possession of the Sha-ho 

River position and Mukden it was over 
Oyama's Prophecy „, T , , 

Fulfilled •*• e J a P anese na d won a momentous vic- 
tory. Vast spoils had fallen into their 
possession. Fully twenty thousand prisoners had surrendered when 
Kuroki had broken through the Russian left, completing the circle 
of steel around whatever of the Russian army had not already 

520 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

made good its escape north of the line from Fushan to Mukden. 
There were hundreds of thousands of shells, millions of rounds of 
small ammunition; there were stores enough to feed the army for 
months, there was Russian property valued at millions, there were 
guns, horses, wagons, railroad material, enough for one hundred 
and fifty miles of track. There was also the knowledge that a loss 
in men had been inflicted three times as great as the Japanese had 
suffered. Mukden and Fushan and a score of smaller towns and 
cities had been taken, invaluable coal mines were now within the 
Japanese lines practically the last upon which the Russians could 
rely for fuel with which to operate the railroad. The victory, in- 
deed, from every standpoint, save one, was complete. 

The Russian army had escaped. 

This escape had been effected, because -despite the wonderful 
extent of their victory the Japanese armies had failed to meet 
across the north of the Russian position before the bulk of Kuro- 
patkin's army had swept out of the mouth of the bottle. Nature 
herself saved them. When on the evening of March 7, Kuropatkin 
ordered the retreat the great battlefield had already become en- 
veloped in tremendous clouds of blinding dust and snow swirled up 
from the dry plains by a tremendous gale. Beginning on March 7, 
this veritable cyclone increased in fury throughout the night of 
March, 8, and continued with unbroken severity during March 9, 
10 and 11, days vital to the Russian army. In the main the Jap- 
anese suffered most from the storm. Their object was to find the 
foe and attack, the Russian object was simply to plunge northward 
toward safety. Ultimately the storm had reached a degree of vio- 
lence which made sight impossible and the Japanese pursuit was 
halted at a moment when it seemed that the full purpose of their 
Generals' strategy was to be realized. When two days later they 

S2i 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were able to take up the pursuit the possibility of complete success 
had passed. But there was still opportunity to strike the fleeing 
army and the horrors of that flight and pursuit, from March 12 to 
March 15, will never adequately be told. The Japanese forced a 
way parallel to the line of pursuit on both sides and clung relent- 
lessly to the routed army. Here a company was annihilated by 
furious cavalry charge. Here a regiment was cut off, surrounded 
and compelled to surrender after awful slaughter. Forty thousand 
prisoners were taken in the four days of this carnival of slaughter 
and when the remnants of the Russian army had reached Tie Pass, 
forty-three miles away, Kuropatkin had lost 170,000 men, killed, 
wounded and missing. His army had lost fifty per cent, of its 
strength, a slaughter not equalled in the history of civilization. No 
parallel exists until the half mythological days of Asian conflicts 
are reached. 



,522 



CHAPTER XIX. 

Battle of the Japan Sea— Fleet Russia's Last Hope— Tragedy of the North Sea 
— Reaches Asiatic Waters — On the Eve of the Struggle — Russians in Dou- 
ble Line — Borodino First to Go Down — Russians in Full Flight — Admiral 
Nebogatoff Surrenders — Togo's Reports of the Battle — Rozhdestvenskv a 
Prisoner — Searching Sea for Remnants — Japan's Loss Only 424 Men — Your 
Utmost for the Empire — Russian Line Enveloped — Destroyers Took Last 
Thrust — As Sailors Saw the Battle — Blowing up the Izumrud— The News 
Reaches Russia — Russian Story of Disaster — Why Russians Were Defeated. 

HE Japanese-Russian war has added many pages of 

T awe-inspiring achievement to the vast volume of 
the world's valorous records of land and sea. 
Notable, among all of the amazing array, ever 
will stand the naval battle of the Sea of Japan, fought 
in the Straits of Korea, Sunday, May 28 ; Monday, May 
29, and continuing as a pursuit on Tuesday, May 30, 
1905. Russia's enormous armada of thirty-seven fighting 
ships, and one hundred ships in all, had been sent to 
the Far East to recover command of the sea from Japan, 

which had been won from her in the naval 
Battle of the Japan Sea campaign of 1904, when the Russian Port 

Arthur fleet had been destroyed and the 
Russian Vladivostok squadron had been weakened to a helpless con- 
dition. The result was overwhelming victory for Japan, achieved 
at the cost to Russia of the annihilation of her entire armada. No 
naval battle of history equals this in the enormous power of the 
fighting array; none exceeds it in the degree of its decisiveness. 
Trafalgar, a hundred years earlier, affords the only possible parallel, 

5 2 3 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

and Trafalgar, for a century the world's greatest naval struggle, was 
outdone. 

The story begins eight months before these thrilling events in 
the Straits of Korea, when the Russian fleet, variously called the 
Baltic Fleet and the Second Pacific Fleet, sailed from Cronstadt, in 
the Baltic, on its 20,000 mile journey, around Africa and by way 
of the Indian Ocean to the Orient. 

The fleet represented every available Russian warship. A half 
dozen others, too old for active service or still in course of building, 

were left in Russian waters, the Czar de- 
Fleet Russia's ciding to leave the home shores practically 
Last Hope unprotected after securing a secret agree- 
ment with Germany, which amounted to 
a temporary offensive and defensive alliance. The fighting strength 
of the squadrons included seven battleships, two armored cruisers, 
six cruisers, with a full complement of torpedo boat destroyers, a 
fleet equal, on paper, to the entire available navy of Japan, and in 
some aspects stronger than any Japan could hope to muster. Su- 
preme command of the armada was entrusted to Vice-Admiral 
Rozhdestvensky, with three divisional commanders, Vice-Admiral 
Volkersham, Rear Admiral Nebogatoff, and Rear Admiral Enquist. 
The ultimate task of the fleet was to regain mastery of the sea from 
Japan, in undisputed possession by reason of having destroyed the 
Russian Pacific squadrons at Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Vladi- 
vostok, Russia's sole remaining port in the Orient, was the destina- 
tion. From that point it was intended to assail Japan on the sea; to 
interrupt her transport sendee, which was vital to her army then 
in the midst of a victorious campaign, 300 miles from the sea, in the 
heart of Manchuria, and thus cripple and harass the Island Empire 
until no other course than to sue for peace would be open to her. 

5 2 4 



T HE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The task was enormous; so vastly difficult, indeed, that until the 
actual departure of the fleet few, anywhere, believed that such a plan 
was seriously contemplated. Even when departure had been made, 
experts rather held to the view that Russia, herself, meant to ask 
for peace and was merely making a demonstration that might be 
counted on to modify Japan's demands. 

The voyage had hardly been begun when an incident occurred, 
which has been already narrated, and which astonished the entire 

world and nearly led to war between Rus- 
Tragedy of the sia and Great Britain. In the North Sea, 

North Sea at the point known as the Dogger Bank, 

the Russian vessels encountered the 
Gamecock fishing fleet from Hull, England. The Russian admiral 
mistook some of the trawlers for torpedo boats and ordered his 
vessels to fire. One fishing boat was sunk and two men were killed, 
others v ••it?" badlv wounded. 

For -some days the excitement in England was intense, and 
British official documents published later on showed that the two 
countries were on the point of war, but the crisis was ended by an 
agreement to refer the incident to an international naval tribunal. 
This board of inquiry met in Paris, and after a long investigation 
reported that the Russian contention that hostile torpedo boats were 
present when the firing took place was not justified. Rozhdestvensky, 
however, was acquitted of the charge of conduct unbecoming a 
sailor, and the incident was ultimately closed by the payment of a 
large money indemnity by Russia. 

The Dogger Bank affair caused some delay to the Russian 
ships, though not nearly as much as Englishmen expected. After 
leaving the Straits of Gibraltar the fleet divided, one division, under 
Admiral Rozhdestvensky, proceeding by way of the Cape of Good 

525 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Hope and the other, under Admiral Vollkersham, going via the Suez 
Canal. Rozhdestvensky had with him most of the battleships and 
Voelkersam the majority of the cruisers. 

Both squadrons proceeded very slowly, and the reports from 
time to time regarding their whereabouts were of the most puzzling 
character. On January i, however, Rozhdestvensky reached Mada- 
gascar, and there he awaited the cruiser squadron. The long time 
spent there led to renewed assertions that the Admiralty at St. 
Petersburg would never order the fleet to the Far East. In the 
middle of March, however, reports were printed that the Russians 
had sailed. These reports were denied, and then repeated, and at 
length it was definitely established that the Baltic fleet had sailed. 

Nothing more was heard of it till April 8, when the news came 
that the fleet had passed Singapore and was in the China Sea. On 

entering the China Sea, Admiral Ry/hd- 

Fleet Reaches estvensky sailed directly to" Kadfif?5ih Bay, 

Asiatic Waters on the coast of Indo-China, in French 

territorial waters. The prolonged stay of 
the fleet resulted in a vigorous protest from Japan to France, back 
of which was the possibility that Japan would invoke the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, calling upon Great Britain to compel respect of 
neutrality by France. France, in addition to instructing her repre- 
sentatives in Indo-China to demand that the Russians leave territorial 
waters, forwarded the protest to Russia. 

Admiral Rozhdestvensky, on the eve of the great struggle, had 
dismissed every unnecessary ship. More than a half hundred colliers 

and supply ships, which had accompanied 

On the Eve of the fleet or had met it in the China Sea, 

the Struggle were dismissed after the last ton of coal 

had been stored on the big fighting ships. 



THE RUSSIAN FLEET. 



Name 



9 
3 is' 

3 w 
V ° 
I rt 

>-3 
o 

3 



W 
W 



2 
c/i O 

>o g 
W 

3 
o 



Kniaz S'uvaroff 13.5^6 16.800 18.0 

Alexander III 13.516 l6 - 8o ° l8 ° 

Borodino ...13.516 16.800 18.0 

Orel 13,516 16,800 18.0 

Oslabya 12.674 14.500 190 

Sissoi Veliky 8,88o 8,500 16.0 

Navarin 9-476 9.000 16.0 

ARMORED CRUISERS. 

Dmitri D'skoi 5-893 7.ooo 15.0 

Admiral Nakhimoff 8.500 9.000 19.0 

PROTECTED CRUISERS. 

Oleg 6,675 19.500 23.0 

Aurora 6,630 11,000 20.0 

Svietlana 3-828 8,500 20.0 

Almaz 3.285 7,500 190 

Jemtchug 3.200 17,000 24.0 

Izumrud 3.200 17.000 24.0 

THE JAPANESE FLEET. 

Asahi 15,000 15,000 18.0 

Shikishima I5-000 15,000 18.0 

Mikasa 15.000 16,000 18.0 

Fuji 12,300 13,000 18.0 

ARMORED CRUISERS. 

Tokiwa 9.750 18.000 21.5 

Asama 9-750 18,000 21.5 

Yakumo 9.850 16.000 20.0 

Azuma 9436 17.000 21.0 

Idzuma 9800 15.000 24.7 

Iwate 9-8oo 15,000 24.7 

Kasuga 7-853 14.000 20.0 

Nisshin 7.853 i4,ooo 20.0 

PROTECTED CRUISERS. 

Takasago 4.300 15.500 24.0 

Kasagi 4784 15.500 22.5 

Itsukushima 4-277 5,4O0 16.7 

Hashidate 4,277 5,4O0 16.7 

Matsushima 4,277 5,400 16.7 

Naniwa 3727 7.120 17.3 

Takishibo 3727 7.120 17-3 

Atkitsushima 3.^0 8,400 19.0 

Nitaka 3.420 9,500 20.0 

Tsushima 3420 9.500 20.0 

Suma 2.700 8.500 20.0 

Akashi 2,700 8.500 20.0 

Idzumi 3,ooo 6,000 18.0 

527 



O 

«+ s 

6" » 
I 3 

I— I ri 

3 a 



11.6 
11.6 
11.6 
11.6 
10.5 
12.5 
12.5 



12.2 
6.0 



4.0 

4-5 
4.0 



14.6 
14.6 
14.6 
14.6 

6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 

4^.2 
454 
1 1.4 



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3">Cr" f» 
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4,426 
4426 
4,426 
4,426 
2,672 
3,186 
3404 

444 
944 

872 
632 
476 
184 
184 
184 



4.232 
4,232 
4,232 
4,005 

1,779 
1,779 
1,679 
1,679 

1,779 
1,779 
1,686 
1,606 

804 

804 

1,260 

1,260 

1,260 

1,200 

1,200 

380 

466 

466 

335 

335 

335 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

From the Saddle Islands, a thousand miles stretched away to Vladi- 
vostok. Coal and stores for the dash there were on every ship. 
Then prows were turned northward, there was a full day when 
nothing was known of the Russians. Then came this word, that 
the great destiny-laden armada was sighted approaching Admiral 
Togo's lair in the Straits of Korea. Forty-eight hours more, and 
the Japanese admiralty was electrified by the characteristically mod- 
est announcement from Japan's great naval captain : 

"The main force of the Russian second and third fleets is nearly 
annihilated. Please feel assured of it." 

Between lies a tale marvelous for brilliancy, valor, daring, for 
all that is spectacular and awe-inspiring in war; for all that spells 
glory to the victor; for all that defeat, disaster, can mean to the 
beaten and crushed. In brief, of Russia's seven battleships, five 
had been sunk, and two, captives, were flying the flag of the victor ; 
Of the mighty array of cruisers, all but four were at the bottom 
of the sea. Of the destroyers, three were afloat. In the harbor of 
Vladivostok were a single unarmored cruiser, and these three 
destroyers, the sorry fragments of the armada that reached this 
destination for which the flower of Russia's European squadron had 
set out. Sixty hours after the battle three armored cruisers, the 
Aurora, Oleg and Jemtchug, laden with wounded, riddled with shot 
and shell, crept into the harbor of Manila, there to be interned, with 
their officers, Admiral Enquist among them. As a climax to the 
victory, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was a prisoner, badly wounded, 
and in the care of Japanese physicians in the naval hospital at Sasebo. 
Admiral Volkersham was dead. He had fallen in the first havoc- 
working broadside from the Japanese fleet. Admiral Nebogatofr 
was a prisoner. Without a fight he had surrendered two battleships 
and two coast defense ironclads, with the result that after the battle 

528 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

that had annihilated the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet was even 
more powerful than when it cleared decks for action. 

The Russian fleet had, in truth, sailed into Admiral Togo's 
lair. The Straits of Korea lie between Japan and Korea, and are 
an average of one hundred miles wide. Half way across rise the 
Tsu Islands, which Japan has fortified until they are a veritable 
Gibraltar. Only twenty-five miles wide is the Tsushimi Channel of 
Strait, between Tsu Island and the Japanese coast. 

So narrow indeed is the water that as the Russian ships were 
pressed eastward toward Tsu Island the forts there got range of 

the battleships and sank the Oslabya. 
Under Guns of the Forts Togo's base was at Masampho, on the 

Korean coast. Thousands of Japanese 
knew this fact, but so deeply was the necessity for secrecy appre- 
ciated by all classes of the islanders that throughout the nine months 
of waiting the entire world never had the slightest intimation of 
the point from which Japan's defensive blow would be struck. The 
general impression was that Formosa, the southernmost of the 
Japanese archipelago, would be chosen. This opinion was fostered 
by show of activity there and by various orders calculated to mark 
this spot as of especial significance in the campaign. When Rozhd- 
estvensky had traversed the Straits of Formosa without opposition 
and had reached the China coast north of there, Russians even 
rejoiced, declaring that their admiral had outwitted the Japanese 
by eluding their trap. Meantime Togo waited. His position 
enabled him to meet the enemy should the direct route to Vladivostok 
via the Straits of Korea and the Sea of Japan be chosen, or he was 
in position to sail northward to intercept the Russians should 
Rozhdestvensky decide to go further eastward into the Pacific, circle 
Japan, and finally approach Vladivostok by La Pelouse or another 

529 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

of the channels between the northern islands of the Japanese archi- 
pelago. When Rozhdestvensky headed north from the China coast 
toward the Straits of Korea he fell in with the plan of battle to meet 
which the whole genius of the Japanese admiral had been preparing. 
Only one detail failed to agree with what Togo had expected. He 
believed that the Russians would shun the narrow channel east of 
Tsu Island, nearer Japan, and would traverse the western channel 
between Tsu Island and Korea. In the latter event the blow would 
have been dealt by a dash from Mesampho. As it happened, the 
fleet had only to round the northern promontory of Tsu Island and 
fall upon the Russians in the most disadvantageous position that 
could have been found in all of the waters of the Orient. 

The strength of the fleets as they approached on that fateful 
Saturday morning may be shown in tabular form. The chief units 
are here given. In addition, there were twelve torpedo boat destroy- 
ers with the Russian fleet and a veritable swarm of destroyers and 
torpedo boats with the Japanese fleet. Nevertheless, the armada, 
with practically twice the number of Japanese battleships, would, 
on paper, have advantage over a large fleet, made up so largely 
of lighter vessels. 

The Russian fleet advanced in a double line, the battleships on 
the side away from the Japanese coast ; the inner line, nearer Japan, 

made up of cruisers and light craft. Ad- 
Russians in miral Togo swung northward of Tsu 
Double Line Island, then turned sharply toward the 
southeast, thus moving parallel to the 
line of bows of the Russian ships, opening the broadsides of all of 
his ships, while through practically all of the first day's battle the 
Russians had only available bow and forward guns, a manoeuvre 
which eliminated enough of the effectiveness of the Russian battle- 

530 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

ships to give Togo an advantage despite his weakness in these 
floating fortresses. 

It had ben planned that the initial attack should be made by 
the giant twelve-inch guns of the Japanese big ships, and that under 
cover of this bombardment the torpedoers and destroyers should 
dash for the leading Russian ships and attempt to throw the enemy's 
column into confusion. 

The commanders of the torpedoing flotilla had previously been 
summoned and had been notified in a few words by the admiral of 
the desperate service that was required of them and of the small 
chance of any of them reporting again for duty. 

They were told, in fact, that it was a simple case of sacrifice, 
and they accepted it so willingly that the admiral found it difficult 
to detail a torpedo reserve in case the first division failed in its task. 
Until sunset the heavy guns of the Japanese battleships and 
the ten-inch battery of the cruiser Kasuga roared and fired at the 
oncoming Russians, while the Russian guns roared in reply. 

First of the Russian battleships in line behind the protected 
cruiser Jemtchung was the 13,000-ton Borodino, and these two soon 

showed that they were receiving the brunt 

Borodino First to of the shelling. The cruiser Nakhimoff. 

Go Down in the van of the Russian port column, 

was also observed to be in distress, and 

then, the sun having set and the quick-setting darkness having come, 

the torpedoes were sent out under cover of a still heavier cannonade. 

The flotilla formed into two divisions, one heading for the battleship 

column of the Russians and the other for the cruisers. 

The searchlights of the Russian fleet threw out their great 
beams and their small gun batteries swept the sea but the swift 
hornets cf the sea went wallowing and buzzing on their way. The^ 

531 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

circled and swept, and then came the dull roars and heaving foun- 
tains that told that the torpedoes had been loosed from their tubes 
and were doing their deadly work. 

Again and again came the roars, and as the Japanese search- 
lights swept across the field of fight and then went out it was seen 
that the great battleship Borodino was sinking; that the protected 
cruiser Svietlana was a wreck; that the battleship Alexander III had 
gone; that the two armored cruisers Dimitri Donskoi and Nakhimoff 
were out of the fighting. A far-sailing shell had also reached and 
sunk the supply ship Kamchatka. Thus ended the first day's fight. 
In the darkness of the night of Saturday, May 27, the shattered 
Russian fleet reformed as well as it might, and once more took up 

its despairing run for the Sea of Japan 
Russians in Full Flight and the haven of Vladivostok. 

Hanging on to the already beaten en- 
emy, an easy matter with his faster ships, Togo picked up the 
Russians all of Saturday night with his searchlights, occasionally 
sending a long-distance shell toward one of the shadowy hulls that 
were racing to get through the straits. 

But just as Togo had selected his fighting ground for working 
out one chapter of the tragedy, so now he chose the scene of the 

second day's fighting. 

To the northeast of Osino Island lies a dangerous little archi- 
pelago known as the Liancourt Rocks, and with his battleships and 
heavily armored cruisers the Japanese admiral stood out in crescent 
form across the Korean Strait and drove the enemy toward this dan- 
gerous running. 

Keeping together in some semblance of order, five Russians, 
consisting of the battleships Nicolai I and Orel and the coast defence 
vessels Senyanin and Apraxine and the protected cruiser Isumrud, 

53 2 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

were heading bravely for the Sea of Japan. Seeing a possibility 
of their escape, Togo, who was personally conducting the pursuit, 
signaled to close in and attack. 

With their forward turrets blazing and roaring, the Japanese 
squadron dashed on. The Russians replied vigorously for a time, 
but the gunnery of the Japanese was too deadly and accurate; shells 
were carrying death and destruction into the fleeing five, and the 
fight went out of the Russians. 

One after another flew surrender signals, the Japanese ceased 
firing, and the Nicolai I, Orel, Senyanin and Apraxine were added 

to the Mikado's navy. Only the Isumrud 
Admiral NebogatofT got away Fleeter than her sisters, she 

Surrenders steamed boldly to the northwest. But she 

was doomed. Swift pursuing Japanese 

cruisers followed, hurling after her tons of metal, much of it taking 

effect. The end came when the Russian ship, entering Vladimir 

Bay, went fast on a reef. The Russian captain blew up the ship. 

So practically ended the second day's fight, and here again the 
apparently impossible happened — Togo's captains all reported, "No 
damage to men or ships." ^ 

Togo's captains, had, however, other things to report, for while 
the main force of the combined squadron was hammering the four 
Russians into subjection off the Liancourt Rocks others of the 
cruisers were chasing scattered Russian ships, while still others were 
completing the work of destruction around Osino Island. Two 
special service ships and a destroyer were captured, and so was the 
armored cruiser Monomach, but she foundered soon after transfer- 
ence of flags. 

And there were prisoners to report, 3,000 of them, including 
the unhappy NebogatofT, while up and down the seas the fight 

533 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

between pursued and pursuer still went on. 

Battles at sea are necessarily fought away from the eyes of 
neutral observers. The active participants are unable to know of 
more than the immediate scene of the drama in which their own 
ship is engaged. Even the admiral of the fleet is unable to see all 
that occurs. Hence detailed, continuous accounts of such occur- 
rences rarely, if ever, are written until years later the disconnected 
stories of here one, there another, can be assembled, corrected, dove- 
tailed. Sufficient time has not elapsed since this remarkable battle 
to permit of such assembling of facts. But both Japanese and 
Russians have told of undividual experiences. These have a 
graphic interest, coming hot from the scene of the great events 
which, perhaps, a more finished narrative might lack. First in 
interest, come the actual reports from the admiral himself. Few 
great fighters have been men of fewer words than this Togo. His 
reports, and, indeed, all of the Japanese reports, have been in marked 
contrast to the elaborate, verbose messages sent to the Emperor 
of Russia. 

The story of the battle, as told by Admiral Togo, follows: 
First report, received morning May 27: 

"Immediately upon the receipt of report that Russian squad- 
ron was in sight our combined squadron started for attack. Weather 

is fine to-day, but with heavy seas." 
Togo's Reports of Second report, received night May 2J : 

the Battle "Combined squadron attacked Russian 

squadron to-day near Okinoshima (south- 
east of Tsushima) and defeated it, sinking at least four ships and 
inflicting heavy damage upon others. Damage to our ships is insig- 
nificant. Our destroyer and torpedo flotillas delivered attack after 
sunset." 

534 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Third report, received Monday, May 29. 

"Main force of our combined squadron continued pursuit since 
the 27th, and attacked (28th) near Liancourt Rocks (northeast of 
Okinoshima) a squadron consisting of Nicolai I (battleship), Orel 
(battleship, Senyanin, Apraxin and Izumurud. Izumurud fled 
while remaining four vessels surrendered. No damage to our ships. 
According to statements of prisoners, vessels sunk in engagement 
May 27 were Borodino (battleship), Alexandre III (battleship), 
Jemtchug and three other ships. Rear Admiral Nebogatoff and 
about 2,000 other Russians were taken prisoners." 

The following are damages suffered by enemy in addition to 
those given above since commencement of battle, as reported by 
commanders not under immediate command of Togo and by obser- 
vation stations : 

Sunk — Admiral Nakhimoff, Dmitri Donskoi, Svietlana, Ad- 
miral Usakoif, Kamchatka, Irutshnsh and three destroyers. 

Vladimir Monomach, foundered after capture. One special 
service ship, whole name unknown, and one destroyer captured. 

Russian losses definitely known so far may be classified as fol- 
lows: 

Two battleships, one coast-defence ship, five cruisers, two 
special ships, three destroyers were sunk ; two battleships, two coast- 
defence ships, one special service ship, one destroyer were captured. 
It is not yet clear whether three vessels, as stated by prisoners to 
have been sunk, are included or not in above list. There are more 
than 1,000 prisoners, besides 2,000 taken by main force of combined 
squadron. 

"The naval engagement is still in progress, so that it will take 
some time before the final results can be known," 

535 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Fourth report from Togo received afternoon, May 30: 
"The main force of our combined fleet, upon accepting surren- 
der of the remaining Russian main force near Liancourt Rocks, in 
the afternoon of May 28, as already reported, stopped pursuit, and 
while engaged in the disposition of surrendered ships found in a 
southwestern direction the Admiral Ushakoff, a coast defence ship. 
Thereupon Izvate and Yakumo were immediately dispatched in pur- 
suit and invited her to surrender, but she refused and was sunk at 
6 P. M. Her crew of over 300 men were rescued. 

Cruiser Dimitri Donskoi was also found in the northwestern 
direction at 5 P. M. and was immediately overtaken and was fired, 
upon vigorously by our fourth division and second destroyer flotilla. 
"She was attacked that night by the second destroyer flotilla, 
and the next morning was found aground on the southeastern shore 
of Urleung Island, off the Korean coast. 

"Our destroyer Sazanami captured, toward the evening of May 
27, in the south of Urleung Island, the Russian destroyer Biedovy, 

wherein were found Admiral Rozhdest- 

Rozhdestvensky a vensky and another admiral, both severely 

Prisoner wounded, together with eighty Russians, 

including staff officers from the flagship 

Kniaz Suvaroff, which was sunk at 5.29 P. M. on May 27. They 

were all taken prisoners. 

"Our cruiser Chitose, while cruising to the northward on the 
morning of May 28, found and sunk another Russian destroyer. 
Our cruiser Nditaka arid destroyer Murakumo attacked also at noon 
on May 28 a Russian destroyer, which finally went aground. 

"According to various reports hitherto received and statements 
of prisoners, the result of the battle from May 2j to May 29, is as 
follows : 

536 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"Prince Suvaroff, Alexander III, Borodino, Dimitri Donskoi, 
r Admiral Nachimoif, Monomach, Zemtchug, Admiral Ushakoff, one 
converted cruiser and two destroyers sunk. 

"Nicolai I, Orel, Admiral Apraxine, Admiral Senyavin and 
destroyer Biedovy captured. According to the prisoners, the Osliabia 
sunk about 3 P. M., and the Navarin also was sunk. 

"Almas, on May 27, was observed in a disabled and sinking 
condition, but her final fate is yet unknown. 

"The full particulars regarding the injury to our ships are not 
yet in hand, but as far as I could ascertain none was seriously 
injured, all being still engaged in operations. The whole casualties 
are not yet ascertained. Casualties of first division are a little over 
four hundred. Prince Yorhito is in excellent health ; Admiral Misu 
slightly wounded, May 27. 

"Fifth report, received the afternoon of May 30: 

"Loss of Osliabia, Navarin, confirmed. Sissoi-Veliki also defi- 
nitely reported to have sunk on the morning of May 28. 

"Official statement of Russian losses so far as ascertained : 
Following six battleships sunk : Prince Suvaroff, Imp er at or, Alex- 
ander III, Borodino, Osliabia, Sissoi-Valiki and Navarin. 

"Following five cruisers sunk: Admiral Nachimoif, Dimitri 
Donskoi, Vladimir, Monomach, Svletlana and Zemtchug. 

"Coast defence ship Admiral Ushakoff sunk. 

"Two special service ships, Kamchatka and three destroyers 
also sunk. 

"Two battleships, Orel and Imperator, Nicolai I; two coast 
defence ships, General Admiral Apraxine and Admiral Senyanvin, 
and one destroyer, Biedovoy, captured. 

"Thus Russians lost altogether twenty-two ships, the aggregate 

537 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR, 

tonnage whereof amounting to 153,411 tons, besides cruiser 'Almax, 
suspected to have sunk. 

"Later reports from the different divisions of the fleet engaged 
in the naval battle of May 27 show as follows : 

"The Russian battleship Oslabya was heavily damaged in the 
early part of the fight on Saturday, going 
Havoc Among down at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 

Battleships "The first Russian vessel sunk was the 

battleship Sissoi Veliky. 

"The armored cruisers Admiral Nakhimoff and Vladimir Mon- 
omach, after being in the general engagement during the daytime, 
were still further damaged by torpedoes during attacks by night, 
and were eventually completely disabled. They drifted into the 
vicinity of Tsu Islands, where they were discovered on Sunday 
morning, May 28, by the auxiliary cruisers Shilano, Yazvata, Tainan 
and Sado, which were about to capture them, but they all sank. 

"The crews of our auxiliary cruisers rescued 915 of the crew 
of the sunken Russian ships. 

"The battleship Navardn was torpedoed four times after sun- 
down on Saturday, May 27, and sunk. The survivors of the 
Navarin's crew confirm the story of her destruction. 

"The cruisers Niitaka and Otawa discovered the Russian cruiser 
Svietlana at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning in the vicinity of Chapp- 
yan Bay and immediately attacked and sunk her. The commander 
of the Niitaka reports the fact. 

"It is suspected that the Russian cruisers Almaz and Aurora 
were sunk by torpedoes on the night of May 27 

"The former report includes the statement that the Russian 
cruiser Jemtchug was sunk, but as yet this remains unconfirmed, and 
the cruiser's name has been excluded from the revised list of Rus- 
sian vessels destroyed. 

538 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"Judging from this and former reports, the enemy's mai» 
strength, consisting of eight battleships destroyed or captured, three 
armored cruisers and three coast defence ships destroyed or cap- 
tured, with the second-class cruisers and other vessels destroyed, the 
enemy's fighting power is thus annihilated. ; , 

"Later reports show that during the night of May 2j our 
torpedo boats, numbered 34, 35 and 69, were sunk by the enemy's 
fire. Comrades rescued the majority of their urews. Besides the 
above, there was no damage worth reporting. No warship nor 
destroyer suffered any loss of fighting or navigating power. 

"We anticipated a heavy loss of life, but find that our casualties 

were comparatively slight. They do not 

Searching Sea for exceed 800 killed and wounded. The cas- 

Remnants ualty reports will be rendered as speedily 

as possible in order to reassure families 
and friends. 

"Nearly the whole strength of both combatants met in battle, 
and the area of the fighting was very wide. 

"The first day proved foggy, and even without the smoke and 
fumes resulting from the battle it was impossible to see five miles. 
Consequently, during the day it was impossible to locate or observe 
all the ships under my command. Moreover, the fighting having 
lasted two days, and the ships of my command being scattered for 
the purpose of chasing and attacking the enemy, some having re- 
ceived special orders after the battle, it is impossible to collect and 
frame any detailed report covering the whole battle at the same 
time." 

Admiral Togo telegraphed, May 30, as follows : 

"The ships sent northward to search for Russian ships returned 
yesterday. The cruisers Iwate and Yakumo and other vessels sent 

539 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

southward to find Russian ships, returned to-day. They thoroughly 
searched the Shanghai course from Tsushima and vicinity, but on 
both sides found no trace of the Russians." , 

Admiral Shimamura, on board the cruiser Iwate, reports : 

"During the battle on May 27, at 3.07 P. M., the cruiser hvate 
vigorously attacked the protected cruiser Jemtchug at a distance of 
3,000 metres. The Jemtchug sank in one minute. The loss of the 
Jemtchug is, therefore, confirmed. 

"During the engagement fire broke out on the Jemtchug and 
smoke concealed the hull of the vessel. Consequently the remainder 
of our fleet were unable to see the ship." 

Admiral Togo gave this list of casualties, surprisingly small 
even to himself, for he had estimated his losses as 800 men. 

"The Japanese losses in the battle of the Sea of Japan were 113 
officers and men killed and 424 officers and men wounded. The 

completion of the revised list shows that 
Japan's Losses Only the losses were fewer than the original 

424 Men estimates. The flagship Mikasa was the 

heaviest loser, losing 63 killed and 
wounded. The losses were distributed among the ships of the fleet 
as follows: Mikasa, 63; Adzuma, 39; Shikishima, 37; Asashi, 31; 
Fuji, 28; Idzuma, 26; Nisshiii, 27; Otowa, 26; Kasaga, 26; Tsush- 
ima, 19 ; Asama, 15 ; Naniwa, 17 ; Tokiwa, 15 ; Yakumo, 1 1 ; Chitosc, 
6 ; Idzumi, 10 ; Kasuga, 9 ; Hashidate, 5 ; Niitaka, 4. 

The casualties on the destroyers and the torpedo boats were 87. 

Commander Togo was wounded on the Adzuma. 

Admiral Togo concluded his series of reports with this abso- 
lutely accurate statement of the ships that had escaped, in the main 
a remarkable feat, when the conditions of alternating fog and sun- 
shine and the natural confusion among the Russians is taken into 
account. 

540 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"The Russian vessels present in the recent battle which were not 
sunk or captured and which are unaccounted for are," Togo's report 
adds, "the protected cruisers Oleg, Aurora, Izumrud and Almas, 
three transports, two torpedo boat destroyers and one towboat. 
During the battle the Oleg and Aurora were within range of our 
third and fourth squadrons and were on fire. They may have 
escaped, but it will take time to restore their fighting power." 

A Japanese officer described the battle more connectedly in the 
following words : 

"At 5.30 Saturday morning a wireless message, reading, 'The 
enemy's squadron is in sight,' reached the naval base. This message 

was transmitted to all our ships by the 
Your Utmost for flagship, with instructions to get ready 

the Empire for action. Our squadron left their ren- 

dezvous and headed for the eastern chan- 
nel off Tsushima. Our men seemed to be filled with new inspiration, 
and were eager for the long-delayed fight to begin. 

"When Tsushima was sighted to the southwest the sea was 
rough and the torpedo boats were forced to run for the shelter of 
the island. Our third fighting squadron, with the Takashiho to port, 
reconnoitred the Russian course, and at 11.30 A. M. informed the 
main squadron by wireless telegraph that the Russian ships were 
passing into the east channel, whereupon our main squadron, chang- 
ing its course somewhat to the southward, came in sight of Okin- 
shima at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The third division arrived 
later and joined the main squadron. The first and second divisions, 
accompanied by the destroyer flotilla, changed to a westerly course, 
while the third division and the fourth destroyer flotilla headed 
slightly eastward. 

"During the manoeuvre the Russian flagship appeared to the 

S4i 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

southward, at 1.45 o'clock. The Russians steamed up in double col- 
umn. The fleet was numerous, but no living being was visible. The 
Russian ships seemed to be in good order. Our ships hoisted the 
flag of action, the Mikasa signaling: 'The defence of our empire 
depends upon this action. You are expected to do your utmost.' 
Our men seemed to silently weigh the significance of this signal. 

"Our first and second divisions turned to the Russians' star- 
board, while the third division kept in close touch with the preceding 

two divisions. With the Japanese ships 
Russian Line proceeding in this order, it was 2.13 

Enveloped o'clock when the Russians opened fire. 
The first two shots fell short of our line, 
and it was some minutes later before we commenced firing. Then 
the battle was on, with firing from both sides. Our destroyers kept 
on the port side of the main squadron, and in this formation we 
pressed the Russians against the coast of Kiushiu, and they were 
obliged to change their course to the east. 

"We so manoeuvred our ships as to have their bows parallel 
to the north side of the Russian line. The Mikasa, of our first 
division, which had been leading, changed to the rear of the line, 
while the Kasuga headed the line. The engagement now became 
very fierce. The Borodino was seen to be on fire. A little later the 
Russians headed west, and we changed our course accordingly. 
Five ships of our second division concentrated their fire on the 
Borodino. Our first division now began firing vigorously, proceed- 
ing parallel with the Russian line, and as we began to press against 
the head of the Russian line our third division veered to the Russian 
rear, thus enveloping their ships. 

"The engagement proceeded hotly. Our second division fol- 
lowed a course parallel with the northern side of the Russians, and 

542 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

this movement completed the envelopment. The Russian ships were 
seen trying to break through, and our destroyer flotilla intercepted 
their new course. This state of envelopment continued until the 
following day, with the ships at varying distances. Thus enclosed 
on all sides, the Russians were helpless and powerless to escape the 
circle, 

"Previous instructions had been given the destroyers and tor- 
pedo boats to attack the Russian ships. Following instructions, the 

fifth destroyer flotilla advanced against a 

Destroyers Took Last Russian ship, upon which the second 

Thrust. division had been concentrating its fire, 

signaling, 'We are going to give the last 

thrust at them/ 

"The Russian ship continued to fight, and seeing the approach- 
ing torpedo boats, directed its fire on them. Undaunted, our destroy- 
ers pressed forward, the Chitose meantime continuing its fire. The 
, torpedo flotilla arrived within 200 metres of the Russian ship and 
the Shiranus fired the first shot. Two other torpedo boats fired one 
each. The Shiranus received two shells, but the other boats were 
not damaged. The Russian ship was sunk. 

"Sundown saw the battle raging furiously. Our shells were 
evidently telling on the Russians, who showed signs of confusion. 
Our fifth torpedo flotilla, after destroying the Borodino, followed 
in the wake of our second division, the signal reading, 'Something 
like the Russians' submarines have been sighted. Attack them.' 

"The flotilla followed and located the object, which proved to 
be a sinking ship with its overturned bottom showing. Thirty sur- 
vivors clung to the wreck, crying for assistance. Firing ceased 
with the approach of darkness. 

543 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"According to orders previously given for a torpedo attack after 
dark, all the destroyer flotilla, dividing into two squadrons, pro- 
ceeded to attack the Russians during the whole night. The Russians 
frustrated the first and second attacks with searchlights. A third 
attempt was carefully made, and the Yugiri sank a ship of the 
Borodino type, and also hit others. During the night the Russians 
continued to move, and we preserved our enveloping movement 
some distance from the Russian position. The Russian ships headed 
northeast after daybreak, hoping to reach Vladivostok. Our officers 
and men were determined that not a ship should escape, and resolved 
not to relax their efforts until they had succeeded in either sinking 
or capturing every Russian ship. 

"Our ships always kept ahead of the Russians. The battle 
was resumed at 9 o'clock Sunday morning, twelve miles east of 
Chiyupyon Bay, and lasted all day. Here the Russians suffered 
their heaviest losses. They seemed unprepared to repel night attacks. 
During our first night attack the Russians showed nine searchlights 
and frustrated the attacks, but clearly gave us the location of the 
fleet, which brought success later." 

Still another version has been supplied by Japanese tars, as fol- 
lows : (^ 

"At dawn on Saturday our squadron left its rendezvous and 
advanced through the Tsushima Channel. At 2.08 in the afternoon 

we sighted the Russian fleet. Gradually 
As Sailors Saw closing in, we found the Kniaz Souvaroff 

the Battle leading the line, with the Borodino, the 
Alexander III, the Orel, the Osliabia and 
the Navarin following in the order named. The Nicolai I brought 
up the rear. Parallel to this line we observed five cruisers. After 
them came the special ships and torpedo boat destroyers. We counted 
thirty-two Russian ships in all. 

544 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

"Our fleet, with the battleship Mikasa leading, proceeded 
toward the Russians in vertical line formation. The Souvaroif 
opened fire first and then suddenly turned, reversing her course. 
Almost simultaneously the Mikasa opened fire with her big guns, 
and thus the curtain rose on the great sea battle. The hostile fleets 
gradually closed in toward each other, exchanging a vigorous fire. 
The armored cruiser Asama approached within 3,000 metres of the 
Russian fleet and carefully observed its action. 

"After a short but fierce fight the Admiral Oushakoff's deck 
was observed to be ablaze, and the ship left the line. By 4.30 in 
the afternoon the Russian line was disordered and its fire slackened. 
The Borodino and Kamchatka had been disabled and soon sank. 
The Borodino continued to fire bravely until the ship was submerged 

"The Japanese fleet continued to maintain enveloping positions 
from sundown until dawn. Sunday morning opened misty, but the 
weather soon cleared, and the search for the remnants of the Rus- 
sian fleet was begun. Five Russian ships were discovered in the 
vicinity of Liancourt Island, and they were immediately surrounded. 
One, supposed to be the Izumrud, escaped at full speed. The re- 
maining four offered no resistance, and hoisted the Japanese flag 
over the Russian colors, apparently offering to surrender. Captair 
Yashiro, commanding the Asama, started in a small boat to ascer- 
tain the real intentions of the Russians, when Admiral Nebogatoff 
lowered a boat and came on board the Asama, where he formally 
surrendered. The prisoners were distributed among the Japanese 
ships, and prize crews were selected to take possession of the cap- 
tured vessels." 

To have destroyed the Russian armada was, of itself, an amaz- 
ing feat ; but to have captured the commander-in-chief, and to have 

545 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

compelled the surrender of an admiral of 

The Capture of the line, add vastly to the glory of Togo. 

Rozhdestvensky The story of Rozhdestvensky's capture 

is dramatic. 
The destroyers, Kasumi, Usugnmo, Sazanami and Kagerou, 
were ordered to attack the Russian warships on the night of May 
27 and were steaming ahead when they suddenly encountered a 
number of Russian ships. The Kasumi narrowly avoided a collision 
with a Russian cruiser, the closeness of which seems to have saved 
the destroyers from being damaged by the heavy fire which the 
Russians directed on them. 

During the Russian attack the vessels forming the destroyer 
flotilla divided. The Sazanami and Kagerou continued the search 
for Russian ships throughout the night, and in the morning discov- 
ered two torpedo boat destroyers. One of them steamed away, but 
the other was unable to do so. On approaching the latter the Japan- 
ese discerned a white flag flying from the foremast and the Red 
Cross flag astern. She proved to be the Bedovi with Admiral Rozhd- 
estvensky and his staff on board. The Bedovi signalled that her 
engines were damaged, and that she was short of coal and water. 
An armed guard was sent on board the Bedovi to receive her sur- 
render. The Russians requested the Japanese not to remove Admiral 
Rozhdestvensky and the other officers on account of their wounds, 
and the Japanese complied, with the understanding that the guard 
would shoot Rozhdestvensky in the event of the delay leading to a 
meeting with Russian ships, thus running the danger of his recap- 
ture. The Sazanami ran a line to the Bedovi and began to wing her. 
The line parted twice. In the morning the Sazanami met the Japan- 
ess cruiser Akashi, which convoyed the two destroyers to Sasebo. 
During the trip the destroyers encountered heavy seas, and their 
decks were awash during part of the time. 

546 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Thirty naval commanders participated in the battle of the Japan 
Sea. Vice Admiral Togo was commander-in-chief, leading the 

first squadron. Vice Admiral Kamamura 
Chiefs of Japan's Fleet was \ n command of the second squadron, 

and Rear Admiral Kataoka led the third 
squadron. 

The chiefs of staff in the order named were Admiral Kato 
and Captains Fujii and Saito. The commanders of the squadron 
divisions were Vice Admirals Dewa, Uriu and Mitsu, acting as rear 
admirals under Vice Admiral Togo, Captains Yamada, Shimamura, 
Taketomi and Kokura. 

The fate of the cruiser Izumrnd is a chapter of itself in the 
story of the battle. Baron Ferzen, her captain, with survivors of the 

ship's crew, reached Vladivostok on June 

Blowing Up the i and sent a report, which, in addition to 

Izumrud confirming the disaster to the entire fleet, 

told the fate of his own ship. The Baron 
reported that before dark, on May 27, the Osliabya, Alexander III 
and Borodino had been sunk, and the Knias Souvaroff, the Kamt- 
chatka and the Urel had been seriously damaged and were lost to 
sight. The command then devolved on Rear Admiral Nebogatoff. 

In the evening the Nikolai I, the Orel, the General Admiral 
Apraxine, the Admiral Seniavin, the Admiral Oughakoff, 
the Sissoi Veliky, the Nevarin, the Admiral Nakhimoff, and the 
Izumrud sailed northeastward, the latter being charged to transmit 
orders to the battleships. Two other cruisers were cut off from the 
fleet and were not again seen. 

The battleships, steaming at fourteen knots, were repeatedly 
attacked by the Japanese torpedo boats, especially at the extremities 
of the line. 

547 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

At dawn it was ascertained that the battleship division con- 
sisted of the Nikolai I, the Orel, the General Admiral Apraxine and 
the Admiral Seniavin. ~) 

At sunrise, May 28, smoke from the Japanese ships reappeared 
on the horizon, whereupon the admiral gave orders for increased 
speed. The Admiral Seniavin and the General Admiral Apraxine 
dropped behind. 

Toward 10 o'clock, the Japanese fleet appeared first to port and 
then to starboard, while the cruiser division manoeuvred behind the 

Russians to starboard. Baron Ferzen's 
Flight Ends in Disaster account continues : 

"I was cut off from the squadron and 
finding it impossible to rejoin it resolved to make for Vladivostok. 
I put on full speed and the enemy's cruisers came on in pursuit. 
Owing to the insufficiency of my coal supply and the certainty of 
meeting the enemy's cruisers, I subsequently altered my course for 
Vladimir Bay, where I arrived on the night of May 29. At 1.30 
o'clock next morning, in pitch darkness, the Izumrud ran full on a 
reef at the entrance of the bay. Having only ten tons of coal and 
seeing that it would be impossible to again float my vessel, I ordered 
the crew ashore and blew up the Izumrud to prevent her falling into 
the hands of the enemy. Ten of my sailors were wounded in the 
battle, but the officers and the rest of the crew are all safe." 

Intimations of the extent of the disaster first reached Russia 
through foreign telegrams. The emperor and naval officials hoped 

against hope that their own advices would 
The News Reaches bring some ray of comfort. It was hoped 

Russia that a portion of the fleet might reach 

Vladivostok strong enough to aid in pro- 
tecting the fortress against attack from the sea. 

548 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

One unprotected cruiser and three torpedo boat destroyers were 
all of the splendid fleet that ever were to reach Vladivostok. The 
cruiser Almaz, which by reason of her lack of protective sheathing 
had been ordered by Rozhdestvensky to flee in event of battle, got 
through the Japanese lines with a minimum of damage, though well 
scarred by shots that had reached her by chance. Captain Chagir, 
her commander, speedily communicated with the emperor at St. 
Petersburg through Lieutenant General Linevitch, commander-in- 
chief in the Far East. This was the message : 

"The cruiser Almaz has arrived at Vladivostok. Her com- 
mander reports as follows : 

" 'On May 27, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky's fleet in the Tsu 
Strait engaged the Japanese in battle. During the day we lost the 
battleships Kniaz Soiwaroff, Borodino, Osliabya, and the cruiser 
Ural. The battleship Alexander ///was seriously damaged at the 
start of the battle. 

" 'After the separation of the cruiser Almaz from the fleet the 
battle was renewed in the darkness. The result of the night battle is 
not known/ " 

The Almaz was cut off from the fleet and reached Vladivostok. 
"Supplementary reports of the commander of the Almaz, for- 
warded by the post commandant at Vladivostok, state that the 
transport Kamtchatka was seriously damaged." 

"The Almaz had Lieutenant Mochalin and four sailors killed 
and ten sailors wounded. There is no news as to those who were 
saved or those who perished on the sunken warships." 

The arrival of the Almaz has thus been described by an eye 
witness at Vladivostok: 

The Almaz, which arrived at her anchorage here Monday even- 
ing, May 29, bore scars of the battle. Her mizzen mast was shot 

549 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

away, and one of her smokestacks was pierced by a cannon shot 
But the Grozny, though engaged for several hours in a running 
fight at short range with a large Japanese destroyer, showed no signs 
of the fray. After her commander, Captain Andriffski, had been 
wounded, and an officer and three men had been killed, the Grozny 
succeeded in sinking her opponent with a luckily placed shot, and 
reached Vladivostok without further adventure. 

For two days Vladivostok had been buzzing with rumor and 
excitement. The fact that a battle between the rival fleets was 
imminent, if Rozhdestvensky was not already at hand-grips with 
Togo, was made known through telegrams from Europe, and when 
it was learned Monday morning that a Russian cruiser had been 
sighted off Askold Island, headed for the harbor, the city was filled 
with the wildest reports of every nature. 

The inhabitants clustered in the streets, thronged the waterside 
or climbed the frowning hills overlooking the harbor for a better 

view. Finally, toward 6 o'clock in the 
Story of Russian evening, a graceful cruiser with two 

Survivors snowy-white stacks, shot in view at the 

entrance to the Golden Horn and rounded 
to an anchorage beneath the bristling guns of the curving promon- 
tory. From afar the broken stump of her mizzen-mast and a shot 
hole showing black upon the white paint of one stack indicated that 
the cruiser had encountered the Japanese. As the anchor chain rat- 
tled in the hawse holes the vessel wreathed itself in smoke — it was 
an admiral's salute in honor of Rear Admiral Von Jessen. Scarcely 
had the boom of the last cannon begun to echo from the surrounding 
hills when Von Jessen's flagship, the cruiser Rossia, answered the 
salute, and a minute later the guns of the fortress took up the can- 
nonade. 

550 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

Excitement beyond description seized the thronging spectators, 
who, with frantic "huzzas," tossed high their caps. 

Citizens embraced each other and danced jubilantly upon the 
pier, while the crews of the ships in the harbor joined in wild 
cheering. 

In a thrice the boats were dropped from the davits, and in a 
moment the officers of the cruisers and torpedo boats in the harbor 
and the military officials from the fortress were swarming on board 
the Almas to learn news of the fight. 

The story was short. According to the officers of the Almas, 
the fleet under Rozhdestvensky met the Japanese in the Straits of 

Korea near Tsu Island, and the opposing 
Saw Flagship fl ee t s immediately closed in. 

Go Down Being lightly armored, the Almas, as 

had been expected by Admiral Rozhdest- 
vensky before the battle, separated itself from the main fleet at the 
first opportunity and headed for Vladivostok soon after the com- 
mencement of the action, but not too soon to observe that the losses 
on both sides in the titanic combat were great. 

Early in the battle an officer of the Almas, while watching 
Rozhdestvensky's flagship, the battleship Knias Souvaroif, for a sig- 
nal, saw the flagship shudder from stem to stern, as if under a blow 
from a gigantic hammer, and hesitate in hei course, while the waves 
rose high from her armored sides. Then she commenced to list 
and sink. 

The officers believe that the debut of the submarine boat as an 
effective agent in naval warfare, or perhaps a large mine caused the 
disaster to the Knias Souvaroif. The damage, however, was so 
extensive that the flagship soon went down, leaving the deck officers 
and many of the crew struggling in the waves. 

5Si 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

One of the Russian torpedo boats, either the destroyer Buiny 
or the Bravi, ran in and picked up a number of the swimmers, one 
of whom was recognized through a glass as Admiral Rozhdest- 
vensky. 

Under a grueling attack by the Japanese warships, aided by 
torpedo boats, mines and submarines, the Borodino, Osliabia and 
Ural were placed out of action and followed the flagship to the 
bottom. 

The fog, which had raised and lowered intermittently during 
the morning, began to settle down again, and the distance of the 
Almaz, which now succeeded in disengaging herself in the combat 
from the struggling ships, made it difficult for her to see clearly. 

The arrival of the Grozny on the following day was marked by 
the same scenes of excitement as those which characterized the 
advent of the Almaz. The wounded commander of the destroyer, 
Captain Andriffski, confirmed the details given by the officers of the 
Almaz. He described his combat as a running fight, in which the 
Grozny was engaged for several hours, finally sinking the pursuing 
Japanese destroyer. 

From this and further fragmentary reports the Russians pieced 
together a story of the disaster. They figure that Admiral Togo, 

with his main squadron, must have lain 
Russian Story of somewhere off the coast of Korea, while 

Disaster Admirals Kamimura and Uriu held their 
squadrons further north to head off the 
Russian vessels which might get through Togo's lines or be pre- 
pared to bar the entrance to the Straits of Tsugaru in case the Rus- 
sians should be reported moving up the east coast of Japan. When 
Togo's scouts reported that Admiral Rozhdestvensky was heading 
for the eastern channel of the Straits of Korea the Japanese Admiral 

552 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

steamed around the northern part of the Tsu Islands, and came upon 
the Russians steaming in double column, with the cruisers to port. 

Togo enjoyed the great advantage of tactical position when he 
opened fire, having the lightest of the Russian ships between him 
and Rozhdestvensky's heavier vessels, thus smothering the fire of 
the latter. Besides, Togo was able to use all his broadsides, whereas 
the sternmost ships of the Russian columns, coming on in line ahead 
formation, could probably only with difficulty use any guns at all. 

When Sunday morning came the Russian fleet was divided. 
The faster and stronger division, under Rozhdestvensky, was met 
by Kamimura and Uriu, while the slower division, under Neboga- 
toff, renewed the fight with Togo. With some, of the scattered 
Russian units it was a case of save himself who can. In the running 
fight the Japanese enjoyed the advantage of superior speed, enabling 
them to concentrate their fire and bring every crippled Russian ship 
to bay. Admiral Nebogatoff's battered remnant surrendered off 
Liancourt Rocks, while Rozhdestvensky, with the best remaining 
battleships, fought on for the honor of the Russian navy. 

Torpedo attacks were the feature of the Japanese program, 
which more surely than anything else brought disaster. Torpedo 
boats in night attacks launched their deadly missiles within a hun- 
dred yards of ,their Russian targets. They completely encircled 
the Russian ships, swarming like angry hornets. Much of the sweep- 
ing character of the victory will ultimately be traced to these com- 
paratively tiny craft, fighting under the shower of shells being hurled 
from the big guns of the battleships and cruisers far away. 

Summarizing scattered reports, the results of the battle may be 
accurately stated to be annihilation for Russian sea power in the 
Far East. Thirty-seven Russian warships of all classes entered 
the Korean Straits. Of these, three, a cruiser, and two destroyers, 

553 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

reached Vladivostok; three armored cruisers reached Manila; two 
battleships and two coast defence ships were captured and were 
taken to Sasebo ; one destroyer, found helpless at sea, was towed to 
Shanghai ; leaving a total of twenty-six ships that were sent to the 
bottom, five of them battleships. The Russian loss in life reached 
a total of 6,500 men, one admiral and ten captains among them. 
The loss to Russia in gold amounted to $75,000,000. Japan's loss 
in ships was three torpedo boats and a few more than 400 men. 
Experts the world around failed to find adequate explanation for 
this amazing disparity. As summarized at Tokio, these are reasons 
which in part contributed to Admiral Rozhdestvensky's defeat: 

"First. An . imperfect reconnoissance and incomplete, faulty 
and misleading intelligence. 

"Second. An imperfect battle forma- 
Why the Russians tion, which indicated that Rozhdestvensky 

Were Defeated did not expect to meet Togo off Tsushima. 
"Third. The weather, the direction of 
the wind and the sunlight were unfavorable to the Russians, Togo 
having the sun behind him and firing with the wind, while the 
Russians had the sunlight in their eyes and fired against the wind. 

"Fourth. The Russians wasted their ammunition and event- 
ually their supply ran short. It is believed that the surrender of 
Nebogatoff was necessary because his ammunition had been ex- 
pended. 

"Fifth. The marked inferiority of the Russian gunnery." 

Japan hailed Togo as the nation's hero. A popular subscription 

will raise to him a giant lighthouse on 

Japan Honors Togo lofty Tsu Island, commanding the sea 

for a radius of eighty miles, the area 
through which the battle was waged. 

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CHAPTER XX. 

Aftermath of the Victory of the Sea of Japan— The World Hopes that Peace 
Will Result— The President of the United States Takes the Initial Step- 
Meantime the Japanese Decline an Armistice — Operations Begun for the 
Seizure of Saghalien Island— Japanese Landing Parties Successful— Rus- 
sians Continue Flight After Series of Conflicts— Japanese Take Chief Town 
of Island, Alexandrovsk, July 25 — Flight of Russians and Pursuit Con- 
tinued — Governor of Island and Remainder of Garrison Surrender to 
Japanese, July 30 — Russia and Japan Accept President's Proposal to Meet 
and Discuss Terms of Peace — America Chosen as Scene of Meeting — 
Envoys Named — Portsmouth, N. H., Selected as Scene of Meeting — Russian 
and Japanese Envoys Formally Received by the President at Oyster Bay, 
August 5 — Sessions of Peace Conference Begin at Portsmouth, August 9-- 
Conference Adjourns Without Achievement, August 18 — President Begins 
Effort to Effect Compromise, August 19 — Japan Withdraws Demand for 
Indemnity and Other Demands on Which There Had Been a Deadlock, 
August 29 — Announcement Made That Peace is Assured — Work of Draft- 
ing Treaty Begun — Peace Treaty Signed — The Treaty of Peace. 

WAVE of awe went 'round the word when the full effects 
«?7%* of the Battle of the Sea of Japan were realized. Russia 
/ ■' Wl stood before the world in the light of a thoroughly van- 

quished nation. On land her armies had been invariably- 
defeated in a series of battles of stupendous magnitude. Her 
original Asiatic fleet had been annihilated. Her last great effort to 
stem the victories of Japan, the sending of a vast Armada to the 
Orient, had resulted in complete annihilation of that fleet. The 
nations forgot to grieve for the thousands slain in the hope that 
this last crowning disaster to Russia would bring what every civil- 

557 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

zed land had desired for months — an end to the titanic war. 

While this was the universal wish it remained for the Presi- 
dent -of the United States to take the 
President Takes initiative. The fact that, with the ex- 

Initiative ception of a minor campaign for the pos- 

session of the Island of Saghalien, off 
he Siberian coast, this was really the closing chapter of the war, 
las added a brilliant feat to the annals of American diplomatic 
achievements and has placed the name of Theodore Roosevelt 
eternally among those of the famous benefactors of humanity. 

As has been said, one minor martial enterprise remained for 
the Japanese. Saghalien Island, blanketing the coasts of Siberia for 
a distance of 700 miles, had been secured by Russia from Japan 
by a treaty partaking, it was claimed by the Japanese, the nature of 
a coercive measure. Among the objects for which the Japanese 
had entered upon the war were to secure permanent fishing rights 
in the waters along the Siberian coast and the recession of Sag- 
halien Island to her. The seizure of this Island, too, was a neces- 
sary corollary of a land and sea campaign against Vladivostock, 
which would have been the next step in her military campaign had 
not the war come to an end. There was little surprise, therefore, 
when the Tokio government, while giving consent to a proposal 
that the belligerent nations meet to talk of peace, refused to con- 
sent to an armistice. Possession of Saghalien Island was still to 
be gained. The Japanese campaign began when a landing was 

effected on the East coast of the Island 

Japanese Take on July 8. The Russian garrison num- 

Saghalien bered 8,000 men and while there were 

defensive works of some strength at a 

558 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

number of points, the defenders were helpless before the advance 
of the invaders. The campaign amounted to a half dozen engage- 
ments, mere skirmishes, when compared with the battles of the 
Manchurian campaign. The Russians made a brave defence, but 
lost position after position and the subjugation of the Island was 
completed on July 30, when the Russian Governor and 3,500 men" 
surrendered "in the name of humanity." Five days previously the 
Japanese had occupied Alexandrovsk, the chief town of the Island 
and co-operative naval forces were disposed so that the escape of 
the garrison from the Island to the mainland was impossible. The 
slaughter of the entire force of the defenders could have been the 
only result of continued resistance. The Japanese announced the 
organization of a civil administration of the Island the moment 
the surrender had been completed, and were thus in possession of 
what was actuallyRussian territory. This fact was important to 
the Japanese from several standpoints. The Island is rich in min- 
erals, it is the centre of the vast fishing industry of the North 
Pacific and has strategic value on account of its position with re- 
gard to the entire Siberian littoral. More important than any of 
these circumstances, however, was the fact that it had been soil 
over which flew the Russian flag. The Japanese contemplated 
making a demand for indemnity at the forthcoming peace confer- 
ence. Precedent demanded that there should have been the occupa- 
tion of territory to make valid such a claim. The occupation of 
Saghalien gave this necessary basis for the indemnity demand 
which, ultimately was presented and only withdrawn when it became 
apparent that the war must go on unless Japan withdrew her claim. 

But the conquest of Saghalien marked the last of actual war- 
fare between Japan and Russia. President Roosevelt had sent an 

559 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

identical note to Japan and Russia on June 8, calling" upon each, in 
the name of humanity, to meet to discuss terms of peace and the 
whole Saghalien campaign .had gone on while, following this re- 
quest, diplomatic machinery had been slowly at work preparing the 
way for the peace conference. The rest of the story of the Japan- 
Russia War has to do with the events which finally called perma- 
nent truce to the long struggle and caused a million fighting men 
and their auxiliaries to turn their faces from the rugged plains of 
Manchuria, where thousands on thousands had given their lives 
for their Emperors and their Fatherlands. 

Russia's acceptance of the President's invitation reached Wash- 
ington on June 12, two days after Japan had announced her as- 
sent. A ripple was caused by difficulty 
Preparing for in choosing a place for the meeting. 

Peace Parleys Russia preferred an European capital. 
j Japan would not consent to any that 

could be named. Russia ultimately yielded the point, and on June 
15, with the consent of both of the belligerents, Washington was 
named, and a day within the first ten days of August was accepted 
for the assembling of the envoys. The Czar named Sergius Witte, 
greatest statesman of the Empire, to head the peace delegation, with 
Baron Rosen, Russian ambassador at Washington, as his associate. 
The Mikado named Baron Komura as chief of the Japanese dele 
gation, and as his associate, Mr. Takahira, Japanese Minister to 
the United States. Accompanying each was a suite of a dozen 
secretarys, legal and military experts and interpreters. On July 
11, the President named Portsmouth, N. H., Navy Yard as the 
actual place of meeting. It was feared that Washington, under the 
torrid conditions usually prevailing there in mid-summer, would 

56o 



TMM JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

prove a too uncomfortable place for the guests of the nation to 
spend the weeks that must necessarily be consumed in the negotia- 
tions. The Japanese envoys and their suite reached New York on 
July 25. M. Witte, the chief Russian envoy, arrived in New York 
with his suite on August 2, and was joined by Baron Rosen, his 
associate. Both the Japanese and the Russian delegations were in- 
formally presented to the President at his summer home at Oyster 
Bay, N. Y., prior to the formal reception of the two peace missions 
which took place on the President's yacht, the Mayflower, in Oyster 
Bay on August 5. The President, in a toast to which no reply was 
given, expressed the hope that a "just and lasting peace" might 
be arranged. The envoys and their suites were conveyed in war- 
ships to Portsmouth, reaching that city on August 7. The envoys 
were formally welcomed by United States officials and the Gov- 
enor of the State of New Hampshire. The Hotel Wentworth, on 
an island off the mainland was made their place of residence. The 
newly constructed general stores building in the Navy Yard, which 
had been elaborately fitted up with every possible convenience, was 
designated as the scene of the sessions. 

The first meeting of the envoys was held on August 9. The 
Japanese terms were presented in twelve sections, as follows : 

I. Recognition of Japan's "preponder- 
The Japanese ating influence" in Korea. 

Terms II. Mutual obligations to evacuate 

Manchuria, Russia to retrocede to China 
all special privileges. 

III. Japanese obligations to restore the sovereignty and admin- 
istration of China in Manchuria. 

IV. Mutual obligations to respect the territorial and admin- 

56i 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

istrative integrity of China and the principle of the "open door." 

V. The cession of the Island of Saghalien. 

VI. The surrender of the Russian leases in the Liaotung 
Peninsula, including Port Arthur, Dalny and the Blonde and Elliott 
Islands. 

VII. The cession of the branch of the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
road from Harbin southward. 

VIII. The retention by Russia of that portion of the railroad 
line through northern Manchuria connecting the Transsiberian road 
with Vladivostock. 

IX. The reimbursement of Japan for the war — commonly 
spoken of as the indemnity. 

X. The surrender of Russian warships which have been in- 
terned in neutral ports during the war. 

XI. The limitation of Russia's naval forces in the Pacific. 

XII. The question of fishing rights of Russia and Japan off 
the Siberian coast. 

These demands, one by one, were discussed by the envoys. 
It developed that Russia absolutely refused to grant an indemnity, 
to surrender warships interned in Chinese and American ports, 
or to cede to Japan the Island of Saghalien. Whatever hope of 
compromise there seemed to be with regard to the other questions 
at issue it was regarded as absolutely essential to the signing of a 
treaty of peace that Russia should yield on the subject of indemnity. 
The President's efforts were directed toward accomplishing this re- 
sult under some other name than indemnity. It was proposed to 
arrange for the payment of the amount demanded as a purchase 
price for Saghalien, or for the railway rights over which Japan had 
become master. No compromise would be listened to by the r 

563 



THE JAPAN-kttS&A WAR. 

"Not a kopeck for indemnity/' was the phrase of M. Witte, and 
there was no yielding. By shrewd diplomatic manoeuvring the 
Russian envoy had placed Japan in a position which meant that 
were the war to be continued it would be upon the responsibility 
of Japan and for the sole reason that money must be had. The 
Tokio government, after long discussion, decided upon a magnani- 
mous course, which at once won the encomiums of the whole civil- 
ized world. She yielded every point in dispute, gave up her demand 

for indemnity, gave up half of Saghalien, 
Japan Makes gave up her claim upon the in- 

Peace Possible terned warships and, though tri- 

umphantly victorious in every step of 
the war, accepted terms of peace dictated by the nation 
she had conquered, and this "in the name of humanity." 
Russia had won the victory on the face of it, but the historian will 
credit to Japan the greater and the real victory, a victory of vast 
moral and humanitarian significance. 

The glad news went out to the world on August 29, that the 
envoys had agreed upon every point and that a treaty of peace would 
forthwith be drafted. To Prof. Maartens, the famous authority 
of international law and to Mr. Dennison, an American, long an 
adviser of the Japanese Foreign Office, was assigned the task of 
actually drafting the treaty in accord with the general agreement 
that had been reached by the envoys. Their work was speedily 
accomplished and the "Treaty of Portsmouth" brought to an end 
this struggle that had cost hundreds of thousands of lives, billions 
of dollars and had completely changed the status of political power 
in the Far East. 

5^3 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

The treaty of peace was finally signed at Portsmouth, N. H., 
on September 5, 1905 ; Sergius Witte and Baron Rosen signed for 
Russia, while Baron Komura and Mr. Takahira signed for Japan. 
It was signed by the Emperors of Russia and Japan and made public 
October 16, 1905. 

TEXT OF THE TREATY. 

The text of the treaty is as follows: 

The Emperor of Japan, on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Rus- 
sias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace 
to their countries, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for 
this purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Impe- 
rial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Ex- 
cellency, Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Min- 
ister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias 
his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron 
Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Am- 
bassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, 
which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following- 
articles : 

ARTICLE I. 

There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the 
Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their re- 
spective States and subjects. 

ARTICLE II. 

The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in 
Korea paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither 
to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control 
which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. 
It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly 
the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is 
to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens 
of the most favored nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes 
of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Rus- 
sian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the 
security of Russian or Korean territory. 

ARTICLE III. 

Japan and Russia mutually engage: 

564 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

First. — To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the 
territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with 
the provisions of the additional article i annexed to this treaty, and, 

Second. — To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administra- 
tion of China all the portions of Manchuria now in occupation, or under the 
control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory 
above mentioned. 

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria 
any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the im- 
pairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal 
opportunity. 

ARTICLE IV. 

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general meas- 
ures common to all countries which China may take for the development of 
the commerce or industry of Manchuria. 

ARTICLE V. 

The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial 
Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease 
of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territory and territorial waters, and 
all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such 
lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan 
all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-men- 
tioned lease. 

The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the 
Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. 

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the propri- 
etary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be per- 
fectly respected. 

ARTICLE VI. 

The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the 
Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of 
the Chinese Government, the railway between Changchunfu and Kuanchangtsu 
and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges 
and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal 
mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. 
The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the 
Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. 

ARTICLE VII. 

Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria 
exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic 

565 



tttU JAPAM-RUSSiA war. 

purposes. It is understood that this restriction does not apply to the railway 
in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. 

ARTICLE VIII. 

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote 
and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a sep- 
arate convention for the regulation 01 their connecting railway services in 
Manchuria. 

ARTICLE IX. 

The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of 
Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island 
of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and prop- 
erties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latituude is adopted as the north- 
ern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory 
shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional ar- 
ticle II annexed to this treaty. 

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective pos- 
sessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or 
other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any 
military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La 
Perouse and the Strait of Tartary. 

ARTICLE X. 

It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to 
Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer 
to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained and protected in the 
full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submit- 
ting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to 
withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any 
inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She en- 
gages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully 
respected. 

ARTICLE XL 

Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects 
rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Ok- 
hotsk and Bering Seas. 

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already 
belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions. 

ARTICLE XII. 

The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having 
been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia en- 
gage to adopt as a bisis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion 

566 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAK. 

•f a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which 
was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment 
on the footing of the most favored nation, in which are included import and 
export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission 
and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories 
of the other. 

ARTICLE XIII. 

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners 
of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan 
and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the 
prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered 
to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly 
authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient 
ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance 
to the commissioner of the receiving State. 

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon 
as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement 
of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and main- 
tenance of the prisoners from the date of capture or surrender and up to the 
t'me of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay to Japan as soon as pos- 
sible after the exchange of statement as above porvided the difference be- 
tween the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount sim- 
ilarly disbursed by Russia. 

ARTICLE XIV. 

The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of 
Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as 
little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date 
of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments 
of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and 
the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date 
of the latter of such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into 
full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washing- 
ton as soon as possible. 

ARTICLE XV. 

The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and 
French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a 
discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail. 

SUB-ARTICLES. 

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of 
peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries 
have concluded the following additional articles: 

567 



JAN 13 1906 



THE JAPAN-RUSSIA WAR. 

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE III. 

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to com- 
mence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria 
simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, 
and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two 
countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the 
leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries 
occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn. 

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain 
guards to portect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of 
such guards shall not exceed fifteen ytr kilometre and within that maximum 
number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by com- 
mon accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible 
while having in view the actual requirements. 

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall 
agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles 
and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evac- 
uation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of eigh- 
teen months. 

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE IX. 

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee 
of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed 
respectively by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark 
in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian 
possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far 
as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north 
latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at 
any points are found to be necessary Compensation will be made by correlative 
deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to 
prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the ces- 
sion, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the 
boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be sub- 
ject to the approval of the high contracting parties. 

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the rat- 
ification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed. 

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed 
seals to the present treaty of peace. 

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of 
the thirty-eighth year of the Meijei, corresponding to the twenty-third day of 
August, one thousand nine hundred and five. (September 5, 1005.) 



568 



THE 



Japan- Russia War 



An Illustrated History of 
the War in the Far East 



The Greatest Conflict of 
Modern Times 



=BY= 



SYDNEY TYLER 

War Correspondent and Author of 

u The Spanish War," "The War in South Africa," Etc., Etc. 



Illustrated by Photographs and Drawings 
Made by Eye-Witnesses 



P. W. ZIEGLER CO. 

PHILADELPHIA 



51 

Tq 



LIBRARY of CONGRESS 

Two Cooies Received 

UAN 13 1906 

Copyrljht Entry 
CLASS 
I COP Y E 



CeprritH 1909, 

by 

D. W. CASKEY, Jr. 







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